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Central to my analysis of Woolf's work are five novels: Jacob's 
Room, Mrs. Dalloway, To the Lighthouse, Orlando, The Waves. These are 
written in pursuit of Woolf's modernist project, but as I shall argue 
below, her modernism was at the same time a feminist subversion of 
conventions, and I will analyze the ways in which Woolf actually effects 
this fusion of her concerns in her texts. I will concentrate on her 
fiction in this thesis, an area of her work that has been, surprisingly, 
comparatively underemphasized in the recent, intense revival of interest 
in Woolf. Directed towards her centenary in 1982, the revival has at its 
centre a 'family' industry which includes Quentin Bell's biography, the 
publication of Woolf's innumerable letters and diaries, and previously 
unpublished material. As a consequence of this extensive, new access to 
Woolf's personal life, there has flourished a biographical and psycho- 
analytical criticism, but this latter has tended to focus on her actual 
mental illness rather than the possibilities of new readings of her 
texts, a relative neglect which this thesis hopes, to a degree, to 
remedy. The linkage of psychoanalysis and Woolf is not an arbitrary one, 
since the Hogarth Press has been Freud's English publisher since 1921. 
Leonard himself reviewed Freud's Psychopathology of Everyday Life. 
Though she was never treated by Freudian psychoanalysts, Woolf did meet 
Freud when he took refuge in England just before the war. It is not 
until towards the end of the 1930s that we can be certain, from the 
entries in her diary and her reading notebooks, that Woolf was actually 
reading Freud. 
' Yet we can sense the great impact of Freudian psycho- 
analysis in her references to 'our psychoanalytical age'(CE II 142). She 
wrote a review called 'Freudian Fiction', in which she showed her 
dissatisfaction, not with Freud's own discoveries, nor with the principle 
of their use in fiction, but with the way a particular novelist 
(J. D. Beresford) had done so: 'It simplifies rather than complicates, 
detracts rather enriches'(CW, 154). 1 shall seek to heed this caveat in 
iii 
the studies that follow. 
Contemporary feminism has, since the seventies, given impetus to 
this prodigious revival of interest in Woolf; its recent major emphasis 
has been the re-assessment of Woolf as a radical political thinker. 
Feminist assessments of Woolf's aesthetics (E. Showalter, Sidney Jane 
Kaplan)2 have often been on the whole negative, fundamentally continuous 
with the criticism of her by the politically committed writers of the 
1930's or of Scrutiny: Virginia Woolf as hypersensitive, as a sheltered 
invalid lady unable to cope with a harsh 'reality'. A pioneer book by 
Herbert Marder in 1968 stressed the crucial importance of feminism in 
Woolf's art: 'far from being a mere excrescence on her work, feminism... 
is essential to her conception of reality. 
3 But the major shift in 
evaluation was initiated by American feminists around Jane Marcus, who 
aim to revolutionize the commonly accepted accounts of Woolf by 
emphasizing the political dimensions of her writing. 
4 These recent books 
and articles have valuably uncovered previously unknown or repressed 
aspects of Woolf, which offer the possibility of a new and fuller 
comprehension of her literary endeavours. Yet, because these works are 
eager to dispel the old image of ethereal aestheticism, they tend to 
eschew fullscale dealings with Woolf's formal experimentation, that 
series of works from Jacob's Room to The Waves which have conventionally 
been regarded as quintessentially Woolfian, which have supported the 
image of her work as beautiful, pure artefact, subjectivistic and 
hypersensitive. What is needed now is to radicalize the reading of 
precisely these novels and of the aesthetic behind them, and I have 
sought to bring the resources of contemporary critical and psychoanalytic 
theories upon them, stressing those aspects of theory which seem to me 
most germane and illuminating for each particular novel. 
I shall argue that Woolf's series of major experimental works, which 
are traditionally assigned to a gender-free category of 'modernism', can 
iv 
be interpreted as a quest for what she refers to as a 'woman's sentence' 
that would allow 'a woman [to] write exactly as she wishes to write', 
5 
and what I refer to, in my title and throughout this thesis, as 'feminine 
writing'. Both modernism and literary feminism - projects which, as I 
shall suggest below, are uniquely conjoined in Woolf - are a questioning 
of a previously dominant mode of writing, and the crisis-of narrative 
that they represent is also a crisis of the self. Lacanian psycho- 
analysis illuminates this crisis of the subject by bringing Freud's work 
into relation with structuralist theories of language, and allows us to 
define feminine writing as a concern which addresses itself to the 
position of mastery maintained in the order of discourse. The 'feminine' 
can then be seen as the subversion of a mastery guaranteed by the 
'Cartesian' subject or self which also sustains the narrative conventions 
that Woolf's experimental novels so effectively interrogate. Far from 
being a flight from social commitment into an arcane modernism, her 
experimental texts can, I shall argue, best be seen as a feminist 
subversion of the deepest formal principles - of the definitions of 
narrative, writing, the self - of a patriarchal social order. 
I would like to thank Dr. John Rignall for his valuable supervision 
and kind, patient support during the long and sometimes troubled years of 
my research; without him this thesis would never have been completed. 
And I should like to thank my husband, Tony Pinkney, for cycling into the 
gale. 
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CHAPTER 1: Feminism and Modernism in Woolf 
Virginia Woolf's essay 'Modern Novels', which under its later title 
'Modern Fiction' became so famous as a manifesto of literary modernisml 
and which constitutes the prelude to Woolf's own most distinctive 
artistic achievement, was not a sudden revolutionary argument with no 
wider literary context. By the time of its publication in the Times 
Literary Supplement in April 1919, four volumes of Dorothy Richardson's 
Pilgrimage had been published (Woolf reviewed the fourth of these, The 
Tunnel, in February 1919) and James Joyce's Ulysses had appeared in 
instalments in The Little Review. In the same periodical, one year 
before Woolf's 'Modern Novels', May Sinclair had published a full 
explication and assessment of Dorothy Richardson's novels, using, 
probably for the first time in a literary context, the term 'stream-of- 
consciousness'; it is known that Woolf read this and made notes from it 
for her own essay. 
2 In Some Contemporary Novelists (Women) published in 
1920, R. Brimley Johnson discussed an emerging trend among the female 
novelists of the early twentieth century: '[She] has abandoned the old 
realism... She is seeking, with passionate determination, for that Reality 
which is behind the material, the things that matter, spiritual things, 
ultimate Truth. And here she finds man an outsider, wilfully blind, 
purposely indifferent'. 
3 It is not clear if Brimley Johnson had read 
Woolf's 'Modern . Novels', but clearly his account of this 'New Realism' 
which searches for a new vision or Truth behind the veil of masculine 
materialism and of which Richardson is the foremost practitioner shows a 
strong affinity with Woolf's own demand for a new literature. But for 
Woolf herself at this stage, this new literary vision pertains to a new 
generation; it is not gender-specific. She periodizes literary history by 
the reign of monarchs - spiritual Georgians against crassly materialistic 
Edwardians - not by the difference between sexes. 
The literary transformations around 1920 have more recently been 
connected by Elaine Showalter to the rise of 'a female aesthetic': a new 
2 
consciousness which 'reversed the orthodox argument that women have 
limited experience by defining reality as subjective'. 'Novels written 
by early twentieth century women were', she continues, 'anti-male, both 
in the sense that they attacked "male" technology, law, and politics, and 
4 that they belittle masculine morality'. Certainly Dorothy Richardson 
had emphatically defined her aesthetic as feminine in the foreword she 
wrote in 1938 to Pilgrimage: 'attempting to produce a feminine 
equivalent of the current masculine realism'. 
5 For Richardson, this 
feminine realism is superior in that it can reach a deeper reality 
because of the intuitive, immediate, pluralistic nature of female 
consciousness. 
It is clear that, while other contemporary commentators (including 
Wyndham Lewis)6 stressed the feminist dimension, Woolf's own declarations 
of literary identity repress a potential feminist awareness and 
universalize the issue into the Oedipal polemic of the generations. And 
it was true, after all, that many male writers (Joyce, Eliot, Strachey, 
Forster, Lawrence) were committed to literary projects more or less 
related to female 'New Realism'. Woolf sees a danger across the whole 
range of modernism, which is however, significantly exacerbated for the 
woman writer. Though one does well to reject the dessicated objectivism 
of realist conventions, there then looms the trap of the 'egotistical 
self; which ruins Joyce and Richardson': 'becoming as in Joyce and 
Richardson, narrowing and restricting'(WD, 23). Together with this 
'cramp and confinement of personality, (CE, 2: 159) the subjectivistic 
concentration on self tends- to produce what Woolf terms 'self- 
consciousness' - the sudden literary lapse from image to statement, from 
the concrete enactments of experience to shrill social protest. All 
outsiders, the oppressed, the marginal, are necessarily vulnerable to 
this vice; American writers, women, working men, negroes, or anyone 'who 
for some other reason is conscious of disability'(CE, 2: 144) . 
tends thus to 
3 
violate the organic textures of the literary work. The pressures are 
particularly acute on women, however, vitiating aspects of the work even 
of geniuses like Charlotte Bronte or George Eliot, let alone innumerable 
lesser women writers. Woolf believes that relative improvements in the 
socio-economic position of women have started to free them from self- 
consciousness. If the male writer suffers self-consciousness as an 
aspect of the general experience of modernity, with its dissolution of 
tradition, its sceptical, even nihilistic testing of old sanctities and 
pieties, then clearly the woman writer's sense of the injustice of 
women's position in society, with its temptations of bitterness, 
denunciation, resentment, reinforces the danger. 
Woolf's second dissatisfaction with the modernist text concerns its 
fragmentation. In her review of Dorothy Richardson, she had applauded 
her literary technique, which attains 'a sense of reality far greater 
than that produced by the ordinary means', yet she also complains of a 
lack of 'some unity, significance, or design' which 'we should perceive 
in the helter-skelter of flying fragments'. Woolf's aesthetic demands 
that 'the flying helter-skelter resolves itself by degrees into a 
perceptible whole'(CW, 121). From this point of view, the distortions or 
stridencies produced by social self-consciousness are just one aspect of 
the more general chaotic dispersal of the modernist work. By contrast, 
the two desiderata of impersonality and synthesis or totality constitute 
what Woolf terms 'poetry'. 
In 1929, when Woolf for the first time fully discusses women and 
fiction, she hopes that improvements in the economical and educational 
conditions of women will encourage 'the greater impersonality of women's 
lives' and thus result in 'poetry' in women's fiction: 'It will lead them 
to be less absorbed in facts and no longer content to record... their own 
observation. They will look beyond the personal and political 
relationships to the wider questions which the poet tries to solve - of 
our destiny and the meaning of life' (CE, 2: 147). In 'The Art of Fiction' 
4 
(1927) Woolf speculates on the possibility of the novel becoming 'a work 
of art', aspiring beyond its traditionally mimetic or derivative 
relationship - 'a parasite' - towards life. In 'The Narrow Bridge of 
Art' (1927), she suggests an 'unnamed variety of the novel' (it is to be 
actualized as The Waves), which will be poetry but not written in verse, 
dramatic and yet not a play. She emphasizes that it will 'stand further 
back from life', (CE, 2: 224-225). Her insistence on abolishing the 
sociological realism of an Arnold Bennett is consistent with her earlier 
challenges to Edwardianism in 'Modern Fiction' or 'Mr. Bennett and 
Mrs. Brown', but this concept of 'poetry' marks a further break from any 
kind of realism, for in the earlier essays Woolf was still talking in 
terms of 'reality', 'trueness to life'. 'Without life nothing else is 
worthwhile'(CE, 2: 105) - there is no disagreement on this in both camps, 
and this was indeed the whole point of Brimley Johnson's label, 'New 
Realism'. In 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown' Woolf even agrees with Bennett 
that characters are vital components of a novel, though she contends that 
the characters that are real to her are radically different from those 
which Bennett considers convincing (CE, 1: 319). But Woolf seems to move 
further and further away from realism, sociological or 'New', and to wish 
fiction to become 'poetry', no longer representing reality but rather 
presenting or constructing reality. Writing about the major modernist 
authors, David Lodge notes 'a general tendency to develop... from a 
metonymic (realistic) to a metaphoric (symbolist or mythopoeic) 
representation of experience. Virginia Woolf exemplifies this tendency 
very clearly'.? Woolf's aesthetic declarations in her various 
'manifestos' and in her actual literary practice (starting with Jacob's 
Room and culminating in The Waves) exemplify her pursuit of a symbolist 
modernism, the aim of which is to create meaningful order and pattern by 
imposing artistic form on the supposed chaos of the phenomenal world 
(though aspiration is one thing and actual achievement another). While 
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thus establishing her avant-garde literary identity, Virginia Woolf 
represses an incipient feminism that had, however, been testified to by 
the concern of both her earliest novels, Voyage Out and Night and Day, 
with women's problems, as also by the short story 'A Society' which may 
be seen as a prototype of both A Room of Ones's Own and Three Guineas. 
In this light it is interesting that Woolf published her first major 
feminist essay 'Women and Fiction' and its extended, book-length version, 
A Room of One's Own in 1929, when her fame was highest after the 
successive publication of Jacob's Room, Mrs. Dalloway, To the Lighthouse 
and Orlando, and when she was contemplating a play-poem, The Waves, the 
final embodiment of her symbolist ideal. 
A Room of One's Own (and 'Women and Fiction') is a rewriting of 
'Modern Fiction', presenting what was once a generation difference in 
terms of gender difference. Earlier, Woolf expressed the -dissatisfaction 
of younger writers with literary conventions that denature their own 
vision. Now she explicitly identifies 'the arbiters of that convention' 
as men: 
as they have established an order of values in life, so too, 
since fiction is largely based on life, these values prevail 
there also to a very great extent. 
It is probable, however, that both in life and in art the 
values of a woman are not the values of a man. Thus, when a 
woman comes to write a novel, she will find that she is 
perpetually wishing to alter the established values - to make 
serious what appear insignificant to a man, and trivial what is 
to him important. (CE, 2: 145-6) 
But 'in the midst of that purely patriarchal society' (RO, 112) the 
critic of the opposite (male) sex will see in this attem pt to alter the 
current scale of values 'not merely a difference of view, but a view that 
is weak, or trivial, or sentimental, because it differs from his own' 
(CE, 2: 146). A further difficulty which women writers are faced with 
because of this difference is the inadequacy of th e language of 
novelistic texture as well as narrative structure. Woolf advocates that 
the woman writer alter and adapt the current 'man's sentence', which is 
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'unsuited for a woman's use' (RO, 115), 'until she writes one that takes 
the natural shape of her thought without crushing or distorting it'. 
(CE, 2: 145) At the level of macrostructure, women need to reshape the 
present literary form which 'has been made by men, out of their own needs 
for their uses' and to provide 'some new vehicle' (RO, 116). 
Yet even in her earlier writings, Woolf begins to attribute the 
'Georgian' literary revolt to the difference and the value of the 
specifically female writer. For already in 1918 she noted in a review of 
Brimley Johnson's The Women Novelists that from the difference of view 
between man and woman 'spring not only marked differences of plot and 
incident, but infinite differences in selection, method and style' 
(CW, 27). In the review of The Tunnel (1919), Woolf points to 
Richardson's 'genuine conviction of the discrepancy between what she has 
to say and the form provided by tradition for her to say it in' 
(CV, 120), and Richardson herself had explicitly argued that the 
discrepancy derives from sexual difference: 'a woman is at a disadvantage 
-because they speak different languages... She must... stammeringly, speak 
his'. 8 Woolf also points to this discrepancy, quoting Miriam Henderson's 
objection to writing a book with 'mannish cleverness', becoming 'like a 
man' (CW, 120). 'The spasmodic, the obscure, the fragmentary' attempt of 
the modernists to break down the 'sleek, smooth novels', the 'portentous 
and ridiculous biographies' of the older generation (CE, 1: 336-337) - this 
modernist revolt is based on 'the difference of view, the difference of 
standard' (CE, 1: 204) as a woman which, as Woolf wrote in 1919, George 
Eliot refused to renounce. The modernist revolt attempted to rupture 
both the oppressive ideology of sameness held in place by Victorian 
patriarchy and the complacent superficiality of the Edwardians who failed 
to question it; it represented the assertion of a radical alternative to 
what contemporary feminists regard as a phallocentric society and 
culture. For women this conflict with Victorian and Edwardian 
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conventions is naturally the crucial issue for their own sex, though the 
conflict was actually shared by both men and women. For Woolf, both the 
feminist aesthetic and modernist aesthetic converge, at least initially, 
in this attempt to break the dominance of phallocentricism. 
But around 1920, Woolf predominantly urges only the modernist case 
in her aesthetic manifestos, as if she represses the feminist version, 
'resist(ing) the temptation to anger' (CE, 2: 144), for as she repeatedly 
contends, self-consciousness of one's sex, and the bitterness, fear, 
protest, and preaching which necessarily spring from it cannot but 
denature one's writing. Not that she was by any means free of anger. The 
publication in 1920 of Arnold Bennett's Our Women and its attendant 
publicity led Woolf to consider 'making up a paper upon Women, as a 
counterblast to Mr. Bennett's adverse views' (WD, 28-29). This paper has 
not survived, if it was ever begun, but her indignation was finally 
discharged through a correspondence with the columnist 'Affable Hawk' of 
the New Statesman (Desmond MacCarthy) who discussed Bennett's book and 
endorsed its argument, that 'intellectually and creatively man is the 
superior of woman', and 'no amount of education and liberty of action 
will sensibly alter' that fact. In a letter headed 'The Intellectual 
Status of Women' on 9th October, 1920, and-in a reply to the further 
response - of MacCarthy, Woolf refutes this essentialist argument and 
protests that the lack of artistic and intellectual achievement by women 
is culturally determined, the result of 'some external restraint upon 
their powers'. Woolf's contention foreshadows her arguments in A Room of 
One's Own. Genius is not a singular, solitary birth; it requires a long 
tradition and favourable external conditions (education, freedom of 
action). Such is Woolf's version of T. S. Eliot's 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent': 'you will not get a big Newton until you have 
produced a considerable number of lesser Newtons'. She finally demands 
that women 'should differ from men without fear and express their 
difference openly', 
9 
and such statements as those of Bennett and 
8 
MacCarthy impede this possibility. It is thus likely that Bennett's 
anti-feminism may have given a sharper edge to Woolf's hostility to his 
literary values. 
Woolf expressed difference openly, however, not as the difference of 
a woman writer but as that of a new generation. The temptation to anger, 
the pressure of fear, were still too great; Woolf's own literary position 
was still too insecure and vulnerable for her to assert woman's 
difference and be treated seriously in literary debate. 
10 Even when, in 
1929, she can to a certain extent express her feminist protest openly, 
her motto remains 'to resist the temptation to anger'. She accordingly 
adopts a strategy of humour and satire, defending herself with 'fiction' 
and 'lies' rather than 'facts' and 't-ruths' (RO, 7). Facts are 
completely ruled by men, there are no facts left for women; Shakespeare's 
sister can only be retrieved in fiction, for she is a completely 'lost' 
existence in history. Galsworthy, who was already a victim in 'Modern 
Fiction', is taken up in A Room of One's Own and his works are criticized 
from a woman's point of. view for their pure maleness. 'Do what she will 
a woman cannot find in them that fountain of perpetual life which the 
critics assure her is there. It is not only that they celebrate male 
virtues, enforce male values and describe the world of men; it is that 
the emotion with which these books are permeated is to a woman 
incomprehensible' (RO, 153). 11 
Thus if her literary adversaries from the early 1920's are now 
redefined as masculinist, Woolf also distances herself from her former 
allies who are now seen as representatives of the dominant male culture. 
In 'The Leaning Tower', published in 1940, Woolf described the writers 
whose best books were written between 1910 and 1925 as tower-dwellers. 
The 'representative names' that she lists include E. M. Forster, Lytton 
Strachey, T. S. Eliot, Aldous Huxley. All these writers (D. H. Lawrence is 
the major exception) have been raised 'above the mass of people', they 
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stand 'upon a tower raised above the rest of us; a tower built first on 
his parents' station' - 'that is their middle-class birth', on his 
parents' 'gold - that is their expensive education' at the public schools 
and ancient universities (CE, 2: 168-169). This is true, she points out, 
of all the nineteenth-century writers and of the groups which wrote 
between 1925 and 1939. But 'the tower of this last generation is 
precarious, leaning, about to topple down. If Woolf situates herself in 
'the mass of people', 'the rest of us', she clearly views the fact of her 
class birth as a less radical determinant than her exclusion from the 
educational process which, she emphasizes, played the crucial part in 
forming these writers' literary outlook. Dissociating herself from 
previous allies like Forster and Strachey, who are now branded as tower- 
dwellers, she writes: 'are we not commoners, outsiders? ' (CE, 2: 181). 
Alluding to a resonant image from A Room of One's Own, where the heroine 
upsets a Beadle by trespassing on the turf of an Oxbridge college, she 
recommends trespass, transgression: 'Let us trespass at once. Literature 
is no one's private ground; literature is common ground... Let us trespass 
freely and fearlessly and find our own way for ourselves' (CE, 2: 181). 
She looks eagerly forward to the next, post-war generation, when all 
towers will have disappeared, thus affording the possibility of a 
literature of commoners, outsiders. 
It is perhaps more than mere accident that Woolf symbolized 'the 
spirit we live by, life itself' (CE, 1: 337), the vision which a novelist 
must capture, by 'Mrs. Brown' - an insignificant, small, elderly woman. 
It is the voice of this woman, who is 'protesting that she was different' 
(CE, 1: 333), that had been silenced or ignored in the novels of Bennett, 
Galsworthy, and Wells: 'They have looked... at factories, at Utopias, even 
at the decoration and upholstery of the carriage; but never at her' 
(330). Discussing a passage from Arnold Bennett's Hilda Lessways, Woolf 
complains: 'But we cannot hear her mother's voice, or Hilda's voice' 
(330). To make the woman's voice heard, one might be led 'to destroy the 
10 
very foundation and rules of literary society... Grammar is violated; 
syntax disintegrated'(334). In A Room of One's Own Woolf contends that 
'for the whole of that extremely complex force of femininity' to be 
expressed, 'the resources of the English language would be much put to 
the stretch, and whole flights of words would need to wing their way 
illegitimately into existence' (RO, 131 - emphasis added). Having 
declared that 'the Edwardian tools are the wrong ones for us to use' 
(CE, 1: 332), her own untiring experiments and innovation in the method 
and forms of fiction can be seen as the pursuit of the woman's voice, 
altering and adapting the current novelistic texture and structure 'until 
she writes [a sentence] that takes the natural shape of her thought 
without crushing or distorting it (CE, 2: 145). For, she writes in 1920, 
this is 'a task that must be accomplished before there is freedom or 
achievement', referring to the frustration of Bathsheba in Far from the 
Madding Crowd, who says that she has 'the feelings of a woman', but only 
'the language of men'. 
12 
For Woolf, then, aesthetic innovation and feminist conviction are 
deeply interlinked, and her notion of 'androgyny', the theoretical 
implications of which I shall now consider, mediates between the two, 
being both a formal principle and a substantive theory in its own right. 
Inasmuch as Woolf's feminism is underemphasized, though still latently 
present, in her early Modernist manifestos, her concept of androgyny can 
be seen as an attempt to theorize, after the fact, vital new insights to 
which she had already broken through in literary practice. 
'Women are apt to differ' (CW, 26); 'they should differ from men 
without fear and express their difference openly'. 
13 In these terms 
Woolf praises Dorothy Richardson's Revolving Lights; she applauds its 
sentence as 'the psychological sentence of the feminine gender' and her 
description of it might well be applied to her own writing: 'of a more 
elastic fibre than the old, capable of stretching to the extreme, of 
ii 
suspending the frailest particles, of enveloping the vaguest shapes'. 
, It is a woman's sentence, but only in the sense that it is used to 
describe a woman's mind by a writer who is neither proud nor afraid of 
anything that she may discover in the psychology of her sex' 
(C/, 124-125). However, while she advocates a specifically female 
sentence, Woolf also warns that 'it is fatal for anyone who writes to 
think of their sex. It is fatal to be a man or woman pure and simple' 
(RO, 156-157). She here again stresses the literary dangers of 
self consciousness. 'It is fatal for a woman... to speak consciously as a 
woman' (RO, 157). She therefore defines the ideal state of the creative 
mind as 'androgynous' (RO, 148): 'one must be woman-manly or man-womanly' 
(RO, 157). The logic which holds together these two seemingly 
contradictory arguments -a writer must be androgynous, sexually 
unselfconscious; a woman writer must find or forge the woman's sentence - 
is the principle of 'difference' as opposed to the logic of identity. 
The forgetting of one's sex does not erase difference, which necessarily 
derives from one's sex, for 'that curious sexual quality-comes only 
when sex is unconscious of itself' (RO, 140). And after all the concept 
of androgyny is possible only on the basis of the existence of two 
distinct genders. Against an Enlightenment universalism which, by 
defining humanity as disembodied Reason, would. reduce sexual difference 
to a merely phenomenal form, Woolf argues: 'if two sexes are quite 
inadequate, considering the vastness and variety of the world, how should 
we manage with one only? Ought not education to bring out and fortify 
the differences rather than the similarities? For we have too much 
likeness as it is (RO, 132). Androgyny is the rejection of sameness; it 
aims to cultivate difference on an individual level, in the teeth of a 
cultural impulse to reduce the two sexes into something that is neither. 
Yet as Stephen Heath notes in The Sexual Fix, this argument is a 
double-edged weapon: optimally 'it can function... as the beginning of. an 
alternative representation, as an insistence against the one position, 
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the fixed sexual order, man and woman', but on the other hand, 'it can 
return constantly as a confirmation of that fixity, a strategy in which 
differences... are neutralized into the given systems of identity, the two 
halves - masculine and feminine - adding up to the same old one'. 
Bisexuality can thus become a theoretical and ideological trap, as 
happens, according to Heath, in the cases of Freud and D. H. Lawrence. 
For them 'the basis of that polarity [man/woman]... is the man, the 
phallus, the phallic organization of the sexual'. So bisexuality, as 
plurality opened up in the individual, is in fact 'reduced in the very 
beginning... to the system of the one-phallic-identity'. 
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If 'it is fatal to be a man or woman pure and simple', 'fatal' is no 
mere figure of speech, since writing founded on such monolithic positions 
'is doomed to death', 'it ceases to be fertilised' (RO, 157), 'falls 
plump to the ground - dead' (153). Meaning, it is here implied, can be 
produced only in the play of difference. The French theorist Julia 
Kristeva makes a similar point when she writes of 'sexual difference, not 
as a fixed opposition ("man"/"woman"), but as a process of 
differentiation' to which 'the truly great "literary" achievements bear 
witness'. She continues: 'All speaking subjects have within themselves a 
certain bisexuality which is precisely the possibility to explore all the 
sources of signification, that which posits a meaning as well as that 
which multiplies, pulverizes, and finally revives it'. 
15 Woolf does, to 
be sure, refer to 'the unity of the mind', 'a natural fusion' 
(RO, 146-147), but this is not a single unitary state, but a wholeness 
which is composed of heterogeneity, for the mind, for Woolf, 'seems to 
have no single state of being... It can think back through its fathers or 
through its mothers' (RO, 146). The homogeneous unity of the mind is only 
a fiction maintainable by 'repression' (RO, 147). Mary Jacobus rightly 
interprets Woolf's androgyny as 'a simultaneous enactment of desire and 
repression by which the split is closed with an essentially Utopian 
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vision of undivided consciousness. The repressive male/female opposition 
which "interferes with the unity of the mind" gives way to a mind 
paradoxically conceived of not as one, but as heterogeneous, open to the 
play of difference'. 
16 The rejection of homogeneity and the realization 
of this paradoxically heterogeneous harmony is Woolf's aim in elaborating 
the Utopian concept of androgyny. It is not, at any rate, a Hegelian 
Aufhebung of opposed terms. 
The assertion of the specificity of the feminine and the attempt to 
inscribe that specificity in language becomes important in this context 
of the defence of difference against the existing order of discourse and 
culture, which is that of the sameness organized around a single 
standard, the man, or, in psychoanalytic terms, the phallus. In the male 
text Woolf finds the 'straight dark bar ... "I'll casting a dominating 
phallic shadow across the page and obliterating all else, 'a tree' or 'a 
woman', into mist and vapour (RO, 150). Hence Woolf explains the 'I' of 
her own discourse as 'only a convenient term for somebody who has no real 
being', any 'Mary' or many 'Marys' (RO, 8). It is in this sense that 
Woolf can, without self-contradiction, urge the need for a specifically 
female sentence at the same time as she advocates an ideal of androgyny 
for the writer's mind. Woman is privileged (or rather forced) to attain 
an androgynous position and to call into question, to reveal the 
fictionality of, the dominant male ideology of the same in order to 
deconstruct the masculine discourse. For woman is situated at once 
outside and inside in relation to the dominant order. In spite of her 
difference she, too, is necessarily submitted to phallocentricity in 
order to have acess to what Lacan terms the symbolic, to language and 
culture. The woman's mind 'can think back through its fathers or through 
its mothers', and she 'is often surprised by a sudden splitting off of 
consciousness... when from being the natural inheritor of that 
civilisation, she becomes, on the contrary, outside of it, alien and 
critical. Clearly the mind is always altering its focus, and bringing 
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the world into different perspectives' (RO, 146). Woman may well be said 
to be necessarily androgynous because - of this internal. 'split' in her 
consciousness. Woolf's position is close to that of the French feminist 
theorist Helene Cixous, who also defines woman's position as 'neither 
outside nor in' and privileged for its 'bisexuality': 'Now it happens 
that at present, for historico-cultural reasons, it is women who are 
opening up to and benefiting from this vatic bisexuality which doesn't 
annul differences but stirs them up, pursues them, increases their 
number. In a certain way, "woman is bisexual": man... being poised to 
keep glorious phallic monosexuality in view'. 
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What, then, is this difference between men and women? In particular 
what is a feminine writing? - Stephen Heath points out the dangers of the 
argument in favour of 'difference', which can, with alarming ease, merge 
into familiar reactionary positions: 
a tourniquet operates in which the real necessity to claim 
difference binds back, and precisely from the difference 
claimed, into the renewal of the same, a reflection of the 
place assigned, assigned as difference. Patriarchy, men in its 
order, has never said anything but that women are - the woman 
is - different: they are not men, the difference maintained 
supports the status quo, the difference derived, derived 
ideologically, from nature, the appeal to the biological, 
'undeniable'. 18 
It is therefore crucial to break away from any such essentialist 
definition of difference, which 'is always itself a form of social 
representation, within a particular structure of assumption and 
argument'. 
19 Woolf takes scrupulous care not to fall into essentialism. 
At the beginning of A Room of One's Own, she wards off the problem: 'I 
have shirked the duty of coming to a conclusion upon' the question of 
'the true nature of women' (RO, 6). In a speech for the National Society 
for Women's Service she argues: 'But what is 'herself'?... what is a 
woman? I assure you, I don't know; I do not believe that you know; I do 
not believe that anybody can know until she has expressed herself in all 
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the arts and professions open to human skill'. 
20 Woman is a project, not 
a given; femininity is a matter of representation, a historical and 
cultural construction, not an eternal essence which could be always 
referred to outside any socio-historical context. Women are so radically 
various (women's 'rooms differ so completely' (RO, 131)) that all Woolf 
can say she h'as discovered is that 'a woman... is not a man'. 
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Discussing Brimley Johnson's book, The Women Novelists, Woolf agrees with 
him that 'a woman's writing is always feminine', and continues: the only 
difficulty lies in defining what we mean by feminine. He shows his 
wisdom not only by advancing a great many suggestions, but also by 
accepting the fact... that women are apt to differ'. The attempt at 
definition makes a circular argument round the term 'difference', since 
it cannot make any reference outside it; thus feminine difference is 
defined only by the tautalogy of 'difference'. 'The essential 
difference' between a novel written by a man and a novel by a woman 'lies 
in the fact... that each sex describes itself' rather than in 'the obvious 
and enormous difference of experience' (CW, 26). Here again the 
difference does not get referred back to experience outside 
representation, but rather depends, in circular fashion, on the very 
representation of the difference itself. The crucial task is to free the 
feminine from the essentialist 'difference', which is itself the 
construction of a representation within and by a particular ideology, and 
to understand it as a problem produced in representation. 
In the light of this, Elaine Showalter's well-known critique of 
Woolf's founding of an aesthetic upon the ideal of androgyny should 
itself be critically reconsidered. In A Literature of their Own 
Showalter argues that Woolf's androgyny 'represents an escape from the 
confrontation with femaleness or maleness', and that her famous 
definition of life as 'a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope' is 
'another metaphor of uterine withdrawal and containment'. The false 
transcendence of 'sexual identity', or in Showalter's phrase, 'the flight 
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into androgyny' amounts to 'evasions of reality' and of 'the female 
experience', and this is presumed to result in Woolf's 'progressive 
technical inability to accommodate the facts and crises of day-to-day 
experience, even when she wanted to do so'. 
22 What is posited in 
Showalter's stress on 'confrontation', 'sexual identity' or 'experience' 
is what we might term a Lukfsian concept of a unified autonomous subject 
which is the sole agent of its own development in confrontation with the 
environment. But, as structuralism has argued, if the human subject is 
born into a preexisting network of sign-systems and is constituted in and 
by them, then the individual's 'identity', either social or sexual, 
cannot be taken as a self-evident starting point; nor is there a simple 
confrontation of the human subject and the world; nor are we justified in 
a naive belief in authentic experience, which is always already 
implicated in the surrounding structures and produced by them. 
Experience never comes into being without representation; there is no 
immediate experience or pure facts, as Woolf was well aware in A Room of 
One's Own, where she appeals to the order of 'fiction' rather than 
'facts', to 'lies' rather than 'truth' in her attempt to construct a 
female perspective. Showalter's term 'confrontation' (in this case of 
woman and man, woman and a patriarchal, phallocentric society) offers as 
indubitable starting point a subject-object polarity that is, in fact, 
already reified and abstract. The feminist text must call into question 
the very identities which support this particular pattern of binary 
opposition. In this context, the concept of androgyny becomes radical, 
opening up the fixed unity into a multiplicity, joy, play of 
heterogeneity, a fertile difference. 
In her account of subjectivity and 'self', Showalter is very near to 
George Lukäcs's famous denunciations of modernist literature, as is 
indicated by her referring to Lukäcs's formulation in her critique of 
Woolf's aesthetics: the ethic of a novelist, she notes, becomes an 
17 
aesthetic problem in his/her writing. In The Meaning of Conte porary 
Realism Lukäcs notoriously criticizes modernist literature, defining its 
characteristics as an 'attenuation of reality and dissolution of 
personality': 'Man is reduced to a sequence of unrelated experiential 
fragments'. He sees this 'modernist schizophrenia' 
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as leading to 
passive impotence in the face of the human impasse brought about by 
capitalist industrialization, and for Showalter, analogously, Woolf's 
description of (in the critic's phrase) 'consciousness as passive 
receptivity' is, in one sense, 'an extension of her view of women's 
female social role: receptivity to the point of self -destruction. 
24 'The 
human being is deprived of his or her active subjectivity, his or her own 
role as agent of change in dialectical relationship with world history. 
Though Lukäcs does not specifically mention Virginia Woolf in his 
critical account of modernist literature, her work might well be one of 
the targets of his attack, figuring as a typical example of the 
introverted withdrawal from reality which results in the dissolution of 
the self, of the characteristic cul-de-sac of subjectivism into which 
modernism has driven itself. 
The psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, influenced as it has been by 
structuralism, offers a radically new view of the problem of 
subjectivity, which puts into question the Lukäcsian notion of an 
autonomous, coherently unified self confronting the outer world. For 
Lacan there is no natural, unitary self, no Cogito. His notion of the 
'mirror-stage', maintains that the baby, lacking the ability to 
coordinate movements of the body and thus experiencing fragmentation, 
comes to discover the 'self' by a mirror-like identification with the 
image of another. Only by this misrecognition of itself as a whole in 
identification with the image of the other can the child constitute the 
self. This one-to-one identification, which subordinates the child to 
its image, to its mother, to others, is alienating, and this fundamental 
gap opened between the subject and its own self, in which, indeed, the 
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infant discovers his self, can never by bridged. Questioning the 
integrity of the 'I', Lacan reveals that the fragmentation of the self 
which Luk&s interprets as the pathology of modernism is a universal fact 
of the human subject. Misrecognition (meconnaissance) constitutes the 
ego; autonomy is illusion, fiction. The self, constituted in relation to 
the other, is thoroughly permeated by the other in its very formation. 
If the assumption of the autonomous subject and fixed identity is 
problematized by structuralism and psychoanalysis, then 'reality', the 
very ground for Luk& s's realist aesthetics, has also been put into 
question. The work of semioticians like Roland Barthes maintains that 
the 'reality' to which 'realism' appeals is an ideological construction, 
as Virginia Woolf had herself argued in 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown': 'If 
you say to the- public with sufficient conviction: "All women have tails, 
and all men humps, " it will actually learn to see women with tails and 
men with humps' (CE, 1: 332). The formal characteristics of the realist 
novel - narrativity, plot, character - are also radically put into 
question, in both semiotic theory and modernist literary practice. Woolf 
'insubstantises' reality 'wilfully' (WD, 57) and dismisses the criticism 
that she cannot create characters: 'it's only the old argument that 
character is dissipated into shreds now; the old post-Dostoievsky 
argument' (WD, 57). 
Gillian Beer has pointed out the neglect of Woolf's 'narrative 
politics' in Elaine Showalter's critique. Against Showalter's impatient 
claim that Woolf withdraws from 'the facts and crises of day-to-day 
experience', Beer argues: 'If Virginia Woolf moves away from facts and 
crises it is because she denies the claim of such ordering to be all- 
inclusive'. 25 Within the arena of feminist criticism, a polemic 
analogous to the realism-modernism debate in Marxism (Lukäcs versus, say, 
Brecht) is thus fought out. Either one demands that the novel possess a 
new realist content, so that a new consciousness and a will to 
v 
transformation may arise; or one questions and rejects the very form of 
realism as no longer adequate, as simply an impediment. I want to argue 
that the two trends - feminist aesthetic and modernist aesthetic - are, 
at least in Woolf's case, the two faces of a single project. Since, for 
Woolf, modernism and feminism constitute a single awareness and concern, 
her declaration of an urgent need for new fictional modes and languages 
is a protest against Lacan's symbolic order. According to Lacan, this 
order of discursive and symbolic action operates with the phallus as the 
privileged signifier. It fixes difference along the axis of having or 
not having the phallus, and thus refers to a condition outside itself 
which makes significance possible. This symbolic order, to which the 
human being has to submit in order to become a speaking subject, is 
acquired as the child abandons the dyadic, Imaginary mother-child 
relationship through the acceptance of a third term, the Name-of-the- 
Father. This is accomplished through the resolution of the castration 
complex, in which the child confronts the existence of the phallus and 
the possibility of losing it and accepts the father's 'no' to its desire 
for the mother's body. 
26 Thus the symbolic order, the whole realm of 
discursive and symbolic action, is constructed with the phallus as its 
privileged signifier, is phallocentric, patriarchal. Any alternative 
form or alternative language will then have to be non-phallocentric. 
The convergence of modernism and feminism might be expressed in 
Lacanian terms. Modernism might then be seen as an attempt to 
reintroduce the Imaginary, which has had to be repressed and transformed, 
into a symbolic order which is identified with the repressive order of 
Victorianism by modern writers. The Imaginary is the realm of the 
immediate, dual relationship of child and mother in the pre-Oedipal 
phase; it precedes the emergence of self, and contains no distinction of 
subject and object. But the child has to emerge from its fusion with the 
maternal body through the Name-of-the-Father into a mediate relationship, 
i. e., the symbolic. In this theoretical scheme, the revolt of the 
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Imaginary is an attempt to retrieve the maternal which has been repressed 
by the Law of the Father and its limited definitions of selfhood. Such a 
scheme has been outlined by Helene Cixous, one of the French feminists 
who criticize the privileged place accorded the phallus in Lacanian 
accounts of language and sexual difference, as well as his valorization 
of the symbolic. She defends a mode of writing that inscribes the 
feminine: 'Writing in the feminine is passing on what is cut out by the 
Symbolic, the voice of the mother, passing on what is most archaic. The 
most archaic force that touches a body is one that enters by the ear and 
reaches the most intimate point'. 
27 In Virginia Woolf and the 
Androgynous Vision, Nancy Topping Bazin explains Woolf's concept of 
reality by her 'manic-depressive' psychology. Partly because Woolf 
associates mania with her mother and depression with her father, Bazin 
argues that the terms manic/depressive merge into the opposition between 
feminine and masculine; Woolf's aim would then be to achieve a balance 
between these two opposite forces, symbolized as the 'androgynous mind'. 
But Bazin's par igm of depressive (father)/manic (mother) should, 
perhaps, be interpreted as a universal problem for the human subject 
which has to be produced in the confrontation of the Imaginary with the 
symbolic, rather than as Woolf's personal, familial tragedy, and should 
thus be considered in the wider context of modernism and feminism. 
Similarly, the relationship between these two terms should not be seen as 
confined to female writers in general, or Woolf in particular, for, as 
Stephen Heath has suggested, 'modern writing has been precisely bound up 
with the question of female language, feminine discourse'. For in modern 
writing, with its dislocations of syntax, its displacement of positions, 
its disruption of any one identity into mobility, the question of 
feminine discourse emerges 'as a challenge to the fixity of identity, as 
a challenge to the "male" and "female" which are the very terms - the 
places - of that identity, as a challenge to the very principle of sexual 
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identity, the whole fix of "sexuality". 
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If we understand feminine writing as an attempt to break the 
dominance of male positions and to inscribe, instead, positions against 
or alternative to those of the dominant male-centred order, then the 
possibility of feminine writing does not exclusively correspond to the 
biological gender of the writer. From the feminist perspective, however, 
feminine writing cannot perhaps be finally separated from a specifically 
feminine content, from its inscription by a biological woman. Despite 
her claim that it is fatal to write thinking of one's sex, Woolf praises 
the structure of the Richardsonian sentence as 'a woman's sentence' 'only 
in the sense that it is used to describe a woman's mind' by a woman 
writer 'neither proud nor afraid of... the psychology of her sex' 
(GI, 124-125). Male writers may have used a similar sentence, 'but there 
is a difference', Woolf argues: 'Miss Richardson has fashioned her 
sentence consciously' in order to 'descend to the depths and investigate 
the crannies of Miriam Henderson's consciousness'. 
29 In any attempt to 
adumbrate the qualities of a feminine discourse, one tends, perhaps 
ineluctably, to appeal to an analogy with women's physical 
characteristics, bodily experiences, sexual behaviour or even with 
conventional images of 'femaleness' offered by the existing order. Woolf 
talks about a need for the book 'to be adapted to the body' (RO, 117), 
employs terms like 'elastic', 'frailest', 'vaguest', 'enveloping' in her 
description of Richardson's 'sentence of the feminine gender' (CW, 124). 
May Sinclair notes interminability as a characteristic of Richardson's 
sentence; 
30 Gillian Beer remarks Woolf's deliberate 'avoidance of 
narrative climax', 'arousal without climax' in The Waves. The French 
feminist theorists who have done most to develop the concept of feminine 
writing also refer to its 'liquid flow', 'endlessness' or a writing 'in 
white ink [milk]'. 
31 Yet there is once again a danger that this writing 
will end up merely reproducing the 'embedded assumptions about male and 
female characters', for Gillian Beer shrewdly notes that Arnold Bennett's 
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description of George Eliot's writing as 'feminine' - 'too rank to have 
any enduring vitality', 'feminine in its lack of restraint, its 
wordiness, and the utter absence of feeling for form that characterises 
it' - coincides precisely with recent feminists' description of feminine 
language, except that the value judgements are reversed. 
32 The 
valorization of the 'feminine' qualities is meaningful precisely as a 
strategy of reversal, as a challenge to conventional norms of writing. 
Thus recent French writers have attempted to address the problem of 
feminine language at a deeper, more structural level than that feminine 
language which feminists have always attacked as the very locus of sexism 
on the socio-linguistic level. Working in the ambit of post-structuralism 
and neo-Freudian psychoanalysis (whether for or against Lacan), these 
writers construe language, the symbolic order, representation itself as 
made possible by the repression of 'woman'. Femininity and 
representation are, on this showing, the question which psychoanalysis 
has failed to answer. Both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis can only 
define woman as non-man, as absence, lack, excess, the blind spot. If 
these feminist writers start from psychoanalysis, they simultaneously 
attempt to go beyond it and to deconstruct any binary opposition of 
presence/absence organized around the phallus as the Signifier, as well 
as all the other dual oppositions ('hierarchized opposition' in Cixous's 
phrase) which follow from this: full presence-masculine-active-positive- 
coherent (superior); absence-feminine-passive-negative-incoherent 
(inferior). They offer a theoretical understanding of femininity as the 
term which has been repressed into marginality and silence by the order 
of representation, this constituting the very condition for the 
functioning of the symbolic order. Exposing the logocentrism of Western 
culture as patriarchal in its very formation, they radically question the 
whole phallocentric tradition of the West, and advocate feminine writing 
as the locus where that repressed term - woman's desire (jouissance, 
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la mere ui jouit) -speaks, as voicing this muted 'Other'. 
The difficulty is, then, how this feminine language is possible, if 
the repression of the feminine is the very condition of the human 
subject's speech; or how the refusal of language, of the symbolic order 
and phallocentricity, is possible without a collapse into silence, 
marginality, or even psychosis. Julia Kristeva's theory of the subject 
(subject in process/on trial) and of poetic language offers, precisely, a 
new understanding of the dynamics of the repressed term - the maternal or 
the pre-Oedipal - in its relations to the repressive, and helps to 
resolve the difficulty. 
Kristeva calls our attention to what she calls significance - 'the 
heterogeneous practice', 'unlimited and unbound generating process', 'a 
structuring and de-structuring practice' performed in the signifying 
practices of art and literature. 
33 According to Kristeva, the signifying 
process comprises two modalities: 'semiotic' and 'symbolic'. Since for 
her the dialectic between these two modalities constitutes the subject, 
she offers a new concept of subjectivity - the subject in process/on 
trial (sujet en rp oce s) as opposed to the traditional concept of the 
unitary subject. Like Lacan's symbolic order, the Kristevan symbolic is 
founded on a repression, on the splitting of the subject into conscious 
and unconscious, signifier and signified; it is the realm of 
signification, discourse, law, the sum and locus of human society. The 
second modality of signifying process, the semiotic, however, 'logically 
and chronologically precedes the establishment of the symbolic and its 
subject' (RPL, 41). 'The semiotic is articulated by flow and marks: 
fasciliation, energy transfers, the cutting up of the corporeal and 
social continuum as well as that of signifying material' (41), the 
establishment of a 'distinctiveness' that is ordered in what Kristeva 
terms the 'chora'. This chora is 'a non-expressive totality formed by 
the drives and their stresses in a motility' (25). Discrete quantities of 
energy move through the body of the subject who is not yet constituted as 
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such, and gradually, under the constraints of biological growth and 
social or familial structures, they are provisionally fixed into the 
different semiotic materials - sound, movement, colour, shape. The chora 
is 'analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm', 'has no thesis and no 
position' (26). Without unity or identity, this rhythmic space is 
nevertheless subject to 'a regulating process' different from that of the 
symbolic law, and thus constitutes a basis for signification. We can 
imagine the semiotic chora 'in the cry, the sounds, the gesture of the 
baby'. In adult discourse, 'the semiotic functions as rhythm, prosody, 
word game, the no-sense of sense, laughter'. 
34 Thus the semiotic is 
distinguished from signification, which is 'a realm of positions'. 
Postitionality, by which signification becomes possible, requires 
the identification of the subject and its distinction from objects; the 
subject must separate from and through his image, from and through his 
objects. Kristeva calls this 'break' which produces the positing of 
signification, the 'thetic phase' (RPL, 43). This thetic subject governs 
the whole tradition of Occidental thought and is the basis of its 
rationalism, and Kristeva sees its clearest expression in the 
'transcendental ego' of Husserl: 
The thetic permits the constitution öf the symbolic with its 
vertical stratification (referent, signified, signifier) and 
all the subsequent modalities of logico-semantic articulation. 
The thetic originates in the 'mirror stage' and is completed, 
through the phallic stage, by the reactivation of the Oedipus 
complex in puberty; no signifying practice can be without it. 
Though absolutely necessary, the thetic is not exclusive: the 
semiotic, which also precedes it, constantly tears it open, and 
this transgression brings about all the various transformations 
of the signifying practice that are called 'creation'. 
(RPL, 62) 
The crux of Kristeva's theory is the dialectic of these two heterogeneous 
realms - semiotic and symbolic - which operate in signifying practice 
reciprocally and inseparably. The thetic phase is 'the precondition for 
such a heterogeneity' (63), an absolute necessity which 'marks a 
25 
threshold between the semiotic and the symbolic' (48). 
Among signifying practices, poetry is the special focus of 
Kristeva's work, since it is situated directly over the schism between 
the thetic and semiotic practices and impulses. Poetic language, she 
argues, 'reintroduces through the symbolic that which works on, moves 
through, and threatens it' - the semiotic (81). Kristeva champions 
avant-garde texts (Artaud, Mallarme, Lautremont, Joyce) which demonstrate 
a destruction of the unified thetic subject through the articulation of 
the semiotic. Such texts, shattering positionality, unleash a profound 
force of rupture or 'negativity' that might, just possibly, constitute a 
terrain where a new kind of subject and discourse might be engendered. 
Without transforming the subject, Kristeva argues, there will be no 
revolution on the socio-symbolic level either. Only 'the production of a 
different kind of subject' can bring about 'new social relations' (105). 
She champions the works of the avant-garde modernists as potentially 
revolutionary, as playing a role in the transformation or subversion of 
capitalism. 
Even while she valorizes the irruption of the semiotic, however, 
Kristeva also emphasizes the necessity of the thetic, stressing that the 
breach of the symbolic by the semiotic in poetic practice is necessarily 
relative. A text requires 'a completion', 'a kind of totalization of 
semiotic mobility' in order to hold together as a text: 'This completion 
constitutes a synthesis that requires the thesis of language in order to 
come about, and the semiotic pulverizes it only to make it a new device' 
(RPL, 51). This is what distinguishes a text as signifying practice from 
neurotic or psychotic discourse. After all, no text can be altogether 
devoid of meaning or signification; the 'valorizations of presymbolic 
semiotic stases, not only require the ensured maintenance of this 
signification, but also serve signification, even when they dislocate 
it, (65). 
What remains problematic in Kristeva is the link between this poetic 
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destruction of masculine rationality, and a specifically political 
practice, feminist or socialist. Allon White remarks of her work: 
The space between the formal textual innovations which she 
describes and the radical political practice (feminism) to 
which she subscribes is never satisfactorily filled, since the 
destruction of syntactic order and pronominal stability in a 
poetic discourse, even when it can be appropriated for 
political use is, always and only, a negative politics, an 
evanescent disruption, incapable of identifying its own 
political agent (masculine or feminine). 
For White, then, Kristeva's 'psycho-anarchic aesthetics' replaces 'a 
repressive, phallocentric logos' by a 'politically impotent', 'drifting, 
dispersed' subject, which will be dangerously vulnerable to the force of 
social history. 
35 Yet, on the other hand, Kristeva is criticized by 
other feminists for her valorization of the symbolic as a necessary 
resource, at least temporarily, though it has, ultimately, to be rejected 
again. The fact that these criticisms of Kristeva come from both sides 
shows that they abstractly single out what is, in her theory itself, a 
necessary dialectic between anarchic destruction and repressive mastering 
of these desires and impulses, neither of which must be reduced to the 
other. 
Kristeva has most powerfully made the case for a non-essentialist 
yet feminine writing, taking to task her coevals who are somewhat 
ambivalent on this point. Irigaray's use of woman's autoeroticism, her 
sexual organs being composed of 'two lips which embrace continually', 
provides a series of bodily metaphors that come perilously close to 
biological essentialism. Cixous also maintains woman's closeness to the 
body, defends the characteristics of the writing of women who speak with 
the body, and celebrates the 'gestation drive', yet, in the face of this 
biologistic tendency, she names James Joyce and Jean Genet together with 
Colette and Marguerita Duras as exceptional writers who successfully 
articulate a feminine discourse. 
36 Kristeva distrusts a 'romantic' 
belief in feminine identity and sees such literary practices as the mere 
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inverse of phallocratism, which, for all their revolutionary rhetoric, 
only reinstate the site of women's oppression and confinement. For 
Kristeva, femininity is a position, not an essence, an archaic phase of 
experience that remains available as a possibility rather than a 
substantive identity given once and for all: 'In "woman", I see something 
that cannot be represented, something that is not said, something above 
and beyond nomenclatures and ideologies. There are certain "men" who are 
familiar with this phenomenon; it is what some modern texts never stop 
signifying'. 
37 The feminine (or rather the maternal body), is situated 
in the semiotic, the pre-Oedipal phase, but actual women must submit to 
the symbolic in order to constitute themselves as speaking human 
subjects. Unlike the son, the daughter is of the same sex as the mother 
and thus has a stronger identification with the mother's body and is less 
inhibited towards the desire for her body. Her separation from the 
maternal body is accordingly imperfect, and she remains in a more 
intimate relation with the semiotic level of signification; women live 
at the borderline, in the margin of the symbolic. Situated between 
nature and culture, chaos and order, woman is neither outside nor inside; 
she is necessarily, in Woolf's term, 'androgynous'. Woolf, too, talks of 
the 'split' in the woman's consciousness, which 'can think back through 
its fathers or through its mothers' (RO, 146), and defines women as 
'trespassers' who emerge from the margin to which they are allocated, 
transgressing the boundaries that delimit inside from outside. Woolf 
adds that: 'Poetry ought to have a mother as well as a father (RO, 155); 
a great literary mind has to be 'androgynous'. Thus Woolf's argument 
bears an affinity to Kristeva's theory of poetic language: poetry is 
poised over the tension between the thetic and the semiotic practices, 
and in poetic language the semiotic mode of signification articulates 
ruptures, to a greater or lesser degree in the symbolic order. 
Woolf is, indeed, one of the few women writers occasionally 
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mentioned by Kristeva, who is notoriously dismissive of the works of 
women. She deals with Woolf briefly in one short chapter of About 
Chinese Women, and also in 'Oscillation between power and denial', in 
which Woolf's writing is mentioned as an example of a woman's discourse 
in which language is 'seen from a foreign land', 'from the point of view 
of an asymbolic, spasmodic body', but, Kristeva demurs, she does not go 
as far as to 'dissect language as Joyce does'. 
38 It is in the light of 
this admittedly qualified endorsement that, where appropriate, I seek to 
demonstrate in detail the value of Kristeva's theoretical exposition for 
the understanding of Woolf's literary practice in the chapters that 
follow. 
CHAPTER II: JACOB'S ROOM 
When Woolf condemns the Edwardian novelists, arguing that 'for us 
those conventions are ruin, those tools are death' (CE, 1: 330), her protest 
is not simply against the style and mode of writing of one specific 
literary generation (though it is this as well). Probing her discontent, 
one encounters a more fundamental problem, a dissatisfaction with 
representation, writing or, in Lacanian terms, the symbolic order and its 
intrinsic phallocentricity, for, as Lacanian psychoanalysis maintains, 
the symbolic is constituted with the phallus as privileged signifier. In 
this sense, as I argued above, Woolf's critique of Edwardian realism is 
ultimately a feminist protest as well. The famous 'series of gig-lamps 
symmetrically arranged' is an image of the ordered life viewed by a 
unified, fixed subject. In opposing this, Woolf evokes the psychic 
dimension which is excluded from life as defined by the 'thetic' subject 
- not the rigidly coherent but rather the 'varying', 'unknown', 
'uncircumscribed', that which shows 'aberration or complexity' in the 
unformed haze of its 'luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope' 
(CE, 2: 106). 
Woolf's dissatisfaction is, ultimately, with the symbolic order, 
with language itself which, as a code and structure, necessarily 
alienates and represses the incommensurable dimension of existential 
reality. When Woolf chides the Edwardians for their literary inability 
to grasp, 'whether we call it life or spirit, truth or reality, this, the 
essential thing'(CE, 2: 105), she deplores their complacent blindness to 
the very possibility of such a truth or final signified, that which Lacan 
calls the Real1 and which can never finally be caught in language. The 
desire for truth produces only an endless chain of signs, the 
substitution - indefinitely repeated - of one signifier for another. But 
literature nevertheless refuses to abandon its quest for a final 
adequation of language and the real. For as Roland Barthes argues: "I 
said a moment ago that, apropos of knowledge, literature is categorically 
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realist, in that it never has anything but the real as its object of 
desire; and I shall say now... that literature is quite stubbornly 
unrealistic; it considers sane its desire for the impossible'. 
2 Woolf 
criticizes Edwardian 'realism' in the name of this more radical 'real'. 
In The Voyage Out Terence's desire to 'write a novel about Silence' 
(VO, 262) incarnates this contradiction of the novel. He seeks to write 
a novel because the desire for a final truth is not abandoned, but a 
novel about silence because language necessarily excludes and defers that 
truth indefinitely. Woolf's short story title, 'An Unwritten Novel' 
(1920), also encapsulates the impossible desire for a full literary 
representation that would evade the duplicities of language, that would 
not, in Jacques Derrida's terms, surrender presence to 'difference'. 
In another early sketch, 'Monday or Tuesday', the heron or narrative 
consciousness passes in the sky, 'desiring truth, awaiting it, 
laboriously distilling a few words, for ever desiring - '(HH, 12). 
Woolf's fiction is driven forwards by this desire for an elusive trut h, a 
point where the narrative might seize a meaning which would at last halt 
the frustrating play of signs. This is shown both thematically and 
technically in her early experimental short stories. The desire for 
truth takes as its starting point the signs which fill the world, but the 
endeavour to read these signs rightly in order to grasp the truth only 
produces more signs, fabricates more signifiers. The truth is thus 
deferred, and this deferring (differance) sustains the discourse of the 
stories. Published in 1917, 'The Mark on the Wall' is the very first 
example of Woolf's distinctively modernist writing. It records the 
attempt to decipher a sign (the mark) on white paper (the wall), and 
comes to an end after a revealing comment from the other person in the 
room: "'I don't see why we should have a snail on our wall. " Ah, the 
mark on the wall! It was a snail'(HH, 48). Yet even if one finds out 
what the mark on the wall really is, the narrator writes early in the 
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story, 'what should I gain? - Knowledge? Matter for further 
speculation? ' (HH, 46). 
3 The substitution of one signifier for another 
and the slippage of the signified beneath the signifier will never end. 
'An Unwritten Novel' is basically structured in the same way as 'The 
Mark on the Wall', for it too begins with a curious sign which invites 
the narrator to decipher its meaning. The narrator seeks to interpret 
signs produced by the woman opposite her on the train: 'I read her 
message, deciphered her secret, reading it beneath her gaze'(HH, 16). 
Yet the truth is elusive and the final revelation is postponed, and this 
deferring provokes the play of the narrator's imagination and thus 
constitutes the very ground of her discourse: 'Have I read you right? 
But the human face - the human face at the top of the fullest sheet of 
print holds more, withholds more'(HH, 20). The discourse comes to an end 
when the narrator discovers, not the truth, but that the truth has 
slipped away: 'Well, but I'm confounded'(HH, 26). Since truth forever 
slides away from one's grasp, the story embodying that truth will never 
be written, hence 'an unwritten novel'. 
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the human gaze is crucial in the 
establishment of a 'mirror relation', in which the Imaginary object 
bolsters the subject in an illusory self-identity by reflecting back to 
it an image that is at once itself and another. This initial 
establishment of an Imaginary relation is the germinating moment in the 
writing of a story, for without this illusory identification of the self 
with the object, the story and the practice of writing would be 
impossible. The narrator of 'An Unwritten Novel' is trapped into this 
imaginary relation by a woman's eyes, for while all other passengers 
'forbade intercourse', the woman 'gazed into my eyes as if searching any 
sediment of courage at the depths of them' (H H, 15). The story records a 
process of increasing identification with the woman's acts: 'she saw 
me... she had communicated, shared her secret, passed her . poison'(HH, 
16). 
Thus only from this Imaginary perspective could the narrator start 
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writing the story of the woman, but once it is established, the narrator 
has to shield her eyes from the other's gaze in order to continue this 
illusory relation. The narrative consciousness enters a state in which 
subject and object are interchangeable: 'who was saying that eggs were 
cheap? You or I? (H H, 21). The gulf between subject and object being 
closed, all intermediary hindrances become transparent and the meaning of 
the object shines forth naturally. An ideal state of the self-presence 
of meaning is achieved: 'when the self speaks to the self, who is 
speaking? '(HH, 24). However, it is, after all, an illusion. When the 
woman opens her eyes again, the narrator discovers that they do not after 
all constitute a reciprocating gaze, and there is a break in the 
Imaginary relation. 'Now, eyes open, she looks out; and in the human eye 
- how d'you define it? - there's a break -a division - so that when 
you've grasped the stem the butterfly's off'(HH, 20). With the breakdown 
of the Imaginary bond, the narrator comes to realize its illusoriness: 
'Well, my world's done for! What do I stand on? What do I know?... Who 
am I? (H H, 26). The collapse of the Imaginary is not simply the 
destruction of the other; since the other and the self are mutually 
dependent, the narrator has to ask not only 'Who are you? ' but also 'Who 
am I? ' Identity itself is threatened by the failure of the specular 
relationship. As the title itself suggests, 'An Unwritten Novel' thus 
dramatizes the problem of writing, the impossibility of closing the gap 
between the subject who writes and the subject who is written about. 
On 26th January 1920, Woolf writes in her diary: 'some idea of a new 
form for a new novel. Suppose one thing should open out of another - as 
in An Unwritten Novel - only not for 10 pages but 200 or so... Mark on the 
Wall K. G. and Unwritten Novel taking hands and dancing in 
unity' (WD, 23). This new novel becomes Jacob's Room, which is the first 
experimental novel written after her 1919 aesthetic manifesto. As part 
of her campaign against the Edwardians, it attempts to discover the new 
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style and form, the need of which she advocated in 'Modern Fiction'. 
After completing the novel, she wrote: 'There's no doubt in my mind that 
I have found out how to begin (at 40) to say something in my own 
voice' (WD, 47). Jacob's Room is fundamentally an extension of her 
earlier experimental short stories. Its major concern is the problem of 
a sign which remains elusive and enigmatic, the impossibility of reaching 
a final truth, which in turn precipitates a suspicion of signification 
itself and dissolves the complacent signifier-signified equivalence of 
Edwardian realism. 
Woolf remarks that the labour expended by novelists like Wells, 
Bennett and Galsworthy to prove 'the solidity, the likeness to life, of 
the story' is not merely wasteful, but is rather 'labour misplaced to the 
extent of obscuring and blotting out the light of the conception' 
(CE, 2: 106). In opposition to these novelists, Woolf announces her 
ambition towards a new form for a new novel in the diary entry already 
partially quoted above: 'no scaffolding; scarcely a brick to be seen; all 
crepuscular, but the heart, the passion, humour, everything as bright as 
fire in the mist'(WD, 23). This ambition is not simply the formal 
concern of Jacob's Room, but also constitutes the theme of the book, just 
as Woolf's experimental short stories are metafictional both formally and 
thematically. The theme of the novel is the bright fire of Jacob's 
being, but its very reverence for this evanescent quality results in the 
book's formal impossibility of rendering it. Woolf's polemic against 
Edwardian realism, which 'obscures' or 'blots out' the glow of essential 
being, is most directly enacted in the novel in Jacob's exasperation with 
the Cambridge tutor, Mr. Plumer. Exclaiming 'Oh God, Oh God, Oh God! ', 
Jacob leaves the luncheon party 'to restore his sense of freedom': 
'Bloody beastly! '(33). The social world that so discomforts him 
comprises 'Shaw and Wells and the serious sixpenny weeklies! '(33). The 
world of the older generation is presented as a gross material 
'scaffolding' or 'brick', which smothers the flame of the fresh, free 
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spirit: 'the cities which the elderly of the race have built upon the 
skyline showed like brick suburbs, barracks, and places of discipline 
against a red and yellow flame'(34). Thus the novel rehearses Woolf's 
own polemic in 'Modern Fiction' or 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown'. This 
quarrel with the parental generation is also expressed in Jacob's own 
literary tastes, in his contempt for 'modern novels' (the only novelist 
for him is Fielding) and in his enthusiasm for Shakespeare, the 
Elizabethans, the Greeks(33,121-122). 
... black outline upon what we are; upon the reality; the moors 
and Byron; the sea and the lighthouse; the sheep's jaw with the 
yellow teeth in it... 'I am what I am, and intend to be it, ' for 
which there will be no form in the world unless Jacob makes one 
for himself. The Plumers will try to prevent him from making 
it. Wells and Shaw and the serious sixpenny weeklies will sit 
on its head. (34) 
If the subject of the novel is 'What is Jacob? ', it is also the 
impossibility of even articulating, let alone successfully fulfilling, 
this concern in the available literary forms. In 'Modern Fiction' Woolf 
defends the 'spiritual' James Joyce against Edwardian 'materialism', and 
writes: 
he is concerned at all costs to reveal the flickerings of that 
innermost flame which flashes its messages through the brain, 
and in order to preserve it he disregards with complete courage 
whatever seems to him adventitious, whether it be probability, 
or coherence, or any other of these signposts which for 
generations have served to support the imagination of a reader 
when called upon to imagine what he can neither touch nor 
see. (CE, 2: 107) 
These are, of course, as much Woolf's own concerns as Joyce's, for in 
Jacob's Room she too will abandon probability, coherence, signposts, in 
order to let the 'flame' burn as it really is. David Lodge has 
characterized the experimentalism of this novel as a 'technique of 
radical and stylish deletion'. Such deletion is, he argues, 'the 
operation by which metonymic devices are produced', for 'structurally 
Jacob's Room belongs in the metonymic category'. 'Its experimentalism is 
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all performed on the chain of combination - the chain of contiguous 
events that is Jacob's life - and consists mainly in cutting away huge 
sections of this chain and viewing the remainder from odd angles and 
perspectives'. 
4 The text moves from one event to another, one scene to 
another, from one character's speculation on Jacob to another's 
impression of him ('one thing', Woolf noted in the diary, 'open[ing] out 
of another'(WD, 23)). It accumulates people, objects, hints around 
Jacob, but the centre itself remains curiously vacant, as the characters 
themselves anxiously note: 'the silent young man', 'how little he said', 
'if he is going to get on in the world he will have to find his 
tongue'(JR, 58,116,70). Nor does the text offer us, from the inside, a 
phenomenology of the protagonist's mind; we are informed that 'he lacked 
self-consciousness'(69), and this stress on Jacob's unconsciousness is 
recurrent. Sitting in the train 'unconscious'(28) or asleep 
'unconscious'(12), Jacob is a kind of lacuna in the consciousness of the 
text, an absent centre, a fissure in the text round which the other 
characters gravitate. This technique of 'deletion', which generates a 
central lacuna in the novel, is Woolf's specific against Edwardian 
realism. She denounces Bennett as 'the worst culprit' 'in as much as he 
is by far the best workman': 
He can make a book so well constructed and solid in its 
craftsmanship that it is difficult for the most exacting of 
critics to see through what chink or crevice decay can creep 
in. There is no t so much as a draught between the frames of the 
windows, or a crack in the boards. And yet - if life should 
refuse to live there? (CE, 2: 104) 
Solidly immaculate construction thus drives life from the novel, as if 
only chinks, crevices' and cracks let through the air that sustains its 
flame. At one point, Jacob's Room reports the opinion that 'character- 
drawing is a frivolous fireside art, a matter of pins and needles, 
exquisite outlines enclosing vacancy, flourishes, and mere scrawls' 
(154-155). If it is so, than vacancy had better be left undisguised, for 
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one will anyway endow Jacob with 'all sorts of qualities he had not at 
all'(72). Aware of the formidable problems of epistemology and 
signification, the novel refuses to define or describe Jacob or the 
essence of his being. Even if one tries to do so, 'there remains over 
something which can never be conveyed to a second person save by Jacob 
himself. Moreover, part of this is not Jacob but Richard Bonamy - the 
room; the market carts; the hour; the very moment of history'(71). The 
best the text can do is to move around Jacob in metonymic fashion, 
collecting odds and ends from the world surrounding him. Hence the title 
Jacob's Room, rather than, say, Jacob Flanders, as if the living flame of 
the young man's spirit, his 'luminous halo', will shine through from the 
room. 
The novel notes that over the doorway of Jacob's eighteenth century 
rooms 'a rose, or a ram's skull, is carved in the wood'(69,176). What 
does this curious indeterminacy mean? It does not seem to be just 
another item contributing to the book's characteristic 'effect of 
haziness' which, as Hermione Lee points out, arises 'largely from the 
syntactical qualities of the writing'. In fact, even such an astute 
practical critic as Lee ignores (represses) this peculiar ambiguity in 
the text, reducing it simply to 'his London rooms with the ram's skull 
over the door'. 
5 From a mere descriptive viewpoint, it is difficult to 
see how two such different objects could be confused with each other. We 
may therefore interpret the phrase as a trace of the novel's own 
reflexive meditations on the nature of the fictional process itself. The 
ram's skull or sheep's skull is a key image associated with Jacob from 
the beginning of the book. 'The sheep's jaw with the yellow teeth in it' 
was offered as an image of the intense reality of Jacob's being, in 
contrast to the solemn, stifling world of the Plumers. As a boy, Jacob 
had picked up a sheep's skull on the beach, as if the novel sought to 
infuse the breath of life into this skull. A skull that might be 
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transfigured into 'a luminous halo' may be seen as an emblem of the 
novel's own aspiration to totalize the series of glimpses, hints and 
fragmentary remarks about Jacob into a triumphant revelation of the 
essence of his being. 
It seems to me that the hesitation between 'ram's skull or rose' 
points towards a central polarity in Woolf's aesthetic: the opposition of 
allegory and symbol. The question at stake in Jacob's Room is whether 
the novel can transform the scattering of inert objects in, for example, 
Jacob's empty room at Cambridge into an organic unity, a skull into a 
rose. Its problem is whether the connotations accumulated around Jacob 
will, in a transfiguring flash, transform that absent centre into some 
resplendent symbol. The American theorist Paul de Man, in his campaign 
against the Romantic fetishization of the symbol, argues that the symbol 
is the product of the organic notion of literary form, in which life and 
form are identical - an effect valued by Coleridge as 'translucence': 
'the material substantiality dissolves and becomes a mere reflection of a 
more original unity that does not exist in the material world'. Compared 
with this glamorous notion of the symbol as 'an expression of unity 
between the representative and the semantic function of language', or 
as 'totality' or 'translucence' in which ideality shines through a 
reduced materiality, allegory appears mechanical and uncouth. In the 
allegorical form the original meaning is devoid of substance, for in 
contrast to the symbol, in which the yoking of being and signification is 
based on 'the organic coherence of the synecdoche', in allegory 'it is a 
pure decision of the mind'. 
6 Or as Frank Lentricchia succinctly 
summarizes: 'symbol is ontologically full while allegory is thin at best, 
and at worst "unsubstantial"... only an illusion of being'. 
I have cited David Lodge's argument that Woolf clearly exemplifies a 
general tendency of modernist writers to develop from metonymic (realist) 
to metaphoric (symbolist) representations of experience, and Woolf 
certainly belongs to this symbolist heritage of Anglo-American modernism. 
38 
With an acute awareness of her times as 'an age of fragments'(CE, 2: 156), 
she emphasizes the need of 'synthesis', the power of metaphor in poetry 
(CE, 2: 93-102), and against the drab world of the Edwardian 
'naturalists', she longs for the spiritual triumph of the symbolist 
novel. Yet with this recognition of her age as fragmented, she also has 
a clear-sighted awareness that the symbolist dream of organic unity is no 
longer easily attainable; truth and sign have fallen asunder. By a 
significant ambiguity - ram's skull or rose - the novel seems to record a 
doubt about the nature of its own achievement. It suggests that a 
distance has opened up between Woolf's aspiration towards totality and 
what the text itself actually shows. 
The novel early on inscribes a dour awareness of the impossibility 
of the symbol, an awareness that the sign is now radically severed from 
the origin. As Jacob strays on the beach and picks up the sheep's skull, 
his brother Archer hunts for him, shouting 'Ja - cob! ': 'The voice had an 
extraordinary sadness. Pure from all body, pure from all passion, going 
out into the world, solitary, unanswered, breaking against rocks - so it 
sounded'(7). Symbolism is only possible in the context of what Jacques 
Derrida terms 'phonocentricism', which postulates the 'absolute proximity 
of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the 
ideality of meaning'8, for this belief is, after all, the founding myth 
of the symbol, in which meaning redeems and illuminates the materiality 
of language from within. Archer's cry is thus a Utopian image of 
language, whose possibility is, however, immediately denied by the fact 
that it is unanswered, a vain call, hence its 'extraordinary sadness'. 
This vain call for Jacob is to be repeated by his friend Bonamy at the 
end of the novel; in this case, too, it receives no answer. The novel 
deconstructs phonocentricism despite its own deep nostalgia for a 
if zed 
transcendental source of meaning which shines through purA of 
materiality, and it grudgingly confirms the impossibility of the project 
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of the symbol. 
The novel is obsessed with the problem of the sign, its radical 
separation from the origin, the arbitrary relation of signifier and 
signified, and with the problem of speech and writing, for this latter 
opposition is another version of the duality of symbol and allegory. 
Symbolism is possible only in the context of a phonocentricism that (at 
least, in theory) subdues the materiality of the sign to a surge of 
spirit; while the practice of writing could be taken as an allegory of 
allegory itself, since it draws its scattered material fragments into 
endless, unmotivated formations of meaning. Such concerns of the novel 
are best focused when the question of the letter is discussed. 'Let us 
consider letters': when the narrator launches into speculation on 
letters, what is at stake is not just the problem of epistles but also 
that of signs in general, the problem of writing itself: 'to see one's 
own envelope on another's table is to realize how soon deeds sever and 
become alien. Then at last the power of the mind to quit the body is 
manifest, and perhaps we fear or hate or wish annihilated this phantom of 
ourselves, lying on the table'(91). Writing is the death of the origin. 
Letters are 'speech attempted', 'venerable', 'brave', 'forlorn, and 
lost'(91). But 
. 
sending one's voice over the telephone is no more 
successful than writing a letter in this attempt to 'penetrate': 'Can I 
never know, share, be certain? '(92). The phonocentric myth is 
deconstructed even by such everyday experiences, and the nature of 
language as 'proto-writing', as a system of differences prior to the 
division between speech and writing, is revealed. Once cut off from the 
origin - and this is necessary for signification to function - writing 
possesses an alarming freedom of its own and becomes untrustworthy. 
Moreover, in addition to this inherent duplicity of language, the writer 
may not even aim to convey truth. He or she may rather consider writing 
as a convenient disguise or simply flinch from the difficulty of 
truthfulness. Mrs. Flanders does never and can never write what she 
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really wants to: 'Don't go with bad women... and come back, come back, 
come back to me'(89); her Oedipal jealousy succumbs to repression and 
never reaches the written page. Nor does Jacob write what matters to 
him: 'that letter-writing is practised mendaciously nowadays, 
particularly by young men travelling in foreign parts, seems likely 
enough'(124). Inherently or contingently, letters are false, and this is 
so across the whole range of written texts. 
The same theme is emphasized with names and epitaphs. Though proper 
names should have a privileged relation to original truth, they all fail 
to grasp that truth, and are even on occasion highly deceitful. The 
connection between the name and its bearer is, in fact, dubious and 
arbitrary. Betty Flanders chose the epitaph 'Merchant of this city' for 
her husband's tombstone, since she had to call him something,, though 
there is no reason why he should be called so: 'as many still remembered, 
he had only sat behind an office window for three months, and before that 
had broken horses, ridden to hounds, farmed a few fields, and run a 
little wild'(14). What he was remains unresolvable, as does the novel's 
main inquiry into the nature of Jacob. The relation between the 
designation and the designated may not be simply unclear but blatantly 
inappropriate. The prostitute Florinda was given her name 'by a painter 
who had wished it to signify that the flower of her maidenhood was still 
unplucked'(76). The confidante, Mother Stuart, ('dirty lodging-house 
wallpaper- she was behind the chastity of Florinda'(76-77) would 
meaningfully point out that Stuart is the name of a Royal house, but 
what that signified, and what her business was, no one knew'(76). Here 
again the bond between the name and its bearer is shown to be broken. 
Another example of the lack of necessity linking name and bearer is the 
villa of the Cambridge don, Mr. Plumer. It is dubbed 'Waverley', but in 
the most inconsequential way: 'not that Mr. Plumer admired Scott or would 
have chosen any name at all, but names are useful when you have to 
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entertain undergraduates'(31). How, moreover, can one deduce the truth, 
however inquisitive one might be, if one does not get the name right in 
the first place, like Mrs. Papworth who cleans for Bonamy in Lincoln's 
Inn: 'Mr. Sanders was there again; Flanders she meant'(100). It is in 
the act of naming that language seems most unproblematically to get a 
purchase on the world beyond signs; here, if anywhere, it -seems to serve 
a humbly referential function. By foregrounding the arbitrariness, 
ironic ineptitude or even the sheer effacement of names, Jacob's Room 
asserts that even at this most basic level 'truth' remains bewilderingly 
elusive. 
Already distanced from the origin, the sign is only distanced 
further and further by any effort to return to that origin. Two months 
after his departure for Greece, Jacob's face is replaced in Fanny Elmer's 
mind by another sign, the statue of Ulysses: 
Sustained entirely upon picture post cards for the past two 
months, Fanny's idea of Jacob was more statuesque, noble, and 
eyeless than ever. To reinforce her vision she had taken to 
visiting the British Museum, where, keeping her eyes downcast 
until she was alongside of the battered Ulysses, she opened 
them and got a fresh shock of Jacob's presence, enough to last 
her half a day. (170) 
Since Ulysses is celebrated in Homer for his cunning resourcefulness, 
craftiness, even deceit, we may perhaps interpret him here as a figure 
for the untrustworthiness of language itself. The quest for the hidden 
meaning of a sign results only in the endless replacement of one 
signifier by another. 'But something is always impelling one to hum 
vibrating, like the hawk moth, at the mouth of the cavern of mystery' 
(72). A cavern might be straightforwardly penetrated, but the image of 
the moth suggests that to do so may be self-destructive, and the novel 
indeed implies that it is so. Both the quester and the object of the 
quest are moths, a double image Woolf had used in 'An Unwritten Novel': 
'Have I read you right?... the moth that hangs in the evening over the 
yellow flower.... I won't raise my hand. Hang still, then, quiver, life, 
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soul, spirit... 1, too, on my flower'(HH, 20). Jacob himself is an 
enthusiastic moth-hunter, and the novel ominously associates this pursuit 
with death; it notes that on the night when he caught a rare species, 
'the tree had fallen'(21), 'a sort of death in the forest'(30). 
In its nostalgia for a Utopia where the plenitude of the sign was 
once attained, Western thought has traditionally always accorded a 
special position to ancient Greece. It is thus not surprising that Greek 
culture is a persistent enthusiasm of Jacob's, and that he himself 
travels to Greece to experience it firsthand in the course of the novel. 
Of himself and his Cambridge friends, he declares: 'we are the only 
people in the world who know what the Greeks meant'(75). As I noted 
above, Jacob is compared to the statue of Ulysses, and even the sheep or 
ram's skull associated with him is a motif that links him to classical 
Greece. For the wood-carved ram's skull over the door of his room is a 
characteristic eighteenth century device which was revived from classical 
Greek and Roman sculpture by Robert Adam. 
9 Greece itself is in a sense 
the 'skeleton' of European civilization, the very base on which more than 
two millennia of European culture has been founded. Its ancient, white 
columns surviving on the dry, bare land, Greece in the novel is perhaps 
appropriately imaged as bleached 'bones': a stark truth stripped of the 
elegant trappings and mufflings of modern European life. 
Jacob's enthusiasm for Greece conceived as the stylistic antithesis 
of the stuffy. or flabby modes of contemporary culture is shared by the 
author. In her essay 'On Not Knowing Greek', published in The Common 
Reader in 1925, Woolf expounds the conventional Western idea of Greece as 
Utopian origin. 'The stable, the permanent, the original human being is 
to be found there'(CE, 1: 4); thus she praises Sophocles. She acclaims 
the 'symbolic power' of Aeschylus, which lets the essence of meaning 
shine through his metaphors. 'The meaning is just on the far side of 
language. It is the meaning which in moments of astonishing excitement 
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and stress we perceive in our minds without words'(CE, 1: 7). Woolf 
emphasizes as a crucial characteristic of Greek drama that it is meant to 
be listened to, not read: 
For none of these dramatists had the licence which belongs to 
the novelist, and, in some degree, to all writers of printed 
books, of modelling their meaning with an infinity of slight 
touches which can only be properly applied by reading quietly, 
carefully, and sometimes two or three times over. Every 
sentence had to explode on striking the ear, however slowly and 
beautifully the words might then descend, and however enigmatic 
might their final purport be. No splendour or richness of 
metaphor could have saved the Agamemnon if either images or 
allusions of the subtlest or most decorative had got between us 
and the naked cry (CE, 1: 8) 
It is not only in drama but also in all areas of life, philosophy, 
politics, that the people judged 'by ear', 'sitting out-of-doors at the 
play or listening to argument in. the market-place'. Therefore they 'were 
far less apt than we are to break off sentences and appreciate them apart 
from the context'(CE, 1: 10). 
Woolf's praise of Greece in her essay is permeated by Derrida's 
'phonocentricism'. The 'general force' of Aeschylus, the Sophoclean 
'type of the original man or woman'(CE, 1: 4), the meaning which 'we 
perceive in our minds without words', all these exemplify what Derrida 
has claimed to be the Western inheritance from Greek philosophy: 'the 
feelings of the mind, expressing things naturally, constitute a sort of 
universal language which can then efface itself'. 
1° These qualities of 
Greek style - 'compactness of the expression', 'to speak plainly yet 
fittingly without blurring the outline or clouding the depths'(CE, 1: 11), 
intensity and directness - are derived, in Woolf's speculations, from the 
warm climate which allowed the Greeks an outdoor existence in a small, 
organic community where 'everyone knows everyone else'. Woolf Is 
conception of the Greek community is similar to the 'authentic' community 
which Derrida discusses: 'a community of speech where all the members are 
within earshot', 
11 
where, accordingly, the relations of the members with 
one another are aural and unmediated, unlike the social relations within 
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modern communities which are only occasional and fragmentary, passing 
through the detour of the written document. (Hence the narrator's 
ambivalence towards letters and telephone-calls in Jacob's Room, which 
are unsatisfactory but indispensable substitutes for a fuller community 
which does not exist. ) In Derrida's mythical community, language is 
speech rather than writing, and therefore 'because the voice, the 
producer of the first symbols, has a relationship of essential and 
immediate proximity with the mind', the signifier and the signified do 
not yet know disparity; but this authentic community is irretrievably 
lost in modern society. Even the Greek language itself survives only in 
the 'fallen' mode of writing. 'We cannot hear it', complains Woolf 
(CE, 1: 11), and she speculates that we can therefore never hope to grasp 
the truth of the Greek sentence. To show how far we are from the 'whole 
fling' of the Greek original, she instances Shelley taking twenty-one 
words of English to translate thirteen words of Greek. Modern languages 
thus have a kind of slack inertia far removed from the lean suppleness of 
Greek itself. 
Yet in spite of all the possibilities of misunderstanding, Woolf 
contends that there is one unmistakeable characteristic of Greek 
literature; it is an impersonal literature, free from self-consciousness. 
This point is also relevant to Jacob's Room, for, as I have noted, 
unconsciousness is a key element in the characterization of Jacob. 
Unselfconscious and distinguished in appearance, Jacob is clearly 
associated with Greek art, and hence Fanny can find the statue of Ulysses 
a satisfying substitute for her absent lover. Lack of self-consciousness 
and impersonality derive from the happy unity of meaning and being, idea 
and form; Jacob is not afflicted by what T. S. Eliot would term the 
'dissociation of sensibility', any more than Greek art is. In fact, 
Eliot's concept of the 'objective correlative' is not irrelevant here. 
Mowbray Allan has suggested that the origin of that notion might be 
45 
traced back to Pater and beyond him to the Hegelian idea of Greek art: 
'this unity, this perfect harmony between the idea and its external 
manifestation, constitutes the second form of art - the Classic Form. 
Here art has attained its perfection, in so far as there is reached a 
perfect harmony between the idea as spiritual individuality, and the form 
as sensuous and corporal reality'. 
12 And Eliot's own 'objective 
correlative' is precisely an aspiration towards this perfect match of 
inner and outer which Greek art traditionally exemplifies: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by 
finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of 
objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the 
formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external 
facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, 
the emotion is im-nediately evoked. 13 
Symbolism in poetry is essentially a belief in 'a special 
unarbitrary mode of language'. 
14 As a magical fusion of signifier and 
signified, being and meaning, the symbol testifies to a miraculous state 
in. which the body or sensuous form is made luminous by the spirit within. 
It is, then, no surprise that the symbolist Eliot diagnoses Woolf's 
collection of short stories, Monday or Tuesday in precisely these terms, 
conceding a certain merit to the author's persistence in her literary 
perversity: 
A good deal of the secret of the charm of Mrs. Woolf's shorter 
pieces is the immense disparity between the object and the 
train of feeling which it has set in motion. Mrs. Woolf gives 
you the minutest datum, and leads you on to explore, quite 
consciously, the sequence of images and feelings which float 
away from it. The result is something which makes Walter Pater 
appear an unsophisticated rationalist, and the writing is often 
remarkable. The book is one of the most curious and 
interesting examples of a process of dissociation which in that 
direction, it would seem, cannot be exceeded. 15 
Woolf's experimental short stories are, indeed, in scandalous opposition 
to the canons of Eliot's own aesthetic, displaying the subtlest 
cultivation of the 'dissociation' of object and feeling, outer and inner; 
and Jacob's Room, as an extension of the short stories, would also earn 
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Eliot's disapproval. In the novel there is an acute sense that the 
miraculous unity of form and idea or body and spirit is no longer 
possible, that meaning/truth and the sign are radically sundered. Both 
thematically and formally, the text demonstrates a 'postlapsarian' 
awareness of some catastrophic unhinging of being and meaning, and is 
tormented by its urgent need to decipher signs and fragments from which 
God has apparently withdrawn. It is Jacob himself who is this withdrawn 
God, the absent centre that leaves only shards, shreds and signs for us 
to decipher laboriously. The narrator's celebration of Jacob is an 
expression of nostalgia for the lost origin, and yet since it is, after 
all, irretrievably lost in the fallen present, a sense of remoteness and 
intangibility also characterizes him. Hence that unidentified 
'overpowering sorrow'(47) which underpins the elegiac tone of the novel 
throughout. 
Jacob incarnates a 'Greek' plenitude of meaning that the novel 
simultaneously knows to be unattainable, and his lack of self- 
consciousness pertains to him at least as much as an empty sign as a 
desirably full one. When the novel first offers a detailed description 
of Jacob's room at Cambridge, it is empty: 'listless is the air in an 
empty room, just swelling the curtain; the flowers in the jar shift. One 
fibre in the wicker arm-chair creaks, though no-one sits there'(37), and 
these very same lines are repeated after Jacob's death at the end of the 
text. The faint movement of air gives a brief, illusory effect of 
Jacob's spirit animating the room, but only in the end emphasizes its 
vacancy the more poignantly, and thus the novel acknowledges its 
recognition of Jacob as an empty sign. If this is so, then the answer to 
the hesitation between 'rose' or 'ram's skull' seems to incline towards 
the skull (allegory) rather than the rose (symbol). The innumerable 
objects that gather around the absent centre stubbornly refuse to be 
synthesized into an organic whole. Fragments of impressions and opinions 
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remain forever tantalising, generating only more and more interpretation. 
Despite the novel's aspiration towards symbolism and its nostalgia for 
the phonocentric ideal -a voice purged of materiality - it remains 
ineradically allegorical. Heaps of objects, people, activities 
accumulate until 'the observer is choked with observations'(67). Too 
many objects present themselves, provocatively, as signs to be read: 'so 
many things to look at'(79). 
Each had his past shut in him like the leaves of a book... 
a book known to him-and his friends could only read the 
title, dames Spalding or Charles Budgeon, and the passengers 
going the opposite way could read nothing at all - save 'a man 
with a red moustache, ' 'a young man in grey smoking a 
pipe. 1(63) 
Every face, every shop, bedroom window, public-house, and dark 
square is a picture feverishly turned - in search of what? It 
is the same with books. What do we seek through millions of 
pages? (96) 
The world becomes text, alluring one towards a final meaning with its 
profusion of emblems, but instead of offering a moment of totalization in 
which a transcendental signifier would be revealed, it overloads, even 
overwhelms the observer with more and more signifiers, rendering a final 
truth ever more distant. 
Walter Benjamin, as one of the critics who attempts to redeem 
allegory from the Romantic denigration of it, notes of the Baroque 
Trauerspiel: 'Seventeenth-century allegory, obsessed as it is by emblem 
and hierogylph, is a profoundly visual form; but what swims into 
visibility is nothing less than the materiality of the letter 
itself'. 16 In the light of this comment, one might consider the short 
story, 'The Lady in the Looking-Glass' (published in 1929), which deals 
in a more focused way with some of the issues raised by Jacob's Room. 
The theme of the story is the attempt to decipher an enigmatic sign, 
Isabella ('reticent', like Jacob), in her room while the house is empty. 
In the looking-glass objects cease 'to breathe and lie still in the 
trance of immortality' and become signs, while in the real world, the 
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faint noise of the outside air - 'the voice of the transient' - comes and 
goes 'like human breath'(HH, 87). The convolvulus, letters, traces, the 
'spindly and hieroglyphic' legs of the furniture constitute a sprawling 
mesh of signs, opaque and material, or what we can designate ecriture. 
The desire of the narrative consciousness, however, is to catch 
Isabella's 'profounder state of being', 'the state that is to the mind 
what breathing is to the body'(HH, 90). Thus the dualism breathing/body, 
voice/written signs structures the story, and the narrative consciousness 
expresses a phonocentric desire for a truth freed of the clogging 
materiality of the body or writing. Isabella is compared to 'the 
fantastic and the tremulous convolvulus', but the narrative condemns its 
own simile as 'worse than idle and superficial': 'they are cruel even, 
for they come like the convolvulus itself trembling between one's eyes 
and the truth'(HH, 87). The paradox of figurative language is that 
despite its efforts to violently 'turn' (trope) literal meaning in an 
effort to hew close to the contours of the object, it may display an 
alarming and autonomous life of its own beneath which the object is 
submerged. This fear of figurality lies deep within the traditional 
empiricism of English culture, as is shown by its being common to both 
Woolf and one of her severest critics, F. R. Leavis. In Revaluation Leavis 
denounces Shelley's poetry for just such a surplus of signification: 
In the growth of those 'tangled boughs' out of the leaves, 
exemplifying as it does a general tendency of the images to 
forget the status of the metaphor or simile that introduced 
them and to assume an autonomy and a right to propagate, so 
that we lose in confused generations and perspectives the 
perception or thought that was the ostensible raison d'etre of 
imagery, we have a recognized essential trait of Shelleys: his 
weak grasp upon the actual. 
Shelley's images 'stand for nothing that Shelley could have pointed to in 
the scene before him'. 
17 Refusing this humbly referential function, they 
foreground only themselves, thus enacting the kind of 'dissociation' 
between object and feeling that, as we have seen, Eliot identified in 
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Woolf's work. The desire for transparent reference is the other side of 
Woolf's demand for speech rather than writing, breathing rather than 
body, essence rather than the inspissation of the mere phenomenon. For 
both Leavis and the narrator of the story, the signifier is tolerable 
only at the moment of its self-effacement before the signified. The 
story refuses the materiality of the sign, questing instead for a final 
signified: 'There must be truth; there must be a wall'(87). 
At last Isabella herself appears. Under the pressure of the 
interpreter's desire to 'fasten her down there'(89), the sign opens 
itself to indeterminacy or polyvalence. The expression of her eyes is 
'mocking or tender, brilliant or dull', and one is left with only the 
'indeterminate outline' of her face. None the less, the story does seem 
to have its moment of revelation in which the elusive sign is finally 
fixed and penetrated, as Isabella renders herself a sign in the tableau 
of reflections in the mirror: 
At once the looking-glass began to pour over her a light that 
seemed to fix her; that seemed like some acid to bite off the 
unessential and superficial and to leave only the 
truth... Everything dropped from her - clouds, dress, basket, 
diamond - all that one had called the creeper and 
convolvulus. (HH, 91-92) 
But just as one expects to encounter 'the hard wall beneath', which the 
creepers had concealed, that final meaning after the tangle of 
hieroglyphs is cleared or 'the woman herself', 'there was nothing. 
Isabella was perfectly empty'(92). The sign conceals nothing; it is 
vacant; there neither was once an origin, nor ever will be a final 
meaning, behind it. For the signifier precedes the signified: the 
signifier lures one into the play of signs only to produce more 
signifiers, refusing to be pinned down to the signified. Nor can one 
reach back to an 'essence' of Isabella from the 'traces' of her that one 
might find in the letters in her room; meaning does not precede its 
trace, but is always part of a system of traces. There is, Derrida 
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argues, no pure presence, for presence is only a 'synthesis of 
traces'. 18 Deconstructing the philosophy of presence and 
phonocentricism, Derrida interrogates the hierarchy which has subjugated 
writing to speech, and he exposes the mauvaise foi of speech as the self- 
presence of meaning. Writing is not the mere secondary trace of a pre- 
existing truth, nor an innocent recording technique. Rather than being 
superfluous to meaning, the 'trace' or 'proto-writing' is the very 
condition of signification. As Isabella stands 'veined and lined', there 
are only traces, nothing beyond or behind - only creepers and tendrils 
with no supporting wall. The story exposes the materiality of the sign 
and the inevitable disappointment of any nostalgia for a transcendental 
source of meaning. The figurative language which 'come[s] like the 
convolvulus itself trembling between one's eyes and the truth' is in fact 
the very nature of language through and through. 'She suggested the 
fantastic and the tremulous convolvulus rather than the upright aster, 
the starched zinnia, or her own burning roses alight like lamps on the 
straight posts of their rose trees'(87). Here, as with the 'rose or a 
ram's skull' of Jacob's Room, two possibilities are presented to us: the 
'allegorical' convolvulus, which interferes between the gaze and 'truth' 
and asserts its tangled lines as emblems to be decoded, or (in Benjamin's 
terms) the 'auratic' object, 
19 the lamp-like rose, a symbol through which 
the essence of being shines to become a luminous halo. But Isabella is a 
convolvulus rather than a burning rose, as the story finally confirms; 
and so too, perhaps, is Jacob. Thus though Woolf's texts aspire to the 
symbol, they also inscribe a recognition that such triumphs of 
transcendental meaning may no longer be possible in a fallen world. This 
'fall', I shall suggest, is related by the novel to the First World War. 
It is well known that Woolf located the change of 'human character' 
'in or about December, 1910'(CE, 1: 320). Her particular reasons for 
assigning that date (probably the first Post-Impressionist exhibition) 
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are qualified by the jesting tone, her excessive precision. For Woolf 
knows well, as she attests in such phrases as 'I will hazard', 'more 
disputable perhaps', 'one must be arbitrary', that epochs do not arrive 
so punctually. Apart from December 1910, she often names the First World 
War as a turning point involving radical social change. 
20 In A Room of 
One's Own, the sight of a tailless cat triggers the narrator's awareness 
of some lack in the contemporary age, of some crucial difference between 
the prewar and postwar periods. At a luncheon party before the war 
people were, she claims, 'accompanied by a sort of humming noise, not 
articulate, but musical, exciting, which changed the value of the words 
themselves'(RO, 19). The narrator contrasts 'the difficulty of modern 
poetry'(RO, 22) with the naive energies of Victorian verse. Tennyson and 
Christina Rossetti, like the Romantics for Matthew Arnold, do not know 
enough, but Woolf is here more inclined to lament their lost vigour and 
'abandonment'(RO, 22) than she is to praise the moderns for their 
sophistication or irony. She attributes this post-Victorian 
disillusionment to the war: 'Shall we lay the blame on the war? When the 
guns fired in August 1914, did the faces of men and women show so plain 
in each other's eyes that romance was killed? '(RO, 23). Whether this is 
a desolating loss of belief or rather an awakening into maturity from the 
'illusion' or mauvaise foi of the Victorians, it is clear that in this 
postlapsarian age, when the transcendental signified has withdrawn, 
symbolism is not possible. It is no longer a simple task to harmonize 
the complex experiences of modern life, the profusion of material objects 
that surround us; thought and feeling, meaning and being are split 
asunder, 'dissociated'. Allegory now becomes, in the words of Fredric 
Jameson, 'the privileged mode of our own life in time, a clumsy 
deciphering of meaning from moment to moment, the painful attempt to 
restore a continuity to heterogeneous, disconnected instants'. 
21 Hence 
it is that Jacob's Room moves from moment to moment, object to object, in 
metonymic fashion as it seeks to decipher the emblems it encounters. 
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I have used the image of a theological 'fall' -in discussing the 
world of Jacob's Room, for it is the catastrophic advent of the 1914-18 
war which pitches English culture out of its Edwardian innocence into the 
embittered 'experience' of the 1920s. At the same time, this theological 
metaphor is also crucial 'to the symbolist aesthetic, since the symbol is 
viewed as the postlapsarian fragment of a unity of being that was once 
continuously available in the mythic organic community. Symbolist 
historiography is therefore preoccupied with locating the precise moment 
of this fall from grace - the Renaissance for Yeats, the English Civil 
War for Eliot22 - and Virginia Woolf applies this paradigm to her own 
experience of contemporary history. But this historical 'fall' is a 
punctual event that brings to individual consciousness what has, in fact, 
always existed, or, more strictly, in this particular case, what has 
never exisited - the plenitude of the sign. 
The war destroys Jacob, as it does the possibility of the symbol; it 
leaves his room untenanted, an empty sign. Jacob is certainly the war's 
victim, a youthful life wasted in a war started by his elders, but the 
relation between him and the First World War is in fact more complex than 
this. Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the 'theological' model of 
history seems to me particularly helpful in analyzing this relation. For 
Derrida there is no moment of pure presence which then succumbs to a 
disastrous Fall because presence is 'always already' inhabited by 
difference. It is not that 'evil' or 'experience' comes from the outside 
to violently overthrow a defenceless innocence, but rather that 
'innocence' is always contaminated by its opposite principle from the 
very start. Derrida demonstrates this powerfully in his analysis of 
Saussure in Of Grammatology. When Saussure complains that writing, which 
should merely be a secondary technique for recording speech, is 
insidiously affecting and denaturing pronunciation itself, Derrida 
retorts that 'the "usurpation" of which Saussure speaks, the violence by 
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which writing would substitute itself for its own origin... such a 
reversal of power cannot be an accidental aberration. Usurpation 
necessarily refers us to a profound possibility of essence'. 
23 In 
Jacob's Room itself, the novel's ambivalent hesitation between a 
theological and 'Derridean' view of history can be seen in the following 
passage: "'Jacob, " wrote Mrs. Flanders, with the red light on her page, 
"is hard at work after his delightful journey... " "The Kaiser, " the far- 
away voice remarked in Whitehall, "received me in audience" 1(173). The 
juxtaposition first dramatizes the incommensurability of private and 
public life, implying that the former is the helpless victim of the 
large-scale machinations of the latter. The passage is thus a grim 
'dramatic irony' where the audience is allowed a fuller glimpse of the 
imminent catastrophe than is perceived by the limited vision of the 
protagonist (here Mrs. Flanders). Yet in the light of the text's 
ambivalence over Jacob, we may also sense Derrida's 'profound possibility 
of essence'. The novel ironizes its own irony, raises its initial irony 
to the second degree, so that the initially shocking gap between private 
and public blurs and narrows to the point where Jacob and the Kaiser do 
not seem so different after all; both are representatives of a blind and 
destructive patriarchy. 
The novel in fact at various points notes Jacob's complicity with 
this destructive masculine power. Much later, in Three Guineas, Woolf 
explicitly connects Fascist war-mongering to an aggressiveness which may 
or may not be innate in the male, and this is an association that Jacob's 
Room, though far less emphatically, also suggests. When the boy Jacob is 
hunting for moths late at night, 'the tree had fallen': 
There had been a volley of pistol-shots suddenly in the depths 
of the wood. And his mother had taken him for a burglar when 
he came home late... The tree had fallen, though it was a 
windless night, and the lantern, stood upon the ground, had lit 
up the still green leaves and the dead beech leaves. It was a 
dry place. A toad was there. And the red underwing had 
circled round the light and flashed and gone. The red 
underwing had never come back, though Jacob had waited... 'How 
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you frightened me! ' she had cried. She thought something 
dreadful had happened-There he stood pale, come out of the 
depths of darkness, in the hot room, blinking at the light. 
(21-22) 
This incident remains mysterious, its aftertaste only a vague 
ominousness; only retrospectively can it be seen as foreboding Jacob's 
tragic end. Mrs. Flanders's lamentation - 'the only one of her sons who 
never obeyed her'(21) - hints that Jacob's death is the result of his 
going astray from maternal protection, evading maternal solicitude: 'You 
won't go far this afternoon, Jacob'(22), 'come back, come back, come back 
to me'(89). From the beginning of the novel Jacob is 'tiresome', 
'naughty', 'a handful', 'obstinate'(5,8,9) towards his mother. Early 
on Jacob's brother Archer interrupts his mother in her letter-writing: 
... nothing for it but to leave, " she read. "Well, if Jacob doesn't 
want to play ... "'(5), where the former phrase is from a sentence she has 
just written. This apparently contingent juxtaposition may, however, 
bear more meaning than it initially seems to. It evokes Jacob's general 
revolt against the parental generation, as later in the cases of Mr. 
Plumer or a Professor Bultul of Leeds - revolts that are 'insolent' yet 
endorsed by the narrator as 'perfectly right'(34,68), but it also evokes 
the mother's helpless resignation, as her weary desire to 'leave' seems 
to suggest a wish to abdicate responsibility for this difficult son 
rather than allude to the mere problems of holiday accommodation. Yet 
there is an ambivalence here, for two issues - Jacob's revolt against the 
whole older generation, and his departure into a man's world from the 
mother's territory - are shown in conjunction, but are in fact not 
reducible to each other. Jacob is presented as simultaneously an 
idealist rebel who stands up against the despicable world of the elders 
and yet also as an adherent of the masculinity which is the very founding 
principle of the world with which, in his other guise, he is so 
indignant. This ambivalence afflicts Jacob's Room throughout, and points 
towards the fundamental problem of the novel. 
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The precious moth which the boy Jacob had been hunting escapes, and 
if we recall the general symbolic value of the moth in Woolf - 'life, 
soul, spirit'(H H, 20) - this midnight moth-hunting clearly suggests a 
lethal violence, a dangerous intrusion into privacy, as is also implied 
by that imagery of 'pistol-shots' and the 'burglar' which terrifies 
Mrs. Flanders. This strange, violent group of images associated with the 
falling tree reappears later in the description of King's College Chapel, 
Cambridge, where Jacob is now a student, and thus links the university 
display of masculine virtue at its extreme with the ominous destruction 
of life. The narrator praises the light of Cambridge, projected out by 
the human intellect into an otherwise dark, formless chaos, and indulges 
in the fancy that 'the sky, washed into the crevices of King's College 
Chapel' is 'lighter, thinner, more sparkling than the sky elsewhere' 
(29-30). Turning to the chapel itself, the narrator is impressed by the 
procession of young men: 'how airily the gowns blow out, as though 
nothing dense and corporeal were within'(30). Cambridge is thus the 
locus of phonocentricism, where a spiritual voice or light triumphantly 
shines forth, subduing materiality. But that this effect can only be 
achieved by some unnaturally rigid control of the will is implied in the 
petrified 'sculptured faces' that sustain this 'certainty, authority 
controlled by piety'(30). This strenuous triumph of the human will over 
Nature is further instanced by the stained glass of the Chapel: 
Neither snow nor greenery, winter nor summer, has power over 
the old stained glass. As the sides of a lantern protect the 
flame so that it burns steady even in the wildest night - burns 
steady and gravely illumines the tree-trunks - so inside the 
Chapel all was orderly. Gravely sounded the voices; wisely the 
organ replied, as if buttressing human faith with the assent of 
the elements. (30) 
In this sanctuary of learning human power heroically subdues the 
hazardous flux of Nature, leaving 'all very orderly'(30). Here and 
elsewhere in the novel emerges a polarity characteristic of Woolf's work: 
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on the one hand, human will and reason, an ordered civilization; on the 
other, nature, darkness, chaos. A globe of light pure of contaminating 
materiality confronts the fertile yet threatening world of Darwinian 
evolution, of natural flux, and this is another version of the 
opposition symbol/allegory. Land and sea become major images for each 
term of this polarity: the Cornish coast, viewed from the ceaselessly 
undulating sea, wears 'an extraordinary look of calm, of sunny peace, as 
if wisdom and piety had descended upon the dwellers there'(47). Timothy 
Durrant, navigating his yacht, becomes for a brief, fanciful moment an 
image of heroic Man on a solitary journey through the universe, questing 
boldly forwards through the wilderness and bearing onwards the light of 
civilization. For Woolf, this formidable responsibility is specifically 
associated with the male, and will receive its most memorable embodiment 
in the figure of Mr. Ramsay in To the Lighthouse. In that novel the sea 
is on the whole a menacing 'fluidity' contrasted with the 'inside [of] 
the room' where exist 'order and dry land'(TL, 151-152). But, as I shall 
argue in my next chapter, the sea also has a more benign, equally 
traditional value as the 'maternal' ocean, the primitive matrix of the 
world, and such is its role in Mrs. Dalloway. 
In the face of the 'trampling energy' of the wind which 'rolls the 
darkness' through the night streets, the subtleties of individual 
difference and the niceties of everyday social decorum are equally 
irrelevant: 'All faces - Greek, Levantine, Turkish, English - would have 
looked much the same in that darkness' (161). Yet despite the formidable 
power of the flux, the will affirms itself: 'At length the columns and 
the Temples whiten, yellow, turn rose; and the Pyramids and St. Peter's 
arise, and at last sluggish St. Paul's looms up'(161). In the end, 
indeed, the dark midnight wind, the persistent menace of 'a sea coldly, 
greenly, swaying outside' becomes almost imperceptible to the citizen 
immersed in the routines of quotidian life, particularly in a modern 
world governed by 'the day's meaning'(161). For the light of 
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civilization, which can be compared to 'the bright, inquisitive, 
armoured, resplendent, summer's day', 'has long since vanquished 
chaos... dried the melancholy mediaeval mists; drained the swamp and stood 
glass and stone upon it'(163). None the less, these impressive 
'trappings' of civilized life and the nuances of individual difference 
will at last become mere 'skeleton', broken pieces of bone that will 
ultimately constitute the only remaining evidence of the existence of 
homo sapiens to the Darwinian scientist of the future. Who, the narrator 
asks, 'save the nerve-worn and sleepless, or thinkers standing-on some 
crag above the multitude, see things thus in skeleton outline, bare of 
flesh? In Surbiton the skeleton is wrapped in flesh'(162). The novel's 
recurrent imagery of skulls and bones (see at least 9,69,131-133,162, 
172,176) serves as a stark reminder of this grim reality of a human 
existence caught up in the inescapable flux and decay of Darwinian 
nature. Darwinism may now be a familiar part of our world-picture, but 
for Jacob's Room it retains all the traumatic force that it had for the 
Victorians themselves. 'Perhaps... we do not believe enough. Our fathers 
at any rate had something to demolish', and Jacob still 'believes' enough 
to attempt to pit political commitment against the 'dark waters which lap 
us about'(137) and threaten to demolish human values. But the 'dark 
waters' are such a wholesale nullification of the socio-symbolic human 
world that both the novel and the hero are somewhat pessimistic about 
this political project: 'what use are fine speeches and Parliament, once 
you surrender an inch to the black waters? '(138). This loss of belief, 
whether or not it was illusion in the first place, leaves the moderns 
powerless. This problem is also pondered in A Room of One's Own, when 
the narrator recognizes the death of 'romance' in the postwar generation: 
'why, if it was an illusion, not praise the catastrophe, whatever it was, 
that destroyed illusion and put truth in its place? '(RO, 23). In spite 
of her awareness that it was illusion, the narrator none the less covets 
58 
the passion which such illusion could generate, for only illusion and 
passion can sustain the globe of light, the symbol, civilization itself 
in the midst of, and in defiance of, the engulfing dark flux. If error 
is, as Nietzsche has argued, necessary and not simply contingent, life- 
sustaining rather than a dangerous confusion, then the narrator of A Room 
of One's Own is well justified in inquiring 'which was truth and which 
was illusion...? '(RO, 23-24) 
Woolf's attitude to the contending forces of natural flux and the 
light of humanity is ambivalent. Nature, to be sure, is fearful, 
hostile, impenetrable by human reason. A lantern put under a tree 
attracts every insect in the forest: 'they amble round the lantern and 
blindly tap as if for admittance', but they 'have no purpose - something 
senseless inspires them'(JR, 30), thus the text suggests the 
irreducibility of Nature to human purposes. The half-dead tree - 'the 
still green leaves and the dead beech leaves'(21) - suddenly falls with 
as little reason. 
24 The human world is, in contrast, a zone of security 
under the governance of reason. But this opposition between 
Nature/danger and reason/human security can also be seen from a different 
point of view, from which the valuations of Nature and Culture are 
reversed. For the reason and order imposed by the human will on Nature 
can be seen as a force which damages, even destroys, life in the 
necessary process of providing security. In the passage I have already 
cited, as the red underwing flies away and a large toad looks much 
'besotted', the light of the lantern brusquely disturbs a nature which 
is, after all, the very matrix of life. 'A terrifying volley of pistol- 
shots rings out... a tree has fallen'(30), and the reader may well 
interpret this 'sort of death in the forest' as due to the intrusion of 
the lantern into the dark, seething fertility of the natural world. The 
aspiration towards 'light', towards 'elements' purged of any gross 
materiality, which impressed the narrator in King's College Chapel, also 
atrophies the spontaneous energies of life by its strained, constricting 
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use of the will. Such restraint and control are the governing principle 
of society in general, of 'the strokes which oar the world forward', 
'together with the incessant commerce of banks, laboratories, 
chancellories, and houses of business': 
And they are dealt by men as smoothly sculptured as the 
impassive policemen at Ludgate Circus. But you will observe 
that far from being padded to rotundity his face is stiff from 
force of will, and lean from the effort of keeping it so. When 
his right arm rises, all the force in his veins flows straight 
from shoulder to finger-tips; not an ounce is diverted into 
sudden impulses, sentimental regrets, wire-drawn distinctions. 
The buses punctually stop. (155) 
The callous inhumanity of the social force that subdues men (for 
Woolf relates it exclusively to men) to such actions is best attested in 
the description of a naval engagement which immediately precedes the 
policeman's 'force of will'. 'The battle ships ray out over the North 
Sea, keeping their stations accurately apart', and 'at a given signal' 
the master gunner fires his guns with superb accuracy: 'With equal 
nonchalance a dozen young men in the prime of life descend with composed 
faces into the depths of the sea; and there impassively (though with 
perfect mastery of machinery) suffocate uncomplainingly together'(155). 
The inhuman suppression of natural emotion fostered by militarism, 
signalled in terms like 'nonchalance', 'impassively', 'uncomplainingly', 
reduces the young men to the sub-human status of 'tin soldiers', 
'fragments of broken match-stick'(155); there is both a certain pathos in 
such phrases and yet a sense that, in themselves consenting to this 
dehumanization, they have forfeited a right to our full sympathy when 
they at last become victims of the violence it had always implicitly 
entailed. The policeman too reduces himself to the less than human; his 
face is as 'smoothly sculptured' as those of the choristers in King's 
College Chapel. 
The forces which such men fear as being dangerous and suppress in 
order to sustain civilization include 'sudden impulses, sentimental 
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regrets, wire-drawn distinctions'. These categories might conventionally 
be regarded as 'feminine' and are certainly so regarded by the novel, as 
for instance in Mrs. Flanders who, though she is a mature women of fifty 
with three sons, remains 'impulsive at heart'(90). Inquiry into human 
character, into 'deeps of feeling', 'sentiment and sensation' or 'love', 
is marginalized by 'the men in clubs and Cabinets' to the fireside or the 
drawing-room, female spaces where such woman's chatter can be tolerated 
as a mere 'matter of pins and needles'(153-155). Such marginalization 
must be rigidly maintained since, if even 'an ounce' of the force of male 
will were 'diverted' by sensation or feeling, the whole imposing social 
edifice would, in principle if not in immediate practice, be jeopardized. 
The 'sculptured faces' of these men in turn recall Jacob; Fanny uses 
the statue of Ulysses as a substitute for him, and Florinda declares, 
'Jacob. You're like one of those statues'(79). Jacob's masculinist 
rejection of feminine diversions had already been revealed by his musings 
in King's College Chapel. He feels that women should be banished, for it 
is their fault that his 'mind wanders': 'if the mind wanders it is 
because several hat shops and cupboards upon cupboards of coloured 
dresses are displayed upon rush-bottomed chairs. Though heads and bodies 
may be devout enough, one has a sense of individuals - some like blue, 
others brown; some feathers, other pansies and forget-me-nots'(30-31). 
Again, then, women seduce into errancy that 'force of will' that should 
flow with the unilateral rigidity of the policeman's gestures. The 
colourful diversity of the women, who are heterogeneous 'individuals', 
contrasts with the white-robed figures of the choristers; they disrupt, 
by their irreducible sensuousness, the men's lofty aspirations to a realm 
of pure spirit. More insultingly, Jacob compares women to dogs, for 'a 
dog destroys the service completely', and he associates them with the 
incontinent natural flux and impulse evoked elsewhere in the novel: 
'wander[ing] down an aisle, looking, lifting a paw and approaching a 
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pillar with a purpose that makes the blood run cold with horror'. Both 
dogs and women should accordingly be kept 'on a gravel path', barred from 
a realm of spirituality which they are congenitally incapable of 
reverencing. One here necessarily recalls the episode in A Room of One's 
Own, where the heroine, who has wandered onto a private grass plot, is 
turned out by the Beadle of the college into 'the place [fit for her]' - 
'the gravel'(RO, 9). Faced with an impossible ideal of devout 
concentration, Jacob's mind has not unnaturally begun to wander, but he 
projects the blame for his own lapses onto the women present at the 
service. However 'devout, distinguished, and vouched for' by their 
husband's spirituality and, learning, these women are irredeemably tied to 
the body; 'they're as ugly as sin', reflects Jacob. His reference to 
'sin' may serve to recall my account above of the 'fall' of the sign. On 
the evidence, Jacob seems likely to ascribe to women responsibility for 
this 'fall', which has rendered impossible the ideal of the symbol, 
reducing the sign to an allegorical status in which its materiality 
tempts one away from the rigours of pure spirit. 
For women themselves, however, matters are otherwise. For them, the 
'fall' has happened in the very beginning; the sign is 'always already' 
material. It is precisely the impossible rigour of the masculine project 
to exclude materiality (the woman) as disruption that has precipitated 
the calamity of war, and the war has in turn finally shattered the male 
illusion and led to the subjective acknowledgement of a fallen state 
that, objectively, had 'always already' been the case. In A Room of 
One's Own the narrator declares that certainly the war 'was a shock (to 
women in particular with their illusions about education, and so on) to 
see the faces of our rulers in the light of the shell-fire. So ugly they 
looked - German, English, French - so stupid'(RO, 23). As evidence of 
the bankruptcy of the very principle of masculine culture, the war was, 
however painful, a liberating experience for women. 'The Mark on the 
Wall' meditates on social change: 'the masculine point of view' which has 
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superseded Victorian standards and 'governs our lives', has become, since 
the war, 'half a phantom to many men and women, [and] soon, one may hope, 
will be laughed into the dustbin... leaving us all with an intoxicating 
sense of illegitimate freedom - if freedom exists... '(HH, 44). After the 
disappearance of all masculinist constraints there might come into being 
a Utopian world which would have dispensed once and for all with the 
technicians of the inhumane will: 'a world without professors or 
specialists or house-keepers with the profiles of policemen'(HH, 46). 
Unleashed by the First World War, this critique of the dominant 
masculine ideology is latently present in Jacob's Room itself. Female 
antagonism towards men and their values is disseminated throughout the 
novel, as is a half-suppressed critique of male standards. This proto- 
e 
fem einst hostility emerges at innumerable moments in the novel and yet 
never becomes a fully focused theme; the marginal objections remain 
dissociated from each other, never cohere into a global critque. The 
novel sides with the very feminine characteristics that men denigrate and 
suppress with an implacable force of will: 'who shall deny that this 
blankness of mind, when combined with profusion, mother wit, old wives' 
tales, haphazard ways, moments of astonishing daring, humour, and 
sentimentality - who shall deny that in these repects every woman is 
nicer than every man? '(9). The text here describes Mrs. Flanders who, 
characteristically scatter-brained, has a moment of forgetfulness, the 
nuisance of which she dissolves in humour. For the novel, this lack of 
concentration is the condition of a rich, almost overflowing, mental 
abundance, which contrasts favourably with the rigid impassivity of the 
traffic policeman at Ludgate Circus. But if Mrs. Flanders's 'polyphonic' 
mind makes her less 'practical' than the narrowly utilitarian policeman, 
she is also more practical in the sense of being closer to the down-to- 
earth necessities of human living than he is. What she has temporarily 
forgotten is, precisely, 'the meat! ', the humble but necessary flesh 
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itself, of which the lofty responsibilities of the male guardians of 
civilization cause them to lose sight. Later, as she writes a rejection 
of Mr. Floyd's offer of marriage, she suddenly, irrelevantly wonders, 
'Did I forget about the cheese? '(19); the female mind thus operates 
simultaneously on various levels. Such incidents are proleptic of the 
more famous juxtaposition of Mrs. Ramsay's epiphanic revelation and the 
Boeuf en Daube in To the Lighthouse, which I discuss below, and similarly 
reveal the irreducible connection between women and corporeality. Such 
juxtapositions also subvert a 'male' standard of literary relevance and 
importance, in the way that Woolf elsewhere more programmatically 
recommends. They exemplify 'the difference between the man's and the 
woman's view of what constitutes the importance of any subject'(CW, 27), 
and demonstrate, as had Imagism in contemporary poetry, 
25 that life does 
not necessarily exist 'more fully in what is commonly thought big than in 
what is commonly thought small'(CE, 2: 107). Not that, for the woman, the 
'small' necessarily excludes the 'big' as, for the male, the big tends to 
do to the small. The 'base' materiality of the cheese does not prevent 
Mrs. Flanders from rising to the occasion created by the grander issues 
of love and matrimony; predictably 'inconsequent', her letter is none the 
less 'such a motherly, respectful... regretful letter' that Mr. Floyd 
treasures it for years(19). 
It is not so far from the narrator's comment that 'every woman is 
nicer than every man' to Mrs. Norman's sudden alarm - 'men are dangerous' 
- as Jacob enters her compartment on the train(28). But the novel hints 
at a female response to the challenge of this potential danger from men. 
Contemplating her old cat Topaz (a keepsake from the rejected Mr. Floyd), 
Mrs. Flanders 'smiled, thinking how she had had him gelded, and how she 
did not like red hair in men'(20). As if the initial gelding were not 
enough, she also reflects that Topaz 'one of these days would have to be 
killed'. The derivation of the cat from Mr. Floyd suggests that the 
violence directed towards it is simultaneously directed towards him as 
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male, and this suggestion is strengthened by the remarkable proliferation 
of maimed men in this novel. Mr. Curnow 'lost his eye'(8), in a 
gunpowder explosion; old Devons is dead and buried 'with one eye 
gone'(100), and Betty Flanders's admirer, Captain Barfoot is 'lame' and 
lacks 'two fingers on the left hand'(23). Such injuries and maimings are 
often the result of military service, 'having served his country'(23), 
and point to the dangerous, because self-destructive courage of men. But 
such glorification of the male, which is not anyway without its note of 
critique, may be the novel's way of salving its conscience for 
Mrs. Flanders's smile at the gelded cat, which testifies to a latent 
desire to castrate. The lost eyes are a Freudian equivalent of 
castration as well as testimony to military honour, and Mrs. Flanders's 
fondness for Captain Barfoot may relate to his being safely 'lame'. 
I have argued throughout this chapter that the novel is deeply 
ambivalent towards the male world, which is both repressive yet 
apparently indispensable, just as Jacob is both victim and victimizer. 
Captain Barfoot is no less so, since though he is lame, he is also the 
strenuous representative of the responsibilities of civilization, a lone 
hero 'on the Bridge at night' who inspires women with the feeling that 
'Here is law. Here is order. Therefore we must cherish this man'(26). 
Of the Captain, as of the policeman at Ludgate Circus, it can be said 
that there is 'something rigid about him', 'something military, (26,24). 
The novel's critique of Barfoot's values emerges in displaced form in the 
smothered rebelliousness of Mrs. Jarvis, who resents the rigid division 
of sexual roles: 'Yet I have a soul... and its the man's stupidity that's 
the cause of this, and the storm's my storm as well as his'(26). 'Too 
good for such a quiet place'(89) in her friend Mrs. Flanders's view, the 
discontented Mrs. Jarvis can find no outlet for her energy and talent, 
and in this she is representative of the women in the book generally, all 
of whom live frustrated in conditions of social, and often geographical, 
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marginalization. The Captain's invalid wife is 'civilization's prisoner' 
(23), confined to a bath-chair on the esplanade at Scarborough. 
Mrs. Pascoe lives in a lonely cottage on the Cornish cliff-edge, dreaming 
absorbedly of sophisticated high society in London. Mrs. Durrant is a 
Cornish resident whose social position gains her access to that London 
world, but this hardly guarantees her the satisfaction of which 
Mrs. Pascoe dreams: "'Why are you so sad? " Charlotte asked'(57). For 
however impressively 'phallic' in style Mrs. Durrant may be - 'firm', 
'upright', 'aquiline', 'imperious', 'hard as iron'(54,56,154,153) - while 
'enunciating strident politics with Sir Somebody'(151), she is in the end 
excluded from the decision-making centres of Whitehall where 'the course 
of history' is 'manfully determined'(172). But though her political life 
is confined to drawing-room chatter, she does none the less reveal an 
impressive astuteness: 'Poor Jacob... They're going to make you act in 
their play'(60), and as Paul Fussell notes in The Great War and Modern 
Memory, her phrase resonates beyond the amateur theatricals of its local 
context to that 'unthought-of kind of amateur theater, where [Jacob] will 
be destroyed'. 26 Perhaps the most poignant of these isolated or 
frustrated women is Clara Durrant, 'a virgin chained to a rock'(122), 
powerless, overshadowed by her mother, trapped in the tedious social role 
of 'pouring out tea for old men'(122). 
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In contrast to these impotently peripheral women, Jacob and his 
friends are destined from the start to be the inheritors and bearers of 
the dominant culture, and this remains true despite their youthful revolt 
and coltishness. 'Himself the inheritor', Jacob is in Cambridge to 
receive the 'gift' accumulated by 'generations of learned men'; not 
surprisingly, therefore, he looks 'satisfied; indeed masterly'(43). And 
the 'room' of the novel's title is precisely that 'Room of One's Own' 
which the women addressed in the later feminist tract so disablingly 
lack. If Jacob represents the vitalistic forces of life in contrast with 
the oppressive social world of the Plumers - all Shaw, Wells and the 
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serious sixpenny weeklies - he himself represents a repressive blindness 
in relation to the women of the novel. He and Bonamy 'never noticed' the 
latter's charwoman, Mrs. Papworth, despite her 'motherly' care of them, 
and Jacob is culpably insensitive to Fanny Elmer's 'sentiment and 
sensation' or Clara Durrant's 'deeps of feeling'(153). 
The presence of these numerous discontented women around Jacob, this 
groundswell of female suffering, seems thus to articulate a deep-seated 
envy and critique of Jacob as representative upper middle-class young 
man. The First World War was then for Woolf a terrible proof of the 
fundamental wrong-headedness, even bloody-mindedness, of this masculine 
ideology, exposing the dangerous unbalance of its expulsion of the 
feminine. Her critique of the literary realism of her Edwardian 
contemporaries was always in principle, if not immediately in practice, a 
critical exposure of the male ideology, for this period would come to 
seem to her the culmination of 'the masculine point of view', as it does 
in 'The Mark on the Wall'(HH, 44). But her dissatisfaction with 
particular forms merges, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
into a dissatisfaction with form as such, with the very principle of 
narrative fiction or, more generally still, with language itself, which 
is necessarily 'phallogocentric', 
28 
and therefore falls under Woolf's 
suspicion. 
The novel protests the phallogocentricism of narrative fiction and, 
beyond that, of writing itself at its very beginning in the account of 
Mrs. Flanders's letter-writing. It testifies to the peculiar 
difficulties a woman faces when she attempts to write - her lack of a 
private space within the home, the family demands, pressures, disruptions 
that render the style of her writing scrappy and inconsequent. With an 
ambivalence that parallels its ambivalence towards the male culture that 
Jacob represents, the novel both deplores women's lack of access to the 
material conditions that enable male writing and valorizes their 
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stylistic inelegance as more richly pluralistic mode of writing than its 
male counterpart can ever be. The text does not remain on this empirical 
level of household interruptions, however, but suggests a more radical 
antithesis to the very nature of writing itself, and Mrs. Flanders's 
letter seems to exemplify the novel's own project for a new mode of 
writing. The letter she pens on the beach retains all the contingent, 
even material circumstances which belong to the time of its writing: the 
'blot' of ink where her pen momentarily sticks, as well as her 'tear 
stain[s]'(5). It thus overturns male canons of objectivity, 
impersonality and relevance, all of which are presumed necessary to 
protect the ideality of meaning from the material body of the signifier. 
This accidental materiality does not simply spoil the neat appearance of 
the letter, but, more radically, erodes even its syntax: 'slowly welling 
from the point of her gold nib, pale blue ink dissolved the full 
stop'(5), and the accidents of falling tears worsen the blot. 'There was 
nothing for it but to leave... ' she has written, in reference to holiday 
accommodation, and she continues 'ignoring the full stop': 'but 
mercifully... everything seems satisfactorily arranged'(5). Like the 
letter, which is later described as 'in pale profusion, dried by the 
flame, for the blotting-paper's worn to holes and the nib cleft and 
clotted'(90), her writing does not achieve any sharp definition or 
precision of meaning. Its content includes 'the cloudy future flocks' of 
chickens, and even her vigorous son becomes, through the medium of her 
prose, 'Jacob in the blur of her outline'(90). Describing 
Mrs. Flanders's letter, the novel's own prose enacts the very qualities 
of it, as Hermione Lee's subtle, detailed analysis of this passage shows. 
'The point of view', she notes, and 'the point in time fluctuates' (the 
effect of a dissolved full stop! ); the syntactic ambiguities, together 
with 'the haziness of some of the images' oddly juxtaposed, produces 'the 
blur of outline'. Such characteristic ambiguities give the reader, as 
she points out, 'all at once the sense of several, habitual scenes in 
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Mrs. Flanders's life'. 29 
The effect of this rejection of one-dimensional, logical syntax and 
of shapely narrative progression is to loosen the ligatures of Kristeva's 
'thetic subject', which is the locus of choice, judgement, integration, 
the sustainer of syntax. The thetic is, in more Woolfian terms, a 
'policeman' of the subject, who keeps the self 'straight' on the 
'continuity of our ways' and saves it from being cast out of civilization 
into 'chasms'(95). To escape this rigidly linear control is in one sense 
liberating, in another a dangerous approach to chaos. Writing is by 
nature linear; one must judge and select, abandoning a kind of 
'polymorphous perversity' of signifier. In Jacob's Room the narrator 
laments the impossibility of totality, of giving full expression to all 
levels of experience of the whole world. 'To prevent us from being 
submerged by chaos, nature and society between them have arranged a 
system of classification-stalls, boxes, amphitheatre, gallery'; hence 
'one has to choose one's seat', but to do so limits the scope of one's 
view, deprives one of the possibility of other views: 'we must choose. 
Never was there a harsher necessity! or one which entails greater pain, 
more certain disaster; for wherever I seat myself, I die in 
exile'(67-68). Thus the text juxtaposes innumerable objects, characters, 
offering as many glimpses and perspectives of them as possible, though it 
simultaneously knows that its desire for totality is impossible. Though 
the novel prefers the sudden impulses, the wayward passions and 
sentiments of women to the rigid control of an impassive police, it 
simultaneously acknowledges the necessity of the 'judging' policemen, the 
need of both forces. Without the Dionysiac 'drums and trumpets - the 
ecstasy and hubbub of the soul', life is an oppressive suffocation or 
even death(112); but without some measure of restraint and control, life 
is a lethal chaos. The novel would thus agree with Roland Barthes that 
'the text needs its shadow: this shadow is a bit of ideology, a bit of 
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representation, a bit of subject', 
30 
or would acknowledge, in Julia 
Kristeva's terms, the need of a dialectic of both semiotic impulses and 
thetic control. This dialectic is figured in a passage which 
metaphorically evokes 'the life of the elderly' in contrast to the 
rashness of youth: 
What can be more violent than the fling of boughs in a 
gale, the tree yielding itself all up the trunk, to the very 
tip of the branch, streaming and shuddering the way the wind 
blows, yet never flying in dishevelment away? 
The corn squirms and abases itself as if preparing to tug 
itself free from the roots, and yet is tied down. 
Why, from the very windows, even in the dusk, you see a 
swelling run through the street, an aspiration, as with arms 
outstretched, eyes desiring, mouths agape. And then we 
peaceably subside. For if the exaltation lasted we should be 
blown like foam into the air. The stars would shine through 
us. We should go down the gale in salt drops - as sometimes 
happens. (119) 
Thus the subversions of the semiotic must at last be held in place by a 
thetic rappel ä fordre. 
It is not only Mrs. Flanders's letters, but those of the women in 
the novel generally that contain irrelevancies to the ideality of 
meaning. Florinda's letters also often have 'tear stains'(93); Mother 
Stuart actually scents her pages with perfume to attain 'a flavour which 
the English language fails to provide'(92), perhaps thus compensating for 
a lack of direct linguistic power. While women's letters are soiled, 
defaced by misspelling and erratic language, Jacob's letters come 
predictably much closer, in both style and subject, to the 
phallogocentric ideal: 'long letters about art, morality, and 
politics'(92). The epistolary contrast between men and women persists 
throughout the novel: men are lucid, logical, orderly, singleminded; 
women lack concentration, are erratic, abundant, polyphonic. Even the 
intellectual Miss Umphelby, Cambridge lecturer in classics, conforms to 
this pattern: as she saunters along the Backs, she wanders mentally off 
into irrelevance - 'but if I ever met him 
[Virgil], what should I wear? ' 
- and her 'other details of men's meeting with women'(40) are the 
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equivalent of Mrs. Flanders's obtrusive meat and cheese. She falls away 
from male standards, but the male scholars themselves only adhere to them 
in a deeply compromised way. In the great Virgilian scholar Erasmus 
Cowan, there is a fundamental falsity; Virgil himself would be shocked to 
see his own image 'in his [Cowan's] snug little mirror'(40). Far from 
being 'the representative of Virgil', this don is rather 'builder, 
assessor, surveyor', and the narrator thus casts doubt on the quality of 
scholarship in this sacred citadel of learning. The ideal light of 
erudition, which ought to be seen 'far out at sea over the tumbling 
waves'(40), finds itself mired in the smug complacencies, the petty 
worldly concerns, of the scholars: 'such is the fabric through which the 
light must shine, if shine it can'(40). 
Similar contrasts of men and women are registered in another 
sanctuary of learning - the British Museum. As in King's College Chapel, 
women disturb the male scholars, either by overbalancing their books or 
by trampling across all categories of human knowledge, like 
Miss Marchmont. She seeks to prove her theory that 'colour is sound', 
and in her philosophy politics and art - 'Mr. Asquith's Irish policy and 
Shakespeare' - merge seamlessly together. Whether or not she is a closet 
revolutionary thinker, with her own early version of Kristeva's 
'revolution in poetic language', she appears to Fraser, who destroys his 
contemporaries' books 'by force of logic', to be merely another example 
of 'abhorred vagueness' (104-105). Dingy and dishevelled, their rooms 
'not very clean'(104), these female readers pursue scholarship despite 
economic hardship. Julia Hedge bitterly notes the contrast with Jacob: 
'what has he got to do except copy out poetry?, for Jacob is 'composedly, 
unconcernedly' concentrating on his work, while Julias mind is disturbed 
into the self-consciousness that A Room of One's Own deplores by her 
feminist indignation against the Museum. 'One leaf of poetry was pressed 
flat against another leaf, one burnished letter laid smooth against 
71 
another in a density of meaning, a conglomeration of loveliness'(106). 
Whether it is the probing narrow focus of the male mind or the more 
diverse, erratic play of female thought that can best attain a 
'loveliness' of meaning buried in the millions of pages stored in the 
Museum is not quite clear. If the troubled or whimsical and vague minds 
of Julia and Miss Marchmont hardly seem up to the task, the novel's 
stress on 'density' and 'conglomeration' seems equally to rebuff the 
penetrating searchlight of the male intellect, suggesting an inert 
materiality that even the latter cannot penetrate. 
If the novel in these various ways calls into question the 
phallogocentric ideology, exposing, though always in somewhat marginal 
form, its theoretical weaknesses and practical inhumanities, it none the 
less faces the embarrassing problem that its own hero is, precisely, a 
man -a fact the novel curiously finds it necesary to remind us of at 
various points. In this light, Jacob's encounter as a boy with the 
sheep's skull may be interpreted as his discovery of his own male 
sexuality. He finds the skull as he flees, distraught, from the lovers 
he had by accident encountered: 'stretched entirely rigid, side by side, 
their faces very red, an enormous man and woman'(7). 'Not far from the 
lovers lay the old sheep's skull without its jaw'(9), and thus the 
association of the skull and sexuality is forged. Mrs. Flanders angrily 
demands that Jacob abandon it - 'Naughty little boy! Now put it down'(8) 
- and chooses this moment to tell the story of Mr. Curnow's loss of an 
eye in a gunpowder explosion, 'aware all the time in the depths of her 
mind of some buried discomfort'(8). This monitory tale might then be 
seen as a threat of castration whereby the mother attempts to compel her 
son to abandon a sexuality he has just assumed; certainly the skull 
causes her an unease deeper and more urgent than its own simple existence 
justifies. Suddenly alarmed by her 'responsibility and danger', 
Mrs. Flanders anxiously reflects that her sons have no father: 'There's 
no man to help with the perambulator'(9). The skull, the eye lost in an 
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explosion, the mother's premonition of danger, also point to Jacob's 
death in the war. But the 'sexual' and proleptic functions of the 
sheep's skull are not, after all, incompatible, for it is precisely 
Jacob's maleness that 'kills' him in a war which is itself the inevitable 
consequence of an inhumane masculine ideology. 
Because its hero is a man to whom the novel in part desires to pay 
homage, its feminist critique remains scattered and half-suppressed. In 
the 1920s Woolf had regarded the male Georgian writers as allies in her 
crusade against the Edwardians, but, as I noted in the previous chapter, 
she dissociated herself from them in 'The Leaning Tower' in 1940, 
rejecting them as 'tower dwellers' who were the product of masculine 
values. This shift of allegiance is also enacted in the novel. For in 
the first instance Jacob 'detests' his own age, 'Mr. Masefield... 
Mr. Bennett. Stuff them into the flame of Marlowe and burn them to 
cinders... Build a better one'(105-106). But as the feminist Julia Hedge 
remarks, Jacob also 'looked a little regal and pompous', and Jacob's 
antagonism to the older generation does in the end seem to be a mere 
Oedipal contention and not the assertion of a Woolfian difference of 
view; thus 'Julia Hedge disliked him naturally enough'(106). Jacob's 
potential complicity with a world he detests had also been signalled 
earlier in the novel. He is moved to sharp indignation by the 
intolerable Plumers. 'He was impressionable', the narrator notes, 'but 
the word is contradicted by the composure with which he hollowed his hand 
to screen a match. He was a young man of substance'(34). The 
'contradiction' the novel here registers is the ambivalence I have tried 
to focus throughout this essay, but in the course of the text it becomes 
an increasing acknowledgement of Jacob's maleness. 'For he had grown to 
be a man'(138), a fact all the women in the novel have to come to terms 
with, some gloomily, some desperately. Thus the narrator's anxiety that 
'a difference of sex' and age may prevent her understanding 'what was in 
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his mind' (93) proves more deeply significant than it had initially 
appeared, and points to the 'impossiblity', the unresolvable tensions, of 
Jacob as hero of the book. The emptiness of Jacob at one level reveals 
the nature of the sign, and at another derives from the tension between 
male protagonist and proto-feminist novel, which means that Jacob as 
character cannot in any full sense be fleshed out. The absent centre 
that Jacob is -a ram's skull rather than rose - exposes simultaneously 
the hollow illusions of both logocentricism and masculine standards and 
values. 
CHAPTER III: Mrs. Dalloway 
Though Jacob's Room clearly 'marks the beginning of her maturity and 
her fame' (QB, 2: 88), it was indeed only a beginning. In spite of 
Woolf's ambition to bring forth a literary 'rose', with 'no scaffolding; 
scarcely a brick to be seen; all crepuscular, but the heart, the passion, 
humour, everything as bright as fire in the mist' (WD, 23), the result, I 
have argued, was in fact more of a 'ram's skull'. When she had finished 
Jacob's Room Woolf noted anxiously in her diary that people would view 
the book as 'a disconnected rhapsody' (WD, 46). Despite Middleton 
Murry's warning that the modern novel 'has reached a kind of impasse' 
(L, 3: 107), there is no doubt that Woolf does progress beyond 
Jacob's Room, and yet along the same lines as that earlier novel. In 
Mrs. Dalloway she comes close to the view of life which she recommended 
in 'Modern Fiction': 'not a series of gig-lamps symmetrically arranged' 
but a 'luminous halo' (CE, 2: 106). While writing Mrs. Dalloway she 
discussed the aims and problems of her work in correspondence with 
Jacques Raverat. Himself a painter, Raverat discussed with her the 
differences between writing and painting, notably the problems posed by 
the essentially linear nature of the former. He proposed an anti-linear 
account of the effect of a word, which is like casting a pebble into a 
pond: 'There are splashes in the outer air in every direction, and under 
the surface waves that follow one another into dark and forgotten 
corners. ' This phenomenon, he argued, could only be represented by some 
graphic expedient such as placing the word in the middle of a page and 
surrounding it radially with associated ideas. Woolf replied that it was 
precisely this to which she aspired, 'to catch and consolidate and 
consummate-those splashes of yours'. 
' 
I wish to consider the novelistic techniques which made it possible 
for Woolf to write in her diary that she had exorcised the spell which 
Murry and others said she had laid herself under with Jacob's Room 
(WD, 68). One of the conspicuous characteristics of that novel is its 
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disjointed fragmentariness, and this is overcome in Mrs. Dalloway by the 
systematic use of 'represented speech' (free indirect speech) which 
generates an effect of subjective haziness across the whole text, the 
effect of a 'semi-transparent envelope', by omitting the specific verbs 
of speaking or thinking that identify the speaker. 
2 'He said he would be 
there' becomes simply 'He would be there', and the so-called 'stream of 
consciousness' style or 'indirect interior monologue' based on 
represented speech allows the novelist's discourse to move freely and 
smoothly from a character's interior world to the exterior world (or vice 
versa) in a homogeneous medium, which produces a continuous 
indeterminacy. Thus if one attends closely to an apparently homogeneous 
discourse written in the conventional narrative form of the third-person 
past tense, the subject of any passage is seen to be continuously 
shifting: 
Remember my party, remember my party, said Peter Walsh as he 
stepped down the street, speaking to himself rhythmically, in 
time with the flow of the sound, the direct downright sound of 
Big Ben striking the half-hour. (The leaden circles dissolved 
in the air. ) Oh these parties? he thought; Clarissa's parties. 
Why does she give these parties? he thought. Not that he 
blamed her or this effigy of a man in a tail-coat with a 
carnation in his button-hole coming towards him. Only one 
person in the world could be as he was, in love. And there he 
was, this fortunate man, himself, reflected in the plate-glass 
window of a motor-car manufacturer in Victoria Street. All 
India lay behind him; plains, mountains; epidemics of cholera; 
a district twice as big as Ireland; decisions he had come to 
alone - he, Peter Walsh; who was now really for the first time 
in his life in love. Clarissa had grown hard, he thought; and 
a trifle sentimental into the bargain, he suspected, looking at 
the great motor cars capable of doing - how many miles on how 
many gallons? For he had a turn for mechanics; had invented a 
plough in his district, had ordered wheel-barrows from England, 
but the coolies wouldn't use them, all of which Clarissa knew 
nothing whatever about. (54-55) 
The paragraph opens with Peter echoing Clarissa's cry and proceeds 
in conventional narrative style (not entirely straightforwardly, however: 
one notices Peter projecting onto the sound of Big Ben qualities he 
believes himself to possess -'direct, downright'). After the parenthetic 
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refrain describing Big Ben, Peter's interior monologue is presented, in 
this case in 'direct speech' without quotation marks: 'Why does she give 
these parties, he thought', but his thoughts and perceptions are now 
presented in the third-person past tense ('represented speech'). However, 
at certain moments it becomes unclear whether this is his interior 
monologue or narrative description. 'Looking at the great motor cars 
capable of doing... ' might be a simple description of his action, but 
when followed by 'how many miles on how many gallons? ' confirms the 
reader's impression that it is a transcription of Peter's perception. 
The reader can never be sure precisely whose logic is represented by the 
immediately following 'For... ', a connective used recurrently throughout 
the book. The sentence is ambivalently poised between a straightforward 
statement about Peter and the contents of his own consciousness, though 
as it proceeds it becomes more and more like his own monologue. 
Another important formal development in Mrs. Dalloway is what Woolf 
terms the 'tunnelling process' - 'by which I tell the past by 
instalments, as I have need of it', she remarked in her diary (WD, 61). 
During the course of the day, Clarissa, Peter and Sally all delve into 
their common past, their youthful days at Bourton. The tense system of 
these scenes from the past is inconsistent. Since the characters' 
present is given in the past tense as is the case in traditional 
narrative, their past should presumably be one tense before the past 
tense, i. e., the pluperfect; but this is not the case in Mrs. Dalloway. 
After recalling a painful encounter with Clarissa at Bourton, Peter 
thinks, 'No, no, no! He was not in love with her any more! ' (85). The 
discourse returns to Peter's present, but the tense used in the sentence 
is the same as that in the remembered scene - the straightforward past 
tense. From a formal point of view, then, past and present are on the 
same plane, indistinguishable, as if the past of the character is revived 
and becomes present. In fact, within Peter's memory-image, though it is 
initially clear that the scene occurred in the past ('She came into a 
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room; she stood... '), matters become gradually ambiguous; past and 
present are fused. In the last few lines the Clarissa who is resurrected 
from the past is no longer merely Clarissa as a young girl at Bourton, 
but is the latter day Clarissa as well. 
The text presents itself as a homogeneous unity in the conventional 
narrative guise of third-person past tense, but is in fact radically 
heterogeneous. Subjects of sentences are continuously shifting, and 
writing is made 'porous' by Woolf's 'tunnelling process'; one suddenly 
finds oneself in a 'cave' of the past, for Woolf records in the diary her 
'discovery: how I dig out beautiful caves behind my characters' (WD, 60). 
An early paragraph of the novel epitomizes these characteristics of 
Woolf Is writing: 
What a lark! What a plunge! For so it had always seemed to 
her when, with a little squeak of the hinges, which she could 
hear now, she had burst open the French windows and plunged at 
Bourton into the open air. How fresh, how calm, stiller than 
this of course, the air was in the early morning; like the flap 
of a wave; the kiss of a wave; chill and sharp and yet (for a 
girl of eighteen as she then was) solemn, feeling as she did, 
standing there at the open window, that something awful was 
about to happen; looking at the flowers, at the trees with the 
smoke winding off them and the rooks rising, falling; standing 
and looking until Peter Walsh said, 'Musing among the 
vegetables? ' -was that it? (5). 
The 'hinges' of Woolf's transitions don't usually 'squeak' 
noticeably as they do here. One technical means of 'oiling' them is the 
conjunction 'for', which as in the above passage often connects slightly 
different planes of discourse in a very loose, characteristically 'half- 
logical' way. 
3 A profuse use of present participles, another 
characteristic of Woolf's writing, loosens the binding function of 
syntax. The effect of the present participles is to attenuate human 
energy; contrast 'he looked at the flowers' with 'looking at the 
flowers', where activity is reduced to contemplative stasis. The present 
participles begin as supplements to a main clause, but generate 'an 
autonomous energy of their own; they meander lyrically on until disrupted 
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by Woolf's brusque comment. Transformed into a present-participle 
phrase, the action composed of a subject-verb relation is transformed 
into an adverbial or adjectival phrase, and as a result the sentence 
gives a sense of the simultaneity of several acts and states. Thus 
writing can, to a certain extent, go beyond its essential linearity. 
Woolf diagnosed this effect, somewhat anxiously, in her diary: It is a 
disgrace that I write nothing, or if I write, write sloppily, using 
nothing but present participles. I find them very useful in my last lap 
of Mrs. D[alloway]' (WD, 66). 'Looseness' and 'lightness' had been her 
aim since Jacob's Room (WD, 23), though she was simultaneously aware of 
their dangers: 
I think writing must be formal. The art must be respected... 
for if one lets the mind run loose it becomes egotistic; 
personal, which I detest. At the same time the irregular fire 
must be there; and perhaps to loose it one must begin by being 
chaotic, but not appear in public like that. (WD, 69) 
In the same month she noted that 'the diary writing has greatly 
helped my style; loosened the ligatures' (WD, 69). 
A further fine example of Woolf's transcendence of narrative 
linearity is the scene in Regent's Park with its aleatory method of 
composition. As one character casually strolls beside another who had 
until then been the focus of narrative attention, so the 'fickle' 
narrative abandons its object to follow the newcomer. A sense of the co- 
existing currents and eddies in the park is thereby created. In its 
nimble manoeuvering between individuals, couples and groups the narrative 
in the Regent's Park episode is behaving curiously like a hostess at a 
party, and this is no accident. Parks and parties are privileged symbols 
for Woolf because they are protected enclaves outside the normal run of 
social life. They are places of a libidinal indulgence that must be 
repressed elsewhere, mini-Utopias of the senses. Every time Clarissa 
gives a party she has a 'feeling of being something not herself, and that 
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everyone was unreal in one way; much more real in another' (187-188). 
They are 'unreal' in that they are detached from everyday social 
occupations, but 'more real' because in touch with libidinal energies 
that the social ego normally represses. So 'it was possible', Clarissa 
thinks, 'to say things you couldn't say anyhow else.... to go much 
deeper'(188). It is then not surprising that Bourton has the resonance 
it does in the novel, for with its spacious grounds and continuous social 
gatherings it is both park and party at once. 
Many critics have pointed out the existence of an apparently unified 
narrative voice in Woolf's writing. Discussing a paragraph of 
To the Lighthouse in Mimesis, Erich Auerbach asks 'who is speaking in 
this paragraph? ': 
And in the ensuing passage the speakers no longer seem to be 
human beings at all but spirits between heaven and earth, 
nameless spirits capable of penetrating the depths of the human 
soul, capable too of knowing something about it, but not of 
attaining clarity as to what is in process there, with the 
result that what they report has a doubtful ring.... 4 
This unidentifiable narrative voice is achieved by 'represented 
speech', which suspends the location of the subject somewhere between a 
given character and the author. This ambiguous 'between-ness' produces 
at once an intimate internalized tone and a certain indirectness, an 
uncertainty; the reader is so near to and yet somehow distant from the 
process of the character's mind. The reader's sense of distance is 
confused as if one is proceeding in a pervasive mist: 'all crepuscular, 
but the heart, the passion, humour, everything as. bright as fire in the 
mist' (WD, 23). 
There are occasions in which one is confronted by the question 'Who 
is speaking? ' as Auerbach is; for example, in the case of the conjunction 
'for' that I mentioned above - who is reasoning? Or again: 
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She liked those churches, like shapes of grey paper, breasting 
the stream of the Strand. It was quite different here from 
Westminster, she thought, getting off at Chancery Lane. It was 
so serious, it was so busy. In short, she would like to have a 
profession. She would become a doctor, a farmer, possibly go 
into Parliament if she found it necessary, all because of the 
Strand. (150-151) 
With the phrase 'in short', one senses the existence of a narrative 
voice which judges and sums up for the reader, but the discourse quickly 
glides into the flow of Elizabeth's consciousness. Even if we posit a 
narrative consciousness to which the discourse of the text should be 
ascribed and which is responsible for the reasoning of, 'for', and the 
interpretative summing up of 'in short', this narrative consciousness is 
nonetheless not a unified entity. Whenever we try to pinpoint the locus 
of the subject, we get lost in a discursive mist: 
Dr. Holmes came again. Large, fresh-coloured, handsome, 
flicking his boots, looking in the glass, he brushed it all 
aside - headaches, sleeplessness, fears, dreams - nerve 
symptoms and nothing more, he said... 
When the damned fool came again, Septimus refused to see 
him. Did he indeed? said Dr. Holmes, smiling agreeably. Really 
he had to give that charming little lady, Mrs. Smith, a 
friendly push before he could get past her into her husband's 
bedroom. (101-102) 
'The damned fool' is of course Septimus's language, though the whole 
sentence is on a straightforward narrative plane; 'smiling agreeably', 
'a friendly push', are neither simply an objective narrative account nor 
straightforwardly Dr. Holmes's own point of view. 'Agreeable' and 
'friendly' cannot evade the influence of Septimus's condemnatory 'damned 
fool', which is backed up by the whole context of the passage, and they 
acquire an ironic edge which satirises Dr. Holmes's self-complacency. 
Thus the narrative voice is never really a homogeneous unity; it is 
fractured, wavering, and multiple. So if one posits a narrative 
consciousness, it is more appropriate to call it 'spirits' in the plural 
as Auerbach does, rather than J. Hillis Miller's 'omniscient narrator'. 
5 
In terms of feminist theory, what Woolf tries to achieve in her writing 
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is a denial of the unified subject which supports all discourse and which 
is necessarily 'masculine', since the symbolic order is established with 
the phallus as a fundamental signifier. The narrative consciousness in 
her writing, if there is indeed one, is a consciousness which has stopped 
judging, interpreting, explaining; it has no single identity; it is not, 
in Kristeva's term, a 'thetic subject'. Woolf's writing is a signifying 
practice without a thetic subject, or if that is impossible (it is 
strictly impossible, since the symbolic is sustained by the thetic 
subject), at least minimizing the control of the thetic subject and 
allowing the other modality of signifying practice - the semiotic realm - 
as much autonomy as possible. 
The extent to which Woolf is playing with the codes and conventions 
of novelistic interpretation is graphically revealed in the episode in. 
which an aeroplane flies acrobatically across the London sky forming 
letters of smoke, presumably as an advertisement: 'Only for a moment did 
they [the letters] lie still; then they moved and melted and were rubbed 
out up in the sky, and the aeroplane shot further away and again, in a 
fresh space of sky, began writing a K, and E, aY perhaps? ' (23-24). For 
that 'key' is doubtless the solution to the hermeneutic riddle of the 
novel, a transcendental signifier that would make all else fall 
meaningfully into place. Woolf tantalises us with the possibilities of 
such a master-key to the text only to withdraw it at once; and as 
narrator, she thus refuses an 'authoritarian' relation to her own novel. 
When writing a short story about Mrs. Dalloway (a rudimentary 
version of the novel), Woolf commented in her diary: 
One must get out of life - yes, that's why I disliked so much 
the irr `pution of Sydney - one must become externalised; very, 
very concentrated all at one point, not having to draw upon the 
scattered parts of one's character, living in the brain. 
Sydney comes and I'm Virginia; when I write I'm merely a 
sensibility. (WD, 48) 
Woolf's practice of writing solely as 'a sensibility', of discarding 
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the self which supports one's identity as a social being, aroused hostile 
attacks in the 1930s from many critics, especially from the Scrutiny 
group. Their argument that her work is a mere cultivation of 
sensibility, a subjectiv/ism to be rejected by the mature adult who has a 
responsible life in society, is summed up by Leavis's article in 1942.6 
But a more positive assessment of Woolf would rather emphasize that what 
she does in her writing is to make the unitary 'I' recede and to loosen 
the ligatures of the unifying and fixing subject'so as to produce a style 
whose characteristics are simultaneity and fluidity. But she never 
destroys the thetic 'I' completely, which is after all impossible as long 
as one wants to remain within language (and sane); nor does she ever go 
as near to shattering language as Joyce does. Her work is not a drastic 
demolition but a subtle and elegant infraction of syntactic laws in order 
to undermine the protocols of writing, loosening the relation between 
subject and object (which the thetic subject sustains), for example, by 
present-participles or intrusive phrases between subject and object, 
nouns and verbs, or by breaking up noun-verb or subject-object relations 
into a mere listing of nouns, and thus disrupting the logical relations 
which language produces for a human subject by its syntactic order. 
'Looseness' is always a term that indicates for Virginia Woolf that her 
writing is going well: 'I feel as if I had loosed the bonds, pretty 
completely and could pour everything in. If so - good' (WD, 62). Or 
again: 'the diary writing has greatly helped my style; loosed the 
ligatures' (WD, 69). In Kristevan terms, Woolf's texts disperse the 
unified transcendental subject that underpins male rationality and opens 
a new possibility for a subjective activity that the traditional 
(masculine) narrative form fails to contain. Woolf's writing is the 
subversion of this positionality and tries to adumbrate the area anterior 
to the thetic (logical, judging, naming) subjectivity which is the agency 
of action and judgement, to bring in the semiotic, the domain of rhythm, 
sounds, intonations, colour and shape. In her writing it is well known 
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that rhythm is always very conspicuously at work. Moreover, colours 
often come into the foreground, detached from objects themselves. An 
extreme example of this is such curious intense sketches as 'Blue and 
Green' and 'Kew Gardens'. 
Yellow and black, pink and snow white, shapes of all these 
colours, men, women, and children were spotted for a second 
upon the horizon, and then, seeing the breadth of yellow that 
lay upon the grass, they wavered and sought shade beneath the 
trees, dissolving like drops of water in the yellow and green 
atmosphere, staining it faintly with red and blue. (HH, 39) 
Virginia Woolf was criticized by contemporaries for her failure to 
create 'characters' and sternly informed that her literature was 'a 
mirage entirely unconnected with reality'.? What she seeks is a state of 
human being prior to its consolidation into character or personality. 
She boldly writes: 'People, like Arnold Bennett, say I can't create, or 
didn't in Jacob's Room, characters that survive. My answer is - but I 
leave that to the Nation: it's only the old argument that character is 
dissipated into shreds now: the old post-Dostoievsky argument' (WD, 57). 
How shocking, and yet how wonderful it was to discover that 
these real things, Sunday luncheons, Sunday walks, country 
houses, and tablecloths were not entirely real, were indeed 
half phantoms... What now takes the place of those things I 
wonder, those real standard things? Men perhaps, should you be 
a woman; the masculine point of view which governs our lives, 
which sets the standard, which established Whitaker's Table of 
Precedency, which has become, I suppose, since the war, half a 
phantom to many men and women, which soon, one may hope, will 
be laughed into the dustbin where the phantoms go, the mahogany 
sideboards and . the 
Landseer prints, Gods and Devils, Hell and 
so forth, leaving us all with an intoxicating sense of 
illegitimate freedom... (HH, 44) 
If it is this 'reality' which the masculine point of view asserts 
but which is a mere phantom to women, Woolf clearly denies her ability to 
write it. 'I daresay it's true, however, that I haven't that "reality" 
gift. I insubstantise, wilfully to some extent, distrusting reality - 
its cheapness. But to get further. Have I the power of conveying the 
true reality? ' (WD, 57). 'The true reality' is reality for women; but 
84 
Woolf is nervous about the censorship from men and their condemnation. 
Julia Kristeva writes: 'In women's writing, language seems to be seen 
from a foreign land... Estranged from language, women are visionaries, 
dancers who suffer as they speak. '8 In a foreign land, one becomes 
naturally more timid about infractions of the law because of the danger 
of expulsion. So Woolf would never go to extremes as Joyce did, and 
throughout her career kept a conventional form of narrative writing in 
the third-person past tense, for 'writing must be formal. The art must 
be respected' (WD, 69). Woolf's literary affirmation of 'true reality' 
is thus neither baffling nor obviously disturbing, but is well protected 
by the apparent formality; her writing subtly undermines the fixed 
positionality of the subject in language, and thus disrupts the 
rationality and logic which underpins conventional 'reality'. Her 
natural descriptions often emit a lateral message about the process of 
the novel's own constitution, and one such self-reflexive image is her 
description of a cloudscape above London: 
Fixed though they seemed at their posts, at rest in perfect 
unanimity, nothing could be fresher, freer, more sensitive 
superficially than the snow-white or gold-kindled surface; to 
change, to go, to dismantle the solemn assemblage was 
immediately possible; and in spite of the grave fixity, the 
accumulated robustness and solidity, now they struck light to 
the earth, now darkness. (153) 
In a similar way, the ordered, apparently formal 'assemblage' of 
Woolf's own prose may be 'dismantled' in a flash by some disorientating 
slippage of narrative voice or some 'tunnelling' and mining of the 
present by the past. 
By disrupting linearity and achieving simultaneity, she modifies the 
status of the subject. For the self which is a unified continuity is 
only one stage of a 'subject in process/on trial'. The true subject is 
not 'a series of gig-lamps symmetrically arranged' - this image clearly 
suggests linearity and logicality - and is evoked by a more spatial 
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image: 'a luminous halo'. Though the phrase 'from the beginning of 
consciousness to the end' implies some kind of temporality, yet the image 
of 'envelope' does not really coincide with the concept of linear 
continuity. In the image of 'this varying, this unknown and 
uncircumscribed spirit' with its 'aberration', 'complexity', Woolf offers 
us a subject which has no simple unity, no clear boundary between itself 
and the other. ('Envelope' implies some sort of boundary, but it is 
'semi-transparent' and therefore it is never a clear-cut distinction 
between the spirit and the world. ) Woolf's idea of self radically denies 
homogeneous unity: 'she [nature] let creep instincts and desires which 
are utterly at variance with his main being, so that we are streaked, 
variegated, all of a mixture'. 
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In writing Mrs. Dalloway Woolf aspired to be 'only a sensibility', 
'not having to draw upon the scattered parts of one's character', and 
this is actually the mode of being the novel itself presents. Phyllis 
Rose calls Mrs. Dalloway 'the most schizophrenic of English novels'. 
'0 
There is a parallel between the mode of the subjectivity - loosed from 
the thetic - which constitutes the stylistic principle of the book, and 
the state of being in which Clarissa and other characters often find 
themselves. '' For Clarissa, it is only by a conscious 'assembling' of 
her scattered parts into one centre that she can attain a social identity 
as Clarissa Dalloway: 
collecting the whole of her at one point (as she looked into 
the glass), seeing the delicate pink face of the woman who was 
that very night to give a party; of Clarissa Dalloway; of 
herself. (42) 
That was her self - pointed; dart-like; definite. That was her 
self when some effort, some call on her to be herself, drew the 
parts together. She alone knew how different, how incompatible 
and composed so for the world only into one centre, one 
diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and... had tried 
to be the same always... (42) 
It is not only in her youthful days that she believed in 'a 
transcendental theory' that 'the unseen part of us, which spreads 
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wide' (168) might survive. Now as she walks through the London streets 
she feels herself part of the trees at home, of the house, of people she 
had never met: 'being laid out like a mist between the people she knew 
best, who lifted her on their branches as she had seen the trees lift the 
mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, herself' (11-12). Whether 
walking through London, alone in her attic room, or retiring in the 
middle of the party into a little room to be alone, Clarissa is mostly 
presented in a state of being where she does not need to 'draw the parts 
together' in order to become herself. In this context it is curious to 
note how obsessive Clarissa is about shoes and gloves: 'And her old Uncle 
William used to say a lady is known by her shoes and her gloves... Gloves 
and shoes; she had a passion for gloves' (13-14). It is almost as if 
without this minute 'passionate' attention the extremities of the body 
cannot be trusted not to fly asunder, as if Clarissa's physical body 
might literally enact the psychical dissociation she so often 
experiences! 
Clarissa would not say of any one that 'they were this or were 
that' (10). To her, one fixed identity is not true; it is impossible for 
her to be one thing and not the other: 'She felt very young; at the same 
time unspeakably aged. She sliced like a knife through anything; at the 
12 
same time was outside, looking on' (10). Clarissa is in a state of 
constant assemblage and dissolving, and as she walks through London she 
is dispersed into the morning air. and spreads among things she sees like 
a mist. There is no single identity; so 'she would not say of Peter, she 
would not say of herself, I am this, I am that' (11), and 'on the ebb and 
flow of things' (11), her dispersed parts become momentarily fused as she 
walks, and she becomes rhythm, sound, colour and shape. Even the sense 
of her body as a whole disappears: 'this body she wore... this body, with 
all its capacities, seemed nothing - nothing at all. She had the oddest 
sense of being herself invisible; unseen; unknown' (13). In this state 
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of being, the words from Cymbeline come to her: 'Fear no more the heat of 
the sun. Nor the furious winter's rages' - the dirge sung over the 
apparently dead Imogen. With the self 'dead', freed from the ego- 
identity, there is no longer death: 'in the streets of London, on the ebb 
and flow of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in 
each other, she being part, she was positive, of the trees at home' (11). 
Similarly, sitting down to mend her silk dress, Clarissa's consciousness 
unfurls gradually, dissolving 'one centre, one diamond, one woman - her 
self'; she becomes at one with her manual occupation and its physical 
rhythm: 'So on a summer's day waves collect, overbalance, and fall; 
collect and fall; and the whole world seems to be saying "that is all" 
more and more ponderously, until even the heart in the body which lies in 
the sun on the beach says too, that is all' (44-45). Once she has let go 
of the ego, there is only the body, movement, colour, sound and rhythm: 
'and the body alone listens to the passing bee; the wave breaking; the 
dog barking, far away barking and barking'. 
It is not only Clarissa's 'self' which is often in abeyance; most of 
the characters' 'selves' are. It is quite natural to find that Septimus 
experiences a similar state of mind, for his ego has collapsed into 
psychosis. Though Clarissa, being perfectly sane, has the power to 
'collect the whole of her at one point', to take up a position as a 
social being, Septimus has lost the power to sustain a unified self. He 
thinks that his body is 'connected by millions of fibres' with the leaves 
of trees (26); everything becomes quickening colour and sounds, rising 
and falling rhythms. The sea-imagery which evoked Clarissa's experience 
while mending the dress, recurs in the description of Septimus: 
Going and coming, beckoning, signalling, so the light and 
shadow, which now made the wall grey, now the bananas bright 
yellow, now made the Strand grey, now made the omnibuses bright 
yellow, seemed to Septimus Warren Smith lying on the sofa in 
the sitting-room; watching the watery gold glow and fade with 
the astonishing sensibility of some live creature on the roses, 
on the wall-paper. Outside the trees dragged their leaves like 
nets through the depths of the air; the sound of water was in 
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the room, and through the waves came the voices of birds 
singing. Every power poured its treasures on his head, and his 
hand lay there on the back of the sofa, as he had seen his hand 
lie when he was bathing, floating, on the top of the waves, 
while far away on shore he heard dogs barking and barking far 
away. Fear no more, says the heart in the body; fear no more. 
(153-154) 
If this familiar sea-imagery recurs frequently throughout the novel, 
this is because the sea itself represents some great semiotic chora 
traversed by natural pulses, rhythms and currents in which one can lapse 
out into a state of libidinal bliss. But having asserted the Utopian 
value of the semiotic, the novel then tries to strategically recontain 
the sensory energies it has released. It does so by giving what the 
Russian Formalists term a 'motivation of the device', naturalizing and 
thus 'taming' the semiotic impulses it has unleashed. It does so in two 
ways. First, by locating the events of the novel shortly after the First 
World War. After this great and violent disruption of the national life, 
the simplest routines and objects have a novelty and vividness they would 
otherwise lack. The disruptive intensity of the novel's sensory 
perceptions are thus rationalized as the simple expression of a great 
relief at national survival. Secondly, semiotic intensities are 
naturalized by being implicitly presented as the effects of a summer 
heatwave. Under this heat and pressure, sensory impressions become 
surcharged, almost surreal, as they did in the 'Kew Gardens' passage I 
cited above. Mrs. Dalloway's Utopian impulse to celebrate the semiotic 
as an end in itself is thus constrained by a need for naturalistic 
motivation, just as I argued earlier that Woolf mines the laws of writing 
from within rather than brazenly flaunting them in the manner of James 
Joyce. 
However, one cannot let one's ego-identity go completely, cannot go 
on living with the self in abeyance, for this is the dividing line 
between sanity and insanity. Although she enjoys the other mode of 
being, Clarissa also 'assembles that diamond shape, that single person' 
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or what Kristeva terms the 'thetic' subject. But to Clarissa, this ego 
is essentially masculine, aggressive, possessive, domineering, and her 
decision not to marry Peter was her rejection of this masculine egotism: 
'For in marriage a little licence, a little independence there must be 
between people living together day in day out in the same house' (10), 
but 'with Peter everything had to be shared' . 
(10). Peter's 
aggressiveness is epitomized by his continuous fondling of a pocket- 
knife, an assertion of his masculinity which in fact ironically shows up 
his weakness and insecurity (his attraction for women and Clarissa is 
that he is 'not altogether manly' (172) ). In a male dominated society, 
when a man demands that a woman share everything as Peter does, it simply 
means the man forcing his own view on her; there is no mutual sharing. 
Though his masculine ego might be said to have constituted civilization 
by its rationality, it at the same time leads humanity to the meaningless 
destruction of World War by its rapacious aggressiveness, as I argued in 
the previous chapter. The equation of masculine egotism and destructive 
aggression is a theme which Woolf will expound strongly in Three Guineas. 
Clarissa is pierced by an intense joy in life: 'London; this moment of 
June. For it was the middle of June. The War was over... '(6). 
Throughout the novel, the impact of World War One is recalled - 'tears 
and sorrows' (12), 'a miracle thinking of the War' (127), and Septimus is 
precisely a victim of the War, a case of the 'deferred effects of shell 
shock'(201). The novel expresses the spiritual bankruptcy to which pure 
masculinity leads humanity. Septimus 'developed manliness' (95-96) in the 
war, the effect Mr. Brewer desired for him when he advised football. The 
wartime emotional turbulence which he had to repress in order to protect 
himself and survive has destroyed his being. Though he is said to have 
'served with great distinction in the War', to his mind, 'in the War 
itself he had failed'(106). 
Thus he is forced into the position of the 'scapegoat' of the 
masculine society, its imperialism and capitalism, for these are nothing 
90 
but political terms for the will to dominate, to reduce differences into 
homogeneity. Woolf describes the intention of the novel as being 'to 
criticise the social system, and to show it at work, at its most 
intense'. (WD, 57) Perry Meisel points out the significance of 
Septimus's job before the war; he is clerk for 'land and estate agents', 
'valuers, in short, of property'. 
' 3 Septimus is one of those 'self- 
educated men whose education is all learnt from books borrowed from 
public libraries', 'a border case' (93), with no secure position in this 
capitalist society. But in spite of his initial successful achievement 
which wins his employer's trust, Septimus drops out of this capitalist 
territory and fails to 'colonize himself'. 
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The incarnation of the capitalist, imperialist spirit is Sir William 
Bradshaw. He is the champion of the society with his perfect 'sense of 
proportion' and 'healthy' strong will 'for dominion' and 'for power' 
(110,112). 'Sir William not only prospered himself but made England 
prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, 
made it impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, 
too, shared his sense of proportion ... '(110). The connection between 
between 'the good of society' which 'Proportion' fosters and imperialism 
and colonization is more explicit in the case of its sister goddess, 
'less smiling, more formidable': 'Conversion'. She is even now engaged: 
in the heat and sands of India, the mud and swamp of Africa, 
the purlieus of London, wherever, in short, the climate or the 
devil tempts men to fall from the true belief which is her own 
- is even now engaged in dashing down shrines, smashing idols, 
and setting up in their place her own stern countenance. (110- 
111) 
This 'Conversion' does not operate only on the political, public 
level; it is also another name for a male egotism which feasts on the 
wills of women, adoring its own features stamped on the face of them. So 
Lady Bradshaw is also a victim of this masculine egotism, and Woolf's 
tone is not so severe towards her. 'Fifteen years ago she had gone 
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under-only the slow sinking, water-logged, of her will into his' (111). 
Having lost her spontaneous, living spirit ('Once, long ago, she had 
caught salmon freely'), now 'the poor lady' had to lie 'to minister to 
the craving which lit her husband's eye so oilily for dominion, for 
power'(112). Thus Sir William is a 'master of his own action', 'a law 
giver', he 'judges', 'rules', and 'inflicts'(163). To him and Lady 
Bradshaw in her ostrich feathers, 'life is good'; but 'to us', his 
patients protest, 'life has given no such bounty'(112). I t is not simply 
that they, lacking a sense of proportion, cannot e njoy life; the 
Bradshaws' comfortable life is made possible only by his domination and 
suppression of others: imperialism enriches itself by colonizing the 
territory of others. 
The novel's treatment of the mysterious car in which greatness (the 
Queen or Prime Minister? ) passes through London, satirises the whole 
machinery of the British Empire. It is merely 'rumours'; the car passes 
'invisibly, inaudibly'(17). 'But nobody knew whose face had been 
seen' (17), and yet it is enough to send men, if need be, 'to the 
cannon's mouth, as their ancestors had done before them'(21). People's 
piety towards this unreal institution called the British Empire 
guarantees 'the flowing corn and the manor houses of England'(22). Hugh 
Whitbread is a harmless but despicable being, who 'had been afloat on the 
cream of this English society', 'a perfect specimen of the public-school 
type'(114,82). However, few of the characters are exempt from this 
charge. Even Peter, who turns a critical eye on the tediousness of high 
society and regards himself as an outcast (he had been a 'Socialist, in 
some sense a failure' (56)), shares deep down the same admiration and 
piety towards the imperial order. He admires the boys' military 
marching, for they symbolize 'duty, gratitude, fidelity, love of England' 
(57): 
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A splendid achievement in its own way, after all, London; the 
season; civilization. Coming as he did from a respectable 
Anglo-Indian family which for at least three generations had 
administered the affairs of a continent (it's strange, he 
thought, what a sentiment I have about that, disliking India, 
and empire, and army as he did), there were moments when 
civilization, even of this sort, seemed dear to him as a 
personal possession; moments of pride in England; in butlers; 
chow dogs; girls in their security. (61-62) 
This passage reveals his complicity with Imperialism and English 
high society, which he pretends to despise. Among men he is exceptional 
in having an element of 'unmanliness', being able to have 'extreme 
intimacy' with women, being too susceptible (which has been his 'undoing' 
in Anglo-Indian society), and yet Peter, after all, cannot escape from a 
sentimental admiration of patriarchal civilization: 'And the doctors and 
men of business and capable women all going about their business, 
punctual, alert, robust, seemed to him wholly admirable, good fellows, to 
whom one would entrust one's life, companions in the art of living, who 
would see one through. What with one thing and another, the show was 
really very tolerable'(62). He would never understand the agony of 
Septimus (as Clarissa does), being fundamentally on the side of Sir 
William Bradshaw. A further incident reveals Peter's true position. 
Seeing the ambulance which carries away Septimus, who has just thrown 
himself out of the window (out of society), Peter admires it as a triumph 
of civilization: 'the efficiency, the organization, the communal spirit 
of London'(166). But he manages to check his imagination and empathy 
with the victim, 'some poor. devil', by means of 'a sense of proportion': 
'Ah, but thinking became morbid, sentimental', for he knows that his 
difference of view and standard - unmanliness - 'this susceptibility', 
'not weeping at the right time, or laughing either', is his undoing(167). 
He has been living all these years in the very midst of Imperialism as an 
Anglo-Indian. Though Peter himself is not free from complicity with this 
machinery of the British Empire, in spite of his illusion that 'he had 
escaped! was utterly free' (58), the criticism he aims at Clarissa on 
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this point is perfectly justified. She has an 'absurd and faithful 
passion' for the royal family, 'since her people were courtiers once', 
and her party itself is partly a gesture of pious service to this myth: 
'she, too, was going that very night to kindle and illuminate'. (7) 
However, she has deep within her something which totally rejects the 
masculine ego which constitutes this society. This secret space within 
the self is symbolized by her attic, to which she ascends 'like a nun 
withdrawing, or a child exploring a tower' (35), and these two images 
convey the ambivalence of the attic, which is at once a place of deathly 
renunciation and austerity and yet also a locus of excited new life and 
discovery. A related ambivalence characterises Woolf's entire treatment 
of this episode. Clarissa's spiritual trauma is a result of Lady Bruton 
not inviting her to a lunch party with Richard; the effect is thus out of 
all proportion to its cause, and a note of satire is introduced, as if 
this scene were so sensitively significant to Woolf that it could not be 
introduced without a protective outworks of irony. Yet its centrality to 
the entire novel is signalled nonetheless: as Clarissa mounts the stairs, 
it is 'as if she had left a party... had shut the door and gone out and 
stood alone, a single figure against the appalling night'(35). Thus in a 
sense, Clarissa 'leaves' her party before she has ever given it, and the 
attic episode is satirical interlude and spiritual focus-point at once. 
In the attic Clarissa discards social decorum and pretensions: 'women 
must put off their rich apparel. At mid-day they must disrobe'(35). 
Clarissa doffs her yellow feathered hat, which, in the light of the 
meanings that piece of apparel has already acquired in the novel, is a 
symbolic gesture. For it was when learning from Hugh Whitbread of his 
wife's 'internal ailment' that Clarissa had 'felt very sisterly and oddly 
conscious at the same time of her hat'(8). A spontaneous movement of 
female solidarity is thus at once undercut by Clarissa's awareness of 
herself as sexual object of the male gaze ('internal ailment' made her 
conscious as woman in both directions), and in laying aside the hat 
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Clarissa may be regarded as renouncing her coquettish self-consciousness 
in the name of a return to 'sisterliness'. It is as if the sheets of the 
attic bed, which are 'clean, tight stretched in a broad white band from 
side to side', symbolize Clarissa's intact hymen. For this attic is the 
space where she rejects all men, even Richard who is 'the best', 'the 
most disinterested' (211) among the politicians who doggedly shore up 
society: 'she could not dispel a virginity preserved through childbirth 
which clung to her like a sheet'; 'through some contraction of this cold 
spirit, she had failed him. And then at Constantinople, and again and 
again'(36). The sexual implications of Clarissa's withdrawal to the 
attic are complex. On the one hand, it is naturalistically motivated by 
the fact of her having a bad heart. But, on the other hand, both Clarissa 
and Richard exploit this biological datum to their own ends. 'Richard 
insisted, after her illness, that she must sleep undisturbed' (35), 
adopting the Bradshaw approach - the use of the 'disinterested' authority 
of medical science to impose constraints on female desire and sexuality. 
But Clarissa trumps this manoeuvre: 'really she preferred to read of the 
retreat from Moscow. He knew it', and the final curt sentence carries a 
stinging humiliation for her husband. This antagonism is repeated a 
little later. When Richard goes back to bed, he 'as often as not, 
dropped his hot-water bottle and swore! How she laughed! '(37). This is 
not just an affectionate chuckle at a spouse's habitual clumsiness; in 
its very excess it has an edge of malice, as if Clarissa were mocking the 
feeble substitute (hot-water bottle) to which Richard has recourse for 
the female bodily warmth she is denying him. The image of Napoleonic 
retreat through snow symbolizes Clarissa who withdraws 'through some 
contraction of this cold spirit'. Yet unlike the retreat from the cold 
snow of Moscow, her retreat does not come nearer to any southern source 
of warmth. Her retreat will be further and further into the attic: 
'Narrower and narrower would her bed be'(35). Her withdrawal and 
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isolation would become more secret and more complete. 
Feminist theorists argue that the fact that the baby girl's first 
love-object is a body of her own sex, the mother's, is the basis of 
woman's narcissistic disposition; it will be difficult for later 
relationships with men to overcome the daughter's loss of her first 
relationship with the mother's body. In one sense, narcissism simply 
marginalizes women, reducing them in the male view to a trivial 
preoccupation with dress and appearance, to personal vanity. But carried 
to an extreme, such narcissism becomes profoundly threatening to men, 
opening the dangerous prospect of women attaining mutual sexual 
satisfaction without any need of the male sex. Peter Walsh, who seeks 
'compassion, comprehension, absolution' (64) in womanhood, is constantly 
confronted by such a total rejection by Clarissa: 'this coldness, this 
woodenness, something very profound in her... an impenetrability' (68), in 
spite of 'their exquisite intimacy'(51). The most vivid image of this is 
the encounter between the newly returned Walsh and Clarissa as she sits 
mending her dress. There is a mythic resonance as a long absent Ulysses 
returns to claim a Penelope whose busy weaving has kept away false 
suitors. But the scene is more complex than this; there is a compacting 
of mythic roles. Peter is both Ulysses (newly returned) and false suitor 
(meeting the wife while her true husband, Richard, is away), and Clarissa 
emphasises his latter role by continuing busily to sew. However, nor is 
Richard altogether the true possessor, the true husband, of Clarissa. 
For the ambivalence extends to him, too; for Clarissa often thinks of the 
extreme joy and excitement which would be hers if she had married Peter: 
'If I had married him, this gaiety would have been mine all day! '(52). 
Thus Clarissa in a sense rejects both of them. When she hears Walsh at 
the door 'she made to hide her dress, like a virgin protecting chastity' 
(45), and a subdued note of sexual violation pervades the entire scene. 
"'And what's all this? " he said, tilting his pen-knife towards her green 
dress' (46); and her sewing up of the dress thus becomes the restitching 
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into wholeness of a hymen which Walsh constantly threatens to tear. 
Because of this narcissistic disposition, her libido folding in upon 
herself, Clarissa ultimately rejects all relationships with others. 
Aware of this cold spirit in herself, she feels that 'I am alone for 
ever' (53), at the same time acclaiming the importance of 'privacy of the 
soul'. The dialectic within Clarissa between this cold contracting upon 
the self and the schizophrenic dispersal I discussed earlier is obliquely 
recognized by the novel in its far-reaching and suggestive remark about 
the negligible figure of Mr. Bowley as he watches the crowds waiting at 
Buckingham Palace: 'Little Mr. Bowley... was sealed with wax over the 
deeper sources of life, but could be unsealed suddenly, inappropriately, 
sentimentally, by this sort of thing'(23). And these two impulses are 
also conveyed in the lines from Cymbeline: 'Fear no more the heat o'the 
sun/Nor the furious winter's rages'. For it is the psychic 'heat o'the 
sun' which melts the sealing wax and unleashes the experience of physical 
dissociation and dispersal. While Clarissa's attic is clearly an 
allusion to the attic which contains Bertha Mason in Jane Eyre, Woolf has 
reversed the values traditionally associated with the 'mad woman in the 
attic'. For Bertha's attic is a place of tropical heat and sexuality, of 
buried physical violence, while Clarissa's has the chill and disembodied 
atmosphere of a mortuary. 
Yet Clarissa can occasionally overcome her 'contraction of this cold 
spirit' in her relationship with women. She yields to 'the charm of a 




, was a sudden revelation, a 
tinge like a blush which one 
tried to check and then, as it spread, one yielded to its 
expansion, and rushed to the farthest verge and there quivered 
and felt the world come closer, swollen with some astonishing 
significance, some pressure of rapture, which split its thin 
skin and gushed and poured with an extraordinary alleviation 
over the cracks and sores. Then, for that moment, she had seen 
an illumination; a match burning in a crocus; an inner meaning 
almost expressed. But the close withdrew; the hard 
softened. (36) 
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The culmination of these experiences with women, the one in which 
Clarissa experienced 'the most exquisite moment of her whole life' (40), 
is the kiss with Sally Seton. Clarissa acclaims this love-relationship 
with Sally for its 'purity' and 'integrity' (38), which are impossible in 
a relationship with a man, which always becomes domination by the man 
over the woman. Relationships with men - especially their culmination in 
marriage - are- thus a menace to the freedom of a woman, a kind of delayed 
repetition of the girl's transition from an active mother attachment to 
mere mother-identification and the passive aim of father-attachment which 
securely fixes a woman as a castrated being in patriarchal society. 
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Marriage breaks up the bond between women to prevent them from uniting 
themselves to form a republic of women and to conform them to the 
masculine will. Hence 'a sense of being in league together, a 
presentiment of something that was bound to part them (they spoke of 
marriage always as a catastrophe), which led to this chivalry, this 
protected feeling'(39). 
The old woman opposite Clarissa's window is a mirror image of 
herself in her attic with 'the bed and Baron Marbot and the candle half- 
burnt'(36-37). She is a symbol of both independence and isolation 
maintained in patriarchal society. Moreover, she lives up to the demands 
of Woolf's major feminist tract because she has 'A Room of [Her] Own'. 
'It was fascinating , with people still laughing and shouting in the 
drawing-room, to watch that old woman, quite quietly, going to bed 
alone'(204). This mirror image endows Clarissa with the strength to 
resist the colonization of herself by the surrounding world, to remain 
immune from 'the contagion of the world's slow stain', 
17 
even though 
Clarissa herself fritters her time away, 'lunching, dining, giving these 
incessant parties of hers, talking nonsense, saying things she didn't 
mean, blunting the edge of her mind, losing her discrimination'(87). The 
characters are continually 'criticizing and 'cutting up' each other in the 
book, but the text implies that there may exist a strong bond between 
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women in spite of differences and hostility: 
Nevertheless her inquiry, 'How's Clarissa? ' was well known by 
women infallibly to be a signal from a well-wisher, from an 
almost silent companion, whose utterances (half a dozen perhaps 
in the course of -a lifetime) signified recognition of some 
feminine comradeship which went beneath masculine lunch parties 
and united Lady Bruton and Mrs. Dalloway, who seldom met, and 
appeared when they did meet indifferent and even hostile, in a 
singular bond. (117) 
There is a bond even between such profoundly different types as 
Clarissa and Miss Kilman, for her relationship to the latter, however 
hostile, has a fierce intensity unparalleled in any of her relationships 
with men: 'she hated her: she loved her' (192). 
The problem of woman is to assert a female specificity as difference 
and to open up space for this difference in the masculine structure of 
society. But this is not to be achieved simply by the assertion of the 
comradeship of women within patriarchal society; it involves, rather, the 
question of the subject. Having remained close to the maternal body in 
spite of the repression which society forces upon her, the girl or woman 
inscribes herself naturally within the semiotic, in touch with what 
Kristeva terms the 'spasmodic force' of the repressed. The woman's task 
is then to affirm this force, to find the practices appropriate to it, 
but this will not be a matter of its defining a separate, substantive 
symbolic of its own. It will rather, Kristeva writes, 'at best be 
enacted as a moment inherent in the rejection in the process of the 
ruptures, of the rhythmic breaks. Insofar as she has a specificity of 
her own, a woman finds it in asociality, in the violation of communal 
conventions, in a sort of a-symbolic singularity'. 
18 Menaced equally by 
paternal paranoia and the schizophrenia of the mother, the daughter must 
maintain herself in a difficult equilibrium between the two. 
In order to avoid madness, silence, and thus further 
marginalization, women must somehow keep a hold on the symbolic too. As 
if in repetition and reinforcement of the mirror phase - the threshold of 
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formation of the unitary ego - Clarissa needs her own reflection: 'the 
delicate pink face of the woman... of Clarissa Dalloway; of herself'(42). 
By means of this specular image she can sustain her self-hood; otherwise 
she is fragmented - 'different' and 'incompatible' 'parts'. So Clarissa 
'assembles' her self 'when some effort, some call on her self' constrains 
her; she submits to the laws of the Father, repressing the maternal body. 
Clarissa is conscious of her lack of 'something central which 
permeated' (36), and this is the maternal body which she has to repress 
in order to become a subject in the symbolic, a repression which is not 
Clarissa's alone, but is the necessary condition for all human beings to 
become subjects. Because of this denial of the maternal body and her own 
body, 'there was an emptiness about the heart of life; an attic 
room' (35) to which she austerely withdraws 'like a nun'. Sally, who more 
fully owns her body, is quick to detect this lack in Clarissa: 'But - did 
Peter understand? - she lacked something' (207). The novel stresses this 
withdrawal from the body in several ways. Clarissa had 'grown very white 
since her illness' (6); she is thus the mere ghost of a woman, cut away 
by physical infirmity from the energies of bodily life. There is, 
moreover, 'a touch of the bird about her, of the jay, blue-green, light, 
vivacious' (6); such energy as she retains is light and ethereal, more 
spiritual than physical. And, finally, she is in her fifties, cut off by 
the fact of menopause from the fertile inner biological processes of 
ovulation and menstruation. 
The most positive representation of the body in the novel is the 
young Sally Seton, who 'forgot her sponge, and ran along the passage 
naked'(38). Sally's fascination for Clarissa was 'a sort of abandonment' 
(37), that is, her different relationship to her own body. Without 
misgivings about the body, Sally teaches Clarissa about sex; she speaks 
of sexual matters in front of men; she shocks others by running along the 
passage naked. She confidently asserts herself as a woman, afraid of 
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nothing: 'as if she could say anything, do anything'(37). Not that her 
feminist boldness goes unpunished, however; Hugh Whitbread's kiss is an 
act of sexual violence, a rape on a miniature scale of a woman who has 
dared argue that her sex should have the vote. But to our and Clarissa's 
disappointment, the apparently fearless Sally has married a capitalist 
millionaire, and is now the mother of five sons. Maternity is the only 
female identity which is valorized and recognized by patriarchy; only as 
a mother is a woman allowed to have her sexuality as difference, to own 
her body and social place. Thus the novel's arch-rebel becomes a sober 
conformist, 'Lady Rossiter', as Clarissa becomes 'Mrs. Dalloway' but in a 
different way. 
Repressing the body, Clarissa is given a place in the symbolic order 
which is constructed around the Name-of-the-Father: 
this body, with all its capacities, seemed nothing - nothing at 
all. She had the oddest sense of being herself invisible; 
unseen; unknown; there being no more marrying, no more having 
of children now, but only this astonishing and rather solemn 
progress with the rest of them, up Bond Street, this being 
Mrs. Dalloway; not even Clarissa any more; this being 
Mrs. Richard Dalloway. (13) 
She is 'not even Clarissa', since once subdued to the laws of the 
father, a woman is next handed over to another man, the husband, as 
commodity in the structure of patriarchal exchange relations. Clarissa 
becomes a mere role - 'Mrs. Richard Dalloway'; this is the only possible 
place for her in the system of patriarchy. Throughout the novel, 
Clarissa's mother is curiously repressed. Her father, Justin Parry., is 
always prominent in her memories, but her mother never comes into the 
foreground. Only once, at the party, does a guest exclaim that Clarissa 
looks that night 'so like her mother': 'And really Clarissa's eyes filled 
with tears' (193); but this brief 'return' of her mother is instantly 
cancelled by her duty as hostess of patriarchy. 
19 This repression of the 
mother is also a denial of the maternal in herself: 'unmaternal as she 
was'(209). Women have to be the daughters of their fathers, not their 
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mothers. Childbirth can no more rupture her hymen outwards than the 
phallus could rupture it inwards; she retains 'a virginity preserved 
through childbirth'(36) . Clarissa cannot move from girlhood to full 
womanhood, and is constantly defensive about her own maternity. Even 
Peter Walsh notices the over-emphasis, the 'histrionic' manner, in which 
she declares 'Here is my Elizabeth' (53), and he later reflects that 
'probably she [Elizabeth] doesn't get on with Clarissa'(63). Seeing 
Clarissa, Walsh notes that 'they [women] attach themselves to places; and 
their fathers -a woman's always proud of her father'(62). In 
'Mrs. Dalloway in Bond Street' Clarissa recalls 'A happy childhood - and 
it was not to his daughters only that Justin Parry had seemed a fine 
fellow... '. 20 Breaking away from the mother, Clarissa submits herself to 
the authority of the father, accepts the role prescribed by his laws, 
becoming 'the perfect hostess'(9). Thus she lets her duty as hostess 
smother her emotion towards her mother. And this repudiation of the 
mother is repeated in Elizabeth: "'one can see they are devoted to each 
other. " She could feel it by the way Elizabeth went to her father'(213). 
Though this severing from the maternal is the most painful loss the 
human subject endures, and for the rest of life its overcoming is his/her 
desire, the risk of fusing with the mother is shown in Peter's dream in 
Regent's Park. It is noteworthy that Peter falls asleep beside an 
elderly nurse who 'resumed her knitting' as he began snoring(63). Here 
is a female. knitter more reassuring then the formidable Clarissa- 
Penelope. Peter's dream of the solitary traveller evokes some ultimate 
principle of womanliness which will 'shower down from her magnificent 
hands, compassion, comprehension, absolution'(64). Seeking fusion with 
the maternal in Clarissa, Peter always finds himself repelled by her, 
confronting a 'coldness' or 'impenetrability' in her, in spite of her 
being 'purely feminine'(84). He therefore thinks 'rather let me walk 
straight on to this great figure, who will, with a toss of her head, 
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mount me on her streamers and let me blow to nothingness with the 
rest'(64). This fusion with the maternal is thus an instantaneous 
dispersal of the human subject. But the passage is deeply ambivalent 
because the novel recognizes that Peter is invoking an ideology of 
femininity in order to avoid contact with the real woman. Hence it 
speaks of 'the visions which ceaselessly float up, pace beside, put their 
faces in front of, the actual thing', and hence the satirical tone, as 
when the Sirens are 'lolloping away on the green sea waves' (emphasis 
added). At the same time, however, even this ideological stereotype of 
the feminine does answer to certain deep-seated needs of the human 
subject, and the sea imagery does nonetheless relate to those more 
Utopian visions of the sea as a great pulsing semiotic chora which I 
discussed earlier. 
The voice of the 'battered woman' singing opposite the tube station 
is precisely the voice of the mother, issuing from 'a mere hole in the 
earth' (91) (the woman, the mother is always a void, a hole in discourse 
- as the unconscious, the unrepresentable): 'so rude a mouth, a mere hole 
in the earth, muddy too, matted with root fibres and tangled grasses', an 
image irresistably suggesting the female genitals. This singing voice 
'bubble[s] up without direction, vigour, beginning or end', and 'with an 
absence of all human meaning into ee um fah um so I foo swee too eem oo' 
(90). A mere rhythmic babble of phonemes, this 'old bubbling, burbling 
song' of the pre-symbolic becomes something like the very principle of 
evolution; it has endured 'through all ages - when the pavement was 
grass, when it was swamp, through the age of tusk and mammoth'. The 
ancient woman therefore offers an alternative, 'feminist' view of 
evolution to set against the patriarchal social Darwinism of a 
Sir William Bradshaw, whereby only the fittest (or those with a 'sense of 
proportion') survive. Septimus sees Holmes and Bradshaw as 'the brute 
with the red nostrils' (162), an allusion to the Tennysonian view of the 
evolutionary process as 'nature red in tooth and claw'. 
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Just as the broken syllables of the old woman's song escape. the 
lexical and syntactic grids of the symbolic order, so she has no place 
within society, but wanders freely as a tramp. Clarissa, in contrast, is 
a perfect hostess; she gives a party for the good of her husband's 
career, escorts the Prime Minister with 'an exquisite cordiality' (191), 
and thus she preserves her place in this patriarchal structure. But this 
complicity with patriarchy arouses an intense hostility in Miss Kilman 
who has been 'cheated' (136) by the male social order. Kilman is a 
'phallic woman'21 who identifies herself with the Father, denying her 
femaleness and 'becoming' a man herself. Hence Clarissa can only 
conceive of Kilman's hated existence as a violent phallic penetration and 
scraping of the delicate interior membranes of her body: 'It rasped her, 
though, to have stirring about in her this brutal monster! to hear twigs 
cracking and feel hooves planted down in the depths of that leaf- 
encumbered forest, the soul... [it] had power to make her feel scraped, 
hurt in her spine; gave her physical pain'(15). Kilman does not 'dress 
to please', and hates Clarissa with her feminine delicacy and 
fashionableness: 'the most worthless of all classes'(136). But because 
of her inferior class-position, Kilman has had to adopt the most 
aggressive masculine values in order to earn and secure a social niche 
for herself. She is thus dominated by egotism and the male spirit of 
conversion, and even her love for Elizabeth has become a rapacious desire 
for. possession. In attempting to conform to the mores of male society, 
Kilman has had to repress the maternal and the body, just as Clarissa 
did. 
'It was the flesh that she must control'(141). She must subjugate 
'her unlovable body', which people could not bear to see and the opposite 
sex would never desire (142), and she therefore desperately resorts to 
religion for this, 'for the light in the Abbey was bodiless' (147); 'to 
aspire above the vanities, the desires, the commodities, to rid herself 
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both of hatred and of love'. Her insatiable pleasure in eating betrays 
the fact that she cannot yet control the body, and it is her powerful 
physical existence that strikes people: 'her largeness, robustness and 
power'(148). This superabundant physicality takes the form of a powerful 
smell about which, however, the novel remains coy. As Elizabeth and 
Kilman have tea together, the former defers to the latter's wish for her 
to remain, but nonetheless reflects that 'it was rather stuffy in 
here'(145). When Elizabeth finally does escape, 'she was delighted to be 
free. The fresh air was so delicious. It had been so stuffy in the Army 
and Navy Stores'(149). Earlier Clarissa thinks of Kilman 'mewed in a 
stuffy bedroom' (14), and when she reflects that 'year in year out she 
wore that coat; she perspired; she was never in the room five minutes 
without making you feel her superiority', this final noun is not quite 
what we were expecting! It is precisely the effort to repress the body 
that turns it sour and rancid, for Kilman's disgusting odour is in stark 
contrast to the healthy and vital smell of Richard Dalloway: 'when he 
came into the room he smelt of stables'(208). The heavy stress on 
Kilman's perspiration reveals her as a principle of heat in contrast to 
Clarissa as the principle of ice and austerity, and this may lend another 
meaning to Clarissa's desire to 'fear no more the heat o'the sun'. 
'With all this luxury going on, what hope was there for a better 
state of things? Instead of lying on a sofa... she should have been in a 
factory; behind a counter; Mrs. Dalloway and all the other fine 
ladies! '(137). Kilman's denunciation of Clarissa is perfectly justified, 
and Peter also criticizes her, protected as she is by her 'Conservative 
husband', for 'sitting all the time', 'playing about', 'going to parties' 
(46); she is little better than Hugh Whitbread who has been 'afloat on 
the cream of English society for fifty-five years' (114), is 'at heart a 
snob'(209). By making Kilman so distasteful and aggressive, however, the 
novel encourages us to discount her attack on Clarissa's complicity with 
patriarchy, the contradiction that she depends on an imperialistic 
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society to afford the material conditions for the possibility of those 
values - 'the privacy of the soul' (140) - which that society at the same 
time negates. This is the very contradiction which Raymond Williams has 
noted of Bloomsbury in general: that the Bloomsbury intellectuals were 
culturally superior to and contemptuous of the bourgeoisie to whom they 
were at the same time mere administrative functionaries. 
22 Clarissa's 
cold and distant attitude to Sally's husband as self-made man and 
industrial capitalist further attests this distaste for the bourgeoisie, 
as does the novel's hostility to Sir William Bradshaw as a member of the 
ideological thought-police of the capitalist order. Bradshaw in turn is 
suspicious, even aggressive towards 'cultivated people'(108). This 
contradiction in Clarissa cannot be evaded: her stoical, sometimes almost 
existential anguish, and her creative energy (in giving a party 'for the 
sake of offering' (135), getting people together), on the one hand; her 
role as snobbish and superficial hostess of high society, surrounded by 
luxury, idling away her time with endless parties, on the other. This 
was Woolf's worry too: 'the doubtful point is, I think, the character of 
Mrs. Dalloway. It may be too stiff, too glittering and tinsely. But 
then I can bring innumerable other characters to her support'(WD, 61). 
Of Kilman, Clarissa thinks: she 'hated her' and 'she loved her', 'It was 
enemies one wanted, not friends'(192). Because of the 'heavy, ugly, 
commonplace' nature of the accuser, Woolf can make Clarissa's defence 
more 'convincing' than it could otherwise have been. 
But if Clarissa and Miss Kilman are starkly opposed, the novel does 
nonetheless propose -a mediation of their antagonistic qualities in 
Lady Bruton whom Clarissa in a sense envies. Like Kilman, Lady Bruton is 
a physically powerful, emphatically phallic woman. She is 'a strong 
martial woman' (120) with a 'ramrod bearing', who 'could have worn the 
helmet and shot the arrow, could have led troops to attack' (198), thus 
contrasting with the physical slightness and femininity of Clarissa. But 
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like Clarissa, Lady Bruton belongs to the upper echelons of society and, 
unlike Miss Kilman, she has little intellect, being wholly dependent on 
Hugh Whitbread and Richard Dalloway to help her compose a letter to 
The Times: 'Debarred by her sex, and some truancy, too, of the logical 
faculty (she found it impossible to write a letter to the Times)'(198). 
Lady Bruton, however, belongs decisively to the past. 'She derived from 
the eighteenth century', reflects Peter (191), 'She was all right': thus 
she is exempt from his criticisms of English Imperialism. As an 
aristocrat, it is appropriate that the positive values associated with 
the body should attach to her, since the aristocracy as a class is 
defined by its blood and breeding. These values have thus migrated 
downwards socially, attaching themselves to the lower classes represented 
by Kilman and becoming negative and dystopian in the process. It is 
Kilman's fusion of mind and body that makes her, politically, so 
dangerous in the novel, for she incarnates two of the most potent middle 
class images of social subversiveness. On the one hand, she is the 
menacing Utopianist, constructing cerebral schemes for the wholesale 
renovation of society. Hence her enthusiasm for post-revolutionary 
Russia (she 'would do anything for the Russians'(14)), which places her 
in the 'Jacobin' tradition first denounced in the name of piecemeal, 
'organic' reform by Edmund Burke. Sally and Clarissa were enthusiastic 
over William Morris in their teens - 'They meant to found a society to 
abolish private property' (38) - and such youthful infatuations, the 
novel implies, display an admirable innocence and idealism. Kilman falls 
out of favour because she has poor enough taste to be still adhering to 
socialist principles in her forties. But Kilman is not only an abstract 
revolutionary, she also represents the middle-class fear of the lower 
orders as 'mob', as a pre-rational violent body clamouring for 
gratification and violently overturning social constraints - hence the 
stress on Kilman's voracity: her wolfing down of eclairs, her desire for 
the sensory pleasures she has been deprived of. But if in uniting these 
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two images of revolution Kilman becomes extraordinarily formidable, she 
is also at the same time rendered powerless. Mind and body are in grave 
contradiction; each tugs in opposite directions, and their overall effect 
is to leave Kilman static and impotent in the middle. Thus Clarissa 
finally defeats Kilman because the 'abducted' Elizabeth returns to the 
bosom of her family. 'Mrs. Dalloway had triumphed. Elizabeth had 
gone'(146). 
Love and religion! thought Clarissa, going back into the 
drawing-room, tingling all over. How detestable, how 
detestable they are!... The cruellest things in the world, she 
thought, seeing them clumsy, hot, domineering, hypocritical, 
eavesdropping, jealous, infinitely cruel and unscrupulous, 
dressed in mackintosh coat, on the landing; love and religion. 
Had she ever tried to convert any one herself? Did she not 
wish everybody merely to be themselves? And she watched out of 
the window the old lady opposite climbing upstairs... There was 
something solemn in it - but love and religion would destroy 
that, whatever it was, the privacy of the soul. The odious 
Kilman would destroy it. Yet it was a sight that made her want 
to cry. (139-140) 
Thus Clarissa defends herself for caring more for her roses than the 
Armenians: 'And people would say, "Clarissa... is spoilt. "... Hunted out of 
existence, maimed, frozen, the victims of cruelty and injustice... no, she 
could feel nothing for the Albanians, or was it the Armenians? but she 
loved her roses (didn't that help the Armenians? )'(133). Clarissa 
asserts this in contrast to Miss Kilman who 'would do anything for the 
Russians, starved herself for the Austrians, but in private inflicted 
positive torture, so insensitive was she, dressed in a green mackintosh 
coat'(14). Though Clarissa's argument is little more than a caricature, 
her point is that callousness of feeling causes social injustice and 
political oppression, and that it is therefore useless to react to 
injustice with the very kind of insensitivity which has brought it into 
being in the first place. She totally rejects politics as incompetent; 
the problem of 'frumps, the most dejected of miseries sitting on 
doorsteps... can't be dealt with, she felt positive, by Acts of Parliament 
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for that very reason: they love life'(6). However, a world groaning 
under injustice and oppression can hardly wait for a total change of the 
political system brought about simply by loving roses. It might be said 
that Mrs. Dalloway is such a 'pure' revolutionary that she ends up being 
reactionary. Though she feels the need for a wholesale transformation of 
social values, she suspects the practical means of social change 
(political action) as themselves bearing the dominative values of the 
system they are attacking. To attempt to transform society is, for 
Clarissa, to be complicit with its worst values. Even socialism is no 
more than a disguise for the tyrannical spirit of 'conversion', who 
'shrouds herself in white and walks penitentially disguised as brotherly 
love through factories and parliaments; offers help, but desires 
power' (111). This view is a further consequence of the Romantic 
suspicion of abstract political thought, and its effect is to leave 
Clarissa in a state of total political quiescence. 
But the novel does not ignore the contradiction in Clarissa's views 
about society. Returning from her expedition to the florist, she thinks 
as she enters the house: 
how moments like this are buds on the tree of life, flowers of 
darkness they are, she thought (as if some lovely rose had 
blossomed for her eyes only); not for a moment did she believe 
in God; but all the more, she thought, taking up the pad, one 
must repay in daily life to servants, yes, to dogs and 
canaries, above all to Richard her husband, who was the 
foundation of it... one must pay back from this secret deposit 
of exquisite moments, she thought. (33) 
But Clarissa's 'exquisite moments', which depend entirely on her 
husband and the whole imperialist society, are ironized by being shaken 
the very next instant by the news that Lady Bruton had asked Richard to 
lunch without her. Earlier in the novel Mrs. Dempster had already been 
used to satirise Clarissa's arguments about 'roses'. Mrs. Dempster thinks 
that life has been bitter, and she had given to it 'roses; figure; her 
feet too': 'Roses, she thought sardonically. All trash, m'dear. For 
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really, what with eating, drinking, and mating, the bad days and good, 
life had been no mere matter of roses'(31). 
Septimus is another victim of patriarchy, its 'scapegoat'(29). He 
had left home as a boy 'because of his mother; she lied' (93-94), and 
educated himself borrowing books from public libraries. His growth is 
thus a process of breäking away from the Mother and identification with 
and assimilation of the locus of the Father. He worked for the Sibleys 
and Arrowsmith: auctioneers, valuers, and estate agents, thus serving the 
capitalist order, and finally he went to War, in which he 'developed 
manliness' (95-96), the lack of which had previously been the only 
unsatisfactory aspect of him. But in this final stage of his cultivation 
of 'masculinity' Septimus has broken down: 'In the War itself he had 
failed'(106). 'His obsession that 'one must be scientific' represents the 
imperative toward rationality of the patriarchal civilization. But he at 
last finds that 'He could reason; he could read... he could add up his 
bill', but he could not feel; 'his brain was perfect; it must be the 
fault of the world then - that he could not feel'(98). He denounces 
himself for his 'sin' of being unable to feel, even about the death of 
his dear friend Evans. 
Like Clarissa and Kilman, Septimus cannot come to terms with the 
body. 'His body was macerated until only the nerve fibres were left. It 
was spread like a veil upon a rock'(76). He loathes all corporeality in 
human beings - 'the putting on of clothes, the getting of children, the 
sordidity of the mouth and the belly! ' (98) - and rejects his wife's wish 
to have a son, because 'the business of copulation was filth to him 
before the end'(99). But if the refusal to procreate is in one sense a 
refusal of the body, it is also a rebellion against the symbolic order, 
for Septimus is refusing to take the final step into the patriarchal 
order by becoming a father himself. His sense of being alone and 
helpless ('They had lost him!... to be alone for ever.... He was alone, 
exposed on this bleak eminence, stretched out'(159-160). is analogous to 
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the fear of the infant bereft of the mother: 'naked', 'defenceless' 
(113). He wishes to retrieve the mother, which the Name-of-the-Father 
prohibits, and Septimus bitterly resents the enforcement of this 
prohibition. The Father as lawgiver is represented in the novel by Dr. 
Holmes and Sir William Bradshaw. "'Must", "must", why "must"? What power 
had Bradshaw over him? "What right has Bradshaw to say 'must' to me? " he 
demanded? ' (162); Bradshaw and Holmes are 'judges'; they 'rule' and 
'inflict'(163). 
With the breakdown of the symbolic and the return of the repressed, 
Septimus loses the capacity for communication. He 'talks to himself' 
(77), hears voices which do not exist, hears birds speak in Greek. 
Communication - the exchange of signs - is made possible only within the 
symbolic order, through the split in the subject which is established by 
the intervention of the phallus in the unity with the mother. In 
Septimus's madness, the division between signifier and signified is no 
longer clear; words and things are confused, imagination and reality no 
longer distinguishable: 'And the leaves being connected by millions of 
fibres with his own body, there on the seat, fanned it up and down; when 
the branch stretched he, too, made that statement'(26). He can no longer 
sustain a stable, fixed self - 'he was not Septimus now' (27,73) - his 
body, the world, the word, are all fusing, intersecting and traversing 
each other. Thus to him inner meaning, truth, seems to emerge out of the 
world at any moment. The word is no longer a mere empty sign but an 
absolute reality through which truth shines with no dividing bar between 
signified and signifier: 'The word "time" split its husk; poured its 
riches over him; and from his lips fell like shells, like shavings from a 
plane, without his making them, hard, white, imperishable, words, and 
flew to attach themselves to their places in an ode to Time; an immortal 
ode to Time'(78). 
Of what Septimus tells Rezia to write down, 'some things were 
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very beautiful; others sheer nonsense'(154). Septimus had always been 
interested in poetry, and now, released from the constraints of the 
symbolic order, he emerges as a paradigm of the Symbolist poet in a 
utilitarian society. Septimus's sense of Nature as about to yield a 
mystic revelation parallels that of Baudelaire's correspondances, where 
La Nature est un temple oü de vivants piliers 
Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles; 
L'homme y passe travers de fore is de symboles 
Qui 1'observent avec des regards familiers. 23 
For Septimus too 'Nature signified by some laughing hint... her 
determination to show... always beautifully, and standing close up to 
breathe through her hollowed hands Shakespeare's words, her 
meaning'(154). Septimus can be extremely happy when he escapes the 
'forcing' of souls (203) by 'human nature' - 'the repulsive brute, with 
the blood-red nostrils'(102). 
To watch a leaf quivering in the rush of air was an exquisite 
joy. Up in the sky swallows swooping, swerving, flinging 
themselves in and out, round and round, yet always with perfect 
control as if elastics held them; and the flies rising and 
falling; and the sun spotting now this leaf, now that, in 
mockery, dazzling it with soft gold in pure good temper; and 
now and again some chime (it might be a motor horn) tinkling 
divinely on the grass stalks - all of this, calm and reasonable 
as it was, made out of ordinary things as it was, was the truth 
now; beauty was everywhere. (77-78) 
In this state Septimus enjoys colours, rhythms, sounds, with extreme 
intensity as the thetic subject is dissolved into the semiotic chora it 
had formerly so severely repressed. 
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However, the society which the Name-of-the-Father upholds does not 
leave one alone: it drives a wedge between subject and the maternal body, 
between signifier and signified. Clarissa understands Septimus's 
suicide: 'Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate, 
people feeling the impossibility of reaching the centre which, 
mystically, evades them; closeness drew apart; rapture faded; one was 
alone. There was an embrace in death'(202). In psychoanalytic terms, 
112 
the 'embrace' which Septimus aimed at through death may be regarded as an 
embrace with the Mother. It is impossible to reach the 'centre' because 
of the split in the subject simultaneous with the entry of the subject 
into the symbolic order as it breaks away from the mother's body. It is 
this embrace which Clarissa sometimes experiences for a moment with 
women: jouissance25 which 'gushed and poured with an extraordinary 
alleviation over the cracks and sores', when she saw 'an illumination' - 
'an inner meaning almost expressed' (36). 
What is crucial is not how Clarissa deciphers Septimus's suicide, 
but that she deciphers it, that a relation is crucially established 
between the two figures. If Septimus does indeed 'embrace' the mother in 
death, it is because he now in a sense has a 'mother' - Clarissa - who 
acknowledges relationship to him: 'She felt somehow very like him (204). 
The novel is deeply marked by the images of the absent son and the 
grieving mother, and in this respect is a development of the closing 
pages of Jacob's Room. Early in the novel Clarissa thinks of 
Mrs. Foxcroft at the Embassy 'eating her heart out because that nice boy 
was killed and now the old Manor House must go to a cousin; or 
Lady Bexborough who opened a bazaar, they said, with the telegram in her 
hand, John, her favourite, killed' (7). And if Clarissa's thoughts 
revert several times to Lady Bexborough, this is no surprise: news of the 
son's death intrudes as brutally into her bazaar as news of Septimus's 
does into Clarissa's party. The figures of bereaved mother and absent 
son also haunt Peter Walsh's dreams; he has a vision of 'an elderly woman 
who seems... to seek, over the desert, a lost son; to search for a rider 
destroyed; to be the figure of the mother whose sons have been killed in 
the battles of the world' (65). Thus when Clarissa 'understands' 
Septimus's suicide, she seems momentarily to assume the guise of bereaved 
mother. 
Though Septimus perished under the pressure of a patriarchal 
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society, Clarissa 'had escaped' by submitting herself to the Law and thus 
instead obtaining protection: 
Then.... there was the terror; the 
one's parents giving it into one's 
lived to the end, to be walked with 
depths of her heart an awful fear. 
Richard had not been there reading 
perished. She had escaped. But 
himself . (203) 
overwhelming incapacity, 
hands, this life, to be 
serenely; there was in the 
Even now, quite often if 
the Times... she must have 
that young man had killed 
Clarissa herself admits her impurity and contradictoriness: 'it was 
her disaster - her disgrace.... She had schemed; she had pilfered.... She 
had wanted success, Lady Bexborough and the rest of it' (203). The old 
woman in the house opposite who fascinates Clarissa affirms the 
imperishable existence of the soul, which entirely escapes the social 
world. She represents a woman's space (a room of one's own) which is 
indifferent to and independent of male-dominated society. By means of 
this mirror image of herself ('the old lady stared straight at 
her! '(204)), Clarissa can secure this female space within herself. 
Clarissa survives despite or perhaps because of her contradiction, 
and Septimus vicariously represents the risk of a total rejection of 
patriarchal law, and perishes. If in one sense Septimus is the absent 
son, united with the mother only in the Pyrrhic moment of death, in 
another sense he is a surrogate for Clarissa, committing suicide on her 
behalf. In Woolf's original plan Clarissa was herself to die, 
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and the 
invention of Septimus is thus a defensive 'splitting', whereby Clarissa's 
most dangerous impulses are projected into another figure who can then 
vicariously die for her: to this degree Septimus and Clarissa are one 
composite character. The tensions in Clarissa's character worried Woolf, 
and this internal split - that aspect of Clarissa which makes her feel 
'somehow very like him [Septimus]' and the snobbish, 'glittering and 
tinsely' (WD, 61) aspect of her - reveals that the problem of woman is 
the problem of subjectivity and also the problem of writing. How is it 
possible to recognize and 'valorize the position of woman as difference? 
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There are two obvious ways open to feminists: to deny the difference of 
woman in order to be admitted as a subject in the symbolic order, thus 
becoming a token man. Or to refuse the symbolic altogether, and risk 
being even more marginalized than before, or worse, expelled as mad from 
society. These alternatives are represented by Kilman and Septimus, in a 
sense; Clarissa must negotiate a precarious balance between them: either 
way a woman has to take a terrible risk. Clarissa saw her sister Sylvia, 
'on the verge of life, the most gifted of them', killed by a falling tree 
- 'all Justin Parry's fault' (87). The Father kills the most gifted girl 
by means of the Phallus (the tree). So Clarissa must be wary: 'her 
notion being that the Gods, who never lost a chance of hurting, thwarting 
and spoiling human lives, were seriously put out if, all the same, you 
behaved like a lady' (87), and we can rewrite 'gods' here as 'men'. 
Though not herself as gifted as Sylvia, who had to be crushed by the 
Father, Clarissa treads carefully. 'she always had the feeling that it 
was very, very dangerous to live even one day' (11). Thus she has 
protected herself by behaving 'like a lady', serving as 'a perfect 
hostess' in the established social structure of patriarchy. 
If a woman wants to avoid total submission to the Law of the Father, 
to avoid gaining a place in the symbolic at the price of negating woman's 
difference altogether, but also desires to avoid expulsion from the 
symbolic into complete silence, then she can only oscillate between these 
two positions, living a tension which must not be resolved in either of 
the two directions. She must reject the frozen identity of the subject, 
but must not relinquish subject-hood altogether. This dialectic between 
stasis and rupture is precisely what the novel's style achieves, both in 
the local, moment-by-moment texture of the writing and in certain self- 
reflexive images which speak of its own ambitions, as in the description 
of a cloudscape: 'Fixed though they seem at their posts... nothing could 
be fresher, freer, more sensitive... to change, to go, to dismantle the 
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solemn assemblage was immediately possible'(153). 
Clarissa often experiences this moment of suspense between stasis 
and rupture: 'How fresh, how calm, stiller than this of course, the air 
was in the early morning... chill and sharp and yet... solemn, feeling as 
she did, standing there at the open window, that something awful was 
about to happen'(5). And this momentary pause in the fraught dialectic 
is memorably repeated in Septimus: 
But he himself remained high on his rock, like a drowned sailor 
on a rock. I leant over the edge of the boat and fell down, he 
thought. I went under the sea. I have been dead, and yet am 
now alive, but let me rest still, he begged... and as, before 
waking, the voices of birds and the sound of wheels chime and 
chatter in a queer harmony, grow louder and louder, and the 
sleeper feels himself drawing to the shores of life, the sun 
growing hotter, cries sounding louder, something tremendous 
about to happen. (77) 
This suspense and adventure of the subject are often evoked in terms 
of sea imagery: 'an exquisite suspense, such as might stay a diver before 
plunging while the sea darkens and brightens beneath him, and the waves 
which threaten to break, but only gently split their... surface... '. 
(34-35). It is suspense between life and death27. As Clarissa's heart 
pauses between life and death before Big Ben strikes, she experiences the 
same suspense: 'one feels even in the midst of the traffic, or waking at 
night, Clarissa was positive, a particular hush, or solemnity; an 
indescribable pause; a suspense... before Big Ben strikes'(6). Big Ben 
clearly has masculine associations; earlier Peter had identified himself 
with 'the direct downright sound of Big Ben'(54). Big Ben in a sense 
even represents the Father: tolling the hours, it dissects the continuum 
of life; it imposes a structure upon life and keeps society moving in 
order (Mrs. Dalloway was titled The Hours in the early stages of Woolf's 
writing). 
28 'Shredding and slicing, dividing and subdividing, the clocks 
of Harley Street nibbled at the June day, counselled submission, upheld 
authority, and pointed out in chorus the supreme advantages of a sense of 
proportion'(113). Time also introduces death into life by its measuring 
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out of life, while life as sheer semiotic energy does not know death: 
'she feared time itself... the dwindling of life... how little the margin 
that remained was capable any longer of stretching, of absorbing, as in 
the youthful years, the colours, salts, tones of existence'(34). Time is 
thus alien to the polymorphous, semiotic mode of being. Representing 
patriarchal law, aligned with the William Bradshaws of the world, Big Ben 
subjugates the human subject to the social order: 'Big Ben struck the 
half-hour... She [the old lady] was forced, so Clarissa imagined, by that 
sound, to move, to go'(140). 'The clock was striking. The leaden 
circles dissolved in the air. But she must go back. She must assemble. 
She must find Sally and Peter'(204-205). As law-giver, it forces the 
imperative 'must' on the human subject. As Clarissa lets the hours 
impose a structure on her life - 'First a warning, musical; then the 
hour, irrevocable' (6) - she collects the dispersed parts of the self 
together into a social entity. Thus Clarissa's life is continual 
dispersion and reassemblage. She is never unitary, 'this' or 'that': she 
is laid out 'like a mist' or spreads like the sky ('It held, foolish as 
the idea was, something of her own in it, this country sky, this sky 
above Westminster' (204)), and yet she 'assembles' to be hostess of the 
party. The true 'site' of the subject is precisely this dialectic 
between self-assembly and dispersal: the melting away of the shell of the 
self by the heat of the sun and the freezing of it again into a hard 
crust by the winter's cold - 'Fear no more the heat o'the sun/Nor the 
furious winter's rages'. 
Clarissa's subjectivity is at the same time the mode of the subject 
in the writing of this novel, which is self-reflectively epitomized by 
the clouds-passage I quoted above. Clarissa's contradictoriness, her 
internal divisions, denote the difficult problem of women's writing 
itself and point to the limits of Woolf's own writing. How can a woman 
give voice to the place of women and reject masculine discourse without 
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being marginalized into madness and silence? If language and the 
symbolic order are essentially masculine, this is only possible through 
the repression of the woman. Even the 'martial' Lady Bruton, who talks 
about politics like a man, has no power of language and logicality. 
Women have to constitute themselves as split subjects to enter into the 
symbolic and play a man's game. So Woolf never radically destroys the 
laws of syntax; she lets grammar dissect and regulate the flow of the 
subject's desire, and keeps the conventional narrative form of third- 
person and past-tense. Within this apparent conformism, however, Woolf's 
writing tries to give voice to the specificity of a female subject, who is 
outside any principle of identity-to-self or self-integration, which can 
identify with multiple scenes without fully integrating herself into 
them. 
CHAPTER IV: TO THE LIGHTHOUSE 
I: 'The Window' 
When Roger Fry inquired of Virginia Woolf what 'symbolic meaning' 
the final arrival of her characters at the lighthouse might have, she 
replied: 
I meant nothing by The Lighthouse. One has to have a central 
line down the middle of the book to hold the design together. 
I saw that all sorts of feelings would accrue to this, but I 
refused to think them out, & trusted that people would make it 
the deposit for their own emotions--which they have done, one 
thinking it means one thing another another. I can't manage 
Symbolism except in this vague, generalised way. Whether its 
[sic] right or wrong I don't know; but directly I'm told what a 
thing means, it becomes hateful to me. (QB, 2: 129) 
Evoking a motif of the quest, the title To the Lighthouse renders the 
lighthouse a hermeneutic provocation, goading the reader into a sense of 
tantalising yet never quite delivered significance. To specify precisely 
what the lighthouse symbolizes might be to make it merely 'a deposit for 
our own emotions'. We risk yoking it violently to a significance we are 
in fact simply importing into it from outside. In its very elusiveness, 
the lighthouse becomes a sort of second-order symbol, a symbol of 
Symbolism itself, of that belief that art can redeem into order the 
chaotic flux of perception which was also shared by Woolf's 
contemporaries like T. S. Eliot and James Joyce. In his account of the 
novel David Lodge relates it to this wider context: 'In the modernist 
writers.... we have observed a general tendency to develop.... from a 
metonymic (realistic) to a metaphoric (symbolist or mythopoeic) 
representation of experience. Virginia Woolf exemplifies this tendency 
very clearly'. 
' But if the lighthouse concentrates the issue of 
symbolism in the novel, it does not exhaust it: symbols, and meditations 
on symbols, are scattered throughout the text. 
I argued in my second chapter that though Jacob's Room aspires to 
the 'rose' or symbol, it remains aware of its actual failure to achieve 
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more than the 'ra m's skull' of allegory. On the face of it, To the 
Lighthouse seems much more successful in its pursuit of symbolism. 
Mrs. Ramsay's privileged moments are themselves miniature symbols, 
bringing 'unrelated passions' (TL, 230) together into unity, demarcating 
a 'shape' in the midst of chaos, making 'of the moment something 
permanent'(249). Lily too partakes in the symbolic vision, witnessing the 
transformation of the Ramsays from their contingent ordinariness to 
universal 'symbols of marriage'(115). Returning to the Ramsay's summer 
house ten years later, Lily will suddenly perceive that 'the words became 
symbols'; they offer her an oblique glimpse at 'the truth of 
things'(228). As artist, Lily seeks to charge the everyday with a wealth 
of meaning and wonder; she seeks 'to be on a level with ordinary 
experience, to feel simply that's a chair, that's a table, and yet at the 
same time, It's a miracle, it's an ecstasy'(309-310). Her fidelity to 
'ordinary experience' aligns her initially with Mr. Ramsay's 
philosophical empiricism, yet she will not rest there, seeking also a 
numinous glow that will redeem what would otherwise be merely quotidian. 
Mothering a family and painting a picture are in one sense opposites, and 
Lily will indeed fear that in her dedication to art she has sacrificed 
some essential emotional pith or warmth. But in another sense they are 
simply two modes of a common process, and Lily feels that Mrs. Ramsay's 
achievements remain in the mind 'like a work of art': 'in another sphere 
Lily herself tried to make of the moment something permanent'(249). 
Lily's picture, in turn, is a figure for the text itself, as Woolf 
attests in her comment to Roger Fry; both painter and novelist are in 
search of that 'central line down the middle' which will solder their 
artefacts together. Lily's perennial problem with her painting is 'how 
to connect this mass on the right hand with that on the left' (86), how 
to find some mediation between the rigidly self-enclosed terms of a 
binary opposition. The central line which accomplishes this task may 
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itself be seen as symbolizing the Lighthouse. When James at last 
confronts the Lighthouse, it is 'stark and straight... barred with black 
and white' and, as if to humiliate as fully as possible his former lofty 
visions of it, it even has its washing spread on the rocks. Yet James 
does after all accept that this bare reality and the mystical lighthouse 
of his childhood are one and the same: 'for nothing was simply one 
thing'(286). James has thus become capable of symbolization; the drably 
everyday and the mystically significant converge in the symbol. Cut free 
from any restrictive single identification, the Lighthouse emerges as a 
symbol for both the fact of symbolism and the faculty of symbol-making. 
The question to be asked of the novel is whether it fully succeeds in its 
symbolist project, which I have so far described only as the text itself 
would 'officially' wish it to be described. But there seems to be a 
discrepancy between declaration and achievement in this novel, an 
ambivalence for which Mrs. Ramsay provides a helpful image early in the 
book. Putting her children to bed, Mrs. Ramsay tactfully manages to make 
Cam believe that the boar's skull (another version of the ram's skull of 
Jacob's Room) does not exist and that only the bird's nest in the 
beautiful valley does, while simultaneously convincing James that the 
skull is in fact still there. I shall argue that this is a self- 
reflexive image of the text, which will itself employ such contradictory 
logic. 
Stylistically, 12 the Lighthouse brings to full maturity the 
techniques of Mrs. Dalloway - not only in its use of 'stream of 
consciousness' but also in the greater density of metaphor and simile in 
the local texture of the writing. This triumph of metaphor is, however, 
also a thematic concern of the book, for it is possible to read the 
polarity of Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay as an opposition between literal meaning 
and metaphoricity. The rigorous propositional discourse of the 
philosopher is contrasted with the symbolic metaphorical language of art. 
Boasting of 'his own accuracy of judgement', Mr. Ramsay refuses to tamper 
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with the facts, never altering 'a disagreeable word to suit the pleasure 
or convenience of any mortal being'(13). Mrs. Ramsay, on the other hand, 
as an artist whose raw materials are human emotions, distorts and 
exaggerates as necessary according to the emotional aim and context of 
her discourse. Since at least Plato, who expelled poetry from his 
Republic, philosophy has tried to distance itself from literature, 
denigrating the latter for the deceitful or dangerous potential of its 
fictions. If Mrs. Ramsay mentions 'something about "waves mountains 
high"', the rigorous rationalist Charles Tansley answers, 'yes... it was a 
little rough'(18). As a British empiricist, Mr. Ramsay represents a 
double chastening of philosophy, adding to its inaugural expulsion of 
literature a deep-grained suspicion of far-fetched metaphysical 
speculation; he thus represents, as it were, the very philosophy of 
philosophy, its most stringent self-discipline. 
This opposition of philosophy and fiction emerges at the very start 
of the novel in the contention over the trip to the Lighthouse. 'Yes, of 
course, il it's fine tomorrow, ' says Mrs. Ramsay, filling her son's heart 
with an 'extraordinary joy' which, however, is cut short by her husband: 
"'But, " said his father, stopping in front of the drawing-room window, 
"it won't be fine"(12). Enraged by the 'extraordinary irrationality' 
(53) of his wife, Mr. Ramsay regards her remark to James as a mere story 
of some 'fabled land' (13); she 'in effect, told lies' (53-54). The very 
intensity of Mr. Ramsay's reaction here already suggests that he is not 
the impersonal arbiter he takes himself to be. Ramsay's critique of his 
wife 'rend[s] the thin veils of civilisation so wantonly, so brutally' 
(54), and this points to a paradox in his position. On the one hand, he 
is civilisation's most eminent representative, working at the limits of 
its consciousness and pitching its standard in hitherto unoccupied 
territory. But he is so far in advance that, on the other hand, he has 
somehow never quite reached the stage of civilisation at all, cannot 
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grasp even those minimal human decencies which make life together in 
society bearable. Almost 'post-social' as a lonely path-breaking 
intellectual, Ramsay is simultaneously 'pre-social' as man and human 
being. A related ambivalence occurs in the geography of the novel. In 
placing the Ramsay's summer house on an island in the Hebrides, the novel 
locates it at the furthest frontier of civilisation. It is a distinctly 
Ramsayan locality, its chilly Northernness being set in implicit contrast 
to Mrs. Ramsay's fertilising Southernness ('had she not in her veins the 
blood of that very noble, if slightly mythical, Italian house'(19)). Yet 
in being physically cut off from the effective centres of civilisation, 
the island becomes a moral centre of it, concentrating its essential 
traits without any of the distracting trivia of the actual civilised 
London world of, say, the Dalloways. This is also true of the time of 
the novel; for a holiday cuts one away from the day-to-day ephemera of 
society only to give one time to cultivate those close, interpersonal 
relations which, for Bloomsbury at least, are its distilled inner 
essence. 
When attacked by Mr. Ramsay in the name of his uncompromising Reason 
or Logos, Mrs. Ramsay defends herself in the name of 'people's 
feelings'(54). At this moment she is aligned with the values of art 
against philosophy, since she is 'keeping her head as much in the same 
position as possible' (31) for the sake of Lily's painting. There are 
already ambivalences here which I shall explore fully later. Mrs. Ramsay 
herself does not take Lily's painting very seriously; and while she 
represents a certain mobility of language, the art-work itself seeks to 
effect an almost deathly immobilization, keeping her as still as 
possible. Nonetheless, the contrast with her husband holds, and lends 
itself to a psychoanalytic reading, for she dreams of the delight she 
would have if her son should 'turn out a great artist'(52). Soon after, 
Ramsay returns to tease James, tickling his bare calf with a stick: 
'James will have to write his dissertation one of these days'(53). 
1.23 
Flaunting the power of the phallus ('sprig'), the father both mocks his 
son's incompetence and warns him that he will one day have to resemble 
the father, thus threatening to end the relationship with the mother. 
Mrs. Ramsay has been knitting a 'reddish-brown stocking' (13) for the 
sick little boy on the Lighthouse, but since James yearns to be a boy on 
a Lighthouse, ' she is in a sense knitting it for him. Designed to protect 
her son's 'bare leg' (53) against the paternal sprig, the stocking's real 
purpose is displaced into simple kindliness towards the Lighthouse boy, 
so that the depth of Mrs. Ramsay's resistance to her husband may be 
muted. But the stocking is not only defensive; it will also be a 
counter-phallus, in the spirit of Roland Barthes's remarks on 'the 
symbolism of the braid': 'Freud, considering the origin of weaving, saw 
it as the labour of a woman braiding her pubic hairs to form the absent 
penis'. 
2 James is at the centre of a classical Oedipal triangle as 
philosophy and art, reality and fiction, struggle over him. 
But if philosophy tries to purge literature in the name of the 
transparency of language to truth, it soon discovers that the 
relationship between it and its 'discredited' counterpart is less secure 
than it thought. Ramsay may regard his wife as an impediment to his 
nobler aims, but in fact he 'depended' on her (65) in his continual 
demand for sympathy: 'It was sympathy he wanted, to be assured of his 
genius, first. of all, and then to be taken within the circle of life, 
warmed and soothed, to have his senses restored to him, his barrenness 
made fertile, and all the rooms of the house made full of life ... 1(62). 
Yielding immediately to all his demands, Mrs. Ramsay practices on him the 
very mode of rhetoric he had denounced when she satisfied James with it. 
Mr. Ramsay, 'filled with her words, like a child who drops off satisfied' 
(64), offers no acerbic rejoinders now. In a brief subversive impulse, 
which she at once tries to suppress, Mrs. Ramsay is able 'to feel finer 
than her husband', to admit that she is not 'entirely sure, when she 
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spoke to him [i. e. flattered him], of the truth of what she said'(65). 
She projects onto an anonymous general subject her own central, but 
inadmissable, perception: 'people said he depended on her'(65). One way 
in which the novel both controls and releases this feminist 
subversiveness is through the figure of Charles Tansley. By divorcing the 
most disagreeable aspects of ' what we could call 'Ramsay-ism' from the 
hero and projecting them onto his mere disciple, the text reduces the 
ambivalence of Mr. Ramsay himself and makes easier that idealization of 
him which it will occasionally indulge. At the same time, the hostility 
that is properly a response to Ramsay can be more readily expressed 
towards the meaner figure of his follower. Though still in displaced 
forms, Mrs. Ramsay can become positively castrating towards him. Walking 
into town with Tansley, she observes a 'one-armed man' sticking up a 
circus poster: 'his left arm had been cut off in a reaping machine two 
yearsago'(23). It seems to me to be the thought of the amputated limb 
rather than the circus itself which 'filled her with childlike exultation 
and made her forget her pity' in a sudden access of castrating 
rebelliousness against her usual sympathetic role. A few pages later, 
once more vexed by the 'odious little man' Tansley, Mrs. Ramsay turns the 
pages of the store's list in search of 'the picture of a rake or a 
mowing-machine'(29). She makes her way through a chain of associations - 
mowing-machine, reaping-machine, amputated arm - in another subdued 
threat of castration. 
In the relationship of the Ramsays we can see enacted a Derridean 
deconstruction of the usual hierarchy philosophy/literature. For, in 
Jonathan Culler's synopsis of Derrida's position, philosophy can be seen 
to constitute itself in relation to the Logos 
by identifying as its Other a fictional and rhetorical mode of 
discourse, and the demonstration, carried out for example in 
some of Nietzsche's texts, that philosophy too is a rhetorical 
structure, based on fictions generated by tropes, leads one to 
posit what one might call an archi- or proto-literature which 
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would be the common condition of both literature and 
philosophy. Philosophy 3cannot escape the rhetorical, 
the 
literary, the linguistic. 
As a version of the opposition between philosophy and literature, the 
polarity of man and woman in To the Lighthouse is governed by the 
theological 'metaphor of the fall, as the former term is seduced out of 
its native realm of pure spirit into the fallen world of materiality, 
body or signifier: 'Of course Ramsay had dished himself by marrying a 
beautiful woman and having eight children'(141). These are Tansley's 
words, but they reflect the general attitude of men to women in the text. 
On the other hand, women are merely trifles, elegant trinkets to have 
about the home, but, on the other hand, they are immovable leaden 
weights, shackling the free play of the male mind. For Ramsay, his wife 
and child are 'trifles so slight compared with the august theme just now 
before him' (73), yet 'he would have written better books if he had not 
married'(110). Women are a danger both quantitative and qualitative. In 
one sense, they simply take up one's time, making one's books shorter 
than they would otherwise have been; William Bankes complains that 'if-he 
had been alone dinner would have been almost over now; he would have been 
free to work'(138). But in another sense, they infiltrate the very 
substance of one's thinking, not. just truncating one's books but making 
them qualitatively worse than they would have been. Women thus menace 
philosophy both from the outside and the inside, and have all the 
ambivalence of a derridean 'supplement'. The superfluous - women and 
children -the thing philosophy tries to purge itself of - soak into the 
very core of its being. 
'He would have been free to work. ' Philosophy serves in this novel 
as a figure for social labour in general, thereby taking on the role of 
the political world in Mrs. Dalloway. If Clarissa and Mrs. Ramsay have 
close mutual affinities, both valorizing the world of intimate personal 
relationships, the other terms of the oppositions in which they are 
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structured have changed, and it is worth inquiring. into the effect of- 
this. In Mrs. Dallowi the public world in a sense depends on the 
private, finding there emotional solace for is own occasionally arid pomp 
and formality (Hugh Whitbread). Yet it is also clear that the private 
domestic world of feeling also depends vitally on the exercise of 
political power to secure the material privileges which alone ensure its 
continuance. In To the Lighthouse the 'public' world of philosophy 
depends still more deeply on the domestic interior, but the converse is 
no longer true; philosophy does not support bourgeois dinner parties in 
the way class politics does. True, Mrs. Ramsay subjectively experiences 
that kind of support ('she let it uphold her... this admirable fabric of 
the masculine intelligence' (164)), but objectively it just does not; it 
would be an extreme idealism, quite at odds with Mr. Ramsay's own 
empiricism, to suppose it did. Philosophy drains affection from 
domesticity, but gives nothing in return: 'That man, she [Lily] 
thought... never gave; that man took... Mrs. Ramsay had given. Giving, 
giving, giving, she had died'(231-232). But in Mrs. Dalloway politics 
more benignly refreshed itself from a domesticity whose essential bulwark 
it nonetheless was. The odds are stacked against Mr. Ramsay by contrast 
with Mr. Dalloway, and the island setting of the novel reinforces this 
tendency. In this isolated community, Mrs. Ramsay's social gifts of 
uniting people, of smoothing differences, assume a greater importance 
because tensions are not blunted by the everyday bustle of public life, 
but could grow to alarming proportions if not carefully defused. But at 
the same time the world of metaphysics, dissertations and scholarships 
shrinks to tiny proportions, and thus Mr. Ramsay is reduced. Only in one 
way does he better Dalloway. Politics is the more or less naked exercise 
of class-power and militarism, as compared to the 'disinterested 
contemplation of philosophy. Dalloway remains stubbornly mundane, but 
Mr. Ramsay is a potentially idealizable figure. Ramsay has the personal 
integrity, the refusal to compromise with the system, of Peter Walsh, 
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while playing the structural role of Dalloway, representing the system 
itself' in contrast to the domesticity of his wife. He is,, as I pointed 
out earlier, the system's eminent representative and its rebel, a cross- 
breed of the two male figures of the earlier book. But if Ramsay 
represents disinterestedness in contrast to Dalloway's worldliness, even 
this is only gained at a price: philosophy is pure precisely in 
proportion to its triviality, its endless hair-splitting over the 
'kitchen-tables' of Lily's imaginings. 
If Mr. Ramsay is both Peter Walsh and Mr. Dalloway, he also 
condenses into a single figure two still more illustrious literary 
predecessors, Casaubon and Lydgate from George Eliot's Middlemarch. Like 
the former, Mr. Ramsay is a dried-up, aging academic, a man no longer 
capable of living up to his former promise; like the latter, he regards 
himself as ruined in his intellectual career through marriage to a 
trivial wife. Mr. Ramsay is much concerned with 'subject and object' 
(40), and it is a split between these two faces of reality that is at 
issue here, since Mr. Ramsay is objectively a Casaubon but subjectively a 
Lydgate. A similar split characterizes the relation between his 
philosophy and life. As an empiricist, he regards the subject as a 
tabula rasa, awaiting the outer world to imprint its messages upon it; 
mind for Ramsay is a humble, passive receptacle. Personally, however, he 
is a moral idealist, his own ego swelling to absorb into itself every 
aspect of its world, imperiously shaping its objects to its subjective 
needs. My comparison with Middlemarch is prompted by the novel's own 
curious reference to the book. When Mr. Ramsay 'talked about George 
Eliot' to Minta 'she had been really frightened, for she had left the 
third volume of Middlemarch in the train and she never knew what happened 
in the end'(153). To the Lighthouse thus chops up Middlemarch, just as 
the reaping-machine had earlier lopped off the bill-sticker's arm. A 
4 
Bloomian 'anxiety of influence' seems to be at work here, as To the 
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Lighthouse 'castrates' a commanding precursor on its own. theme of the 
intellectual husband. Middlemarch must be silenced in this way because 
we might compare Mrs. Ramsay as well as her husband to her Eliotic 
predecessors. For if she is certainly not the idealistic Dorothea, she 
can only be a structural equivalent of the repulsive Rosamund Vincy, 
representing in more benign form the social banalities of the latter, but 
this is not an identification To the Lighthouse cares to pursue. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay see each other as an inadequate Nature that 
needs the support of themselves as Culture. Mr. Ramsay's body has an 
inelegant clumsiness in inverse proportion to the subtle, inner poise of 
his speculations; his physical gestures remind his wife of 'the great sea 
lion at the Zoo tumbling backwards after swallowing his fish and 
walloping off'(55). Curiously, though, this image supports Ramsay's view 
of himself as a proud natural force entrapped and made ridiculous 
(leaping for fish) by the rituals of civilisation. For his part, 
Mr. Ramsay also sees his wife as representing a deficient Nature, the 
lovable defencelessness of the small child; she and James are 'children 
picking up shells, divinely innocent and occupied with little trifles.... 
They needed his protection; he gave it them'(56-57). Mr. Ramsay, of 
course, is a child too, as far as his wife is concerned. He may see 
himself as a Promethean quester carrying light and fire into regions not 
yet claimed for civilisation, but his wife regards herself as the light- 
bearer: 'as a nurse carrying a light across a dark room assures a 
fractious child'(63). Once again, then, Mr. Ramsay is both post-and pre- 
social, so far ahead in the intellectual avantgarde that he has, as 
'child', not yet caught up with the straggling back ranks of his society. 
To impute to anyone the status of a child is to express one's love and 
protectiveness, but also to reify one's relationship to them. Children 
develop ('Why... should they grow up so fast? ' (94)), but adults-as- 
children are locked in an eternal stasis of the personality. The 
protective love one extends to them is regressive, far removed from adult 
129 
emotional interchange. To see the other as a child is also a technique 
for avoiding blame and friction, for the petulance of the other then 
becomes 'natural', a simple expression of Nature, rather than a tension 
in a real and developing relationship. So, in a sense, in a relationship 
with a not yet fully developed subject, one can be master. Mrs. Ramsay 
wishes 'always to have had a baby': 'She was happiest carrying one in her 
arms. Then people might say she was tyrannical, domineering, masterful, 
if they chose; she did not mind'(94). 
In seeing each other as children, both husband and wife project 
their own lack onto the other sex. In this novel it is not only the 
woman who suffers a lack that puts her in need of protection; Mrs. Ramsay 
pities 'men always as if they lacked something - but women never, as if 
they had something'(133). This shifting of the locus of lack enters and 
confuses the sexual imagery in the text. On the one hand, Mrs. Ramsay's 
responsiveness to Ramsay's demand for sympathy is the opening of a warm 
female interior into which the male, as 'a beak of brass', plunges 
himself. As John Mepham notes, the sexual theme 'is also present in a 
series of words which function simultaneously in several of these strands 
of metaphor ("pulse", "throb", "erect", "aglow", "she bade him take his 
ease there, go in and out, enjoy. himself")'. 
5 But Mrs. Ramsay's response 
is not only passively receptive; she is not only an empiricist tabula 
rasa on which her husband can inscribe his need. 'Animated and alive', 
Mrs. Ramsay also 'pour[s] erect into the air a rain of energy, a column 
of spray' (61-62), which is more forceful than we might have expected 
from the 'defencelessness' of a 'divinely innocent' child. 'There 
throbbed through her, like the pulse in a spring which has expanded to 
its full width and now gently ceases to beat, the rapture of successful 
creation'(64). Different aspects of the male sexual act are split apart 
and attributed to characters of the opposite sex. Mr. Ramsay retains 
only its physically penetrative side, that aspect which, when isolated, 
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can be seen as a brute violence forcing its way into the delicate 
membranes of the female interior. The more 'positive' side of male 
sexuality, the ejaculation of the fertilizing seed deep within the 
female, is projected onto Mrs. Ramsay. In this divorce between 'form' 
and 'content', Ramsay retains only the physical husk of the act, while 
his wife appropriates its inner procreative kernel. This splitting 
should be seen in the light of my earlier comparison of Ramsay to 
Mr. Dalloway. If philosophy, unlike politics, could give nothing to the 
feminine world of domesticity, this also extends into the Ramsay's 
metaphorical sexual life, where even the male's limited role in 
procreation is snatched away from him. 
Plunging and thrusting into his wife, Mr. Ramsay has all the 
obvious, 'histrionic' activity of male sex. But being the 'ejaculator', 
Mrs. Ramsay retains a deeper activity, the inner activity of the teeming, 
fertilizing 'energy of the semen as opposed to the mere physical mechanism 
that deposits it. Freud had argued that it was improper to identify L 
femininity with passivity, masculinity with activity. For him the 
opposition active/passive characterizes the infantile anal phase, whereas 
masculine/feminine is the logic of adult sexuality; to confuse the two 
oppositions is 'the error of superimposition' *6 Active and passive are 
the qualities of biological drives, not genders. If To the Lighthouse 
consents to some degree to Mrs. Ramsay's 'passive' role of ministering 
angel in the house to her 'active' intellectual spouse, if it in part 
regards her as subsidiary nurse to his primary speculations, it also 
suggests a simultaneous counter-logic to these positions. The 'passive' 
role turns out to display a truer activity than the 'active', and the 
'subsidiary' is revealed as essential to that 'primary' function to which 
it had initially seemed a mere external crutch. Mr. Ramsay's self- 
serving oppositions -- between philosophy and fiction, men and women -- 
are, to cite Derrida, 'a violent hierarchy' and not 'the peaceful co- 
existence of a vis-ä -vis'. 
7 Yet the text itself undoes these 
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hierarchies, dismantling and reversing them to the. point where the 
excluded term becomes the inner truth of its opposite, where people will 
at last acknowledge that 'he depended on her'(65). 
Mr. Ramsay is both phallus and child, Mrs. Ramsay is both open womb 
and phallus. Though this ambivalence characterizes their relation in 
general, it is brought to a sharp focus in their son James who is living 
this conflict in his Oedipal crisis. The father is a disturbing intruder 
into James's Imaginary (diadic) relationship with his mother: 'the 
perfect simplicity and good sense of his relations with his mother' (61). 
Mrs. Ramsay is thus phallic because the pre-Oedipal child has not yet 
discovered her 'castration'. Since James has not yet accepted his 
submission to and identification with the father, he sees Mr. Ramsay in 
part as just another demanding child, lacking something which his mother, 
as 'whole', can give and fill with her 'phallus'. Yet at the same time 
he does experience the mother's lack, in two ways. On the one hand, he 
wants to be the phallus for her, to substitute, along the lines of 
Freud's equation faeces-penis-child, for the phallus which she lacks. 
James accordingly 'stood stiff between her knees'(63). On the other 
hand, he experiences her lack as her very powerlessness to resist the 
insistent penetrations of the father, 'the beak of brass, the arid 
scimitar of his father, the egotistical man', which 'plunged and 
smote'(63). Inasmuch as his mother desires this penetration by the male, 
she also implicitly desires her own son's impotence, rejecting him as 
ersatz phallus for the real one the father offers her. ' If, as phallic 
mother, Mrs. Ramsay protects the child, as open female womb she is more 
ambivalent, simultaneously offering him the chance to be the phallus for 
her to complete her lack and yet rejecting him for the father's phallus. 
A substitute is only important as long as you cannot have the real thing, 
and thus James will finally be left alone: 'she had risen somehow and 
gone away and left him there, impotent'(287). James will ultimately 
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accept his symbolic castration and the Law of the Father; he will. abandon 
the desire to be the phallus for the mother and wait to become like his 
father, 'having' the phallus himself-8 During the boat trip he completes 
his paternal identification, becoming himself 'the lawgiver' (260) to 
Cam. 
Binary oppositions and hierarchies in this novel are ceaselessly 
undone. Philosophy condemns fiction, but is not exempt from a persistent 
fictionality of its own. Ramsay denounces his wife for the rhetoricity 
of her language - its distortions of facts, its virtual lies - and this 
rhetoricity has a twofold nature. On the one hand, she uses figures and 
tropes rather than a strictly ' transparen t' language, a mythologie 
blanche9 that would let the truth shine unimpededly through. But, on the 
other hand, her discourse is rhetorical in that it is attuned to specific 
situations, taking its predominant colouring from the nature and demands 
of its interlocutors instead of aspiring to an impersonal objectivity. 
Mrs. Ramsay's language is always situation-specific, employing fictions 
according to present need. Yet the irony of Ramsay's irritation with his 
wife is that he himself is no less 'guilty' of this very charge. 
Bitterly denouncing her exaggeration ('You're teaching your daughters to 
exaggerate' (106)), he is not the strict adherent to pure referentiality 
that he imagines himself to be; Lily is alarmed by the 'touch 
of... exaggeration'(241) in his face. If his wife angers him so much, it 
is not simply that her fictionality grates on his nerves as the converse 
of his own convictions; it is rather that she might compel him to face up 
to the secret truth of his own discourse. Mrs. Ramsay is both the binary 
opposite of philosophy and a dangerous revelation and exaggeration of its 
own procedures; she is both the outside and the inner core of 
philosophical discourse. Subjectively, Mr. Ramsay sees her as his 
contrary, divided from him by the sharp line between truth and fiction. 
Objectively, however, there is a continuum between husband and wife, the 
latter revealing, as Nietzsche had argued, that truth itself is just a 
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metaphor or fiction whose fictionality we have forgotten. At crucial 
moments in the text the polarity truth/fiction is suddenly reversed. All 
her husband's 'phrase-making was a game, ' reflects Mrs. Ramsay: 'it 
annoyed her, this phrase-making, and she said to him, in a matter-of-fact 
way, that it was a perfectly lovely evening'(110). Ramsay is thus 
contradiction incarnate: a philosophical empiricist who is an emotional 
idealist, a remorseless enemy of fiction who indulges in incessant self- 
pitying fables and phrase-making. Though he demands objectivity, 
Mr. Ramsay will not even allow literature the kind of universality it 
t 
might justly claim. Instead of reading literary texts as statements 
about human nature in general, he manipulates them to his own subjective 
purpose. Aware that he is orchestrating an 'impure rhapsody', he 
nonetheless cannot renounce the 'delicious emotion' (44) aroused by the 
poetry he incessantly recites. As a literary reader, Mr. Ramsay is 
guilty of the very 'affective fallacy, ' for which he criticizes his wife, 
that of valuing objects (poems or trips to lighthouses) purely in terms 
of their emotional effects. Mr. Ramsay wildly exaggerates and distorts as 
a reader of verse, seeming to believe that by an 'explosion' (316) of 
literariness in this special realm he can purge his thought of rhetorical 
elements that might otherwise contaminate his philosophy. 
Mrs. Ramsay is both wanderer in the 'fabled land' and stubbornly 
'matter-of-fact', a contradiction inherent in the stereotypical image of 
women. At one level, woman represents the body, that substratum of 
materiality without which her husband's loftier abstract creations could 
not exist, but which also threatens to impede and 'dish' them. Woman's 
own evident physicality - the facts of menstruation, of childbearing - 
and her down-to-earth social role in child-care qualify her for this 
identification with the body, the material, the matter of fact. Yet, at 
another level, woman is also the irrational, her everyday intellectual 
caprices being only a short distance from psychosis and insanity. Woman 
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is thus in a sense more 'abstract' than her intellectual husband, because 
his speculations maintain a self-discipline of mutual entailment and 
linearity (from P to Q to R, in Ramsay's terms) while hers are 
unconstrained, excessive. The female biology is simultaneously the 
opposite of the male intellect and the ground for intellect's dangerous 
liberation into fancy or madness. Matter-of-fact and fable-making at the 
same time, woman is denigrated by "the men in the text on both grounds 
alternately, while she is valorized over them by the text for the same 
contradictory reasons. 
Mrs. Ramsay represents both an excess and a lack of speech. Charles 
Tansley sees women as doing 'nothing but talk, talk, talk' (134), yet 
Mrs. Ramsay reflects of her husband that 'he found talking so much easier 
than she did. He could say things - she never could'(190). Similarly, 
when she does talk, her language is both charged with subjectivity and 
yet strangely void of it. It is full of the caringness of Mrs. Ramsay as 
social unifier, as nurturer of emotions, yet it strikes its hearers as 
curiously elusive. Lily is convinced that 'knowledge and wisdom were 
stored in Mrs. Ramsay's heart', but to gain access to them is not easy. 
Even before Mrs. Ramsay's death, she is metaphorically represented as 
'tablets bearing sacred inscriptions, which if one could spell them out 
would teach one everything, but they would never be offered openly, never 
made public'(82). Mrs. Ramsay's sympathetic openness to her husband's 
'arid scimitar' is counterbalanced by her opaqueness as sign to everyone 
in the book. Her discourse flaunts its subjectivity (kindliness) at one 
level only to conceal it tantalizingly at another, and thus it proves to 
be the exact converse of her husband's which, in claiming to be a mere 
impersonal vessel of facts, is actually charged with his manipulative 
emotional intentions. Mrs. Ramsay, who occasionally seems to the men of 
the book all surface and superficiality, is as elusive as Jacob Flanders. 
Like that earlier novel, To the Lighthouse is also a project to decipher 
the enigmatic 'sign' which is its protagonist. 
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Both Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay have their own specific mode of truth. 
Mr. Ramsay cannot reach Z, 'if thought ran like an alphabet from A to 
Z'(184-185). The use of the alphabet here is a metaphor for the 
linearity of Mr. Ramsay's thought, but it is also a figure for the 
necessary figurality of philosophy itself. It is not incapacity that 
prompts Woolf to use this way of representing Ramsay's work, as if she 
were simply incapable of rendering his researches in the highly specific 
way George Eliot evokes Lydgate's. Her point is rather that philosophy 
is originarily figurative, organized around certain master-tropes, a 
supposed ground that cannot itself be grounded. The figure of the 
alphabet is not just an illustrative analogy, which is how philosophy 
would like to see its own metaphors and similes; it rather points to an 
essential figurality of that discourse itself. Ramsay's adherence to 
linearity of argument is also a view of the nature of time. Each step 
being generated by its predecessor, both philosophy and time for Ramsay 
are rigidly consequential. The possibility of tomorrow's trip to the 
Lighthouse is totally determined by the configuration of factors - 
clouds, winds, air-pressure - existing at the present moment. Ramsay 
both respects and 'cancels' time simultaneously. He insists that its 
determined chain of events will not be altered for mere human 
convenience; yet, since the whole of the future is implicit in any single 
moment if we had skill enough to decipher it, he also in a sense 
collapses linearity into simultaneity. This dual aspect of his mentality 
is repeated in his attitude to the objects of his thought. Lily sees his 
work as a meditation on 'a scrubbed kitchen table' (40): 'this seeing of 
angular essences, this reducing of lovely evenings, with all their 
flamingo clouds and blue and silver to a white deal four-legged 
table'(41). This scrubbed table epitomizes the anti-rhetorical discourse 
Mr. Ramsay tries to adhere to; it is 'something bare, hard, not 
ornamental... no colour to it... all edges and angles... uncompromisingly 
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plain'(240-41). With 'no colour to it, ' Ramsay's language refuses the 
colours of rhetoric. Ramsay is in quest of 'essences', the distilled 
inner truth of things, and in this sense he is strictly faithful to 
objects, hewing close to their contours. But at the same time his 
essences 'reduce' their objects, bleeding them dry of all specificity and 
thereby in a sense cancelling them out. 
Mrs. Ramsay has her own mode of access to truth, as when she sits 
alone with her knitting: 'Losing personality, one lost the fret, the 
hurry, the stir; and there rose to her lips always some exclamation of 
triumph over life when things came together in this peace, this rest, 
this eternity' (100, emphasis added). Whereas Mr. Ramsay reduces, his 
wife synthesizes; things are not pared to their bare bones, but rather 
'come together' in her moments of vision. Such privileged moments are to 
a degree anti-social, contrasted with what she momentarily sees as the 
mere fret and hurry of socializing. Yet they share the unifying 
structure of her great moments of social achievement, and to that extent 
are in continuity with them. Inside or outside her community, 
Mrs. Ramsay always achieves 'a summoning together'(100). Mr. Ramsay's 
meditations on 'subject and object and the nature of reality' (48) here 
give way to an indifferentiation of the subjective and the objective. 
His wife sits 'with her work in her hands until she became the thing she 
looked at - that light for example'(101). In this state of mind 
Mrs. Ramsay feels 'they [things] expressed one; felt they became one; 
felt they knew one, in a sense were one'(l01). The female subject can 
reach out to its world in this way, because it was never a unified, 
sealed self in the first place. A division in that subject facilitates 
its responsiveness to its objects. An auto-affection - one part of the 
subject lovingly touching another - can be projected outwards. Merging 
with her objects, Mrs. Ramsay 'felt an irrational tenderness thus (she 
looked at that long steady light) as for oneself' (101); 'she praised 
herself in praising the light'(101). Aspects of the subject reach 
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towards each other in a sexual embrace; there 'rose from the lake of 
one's being, a mist, a bride to meet her lover'(102). The embrace will 
end in orgasm, for the lighthouse is 'stroking with its silver fingers 
some sealed vessel in her brain whose bursting would flood her with 
delight' (103); and this delicate digital caressing of the surfaces of 
the female sex seems far preferable to the arid phallic penetrations of a 
Ramsay. In a series of provocative essays, Luce Irigaray has related 
this division in the female subject to the structure of the female sexual 
organs: 'She is neither one nor two. She cannot, strictly speaking, be 
determined either as one person or as two', for 'a woman "touches 
herself" constantly without anyone being able to forbid her to do so, for 
her sex is composed of two lips which embrace continually. Thus within 
herself she is already two - but not divisible into ones - who stimulate 
each other'. 
10 To the Lighthouse adds a nuance to this account. Woman's 
necessary self-caress has become numb through familiarity. Her auto- 
affection must thus make a detour outside itself into objects, swerving 
from the subject but only to the smallest extent that is compatible with 
its orgasmic return upon the subject in a full, 'defamiliarized' self- 
embrace. The Lighthouse' is a necessary mediation of Mrs. Ramsay's auto- 
affection which lets it experience to the full its own latent reserve. 
But the Lighthouse also becomes an object of fear, 'the steady light, the 
pitiless, the remorseless, which was so much her, yet so little 
her'(103). Auto-affection must pass through the Lighthouse on its way 
back to itself, but it also risks being trapped in the Lighthouse, its 
temporary mediation potentially becoming its prison. The divided subject 
is both origin and end of the itinerary of auto-affection, yet in its 
need for the object to complete this circular journey, it inevitably 
falls into the power of that object; the Lighthouse 'had her at its beck 
and call'. Irigaray's account is a helpful starting point here, but not 
fully adequate to the complexities of the novel. 
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Mrs. Ramsay's dinner party is another privileged moment, a triumph 
of 'merging and flowing and creating' (131); she here glimpses something 
'immune from change [which] shines out... in the face of the flowing, the 
fleeting'(163). Her achievement is symbolically crystallized in the 
Tennyson poem which Mr. Ramsay and Carmichael recite at the end of 
dinner. Like Mrs. Ramsay's own discourse, the words of this poem are 
both bafflingly opaque signifiers ('she did not know what they meant' 
(171)) and yet full with the desire of the subject: 'the words seemed to 
be spoken by her own voice, outside herself, saying... what had been in 
her mind'(171). Similarly, the words are both anonymous and autonomous, 
'as if no one had said them, but they had come into existence of 
themselves' (171), but are also the collective self-expression of the 
dinner party: 'as if this were, at last... their own voice speaking'(172). 
In this Utopian linguistic moment, the disquieting features of writing - 
its anonymity, its opacity - are both acknowledged and surpassed in a 
Hegelian sublation. We approach what Derrida terms 'the absolute 
proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice 
and the ideality of meaning', 
11 
without, however, so absolute an 
effacement of the signifier as is usual in such experiences of full, 
living speech. 
In Mrs. Ramsay's privileged moments there is a stress on a certain 
transcendence of materiality. Sitting at the window, she feels 'all the 
being and the doing... evaporated' (99). Later, in the security of her 
dinner party, she casts off heaviness and solidity: 'she hovered like a 
hawk suspended; like a flag floated in an element of joy'(162). She now 
feels that 'the thing is made that remains for ever' (163), but this 
access to the self-presence of meaning is ephemeral; with her foot on the 
threshold, she knows that it had become 'already the past'(173). 
Mrs. Ramsay is both more 'solid' than her husband, closer to the day by 
day routines of domestic life, and more 'immaterial' than he can ever be, 
since even into his boldest speculations he takes the nagging self- 
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centred doubts about his own fame. She, on the other hand, is capable of 
a proper transcendence of the personal, shedding all attachments to 
become 'a wedge-shaped core of darkness'(99). Mrs. Ramsay outdoes her 
spouse in both directions, and this is appropriate, since she represents 
fictionality or literature as against his philosophy. Literature is more 
'material' than philosophical discourse, because it offers a sensuous 
'body' and particularity while the latter aspires to the grey 
universality of the concept. Yet literature paradoxically outdoes 
philosophy on its own ground too. The very concretion of the literary 
text allows it to concentrate a wealth and play of meaning far above 
philosophy's stricter joining of single signifieds to unambiguous 
signifiers. Immaterial yet incarnate at the same time, both literature 
and Mrs. Ramsay leave Mr. Ramsay's grey abstractness far behind. 
We can pursue these contrasts into Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay's own reading 
of texts. When Mrs. Ramsay returns to the room after dinner, impelled by 
'something I have come to get-without knowing quite what it was' (183), 
the words of the poem arise spontaneously in her mind. Language precedes 
the subject, is not simply at the latter's beck and call, and 
Mrs. Ramsay's response is indeed to the purely signifying rather than the 
signified or intentional aspect of. these words: they begin 'washing from 
side to side of her mind rhythmically'(183). When she begins reading, 
she does so 'at random, ' not asserting control of the matter, but 
surrendering to it in a happy mood of serendipity, and again 'she only 
knew this is white, or this is red. She did not know at first what the 
words meant at all'(184). In contrast to the stress on Mrs. Ramsay's 
transcendence at dinner, it is now her materiality that is foregrounded, 
her relish for the sumptuousness of the signifier without immediate 
regard for its content. Language is experienced here at the level of the 
Kristevan semiotic, as sheer rhythm, intonation, sound, colour. 
Mr. Ramsay, however, remains masterfully in control of the text he reads, 
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'weighing, considering, putting this with that as he read'(182). If he 
read his own novel, he would perhaps be acutely bothered, like Roger Fry, 
about the precise 'symbolic meaning' of its details. Though the text at 
one point maintains that he 'forgot himself completely' (185) as he 
reads, it in fact demonstrates that he is incapable of doing any such 
thing. His very motive for starting Scott's novel in the first place is 
secretly to assess his own prospects with futurity, since 'if young men 
did not care for this [Scott], naturally they did not care for him 
either'(186). The exact analytic play of mind as he weighs and judges is 
in fact in the service of his monstrous ego, and this is perhaps Woolf's 
warning to her own readers who may be equally inclined to make her text 
'the deposit for their own emotions' (see p. 1113 above). As usual, To the 
Lighthouse is more explicit in its denunciations when they are directed 
at the stooge Tansley rather than his mentor: 'he wanted to assert 
himself... that was what his criticism of poor Sir Walter, or perhaps it 
was Jane Austen, amounted to. "I-1-I"'(165). 
The highlight of 'The Window' is Mrs. Ramsay's reading of the 
sonnet: 'All the odds and ends of the day stuck to this magnet; her mind 
felt swept, felt clean. And then there it was, suddenly entire shaped in 
her hands, beautiful and reasonable, clear and complete, the essence 
sucked out of life and held rounded here - the sonnet (186-187). The 
danger of a Woolf heroine is that she may seem to be a mere glorified 
housewife, lost in the frivolous routines of a bourgeois social life, and 
Mrs. Ramsay must therefore be given a nobility and idealism of her own 
that will redeem the drabber aspects of domesticity and outdo the 
genuine, if limited, idealism of her husband. Fiction never quite rests 
easily under philosophy's charge that it is unserious, and it must 
contrive to gain the upper hand over its accuser on the latter's own 
terms. It is precisely this that is achieved by the sonnet, which 
captures an 'essence' of its own in contrast to the 'angular essences' of 
Ramsay's thought. Though 'sucked out of life' might seem to relate this 
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poetic essence to the predatory and reductive violence of philosophical 
analysis, this is in fact not the case. There is a benign . 
'sucking', 
that, say, of the child which relieves its mother of a reserve with which 
she would be otherwise painfully over-full, as well as the more 
'vampiric' sucking of Ramsay's 'beak of brass'. Poetry reaches essences 
without sacrificing phenomena on its way to them. The sonnet is both 
'beautiful and reasonable', achieving a sensuous perfection of form as 
well as the universality of the philosophical concept. It is both 'clear 
and complete', bringing the odds and ends of life together even as it 
sweeps them clean. When these odds and ends are harmonized in an organic 
whole, they are no longer untidily obtrusive as loose fragments, and in 
that sense they are 'swept away'. The sonnet reconciles all the 
oppositions around which 'The Window' has been organized; it fuses form 
and content, the dulce and the utile. It is a symbol in its own right, 
but also a figure for Mrs. Ramsay's earlier moments of symbolic vision, 
both alone and at the dinner party. Having the best of both worlds, the 
symbol appropriates for fiction the best qualities of philosophy without 
importing with them the latter's defects. Fortified by this poetic coup 
de rg äce, Mrs. Ramsay closes this section of the novel 'smiling. For she 
had triumphed again'(191). 
11: 'Time Passes' 
In a proleptic moment, the novel noted in 'The Window' that directly 
Mrs. Ramsay went 'a sort of disintegration set in' (173), and this 
disintegration is realized to its fullest extent in the second section, 
'Time Passes'. This section represents a fall from grace, from the 
idyllic, 'organic' time of its predecessor to the painful 'post- 
lapsarian' visit to the summer house. The salvation of the symbolic 
moment gives way to a difficult, clumsy deciphering of meaning from 
moment to moment. 
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I argued in my second chapter that Woolf locates the historical 
moment of the fall from symbolism as -the First - World War, an event 
encompassed in the ten-year period covered by 'Time Passes'. But in this 
novel there is an interplay between the War and the death of Mrs. Ramsay. 
Both events are perfunctorily noted in parentheses, and both are seen as 
in some sense the loss of the possibility of totalizing 'meaning. 
Mrs. Ramsay's death precedes the war, and in a certain sense is not 
unrelated to it. With the loss of the harmonizing, soothing principle of 
femininity, the aggressive male ego bursts out on an international scale 
into militarism and violence. In Three Guineas Woolf will later more 
fully elaborate this connection between the loss of a certain kind of 
femininity and the likelihood of war. 
12 But since Mrs. Ramsay also 
represents the old Victorian order, the war is in a sense the 'cause' of 
her death - the death less of a single woman than of a civilization. 
This dialectical relationship between the personal and the political is 
sustained in the image of the summer house itself, whose sufferings at 
the hands of time and climate are at the centre of this section of the 
text. On the one hand, the house represents the body of the mother, 
Mrs. Ramsay, in ways to which the psychoanalysis of Melanie Klein has 
alerted us and which I shall explore below. But, on the other hand, the 
house is also the figure of an entire social order, taking its place 
alongside such other literary houses as Mansfield Park or, closer in 
time, Howard's End. 
'Time Passes' offers a consoling glimpse of the fuller symbolic 
perceptions of its predecessor, only to snatch it away almost at once. 
For a moment 'divine goodness had parted the curtain and displayed behind 
it, single, distinct, the hare erect; the wave falling; the boat rocking' 
(198). Yet even this is a redeemed Nature without a perceiving subject; 
Mrs. Ramsay is no longer included as one key term in the symbolic 
'equation'. The curtain of materiality falls again as 'divine goodness, 
twitching the cord, draws the curtain' (199). There remains a lingering 
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sense of a possible transcendence behind objects, but the latter is no 
longer accessible in what had formerly been its mediations. The 
signifying face of the natural world has congealed to a degree that no 
longer lets its signified shine through. The beneficent exchanges 
between self and Nature ('how beauty outside mirrored beauty within' 
(207)) are no longer possible when, from the very depth of Nature itself, 
there arises the trace of the bloody carnage of World War One: 'a 
purplish stain upon the bland surface of the sea as if something had 
boiled and bled, invisibly, beneath' (207). In one sense, 'the mirror 
was broken' (208), and a brutalized Nature no longer reflects 
civilization back to itself, but in another, it gives a truer reflection 
than ever before, since that brutality was always already latent in 
civilisation. At one level, Nature is Culture's opposite, as the 
Scottish climate takes its slow, destructive toll of the house. But at 
another level Nature is in continuity with a profound destructiveness of 
Culture's own: what is literally destroying the house is rain, rats and 
wind, but what is figuratively destroying it is the First World War. A 
mirror is no longer a depthless reflecting surface. It is twisted into a 
double layer by this very contradiction: 'the mirror itself was but the 
surface glassiness which forms in quiescence when the nobler powers sleep 
beneath' (208). 1 take 'nobler powers' to be a bitter irony. If the 
symbolist vision is a myth, what 'sleeps beneath' is the lurking 
bloodiness of world war, which is both the negation of civilization and 
its highest reach (in technology, in the planned mobilization of whole 
societies, and so on). At its utmost limit civilization seems 
indistinguishable from barbarism. 'Did Nature supplement what men 
advanced? ' asks the text anguishedly (207), and the answer is both yes 
and no. 'Supplement' here must be given the weight of its Derridean 
ambivalence - 'progress as the possibility of perversion', 'both 
13 
humanity's good fortune and the origin of its perversion'. Reflecting 
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culture back upon itself in the symbolist mirror, Nature completes it, 
yet it risks showing it a natural violence that may strike an answering 
chord at the very heart of culture itself. 
Just as Nature mirrors Culture, woman mirrors man, reflecting back 
to the latter an image that bolsters him in his self-identity. In A Room 
of One's Own Woolf remarks that 'women have served all these centuries as 
looking-glasses possessing the magic and delicious power of reflecting 
the figure of man at twice its natural size' (35). Women, like Nature, 
should also ideally 'supplement what man had advanced'. Woman is both 
like Nature, in that she refreshes the emotional aridity of the male 
intellect, and unlike Nature, in that her function of social unification 
is on the side of culture. Mrs. Ramsay is a 'mirror', not for her 
husband alone but for the whole family, securing their self-identity by 
reflecting back a coherent image of the subject. As Luce Irigaray argues, 
this female mirror is 'entrusted by the (masculine) "subject" with the 
task of reflecting and redoubling himself. The role of "femininity" is 
prescribed moreover by this masculine specula(riza)tion and corresponds 
only slightly to woman's desire, which is recuperated only secretly, in 
hiding, and in a disturbing and unpardonable manner. ' 
14 As ideal 
Victorian Angel in the House, Mrs. Ramsay attempts to conform to this 
role, and is considered historically superseded by a younger female 
generation who 'sport with infidel ideas... of a life different from 
hers-not always taking care of some man or other' (16). Reflecting on 
her children, Mrs. Ramsay deplores that 'strife, divisions, difference of 
opinion, prejudices... should begin so early' (19). We here detect 
another ambivalence in the role of the First World War in this novel. The 
War is in the first place Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay's own historical product, 
the unleashing of all the latent violence precariously repressed by their 
conventional Victorian roles. Yet with its national 'strife, divisions', 
its jingoistic 'prejudices', the First World War is clearly also the 
product of the younger generation. 'They were so critical, her children' 
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(19), as they cast off Victorian pieties and traditions to enter a new 
historical era of corrosive intellectuality. Mrs. Ramsay's values - her 
pacifying of ruffled male egos, her unifying - could, if mobilized 
internationally, have prevented the catastrophe, as Woolf would later 
attempt to do in Three Guineas. 
However pious she may be, no Angel in the House can fully sustain 
her role. There always remains a margin of excess female desire, 
jostling against the limits society imposes on it. Mrs. Ramsay feels 
guilt at a sense of being 'finer than her husband' (65), extreme 
discomfort at not being sure that he is as academically gifted as she has 
just assured him he is. Desire may be defused by displacement or by the 
substitute gratifications of literature, as when Mrs. Ramsay reads the 
tale of the Fisherman's wife to dames: 'For my wife, good Ilsabil, /Wills 
not as I'd have her will' (90). Or there may be socially allowable modes 
of female self-assertion, as in Mrs. Ramsay's penchant for matchmaking: 
'Mrs. Ramsay... having brought it all about, somehow laughed, led her 
victims, Lily felt, to the altar' (157). Mrs. Ramsay on occasion even 
has something of the subversiveness of a Miss Kilman. Like the latter, 
she too can be accused by some woman 'of "robbing her of her daughter's 
affections"', of 'wishing to dominate, wishing to interfere'. Like Kilman 
too, she can even be 'ashamed of her own shabbiness' (92). Perhaps the 
key image in the novel of Mrs. Ramsay's repressed rebelliousness is 'the 
Swiss girl sobbing for her father who was dying of cancer' (19) in 'The 
Window'. Rebellion is gratified in contemplating the painful death of 
the father, while the censoring superego is satisfied by the stress on 
the girl's agony of grief at the imminent event, and the image thus has 
the dual-sidedness of a Freudian compromise-formation. 
'No image... comes readily to hand bringing the night to order and 
making the world reflect the compass of the soul' (199); 'the mirror was 
broken' (208). With this breakdown of the mirror, the formerly excluded 
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Otherness can at last emerge, for it is. no longer held firmly at the 
margins by the unitary, specular self. The images of, natural fecundity, 
the 'rain of energy', which once attached to Mrs. Ramsay are now writ 
large in the natural world itself, where they become brutal, promiscuous 
and persecutory: 'winds and waves disported themselves like the amorphous 
bulks of leviathans whose brows are pierced by no light of reason, and 
mounted one on top of another, and lunged and plunged in the darkness or 
the daylight (for night and day, month and year ran shapelessly together) 
in idiot games' (208-209). Evolution runs in reverse in this section. 
Natural selection is a brutal process which paradoxically submits Nature 
to the shape of an eventual teleology; the means may be cruel, but the 
ultimate end-product is the unfolding of Reason and Culture. But now 
Nature asserts its resistance and otherness to evolution's attempt to 
convert it to Culture. The Ramsay's house figures in miniature their 
Victorian order, its calm, its leisure, its graces, and is eroded by a 
slow but persistent and ultimately near-devastating natural assault. As 
I have pointed out, women and Nature are in many ways linked in this 
novel, and Nature's assault on the house may thus be seen as enacting the 
dangerous liberation of Mrs. Ramsay's subterranean desire. At the same 
time, as I suggested, the house stands for Mrs. Ramsay herself, just as 
school-buildings, as Melanie Klein has demonstrated, 
15 
may represent the 
body of the mother for the child pupil. Feelings about the building, 
activities in relation to it (entering, defacing, breaking), are then 
charged with psychoanalytic meaning. Nature in part releases a 
subversive female fecundity of Mrs. Ramsay's own, but it also enacts a 
male sexual assault on a building that represents her as woman as well as 
Victorian. Moonlight 'gliding gently as if it laid its caress' (206) 
ominously becomes 'the trifling airs, nibbling, the clammy breaths, 
fumbling' (212) till at last 'a thistle thrust itself between the tiles 
in the larder' (213), a penetrative gesture that recalls Mr. Ramsay's 
arid beak-thrusts into his wife. 
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'What power could now prevent the fertility, the insensibility of 
nature? ' (213). The answer, of course, is Mrs. McNab who will at first 
sustain, at last redeem, the house. The copulating leviathans display 
'no light of reason' (208), and Mrs. McNab's own song is equally 'the 
voice of witlessness' (202). She is more Nature than Culture, a fact 
attested to by her recurrent difficulty in walking. She and her friend 
Mrs. Bast 'lurched', 'their legs ached'; Mrs. McNab 'hauled herself 
upstairs and rolled from room to room' (202,215). Claude Levi-Strauss 
has a helpful remark in his discussion of Oedipus, whose own name means 
'swollen-foot': 'in mythology it is a universal characteristic of men 
born from the Earth that at the moment they emerge from the depth they 
either cannot walk or they walk clumsily'. 
16 Mrs. McNab is thus a 
chthonic being still subject to the centripetal force of her parent 
earth. In contrast to her husband, Mrs. Ramsay certainly represents 
Nature, but in contrast with Mrs. McNab she is associated with an effete 
bourgeois culture against the more robust face of Nature itself. Strong 
class-feelings are also evoked here: Mrs. McNab 'mumble[s] out the old 
music hall song' (203), becoming one of those racy lower-class 
entertainers like Marie Lloyd to whom such contemporary intellectuals as 
T. S. Eliot liked to condescend. 
17 The lower classes have that minimal 
degree of Culture which makes them (just) human, and that maximal degree 
of Nature which makes their inferiority to oneself so palpable. They can 
mediate the harsher aspects of the natural world to their superiors by 
their labour-power, as McNab and Bast do in restoring the house to order. 
Early in the novel Mrs. Ramsay had paid a charity visit to some poor 
women in the town (27); two hundred pages later the shards and shreds of 
her social world will be put back into some kind of order by just such 
women, and this is another example of the novel's deconstructive 
strategies. The excluded term turns out to be the inner truth of its 
dispossesser. The relationship of the Ramsays to the McNabs and Basts 
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reveals the irony- of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, whereby the master 
ultimately becomes more enslaved than the'; wretches who serve him. 
The mirror that is Mrs. Ramsay is broken, but Mrs. McNab too has an 
interest in mirrors. 'With her sidelong leer' she 'stood and gaped in 
the glass'; she twist[s] her face grinning in the glass' (203). Later, 
in a perhaps provocative 'gesture, 'she stood arms akimbo in front of the 
looking-glass' (209). This persistent irreverence in her attitude to 
mirrors suggests Mrs. McNab's rejection of the reflecting and magnifying 
of the male ego which is Mrs. Ramsay's role in life. This, however, Is 
only in a limited sense a rejection because Mrs. McNab has never been 
offered the possibility of choice. Class superiority leads to a female 
scorn for McNab; she has neither the intelligence nor the sensitivity to 
understand what female mirroring is. But there is another, protofeminist 
impulse at work here: McNab is envied for her liberation from that 
stultifying feminine role, and hence the crazy energy that attaches to 
her despite her physical deformities. Male work is 'spiritualized' in To 
the Lighthouse by being represented by Mr. Ramsay's speculations, female 
work is brutalized in the figure of Mrs. McNab. Mrs. Ramsay offers a 
median position at once desirable and false. A woman's work may be the 
organizing of domestic dinner parties, and the novel is justly 
appreciative of the values achieved there, but there is another 
possibility. A woman might equally work in the public sphere, earning 
that five hundred pounds that would let her maintain a room of her own. 
Whether Mrs. Ramsay is the final synthesis of philosophy and labour, or 
whether there might rather be some other female possibility which she 
obscures - these are questions for Lily Briscoe. 
III: 'The Lighthouse' 
'The Lighthouse' represents a sustained questioning on Lily's part 
into that vision of 'completeness' and 'wholeness' (295), associated with 
149 
Mrs. Ramsay, which had characterized life at the summer house ten years 
earlier: 'what does it mean then, what can it all mean? ' (225). 
Gayatri Spivak has argued that 'To the Lighthouse can be read as a 
project to catch the essence of Mrs. Ramsay', and thus as another work on 
the theme I traced above in 'An Unwritten Novel' and Jacob's Room. For 
Spivak, the structure of the book is a grammatical allegory: 'Subject 
(Mrs. Ramsay) - copula - Predicate (painting)'. 
18 Lily's completion of 
the picture is charged with the symbolic meaning of realizing the essence 
of Mrs. Ramsay. This is not so much a matter of the content of the 
painting, but rather of the process of creation itself, for Lily's act of 
painting duplicates the achievements of the older woman. 'Most welcome 
of all' to Mrs. Ramsay was 'a summoning together' (100), and Lily too 
will 'assemble outwardly the scattered parts of the vision within' (204). 
But if the motif of harmonizing fragments is shared by the two women, the 
process operates in different 'directions' in each case. Whereas 
Mrs. Ramsay must bring outward units (guests) into some inner, spiritual 
community, Lily must bring inner units (ideas, feeling, forms) into some 
coherent outward objectification. 
Both women share a certain disjunction of inner. and outer, though in 
Lily's case this split is internalized as between inner and outer layers 
of the mind. At one level she pursues her intense meditations over 
Mrs. Ramsay's death, while at another she ponders whether she shouldn't 
'fetch another cup of coffee' (225). Such banal preoccupations threaten 
to ironize her deeper concern, reducing it to a mere 'catchword... caught 
up from some book' (225). Mrs. Ramsay had lived the same split between 
the most serious, metaphysical thinking and the insistent trivia of 
everyday life. The most famous instance is during her visionary 
perceptions at dinner: 'It partook, she felt, carefully helping 
Mr. Bankes to a specially tender piece, of eternity' (163). The reader 
is forced to enact the disjunction; his or her own quotidian expectations 
lead to the anticipation that 'tender piece, of... ' will be followed by 
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'meat'; and 'eternity' comes as a defamiliarizing shock. Nor, once this 
initial shock has been negotiated, will the phrase settle comfortably 
S 
into a single meaning. Does this juxtapo2ing of incommensurables ironize 
the symbolic vision, or does it rather, as in Eliot's definition of 
Metaphysical 'wit', yoke heterogeneous ideas by violence together in the 
flash and fusion of the conceit. 
19 Both possibilities seem alternately 
valid, yet the suspicion that their opposite may after all be true 
troublingly recurs. The disjunction is perhaps mediated by the structure 
of the meal, which is both the satisfaction of basic biological needs and 
a cultural and signifying occasion, because it affirms human community in 
shared semiotic sytems (codes of etiquette). Animality and civilization, 
fact and value, are joined together in the shared meal. 
In his discussion of Virginia Woolf, Eliot had seen her writing as 
'one of the most curious and interesting examples of a process of 
dissociation' (see above p. 45 ). In her own essay 'The Narrow Bridge of 
Art' Woolf also regards the dissociation of sensibility as a 
characteristic of the modern age. Yet for Woolf the moment of 
dissociation or fall is the First World War, an event which Mrs. Ramsay's 
own disjunction between 'meat' and 'eternity' precedes. Mrs. Ramsay is, 
moreover, a representative of solid Victorian values, 'dusty and out of 
date' (269) as Lily calls her, and not a dissociated modernist. 'The 
discrepancy' which she experiences - 'that was what she was thinking, 
this was what she was doing' (130) - is a matter more of gender than of 
history, of being a woman in any society rather than being a member of 
this particular one at a particular moment. Women's intellectual 
capacities, their emotional idealisms, far outreach and are in constant 
friction with the mundane round of the domestic world they are supposed 
to maintain. Mrs. Ramsay must contemplate the mentality of great men 
while inspecting 'whether those were fresh mole-hills on the bank' (112). 
But though this disjunction between female being and doing is 
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transhistorical, preceding 
. that more universal 
dissociation caused by 
World War One, it none the less has its historical modifications and is 
exacerbated in the modern age. Mrs. Ramsay's division is between the 
mental and the physical, and is a situation not without certain 
compensations. Though it is degrading to do menial tasks far beneath 
one's mental powers, it also offers the possibility of an inner refuge, 
because one's thoughts can range widely while one's hands are 
mechanically occupied. In Lily's case, however, this split is 
internalized, is between different aspects of the mind itself. This 
leaves her hands free, and it is now possible to be a painter rather than 
a housewife; but, on the other hand, it is now a facet of the woman's own 
nature that is trapped in meniality, and this is an oppression more 
intimate and enslaving than the mere physical conformism of Mrs. Ramsay. 
Objectively, men are caught in a similar disjunction between their 
bold speculations and everyday routine. Subjectively, however, they do 
not experience it as disjunction. First, they cultivate a blindness to 
the quotidian, so that it barely registers on their consciousness. 
Despite an 'eye like an eagle's, Mr. Ramsay is 'blind, deaf, and dumb, to 
the ordinary things' (111). Preoccupied in his laboratory with his 
research, Mr. Bankes finds that 'the world when he came out seemed to 
dazzle him' (272). But, secondly, women are anyway providing these 
domestic necessities for them, so they are practically sheltered from 
this potentially intrusive realm of the everyday; Mrs. Ramsay is forced 
'to hide small daily things' (65). Blindness is seen both as man's 
natural incapacity and as his exploitation of his womenfolk, an 
ambivalence typical of Mrs. Ramsay's guilty subversiveness. Women are in 
a sense invisible, 'seen' only as absence, non-being, lack, not 
acknowledged in their difference and otherness. Having consigned both 
woman and the material world to a twilight zone of non-existence, the men 
in the novel cultivate an ascetic dedication to the pursuit of truth. 
They withdraw from the external areas of being into a single, icy, 
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concentrated point. of will. Mr. Ramsay becomes a 'stake driven into the 
bed of a channel... marking the channel out there in the floods alone' 
(72). Women are rather represented by the murky, fluid welter of the 
ocean itself, for 'they could not keep anything clearly fixed in their 
minds'(258). 
In A Room of One's Own Woolf pointed out that, deprived of her own 
retreat, woman must always write or think in the midst of the 
distractions and pressures of daily life. In Jacob's Room Betty Flanders 
was the image of this dilemma, writing her letters in a chaos of children 
and housework. To live through this disjunction between inner and outer, 
aspiration and brute fact, is personally dislocating, yet Woolf also 
suggests that this very tension may be more fructifying than the male 
exclusiveness that has simply abolished one of the two terms. Certainly 
her own writing - with its various points of view, its different levels 
of living, thinking, acting, gesture, in a single sentence, its numerous 
interjections and digressions within a single syntactic unit - all this 
enacts a commitment to the heterogeneity of female experience. Style is 
the registration of a mode of experience, as Woolf noted in remarking 
'the difference between the man's and the woman's view of what 
constitutes the importance of any subject. From this spring out not only 
marked differences of plot and incident, but infinite differences in 
selection, method and style' (CW, 27). In 'Modern Fiction' she advises 
her reader: 'Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. 
The mind receives a myriad impressions - trivial, fantastic, evanescent, 
or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an 
incessant shower of innumerable atoms' (CE, 2: 106). The irony of the 
passage in relation to To the Lighthouse is that this is Mr. Ramsay's 
empiricist philosophy, for the mind is mere passive recipient of external 
sensation, but Mrs. Ramsay's daily experience at the centre of a bustling 
household of guests, servants and children. Though he is intellectually 
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committed to the view of the mind as classicist . 
'mirror', receiving its 
scattered contents from an outside it can do no more than reflect, 
Mr. Ramsay actually lives it more as a Romantic 'lamp', 
20 
casting a 
unified beam out into a world it in part calls into being. 
Lily's task is to catch Mrs. Ramsay's essence by completing her 
picture, but hers will not be the reductive logic and method that result 
in Mr. Ramsay's 'angular essences' (41). Whereas Mr. Ramsay aggressively 
penetrates his wife as a 'beak of brass' or 'arid scimitar' (63), Lily 
will rather follow what Irigaray has termed a strategy of 'the fluid' as 
against the masculine economy of 'the solid'. 
21 'What device for 
becoming, like waters poured into one jar, inextricably the same, one 
with the object one adored? Could the body achieve it, or the mind, 
subtly mingling in the intricate passages of the brain? or the 
heart? '(82). Demanding 'intimacy itself,, Lily desires 'nothing that 
could be written in any language known to men' (83). In its linearity, 
such male language has something in common with phallic penetration as a 
mode of knowledge; it can only effect entry into the object at a single 
point and from a single perspective. In contrast, Lily dreams of multi- 
perspectivism and simultaneity. Against the male gaze, so focused it 
cannot grasp the trivial or evanescent, she demands 'fifty pairs of eyes 
to see with' (303); it is 'not knowledge but unity that she desired' 
(83). Penetration must give way to gentle envelopment. The former 
burrows at a single point in order to infiltrate the very core of its 
object, while the latter surrounds so caressingly and totally that the 
object rather becomes its inner core: 'One wanted most some secret sense, 
fine as air, with which to steal through keyholes and surrdund her where 
she sat knitting, talking, sitting silent in the window alone; which took 
to itself and treasured up like the air which held the smoke of the 
steamer, her thoughts, her imaginations, her desires' (303-304). 
Envelopment is a mode of total contact that paradoxically retains a 
distance that 'leaves the loved object. its autonomy, - whereas male 
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penetration makes a localized incision but claims absolute possession of 
its object. Lily seeks a love that is 'distilled and filtered; love that 
never attempted to clutch its object' (77). Irigaray further elaborates 
this distinction: 'Nearness... is not foreign to woman, a nearness so 
close that any identification of one or the other, and therefore any form 
of property, is impossible. Woman enjoys a closeness with the other that 
is so near she cannot possess it, any more than she can possess 
herself'. 22 
This strategy of 'fluidity' is also the strategy adopted by the 
author in her writing of the book. Lily's dream of multi-perspectivism 
and simultaneity, 'intimacy itself' are Virginia Woolf's own aims in 
writing, whereby she seeks to achieve those 'infinite differences in 
selection, method and style' from 'masculine' writing. Woolf's ideal 
strategy of writing, of rendering characters, is well epitomized in the 
movements of Mrs. Ramsay's mind at the dinner party. Hearing and seeing 
the other people enjoying the dinner, she feels as if she can see their 
thoughts and feelings 'without effort like a light stealing under water 
so that its ripples and the reeds in it and the minnows balancing 
themselves, and the sudden silent trout are all lit up hanging, 
trembling' (165). Here again, as in Lily's dream, a different strategy 
for knowing the object (the other) is adumbrated. Like Mrs. Ramsay's 
'eyes', Woolf also tries to 'go around' the characters, 
'unveiling... their thoughts and their feelings' (165). In 1926 she at 
last felt she had achieved this: 'It is proved, I think, that what I have 
to say is to be said in this manner' (WD, 99), 11 have made my method 
perfect'(WD, 102). Her main literary device for this end is, as I 
pointed out in my previous chapter, 'free indirect speech', which 
produces a 'fluid', unstable status for the locus of the subject of the 
sentence. The author can situate herself somewhere between the viewpoint 
of the omnipotent narrator and the character's own consciousness, or she 
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can move smoothly from one character's thought to another's within a 
single sentence: 'she hovered like a hawk suspended; like a flag floated 
in an element of joy which filled every nerve of her body fully and 
sweetly, not noisily, solemnly rather'(162). In this passage the 
metaphors can no longer be identified as emanating from either the 
author's point of view or Mrs. Ramsay's own; they are indistinguishably 
fused. '... for it arose, she thought' - so it is Mrs. Ramsay's own 
thinking, but it is too elaborate for the direct transcription of her 
consciousness. The strategy is never a clutching or violent penetrating, 
but an 'unveiling' and 'stealing under water'. For if the object is a 
butterfly, 'when you've grasped the stem the butterfly's off'. 'I won't 
raise my hand', the author says, 'Hang still, then, quiver, life, soul, 
spirit... I, too, on my flower' (HH, 20). If one aspires, like 
Mrs. Ramsay, to hold 'the whole... together'(TL, 165), one cannot intrude 
oneself, one has to respect the alterity of the object; this will leave 
some distance from the other in spite of the infinite nearness one aims 
at. Hence the 'doubtful ring', the continual indeterminacy, which 
Auerbach pointed to in his seminal discussion of Woolf's narrative 
viewpoint in Mimesis. 
23 
Male love in the novel is at once violent and fascinating, a 
conjunction of impulses that points to the masochism instilled in woman 
by centuries of subordination. To Lily, Paul Rayley's love has a fierce 
phallic power that would be her destruction; it is 'the most barbaric of 
human passions' (159), 'a fire sent up in token of some celebration by 
savages' (270). As a 'bully with a crowbar' (159), Paul becomes another 
version of Mr. Ramsay's 'brass beak', another testimony to the brutal, 
harassing force of the phallus. Such penetratingness is experienced by 
Lily as a threat to the integrity of her being, of which her physical 
virginity ('treasure of the house' (271)) is both emblem and shield. In 
her fear and retreat from male penetration, Lily shows a kinship to 
Mrs. Dalloway. As the latter tucked away the dress she was mending, 
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'like a virgin protecting chastity, respecting privacy' (MD, 45), against 
the pen-knife wielding of Peter Walsh, so too does Lily draw her skirts 
closer round her ankles to ward off Mr. Ramsay's demand for female 
submission (TL, 236). Only whereas Clarissa's is a spiritual virginity 
retained despite marriage and childbirth, Lily's is both spiritual 
integrity and physical membrane. And just as Clarissa feels compunction 
over her frigidity, so too does Lily have a sense of guilt over her 
coldness to Mr. Ramsay, which reveals how deeply she has internalized her 
culture's hostile valuations of spinsterdom. She regards herself on 
occasion as a 'miserable sinner' (236), 'not a woman, but a peevish, ill- 
tempered, dried-up old maid presumably'(234). 'Presumably' here marks 
Lily's distance from the self-accusation even as she makes it. She is 
'not a woman' in that she will not succumb to the role demanded of women 
in her society, but, on the other hand, there is no available social 
language for the role she genuinely aspires to, and she must therefore 
define herself in the very terms of her enemies. Prue Ramsay is the 
novel's most graphic image of a surrendered virginity. Her own state 
just before marriage is projected onto the spring, which 'like a virgin 
fierce in her chastity, scornful in her purity, was laid out on fields 
wide-eyed and watchful and entirely careless of what was done or thought 
by the beholders' (204). Later we are informed, in a parenthesis as 
'entirely careless' as this virgin's gaze is claimed to be, that Prue had 
died during some illness connected with childbirth. Virginity is not a 
sufficient guarantee of its own survival; it will have to mute its 
'fierceness' and cultivate more subtle, evasive tactics. And Prue's 
death warns that Mrs. Ramsay's role as generator of life is not 
immediately available to the next generation. If it is to be sustained, 
it can only be so by indirection, by an apparent sidetracking that will 
in fact be the only way the main route can now be followed. After 
Mrs. Ramsay's death, sexual penetration threatens death to her 
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successors. 
Lily's defence against this phallic threat to the integration of the 
ego is her painting, which allows her to escape from the male 'fangs' 
(159): 'it had flashed upon her that she would move the tree to the 
middle, and need never marry anybody' (271). It is Lily's profession as 
painter that affords her this 'enormous exultation', allowing her to 
evade penetration by in a sense taking her place among the penetrators 
themselves. Completing her painting is for Lily a symbol of achieving 
full access to her profession, and it therefore exults her and saves her 
from the 'crowbar' of the bullying male phallus (159). Torn though she 
is between her own stance and the conventional values she has 
internalized, Lily at last breaks painfully beyond the socially given 
definitions of femininity. Though at one level she responds strongly to 
female submission, regarding 'the glow, the rhapsody, the self- 
surrender ... on so many women's faces' as 'the most supreme bliss of which 
human nature was capable', she also dryly admits that 'the reason of it 
escaped her' (233). Not admitting vaginal jouissance, Lily cannot 
imitate them; 'this is not what we want', she concludes, 'there is 
nothing more tedious, puerile, and inhumane than love' (160). 
Though Lily attempts to catch the essence of Mrs. Ramsay in her 
painting, she has a persistent fear that artistic representation will 
freeze the flow of living, leaving her with a picture that might be as 
reductive as one of Mr. Ramsay's own angular essences. Recent feminist 
theory throws light on this fear of hers by suggesting that 
representation is only possible at the expense of the body - both one's 
own body ('the inadequate name of some uncommanded diversity of drives 
and contradictions'24) and the body of the mother. To enter the symbolic 
order involves abandoning the maternal body and repressing polymorphous 
desires. Before she exchanges 'the fluidity of life for the 
concentration of painting', Lily suffers 'a few moments of nakedness' as 
if she were 'an unborn soul, a soul reft of body, hesitating on some 
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windy pinnacle and exposed without protection' (245). Lily's soul is 
bodiless in a double sense. It is 'reft of body' in that it has been 
torn away from the maternal body into the order of representation, yet it 
is also 'unborn', that is, hovering on the verge of that incarnation 
which will be the physical work and substance of the painting itself. 
Flinching in this agony of exposure, she wonders whether 'it was in her 
nature, or in her sex'(245), whether she is a lone exception or the 
representation of her gender. Feminist theory would suggest the latter 
view: 'the conflict is always between body... and Power, between body and 
Law, between body and Phallus, even between body and Body. The second 
term in each pair is a finished, fixed representation. The first that 
which falls short of that representation'. 
25 But if the body can never 
be entirely excluded from the realm of the written, it is more obviously 
at work in the field of painting. Urged by 'a curious physical 
sensation'(244), Lily draws her first stroke on the canvas, and she 
sustains her painting by 'a dancing rhythmical movement' (244). This 
rhythmic ebb and flow, like tone and colour, constitutes a key element in 
the Kristevan semiotic, that shifting configuration of somatic impulses 
which is more archaic than language. Painting is always a network of 
conventions of representation, but its very physicality gives it an 
unusual closeness to the body; as sticky, viscous substance, oil paint 
may carry psychoanalytical impulses connected to the bodily substances 
and secretions of infantile experience. Presenting themselves within the 
signifying activity, rhythm and its related semiotic impulses can alone 
traverse the gulf between body and representation, maternal body and 
patriarchal Law. 'With some rhythm which was dictated... by what she saw' 
(246), Lily can successfully reconcile fluidity with concentration: 
'while her hand quivered with life, this rhythm was strong enough to bear 
her along with it on its current' (246). 
Unlike her author, Lily does not have to struggle directly with the 
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order of language in her pursuit of representation. Yet even so it in a 
sense troubles her as Tansley's mocking words ring in her mind: 'women 
can't paint, can't write'(247). Because it substitutes a sign for the 
immediacy of a reality, language distances precisely that ' which it was 
supposed to make present: 'how could one express in words these emotions 
of the body? express that emptiness there?... It was one's body feeling, 
not one's mind. ' (274-275) Lily is a more complete empiricist than 
Mr. Ramsay himself. She implicitly rejects Kant's demonstration of the 
creative role of the mind in perception, its imposition of categories on 
its unformed raw material: 'what she wished to get hold of was that very 
jar on the nerves, the thing itself before it has been made anything' 
(297). In her distrust of language, Lily differs somewhat from 
Mrs. Ramsay herself, and this may be related to the varying historical 
contexts of the two women's lives. Mrs. Ramsay's trust in fictions and 
tropes is sustained by the solid Victorian routine in which she exists. 
Her faith in the vagaries of language is the obverse of the rigid social 
environment that sustains her. Such social props have failed Lily, they 
have been destroyed by the First World War. The social guarantees of 
language are no longer to be trusted, and only one's own immediate 
experience can prevent the dispersal' of language into inflated rhetoric 
and insincerity. This linguistic rappel a fordre was the experience of 
a whole young generation. After being enticed into war by the rousing 
patriotic rhetoric of its elders, it had come face to face with the 
brutal realities of year-long trench-warfare, mustard gas, and so on. 
The disjunction between signifier and signified was lived bitterly on the 
pulses. Rhetoric was discredited by being associated with the dulce et 
decorum26 of an older political generation. One index of this crisis of 
language is T. E. Hulme's desire in his Imagist poetry to 'hand over 
sensations bodily', 
27 
an ambition Lily herself shares, and it is this 
generational experience which, I suggest, constitutes the grounds for 
Lily's suspicion of language - grounds over which the text itself, 
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however, is inexplicit. 
The tex t's most vivid image of Lily's aching physical longing for 
Mrs. Ramsay is the 'mutilated body' (278) of the fish whose side is cut 
to be used for bait before it is thrown back into the sea dur ing 
Mr. Ramsay's boat journey. Immediately after, Lily herself cries out to 
Mrs. Ramsay as her 'pain increased' and she plunges 'into the waters of 
annihilation' (278). The cutting out of substance from the side of the 
fish seems t o be a latent allusion to Adam's loss of the rib from his 
side in creation. Lily is cast in the Adamic role, painfully losing her 
physical pith in the imminent creation of her work of art. The parallel 
from Genesis is also appropriate in that Lily/Adam represents mind, while 
Eve/Mrs. Ramsay represents the fleshy attractiveness of the body. 
Mrs. Ramsay's beauty proves as difficult to handle for Lily as Eve's did 
to Adam, yet its effects for her are curiously like those we would have 
expected to see associated with pure mind itself: 'Beauty... came too 
readily, came too completely. It stilled life - froze it' (273). An 
excess at the level of the signifier may thus be as damaging as 
Mr. Ramsay's reductions of objects into 'angular essences' pared of all 
excess. To appreciate too much the 'sumptuousness' of the signifier is 
not after all the opposite of the hermeneutic reduction into a lean and 
hungry essence; it is rather an alternative manifestation of a common 
tactlessness on the part of the interpreter. Surfaces are valued by 
Woolf, and Mr. Ramsay is wrong to neglect them, but still more valuable 
is that moment when they seem at last to render up an inner depth. Truth 
is an unveiling, as when - all too briefly - 'divine goodness had parted 
the curtain' (198) in 'Time Passes'. As painter, Lily has an acute eye 
for sensuous detail, yet she also fears that such vivid physical surfaces 
might be 'like curves and arabesques flourishing round a centre of 
complete emptiness' (275); she yearns for the moment when 'beauty would 
roll itself up' (277). 
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Curtains can be drawn or, more actively, truth may press rupturingly 
through them. Lily imagines that if Mr. Carmichael had spoken, 'a little 
tear would have rent the surface of the pool. And then? Something would 
emerge. A hand would be shoved up, a blade would be flashed' (276). 
Lily's allusion is to the tale of King Arthur. The blade is thus not, as 
it were, Peter Walsh's pen-knife; it is held by a woman, the Lady of the 
Lake of Arthurian legend, who would here of course be Mrs. Ramsay. Later 
Lily will reflect that at such moments, when the surfaces of daily habit 
are in abeyance, she feels 'something emerge. Life was most vivid then' 
(294). This emergence is as frightening as a wielded blade and as 
desirable as one's most intimately precious 'treasures' (199). This 
blade that tears through the surface in the hand of the Lady of the Lake 
can be read in terms of the 'maternal phallus'. 
28 Mrs. Ramsay is seen as 
the ultimate source of order by Lily; she is indeed the object of the 
latter's transference: 'In Lacanian terms, the silent interlocutor... is 
the subject presumed to know, the object of transference, the phallic 
Mother, in command of the mysterious processes of life, death, meaning 
and identity. '29 Lily leans against Mrs. Ramsay, seeking some inner 
secret: 'she knew knowledge and wisdom were stored in Mrs. Ramsay's 
heart' (83). I have already noted aspects of the phallic imagery that 
attaches to Mrs. Ramsay (see above p. 130 ), and Mrs. Ramsay pitied 'men 
always as if they lacked something' (133), that is to say, it is she who 
possesses the phallus. Lily attributes a formidable authority to the 
older woman: 'the astonishing power that Mrs. Ramsay had over one. Do 
this, she said, and one did it. Even her shadow at the window with dames 
was full of authority'(271). It is perhaps Julia Kristeva who has most 
valuably emphasised the difficulties posed by this recognition of the 
mother's 'phallus': 'that every subject poses him/herself in relation to 
the phallus has been understood. But that the phallus is the mother: it 
is said, but here we are all arretes... by this "truth". 
30 
When Lily reflects that Mrs. Ramsay 'was irresistable. Always she 
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got her own way in the end' (157), she feels a deep, grudge against this 
formidable phallic authority and power. But, according to Jacques Lacan, 
the phallus 'can play its role only when veiled', 
31 
and hence Mrs. Ramsay 
must be veiled beneath the 'cover of beauty', to which she adds a 
tantalizing gift for silence: 'then she was reserved. Nobody knew 
exactly what had happened to her' (300). Provoking gossip and 
speculation - 'what was there behind it? ' - she acquires all the more 
significance by her twinned loveliness and unforthcomingness. She 
becomes the Lacanian 'subject presumed to know', in command of the 
mysterious processes of life and identity. Accordingly, 'directly she 
went a sort of disintegration set in' (173), as is fully evidenced in 
'Time Passes' after her death. 
Though death seems to be a defeat for Mrs. Ramsay, consigning the 
values she represents definitively to the past, it in fact turns out in a 
sense to be the very subtlest of her triumphs. The folds of 
Mrs. Ramsay's shawl loosen one after another as time passes. Thus the 
text renders the dissolution of metaphor by the unfolding of 
Mrs. Ramsay's shawl, but the very language it uses to tell the 
dissolution of metaphor is worthy of Mrs. Ramsay's own metaphorical 
exaggeration: 'once in the middle of the night with a roar, with a 
rupture, as after centuries of quiescence, a rock rends itself from the 
mountain and hurtles crashing into the valley, one fold of the shawl 
loosened and swung to and fro' (201-2,206). After her successful dinner 
party she thinks about Paul and Minta whom she had matched. 'They 
would... come back to this night; this moon; this wind; this house: and to 
her too. It flattered her... to think how, wound about in their hearts, 
however long they lived she would be woven' (175). She reflects 
triumphantly that this entire scene would be revived again in their 
lives. A relevant parallel - with gender transposed - can be drawn with 
Freud's myth of the murder of the primal father in Totem and Taboo. 
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Reserving all the women for himself, the father is killed by the jealous 
sons, but he in fact turns out to be -far stronger dead than alive. 
Feeling guilt as well as liberation in his death, the brothers 
internalize their dead father, granting him a reign more thorough than 
the actual man himself could ever have achieved. Mrs. Ramsay herself 
seems to have a dim premonition that, as a sort of primal mother, she too 
will be internalized by her survivors, guiding them from within rather 
than more chancily manipulating them from without. Most of the 
characters in the novel experience enough impulses of irritation or 
hostility towards Mrs. Ramsay alive to lay the groundwork for a sense of 
guilt once she is dead. There is a notable absence of mourning for her, 
as if Mr. Ramsay's stricken histrionics had left everyone else in a state 
of emotional numbness. 'What did she feel? ' Lily wonders on her first 
morning at the summer house, 'Nothing, nothing... '(225). Indeed, if she 
feels anything it is anger, blaming Mrs. Ramsay for her sudden death and 
for leaving her in a confusion that renders her unable to paint. 
32 
Mrs. Ramsay is Lily's vicarious mother, determined to drive this 
difficult 'daughter' into the feminine role which she herself plays so 
perfectly as wife and mother. Here is the very heart of conflict between 
the two women, for Mrs. Ramsay is the 'Angel in the House' whom Lily must 
kill so that she can establish her own identity as a new woman, 
professional, unmarried, independent. In 1931 Woolf argued that, in her 
experience, killing the Angel in the House was essential for a woman to 
become a writer. 'Immensely charming', 'utterly unselfish', excelling in 
'the difficult arts of family life', sacrificing herself daily, this 
Angel is a phantom woman to be found in every Victorian middle class 
household. Woolf summarizes her credo: 'Be sympathetic; be tender; 
flatter; deceive; use all the arts and wiles of our sex. Never let 
anybody guess that you have a mind of your own'(CE, 2: 285). This might 
stand as Mrs. Ramsay's own manifesto: she flatters and deceives her 
husband(TL, 65), 'disliked anything that reminded her that she had been 
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seen sitting thinking'(108), allows Mr. Ramsay to 'exaggerate her 
ignorance'(187). In her 1931 paper Woolf declared that she had had to 
kill this angel: 'My excuse, if I were to be had up in a court of law, 
would be that I acted in self-defence. Had I not killed her she would 
have killed me'(CE, 2: 286). Lily must make a similarly 'murderous' self- 
assertion. Mrs. Ramsay 'cared not a fig for her paint ing'(TL, 80), 
declares that 'she must... they all must marry', and it is only Lily's 
hardwon confidence in her painting that allows her to affirm her 
spinsterhood as she at last 'stand[s] up to Mrs. Ramsay'(271). Painting 
on the lawn, Lily rejects Mr. Ramsay's demand for sympathy, she refuses 
to identify with the feminine role Mrs. Ramsay would gladly have played. 
At the dinner party Lily, asked for help by Mrs. Ramsay, had had to 
accept this feminine role in relation to Tansley; though she feels that 
'she had not been sincere'(144), Mrs. Ramsay's pressure causes her to 
renounce 'for the hundred and fiftieth time'(143). Ramsay's pressure is 
now inexorable, yet Lily merely draws her skirts closer round her ankles; 
instead of floating 'off instantly upon some wave of sympathetic 
expansion... she remained stuck'(234). At the same time, however, the 
degree of Lily's psychic autonomy should not be over-estimateed. Like 
Freud's mythical father, Mrs. Ramsay exercises a fuller sway in death 
than life. Lily sees her rejection of the role of Angel in the House as 
constituting self-murder as well as an overthrow of her own femininity: 
'not a woman, but a peevish, ill-tempered, dried-up old maid 
presumably'(234). 'Presumably', as I have suggested, denotes a distance, 
but Lily can sustain it only intermittently. Viewing herself as 'not a 
woman', she is confusing her own femaleness with a socially produced 
'femininity', but this is in the first place a confusion and then 
imposition that her own culture insists on. Her society can only 
interpret affirmations of female difference outside its code of the 
feminine as madness, invisibility, non-existence. Earlier, Lily had 
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pleaded for 'her own exemption from the universal law' of reproduction: 
'she liked to be herself; she was not made for that'(81). Again there is 
an elision of terms - between a need to reproduce which is 'universal' in 
the sense that the race will expire unless it is fulfilled, and the 
socially specific definitions of how and in what manner that need shall 
be performed. Though the content (child birth) is constant, the form is 
always historically produced. Lily emphatically rejects the form, which 
is the ideology of the Victorian Angel in the House, but so deep is her 
cultural conditioning, that she cannot distinguish the content from it. 
She abjures motherhood as well as 'angelic-ness', a decision which shows 
how deeply the act of rebellion is constrained by the very society it 
seeks to transcend. 
The first part of To the Lighthouse valorizes Mrs. Ramsay over her 
husband, but the final section articulates the necessity for the 
'daughter' to reject the mother (as far as she is able) without, however, 
merely returning to a position undifferentiated from that of the father 
himself. The daughter is always in danger of being engulfed by the 
mother. There is 'a structural weakness in the distinction between a 
girl and her mother', notes Jane Gallop in Feminism and Psychoanalysis: 
'woman needs language, the paternal, the symbolic order, to protect 
herself from the lack of distinction from the mother'. 
33 That 
'astonishing power that Mrs. Ramsay had over one'(271) may be sheer 
paralysis and must be resisted. In this necessity there perhaps lies a 
further ambivalence of the First World War. It is a tragic loss of full 
meaning, yet it also overthrows the intimidating parents, affording one a 
chink of freedom through which one can seek an autonomy of one's own. 
Paul and Minta's marriage is in Mrs. Ramsay's terms a failure, yet it has 
nonetheless entered a new, interesting phase: 'we can over-ride her 
wishes, improve away her limited, old-fashioned ideas'(269). 
Mrs. Ramsay's views of marriage are now 'incongruous'. 'Triumphing'(269) 
over Mrs. Ramsay, as the latter had previously done over her husband, 
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Lily reflects that: 'It has all gone against your wishes. They're happy 
like that; I'm happy like t his. Life has changed completely'(269). 
Woman needs language and the symbolic order to protect herself from 
the potential lack of diffe rentiation from the mother. But at the same 
time this patriarchal order is precisely the law that commands her to be 
like the mother. Children of both sexes must turn from their first love- 
object, the mother, but the boy turns away only 'provisionally'. He 
cannot possess the mother, but his adult love object will be of the same 
sex as her. The little girl, however, must turn from the mother to the 
father. This overcoming of the Oedipus complex in identification with the 
role of the parent of the same sex is enacted by James and Cam in the 
boat trip to the Lighthouse. After his long Oedipal hatred of 
Mr. Ramsay, James finally realises that 'they alone knew each 
other'(284), and he begins to regard himself as inheritor to the Father: 
"'We are driving before a gale - we must sink, " he began saying to 
himself, half aloud exactly as his father said it'(312). In reward, 
James is recognised by the father when Mr. Ramsay praises his steering. 
Witnessing this, Cam reflects, 'You've got it at last. For she knew that 
this was what James had been wanting'(316). Cam is initially tempted 
('this extraordinary temptation'(261-262)) to yield to the Father's 
speech by accepting his naming of the dog for her. But if she resists, 
it is only because her brother already occupies the father's role for 
her: 'with the tablets of eternal wisdom laid open on his knee', James 
urges her to "'Resist him"(260). But 'no one attracted her more'(262) 
than Mr. Ramsay, and she will at last put herself in the place of the 
mother and accept him as love-object. She too becomes caught in the 
speech of the Father: 'she murmured, dreamily, half asleep, how we 
perished, each alone'(293). Yet the episode has a curious disjunction of 
form and content, enacting the oldest of stories - resolution of the 
Oedipal complex - in a highly atypical situation -a boat sailing from 
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the Hebrides to the Lighthouse. Society's most familiar, indeed 
formative, gesture is projected out to its frontiers, as an enterprising 
quest into the unknown. The effect of this is ambivalent. On the one 
hand, it dramatically highlights the Oedipal resolution in the intensity 
of its focus (three figures on a small boat) and in the heroism of the 
quest motif. But, on the other, it implies that this resolution is only 
possible in these unique circumstances, in what now seems an unusual 
'laboratory' experiment in human emotions. Cam and James will reproduce 
the Ramsayan roles in the next generation, but they are isolated figures, 
while the 'mainland' belongs to Lily and her painting. 
If the first adventure of Virginia Woolf's professional life was to 
kill the Angel in the House, the second has yet to be achieved: 'telling 
the truth about my own experiences as a body'(CE, 2: 288). Woolf doubts 
whether any woman has solved it yet, but the full reason for this is 
deeper than the contingent fact of the social censorship she points to. 
Since the symbolic order is constituted by the very repression of the 
somatic, to seek to 'express' the body is to transgress the limits of 
representation. Lily's near-impossible desire to articulate 'these 
emotions of the body'(274) risks subverting the symbolic and 
precipitating madness or even death. In the physical pain of this 
effort, Lily only just stays on this side of the boundary: 'Heaven be 
praised-She had not obviously taken leave of her senses. No one had 
seen her step off her strip of board into the waters of annihilation. She 
remained a skimpy old maid, holding a paint-brush on the lawn'(278). Her 
problem is 'how to connect this mass on the right with that on the 
left'(86), to 'achieve that razor edge of balance between two opposite 
forces; Mr. Ramsay and the picture'(296). Lily's difficulty is located in 
that infinitesimal distance 'from conception to work'; her 'demons' lurk 
in the 'moment's flight between the picture and her canvas'(34), which 
ideally should reconcile the fluidity of life and 'the concentration of 
painting'(245). Without the symbolic order - representation, 
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identification with the father - then the 'conception' or inner picture, 
which is also the body, will be forever muted, and yet the former is at 
the same time the very force that represses the later. Mr. Ramsay must 
be one element in that razor-edge 'balance' which will be the completed 
painting, yet every time he comes near 'ruin approached, chaos 
approached'(229). Lily's description of her aesthetic ideal may also be 
taken as a self-reflexive statement of the novel's own aspiration: 
'Beautiful and bright it should be on the surface, feathery and 
evanescent... but beneath the fabric must be clamped together with bolts 
of iron. It was to be a thing you could ruffle with your breath; and a 
thing you could not dislodge with a team of horses'(264). This is 
clearly a version of the simultaneously solid and free-floating clouds in 
Mrs. Dalloway. Lily is in the double-bind of needing representation and 
the Law of the Father to distance herself from the (unrepresentable) 
mother, yet finding that the symbolic endlessly defers that full, 
unmediated jouissance which she also desires, that 'very jar on the 
nerves, the thing itself before it has been made anything'(297). To this 
degree, Lily is in accord with Mr. Ramsay. Whereas she hopes to surprise 
the bodily intuition into giving up its secret before it is caught in the 
toils of signification, Mr. Ramsay seeks to press signification to its 
limit where it will finally yield the philosophical 'thing in itself'. 
Lily is, as it were, a pre-social, Mr. Ramsay a post-social empiricist. 
Both may in this respect be contrasted with Mrs. Ramsay. Accepting the 
necessary materiality of language, the latter knows 'the inadequacy of 
human relationships, that the most perfect was flawed'(66), always 
impeded and deferred by signification. Mrs. Ramsay knows the 
impossibility of speaking 'truth', knows that the human subject is always 
caught up in 'lies' and 'exaggerations' which slip into one's language: 
'she never could say what she felt'(190). 
It is no accident that in her desperation Lily turns to 
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Mr. Carmichael for help. He alone in the novel is indifferent to 
Mrs. Ramsay's power; since he lacks nothing, she can get no purchase upon 
him; 'Mrs. Ramsay would ask him... wouldn't he like a coat, a rug, a 
newspaper? No, he wanted nothing'(299-300). 'Always content and 
dignified'(150), Mr. Carmichael may be regarded as enviably in possession 
of the phallus. He does not suffer that 'splitting' of the subject which 
is the condition of the subject's entry into the symbolic order and which 
endlessly defers presence. Mr. Carmichael, in contrast, is 'gorged with 
existence' (274).. He strikes Lily as in possession of an infinite depth 
of wisdom all the more impressive for its inscrutability. He is even 
associated, as I have already noted, with the glimpsed possibility of 
ultimate meaning: 'one could almost fancy that had Mr. Carmichael spoken, 
a little tear would have rent the surface of the pool. And then? 
Something would emerge'(276). As an artist, he has an affinity both to 
Lily, who moves the canvas 'close enough for his protection'(229) from 
Mr. Ramsay, and to Mrs. Ramsay as composer of social tableaux. Over the 
fruit bowl at dinner they had achieved a brief spark of mutual 
recognition: 'looking together united them'(151). Carmichael presides 
over both the landing at the Lighthouse and the completion of Lily's 
painting, and his presence suggests the unsatisfactoriness of the novel's 
offered resolution. The text invests him with a considerable amount of 
pomp and circumstance; he is 'an old pagan God' with a trident(319), a 
Druidic bard with 'a long white robe'(172) improvised out of a table 
napkin. Yet apart from chanting the poem at dinner Mr. Carmichael never 
speaks; moreover, his consciousness is never rendered from the inside in 
the novel. I suggest that this is because he embodies an impossibility, 
representing simultaneously the endless deferral involved in the practice 
of art and the present, full possession of the phallus. Each one of 
these aspects of Carmichael cancels the other, yet the novel insists he 
has both. It is therefore unable to 'realize' him, and gives him an 
inflated external grandeur to compensate for its inability to flesh out 
1.70 
his inner life. Carmichael is an absence or blank in the text; he marks 
the site of a desirable but contradictory resolution to the tug-of-war 
between body and representation. 
Lily at last completes her picture: 'as if she saw it clear for a 
second, she drew a line there, in the centre'(320). Left and right 
sides, Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay, the symbolic and somatic, are joined and 
divided in a single stroke, and the crucial issue is which way the stress 
falls here. Just before drawing the line, Lily had looked at the steps 
and confirmed that 'they were empty'. Yet 'somebody'- 'whoever it was 
stayed still inside'(309) - casts a shadow over the steps exactly as 
Mrs. Ramsay would have done. It is through this 'somebody' that Lily has 
her vision, reaching a definite signified (Mrs. Ramsay) which is the mere 
effect of the indeterminate signifier, the anonymous shadow. The 
signified turns out to be dependent on the signifier that should be its 
mere prop. In general, a shadow is the trace of a presence which 
precedes it, but it does not operate in this usual way in Lily's vision: 
there the presence or vision is secondary to the trace itself. This is 
the very principle of the symbolic order, and I propose to read Lily's 
line as an allegorical statement of the Saussurian algorithm [S], which 
for Lacan denotes the insurpassable separation of the subject of 
conscious discourse from the unconscious. Despite the general euphoria 
of its last pages, the novel itself quietly retains certain key 
qualifications of Lily's vision: 'as if she saw it clear for a second' 
(emphasis added). The dream of identity between left and right sides, 
body and symbolic order, persists, but the inescapable fact of their 
alienation is also acknowledged. Lily's final line is as ambivalent as 
the Phallus itself, which is both disjunction and copula at once. Anika 
Lemaire argues that the phallus is 'a copula -a hyphen - in the 
evanescence of its erection - the signifier par excellence of the 
impossible identity'. 34 The novel cannot end on full presence, but must 
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note its passing: 'I have had my vision'. If this is in one sense loss, 
it is also a sort of liberation, bleak but real, for the vision is Lily's 
bond to Mrs. Ramsay. It is tragically brief but also a debt settled. 
Mrs. Ramsay has vanished inaccessibly into the past, fixed in the 
representation rather than lived on the very pulses of the younger woman, 
but this also constitutes a freedom for Lily, who can now perhaps cast 
off her fixation with Mrs. Ramsay and move on. 
35 
Lily's line is also a Lighthouse, and the Lighthouse is in turn 'a 
central line down the middle of the book to hold the design together'. 
Lily's line and the Lighthouse coincide in a way reminiscent of 
Mrs. Ramsay's own projections of auto-affection into the outside world 
earlier in the book. But this is only a reminiscence and not an 
identity. With her death, a kind of 'division of labour' has set in. 
Whereas Mrs. Ramsay's auto-affection passed through the Lighthouse on its 
circular journey back upon itself, Mr. Ramsay must physically go to the 
Lighthouse, while Lily draws the line which coincides with it. 
36 Woolf 
insists that 'I meant nothing by the Lighthouse'; it is an empty 
signifier. At the start of this chapter I described it as a 'symbol of 
symbolism', for that is the 'subjective' aspect of the Lighthouse's 
'objective' role as signifier. Provokingly empty, it leads to 
hermeneutic efforts to motivate it, to turn it into symbol; Woolf 
'trusted that people would make it the deposit for their own emotions - 
which they have done'. Lily's line represents an unsurpassable bar 
between lived experience and the symbolic order, which always objectively 
exists, but comes to subjective consciousness as the result of a 
historical 'fall' from the plenitude of the Ramsays to the dearth 
suffered by the post-war generation. It is the necessary condition of 
the subject as such, and it reacts back to interrogate the symbolic 
visions of the first half of the text. The novel's ambivalent attitude 
towards this bar or gap is finally grounded in the daughter's fraught 
relationship to the mother. Mrs. Ramsay's death is the bleak loss of the 
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possibility of total meaning, yet it also reveals an arbitrariness in the 
sign which reduces even Mrs. Ramsay's 'impressive symbols into mere 
fictional constructs with no compelling authority over the next 
generation. 
CHAPTER. V: ORLANDO 
On its publication in 1928 Orlando proved 'as Leonard said, the 
turning point in Virginia's career as a successful novelist' (QB, 2: 140). 
Her financial anxieties were ended by its commercial success and 
popularity, and she could at last secure a 'room of her own'. 
' None the 
less, among her critics Orlando has been perhaps the most neglected of 
her novels. Quentin Bell's judgement is representative: 'I think she saw 
well enough that Orlando was not "important" among her works' (QB, 2: 138). 
'Not... important among my works' was, indeed, Woolf's own assessment of 
the novel in her diary (WD, 128), and Bell and a number of other critics 
seem to take this authorial judgement as self-evidently true. 'The book 
itself was, from a publisher's point of view, perfect, ' Bell continues, 
in a rather denigrating tone, as if no work which was successful in 
market terms could possibly have literary value. He summarises the 
feelings of the reading public as follows: 'Here was a work by a highbrow 
-- a "difficult" novelist -- which nevertheless was easy, amusing, and 
straightforward in its narrative' (QB, 2: 140). This indicates the pattern 
of the book's subsequent critical reception. Precisely because Orlando is 
not difficult, not typically 'Woolfian', some critics have dismissed it. 
Meanwhile the very fact of its humour and straightforwardness have led 
other critics to focus on the biographical origins of Orlando rather than 
study of the text as artefact. Instead of criticism we are offered 
biographical gossip or scandal or speculation, and such critics thus 
ironically reproduce the very responses of a reading public they deplore. 
Yet the homosexual love affair from which the novel springs at the same 
time causes them to flinch embarrassedly away from it. This 'simple' 
work thus becomes a difficult book, a thorny text to handle critically, 
finally prompting essays with titles like 'Why is Orlando difficult? '. In 
this essay J. J. Wilson records an amusing fact: 'Professors like to 
include Orlando on reading lists as a kind of literary aphrodisiac for 
their unaroused students'. This is true enough; even readers who 
2 
usually find Woolf's work intolerable often enjoy Orlando ('of all 
Virginia's novels the one that comes nearest to sexual, or rather 
homosexual feeling' (QB, 2: 118). This already suggests how aberrant this 
novel is from what is regarded as the 'quintessence' of Woolf's literary 
project: 'Orlando has a different quality from all Virginia Woolf's other 
novels'. 
3 Many critics' unease focuses on its personal origin and 
passion, as when Nigel Nic$iolson describes it as the 'most charming love 
letter in literature', or when H. Lee writes that 'Orlando... is a 
personal offering, dedicated to Vita Sackville-West in a spirit of love 
and fascination and also of irony' (138). 
4 In so doing, they 
underestimate the degree to which such passions are mediated by 
impersonal literary forms and conventions. Another fact which makes 
Orlando troubling for its critics is that The Waves, which is generally 
regarded as 'really' the next book after To the Lighthouse, had already 
germinated in Woolf's mind when she was writing Orlando, indeed, even 
before the completion of To the Lighthouse. 
5 With the author's own 
disparaging description of it as 'a joke', 'farce', 'a writer's holiday', 
'an escapade', (WD, 105,117,118,124), Orlando seems all the more a 
mere 'intrusion': one critic contends 'Orlando had interrupted the stream 
of inspiration which was to lead. to The Waves'. 
6 Hence many critics' 
omission of Orlando from what they construe as the main current of 
Woolf's literary work. In order to appreciate Orlando justly, we need to 
probe. into the psychic mechanisms of the author's defensive definition of 
it as 'a joke' and refuse to take her words at face value, and equally to 
stop regarding it as a mere 'personal offering' to her lover. 
7 
We should not confound 'joke' with 'insignificance' even though the 
author herself seems to invite us to do so, for Freud had already 
revealed in 1905 that behind a joke or within the relief gained from a 
joke, there resides the truth of the unconscious. 
8 The intensity of the 
'will-to-joke' which Woolf records in her diary suggests some significant 
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psychic impulse. 'Well but Orlando was the outcome of a perfectly 
definite, indeed overmastering, impulse. I want fun. I want fantasy. I 
want (this was serious) to give things their caricature value... to write 
a history, say of Newnham or the women's movement, in the same vein. The 
vein is deep in me - at least sparkling, urgent' (WD, 136) (emphasis 
added). Curiously, two layers are inscribed in this diary entry: surface 
(fun, play) and depth (urgent, overmastering), but they interbreed in 
strange ways. A 'serious' drive towards 'caricature' is perhaps 
paradoxical, and we can certainly then hardly any longer accept the firm 
and stable binary opposition which allows critics to deprecate Orlando as 
'unserious'. In our ordinary way of construing this opposition, we 
assume that seriousness is primary and that play or joke is secondary and 
derivative, just as (a related case) we assume that literal meaning 
precedes the 'transfer' of meaning in the metaphor. Yet Woolf's diary 
entries on Orlando constantly overturn this assumption, affirming instead 
the primacy of play. Though she started the novel as a joke, she 
involuntarily became serious. Thus her worries: 'Yes, it's done - 
Orlando - begun on 8th October, as a joke; and now rather too long for my 
liking. It may fall between stools, be too long for a joke, and too 
frivolous for a serious book' (WD, 124). 'The truth is I expect I began 
it as a joke and went on with it seriously. Hence it lacks some unity' 
(WD, 128). The constant repetition of ' jokiness' itself alerts us to 
forces operating here that are stronger than our usual, attenuated notion 
of 'play' will admit. And in her entry in the diary on 20th December 
1927 Woolf tells us that Orlando came into being through some 
uncontrollable force: 'How extraordinarily unwilled by me but potent in 
its own right-Orlando was! as if it shoved everything aside to come 
into existence' (WD, 120). 
What is this 'overmastering impulse', this 'definite' necessity, 
which drove Woolf to have 'a joke'? Her own explanation emerges in the 
diary. Recording for the first time an idea for some literary project of 
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the fantastic (she named it 'The Jessamy Brides') - 'fantasy', 
'sapphism', 'satire' - she explains: 'I feel the need of an escapade 
after these serious poetic experimental books whose form is always so 
closely considered... it will rest my head before starting the very 
serious, mystical poetical work which I want to come next' (WD, 105). 
9 
This account dovetails with her categorization of 'The Satirists and 
Fantastics' between 'The Psychologists' and 'The Poets' in her essay 
'Phases of Fiction' written contemporaneously with Orlando. In it, too, 
she argues for 'a craving for relief' after the confused feelings which 
psychologically orientated literature rouses in the reader: 'The mind 
feels like a sponge saturated full with sympathy and understanding; it 
needs to dry itself, to contract upon something hard. Satire and the 
sense that the satirist gives us that he has the world well within his 
grasp, so that it is at the mercy of his pen, precisely fulfil our needs' 
(CE, 2: 89). Satire is appreciated for its power to master reality. The 
writers of satire and the fantastic work in 'freedom' in their 'changed 
attitudes toward reality' (CE, 2: 90-91), over which they have the upper 
hand; they do not labour 'under the oppression of omniscience' (CE, 2: 90) 
like the psychologists. This gives the reader too a sense of freedom. 
Maria DiBattista is the only critic who gives full recognition to Woolf's 
'overmastering impulse' and argues that the play which Woolf practises is 
never simply gratuitous, nonutilitarian or unserious: 'Both the urgency 
and seriousness of caricature as a species of Woolf's comic, playful 
expression in Orlando springs from an aggressive impulse directed against 
all she perceives as threatening to the integrity and freedom of the self 
- the pretentious, the powerful, the potentially tyrannical'. 
10 In order 
to give a full assessment of Orlando, it is necessary to probe into the 
particular constraints against which Woolf's fantasy protests, and from 
which it is generated, for in Rosemary Jackson's account of the genre, 
fantasy attempts 'to compensate for a lack resulting from cultural 
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constraints: it is a literature of desire'. 
" What, then, is the desire 
which evokes an 'overmastering impulse' in Woolf to ward off the 
oppressions of reality, and which has to be immediately repressed by the 
author herself as a 'joke', and subsequently dismissed by critics as non- 
essential? 
Woolf's first rudimentary idea of' a fantasy was 'The Jessamy 
Brides', about 'two women, poor, solitary at the top of a house': 'satire 
and wildness' with 'sapphism' suggested (WD, 105). Seven months later, 
this scheme had become Orlando. 'Vita; only with a change about from one 
sex to another' (WD, 116). Thus the idea about a fantasy for fun was from 
the very beginning twined with the themes of woman and sexuality. In 
this period Woolf was active in writing on feminist issues, 
12 
and the 
most substantial fruit of that concern was A Room of One's Own (published 
in 1929), which was based on lectures she gave at Cambridge immediately 
after the publication of Orlando. Since Woolf was thus stepping into her 
father's footsteps (he had been tutor at Trinity College), she can 
perhaps be regarded as acting out that change of sex which Orlando had 
already thematised, and at Cambridge too she was 'playful' where 
solemnity was more likely to have been expected. 
As I suggested in my introduction, Woolf encounters a tension 
between her feminism and the aethetic ideology of Symbolist modernism. 
For the Symbolist work of art, ideas or statements are taboo; a poem must 
not mean but be. Certainly, critics have overestimated the role of the 
modernist sensibility in Woolf, ignoring the counteracting, materialist 
motifs in her work. Yet it is nonetheless true that she remains to a 
degree entrapped within the modernist categories. Thus anything like a 
'direct' expression of feminist anger, Woolf argues, introduces 
distortion and weakness into the work of art. In A Room of One's Own she 
points to 'an awkward break' in lane ire, which she identifies more 
generally in 'Women and Fiction' as a characteristic of nineteenth 
century women novelists - the presence 'of someone resenting the 
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treatment of her sex and pleading for its rights' (CE, 2: 144): 
That is an awkward break, I thought... The continuity is 
disturbed. One might say... that the woman who wrote those 
pages had more genius in her than Jane Austen; but if one reads 
them over and marks that jerk in them, that indignation, one 
sees that she will never get her genius expressed whole and 
entire. Her books will be deformed and twisted. She will 
write in a rage where she should write calmly. She will write 
foolishly where she should write wisely. She will write of 
herself where she should write of her characters. She is at 
war with her lot. (RO, 104) 
Female anger and ambition as a woman are the last thing Woolf wants 
to 'betray', whether in her non-fictional or fictional work. Hence the 
oblique approach to the issues and the playful style in both Orlando and 
A Room of One's Own. Elaine Showalter rightly points out the similarity 
of the techniques of these books: 'repetition, exaggeration, parody, 
whimsy, and multiple viewpoint'. 
13 Woolf's playfulness, then, does not 
mean secondariness or unseriousness, but is a necessary detachment and 
disguise, a deliberate narrative politics by which she can express what 
she otherwise prohibits herself; that which the straightforward style 
cannot articulate within its legitimate confines. But if playfulness in 
a sense begins as a strategem, it ultimately attains a more radical value 
by which it subsumes 'seriousness', which then becomes a subordinate 
moment within it. 
The most radical fantastic elements in Orlando are Orlando's immense 
life span and the sex-change in the middle of the book and Orlando's 
consequent androgynous character. According to Jackson, fantasy 'takes 
metaphorical constructions literally'. 
14 Since Orlando lives more than 
three hundred years and at the end of the book is still only thirty-six, 
it is possible for the reader to reverse the course of fantasy, to 
'naturalize' it as a metaphor for the tradition and ancestors which make 
the individual's existence possible. But the fantasy of sex-change and 
androgyny offers more resistance to any naturalizing attempt, for what 
could this sex-change and androgyny be a metaphor or allegory of? 
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Confusion of sexual divisions is offensive and unacceptable from a 
'normal' viewpoint, as are all confusions of categories like life and 
death, the t, 1man and the animal. If, as Tzvetan Todorov points out, the 
fantastic cannot be placed alongside allegory or poetry, for it resists 
both the conceptualizations of the first and the metaphorical structures 
of the second, then the change of sex is the most fantastic aspect of 
Orlando. 15 However, if one admits that a human being is never purely and 
simply man or woman, that every individual has both 'feminine' and 
'masculine' elements, then the sex-change is no longer a fantasy of the 
nonconceptual. Yet society and the men and women constituted in and 
through it do not accept this, and androgynous dispositions therefore 
have to be presented as fantasy and joke. 
16 
Elaine Showalter's attack on Woolf is directed at precisely her so- 
called 'flight' into androgyny. 'Androgyny was the myth that helped her 
evade confrontation with her own painful femaleness and enabled her to 
choke and repress her anger and ambition'. 
17 Showalter argues, contrary 
to Woolf's modernist ideology that makes anger and protest flaws in art, 
that a woman writer should completely immerse herself in 'the individual 
experience, with all its restriction of sex and anger and fear and 
chaos': 
A thorough understanding of what it means, in every respect, to 
be a woman, could lead the artist to an understanding of what 
it means to be a man. This revelation would not be realized in 
any mystical way; it would result from daring to face and 
express what is unique, even if unpleasant, or taboo, or 
destructive, in one's own experience, and thus it would speak 
to the secret heart in all people. 18 
Though she criticises Woolf's androgynous artist for 'mystically 
transcend[ing] sex', Showalter's alternative is as mystical as Woolf's. 
Can 'the. issues indeed be as simple as she optimistically suggests? Her 
last sentence perhaps already betrays the simplistic sentimentality, of 
her argument. 
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The stridency of the revolt Showalter calls for entails a risk. The 
dominant, patriarchal culture might simply work, all the more powerfully., 
to eliminate women's 'restrictions of sex and anger and fear and chaos' 
in the name of 'insanity', 'illogicality', 'disorder'. Women need a more 
subtly resourceful strategy to let their indignation take effect in 
society. The relation of a woman writer to the dominant culture must be 
oblique. She cannot write completely outside the dominant culture and 
institutions, and yet as woman, she is alien to them. 'At once within 
this culture and outside it', as Mary Jacobus remarks, 'the woman writer 
experiences not only exclusion, but an internal split. ' 
19 This intricate 
mode of working at once within and outside culture 'challeng[es] its 
terms while necessarily working within them'. It is this difficult 
acrobatic feat of continually crossing the boundary of the dominant 
culture in pleasurable satire and fantasy that Woolf chose for Orlando 
and A Room of One's Own. Mary Jacobus suggests that women re-read 
Woolf's 'androgyny' in the light of this difficult challenge of at once 
transgressing the very ground on which we stand and yet necessarily 
working within it - 'a simultaneous enactment of desire and repression by 
which the split is closed with an essentially Utopian vision of undivided 
consciousness'. 
20 The androgynous mind which Woolf dreams of as her 
ideal does not, as Showalter argues, flee into the a-sexual state of 
eunuchism, but is rather 'a constant alternation' between the position 
inside the dominant culture, on the side of the sign, and a 'position' 
outside. In Kristeva's words, 'an impossible dialectic: a permanent 
alternation: never the one without the other. '21 
Critics such as DiBattista have suggested a certain continuity 
between To the Lighthouse and Orlando, seeing Lily's discovery of her 
'mother' and making peace with her 'father' as anticipating the 
resolution of the dualism of male/female (aggressive/self-sacrificing, 
rational/emotional) which Orlando will then body forth quite literally in 
its sex-change. Yet Orlando's androgynous disposition does not in fact 
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emphasize the fusion of these two opposite characterizations of human 
being. This point is made startlingly clear by the fact that Nancy 
Topping Bazin's book omits Orlando completely despite its title and 
theme: Virginia Woolf and the Androgynous Vision. For Orlando's 
androgyny offers no foothold to an argument that sees the androgynous 
vision as a mystical unification of the manic (female) and the depressive 
(male) view of the world. She interprets Woolf's androgyny simply as 'a 
certain equilibrium between the masculine and feminine visions. '22 Yet 
the very fact that androgyny is broached again in Orlando suggests at the 
very least that any supposed 'resolution' in To the Lighthouse is less 
definitive than assumed. 
At a key point in Orlando, Orlando and Shelmerdine suddenly cry to 
each other: "'You're a woman, Shell" she cried. "You're a man, Orlando! " 
he cried'. The narrator underlines the bizarreness of this episode: 
'Never was there such a scene of protestation and demonstration as then 
took place since the world began' (227). The change of sex is a defining 
moment for the fantayfsy of Orlando in that it shows the nature of fantasy 
itself, which I take to be the transgression of boundaries as a play with 
the limit, in other words, as the play of difference. Woolf had the idea 
of 'a change about from one sex to another' at the time she first 
conceived Orlando (WD, 116). Transgression of the boundary is the 
distinctive working principle of the fantastic; R. Jackson points out 
that the fantastic narrative does not operate metaphorically to produce a 
synthesizing image or a suddenly condensed symbol; it rather remains on 
the surface. In it one object, instead of standing for another, 
literally becomes that other, slides through the boundary into the other, 
'in a permanent flux and instability'. 
23 This superficiality and 
metonymical displacement is certainly the contrary of that depth and 
metaphoricity which Woolf usually aims consciously at in her fiction. In 
Orlando, she noted, she had purposely avoided 'difficulty': 'I did not 
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try to explore...! never got down to my depths' (WD,. 136). She also 
intended to write 'all over hastily' (W D; 120). " Jacques Lacan remarks: 
'What do we have in metonymy other than the power to bypass the obstacles 
of social censure? This form... lends itself to the truth under 
opression. '24 The 'truth under oppression' which has to find metonymical 
expression in Orlando is the very notion of androgyny itself. Woolf 
cannot treat her androgynous vision metaphorically in her usual manner, 
for it is specially 'unthinkable'; it can be acceptable only as a joke. 
It verges too much on the comic or ribald to allow an earnest attempt to 
embody it in poetic metaphor. If one tries to give 'androgyny' any 
expression, it has to be done metonymically by 'a change about from one 
sex to another'; a man or woman slides into a woman or man as 'farce' 
(whence, presumably, the social phenomenon of comic 'drag'). Androgyny 
in Orlando is not a reconciliation that resolves the opposition, but the 
throwing of both sexes into a metonymic confusion of genders. 
Before the radical transgression of the dividing line (Orlando's 
metamorphosis from man to woman), and as a kind of textual 'foreplay', 
many other instances of transgression occur. Orlando's sudden love for 
Sasha emerges prior to the division of gender, for when he first sees 
Sasha, he does not know whether the figure is a 'boy's or woman's' (36). 
Physical detail, 'whatever the name or sex', is obscured by an 
extraordinary seductiveness. Accordingly, Orlando's metaphors for Sasha 
are a pell-mell of categories. 'Images, metaphors of the most extreme 
and extravagant twined and twisted in his mind. He called her a melon, a 
pineapple, an olive tree, an emerald, and a fox in the snow' (36). As a 
man, Orlando automatically categorizes this desirable object as woman, as 
'her' in a synaesthetic confusion of the senses: 'he did not know whether 
he had heard her, tasted her, seen her, or all three together' (37). 
Sasha represents otherness to him; she is a foreign woman with whom he 
cannot communicate except in French, which is a foreign tongue for both. 
'There was something hidden' (45) in her, for her true origin is unknown 
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and shadowy: 'something rank in her, something coarse flavoured, 
something peasant born? ' (50). It is the attraction of otherness, she is 
'like nothing he had seen or known in England'; all the English 'words 
failed him. He wanted another landscape, and another tongue' (45). She 
represents all the exoticism of Rachel Vinrace's Voyage Out without the 
trouble of the voyage itself. Orlando is drawn to the uttermost limits 
of himself and beyond them; embraces are only possible (and thus also 
impossible) if the other is the other, on the other side of the boundary 
of the self. Orlando had almost despaired when he for a moment thought 
that Sasha was 'of his own sex': 'all embraces were out of the question' 
(37). Orlando is drawn out of 'his boyish clumsiness' (40) into 'his 
manhood' (39). Metamorphosis on a small scale has already happened: the 
change in Orlando himself was extraordinary' (40). 
Urged by Sasha's complaint that 'It was like being in a cage' (42), 
Orlando takes her beyond the confines of the English court: 'the couple 
was often seen to slip under the silken rope, which railed off the Royal 
enclosure from the public part of the river and to disappear among the 
crowd of common people' (42). This act most 'outraged the Court and 
stung it in its tenderest part' (42). Ignoring the boundary of silken 
rope, Orlando and Sasha seek a passionate embrace in the farthest reaches 
of the frozen Thames. Orlando resolved 'to chase the flame, dive for the 
gem', to discard his familiar milieu (country, office and career), and to 
venture into an unknown barbarism, since Sasha is determined to live in 
Russia. Ignoring 'obstacles and hardships', he feels 'as if he had been 
hooked by a great fish through the nose and rushed through the waters 
unwillingly, yet with his own consent' (50). This passionate pursuit of 
a mysterious foreign woman, which overthrows all decorum and the 
boundaries of English court society, is appropriately situated in an 
exceptional moment of time produced by the sudden and unprecedented Great 
Frost, which gives England something of the primitive severity of Sasha's 
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own Russia. The routine business of life comes to a standstill, and 
instead 'London enjoy[s] a carnival of the utmost brilliancy' (34). We 
can link the novel's term 'carnival' to Jackson's account of the 
phenomenon (which in turn relies heavily on Mikhail Bakhtin): 'Carnival' 
was a temporary condition, a ritualized suspension of everyday law and 
order'. 
25 In the carnivalistic situation, in which free contact between 
ranks is permitted and sexual taboos are broken, Orlando and Sasha's 
affair is an 'improper' relationship. Sasha is not only foreign, but has 
'something rank, something coarse flavoured, something peasant born' 
about her. She is so uncategorizable in terms of Orlando's social world 
that she is completely ambiguous; he cannot decide whether his 'sight' of 
Sasha 'in the arms of a common seaman', which was an utterly 'foul' 
thing, is fact or imagination. But it is in this carnivalistic 
atmosphere, this suspension of common sense and order, that Orlando's 
sexuality is at last liberated. Casting off 'his boyish clumsiness' 
(40), he knew 'for the first time... the delight of love' (43). ' In these 
pages Woolf's writing achieves its maximum sexual intensity, more so even 
than in the evocations of sexual rapture in Mrs. Dalloway, for that was 
merely Clarissa's memory, a brief flashback by a woman who remains a 
spiritual virgin troubled by her own frigidity. 
The ice which 'did not melt with their heat' (43) will eventually 
thaw just before Orlando's planned elopement with Sasha. The freezing 
over of the river is simultaneously the suspension of law and order and a 
'carnival' (34); 'a whole gay city'(58) has been erected on the ice; 
Carnival is a privileged time and space in which all barriers are 
dissolved, and is possible because of the suspension of the flow of 
ordinary time; it is in a sense another version of the 'timeless moments' 
of To the Lighthouse. For life to continue, this flow of time (history) 
has to be resumed: frozen for more than three months, the river suddenly 
regains its. freedom and is now 'a race of turbulent yellow waters. ' 'All 
was riot and confusion' (58), but this is a necessary violence to repress 
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the carnival before the resumption of the flow of the ordinary life. 
Because of this sudden end of the carnival, Orlando cannot after all 
transgress the limits of the court to embrace Sasha. He remains behind 
as Sasha, far out in the sea, flees to Russia, with the race of turbulent 
yellow waters washing down the frantic people between them. Its 
consummation thwarted, desire for otherness turns into revulsion: 'he 
hurled at the faithless woman all the insults that have ever been the lot 
of her sex. Faithless, mutable, fickle' (61). Sasha is cast beyond the 
swirling waters as an evil otherness - 'devil, adulteress, deceiver' 
(61). To understand her, Orlando has to wait until he himself can cross 
the gulf of gender into this other side. 
Once the carnivalistic freedom is dissipated, Orlando is exiled from 
the Court in deep disgrace. He retires to his country house to begin a 
sedate life there, but first undergoes a trance-like seven day's sleep 
which submits his part in the passionate carnival world to repression; he 
wakes 'to have an imperfect recollection of his past life' (63). After 
an uneventful century on his estate the same pattern of transgression 
('slipping out of a silken rope'), carnival and flood will be repeated, 
leading to Orlando's most radical transgression of all. What compels 
Orlando to take the first step outside his self-imposed confinement is an 
amorous incident with the Archduchess Harriet. The episode needs close 
scrutiny, for the text here contains curious and problematic twists. It 
is because Orlando is 'suddenly and violently overcome by passion of some 
sort that he has to leave the room' (107). The texual biographer defines 
this 'passion' - obviously physical desire - as the latter of Love's two 
inseparable faces, 'one white, the other black... one smooth, the other 
hairy' (108). This transformation of Love is the turning point of this 
episode: initially 'a bird of beauty' with 'soft plumage', it 
metamorphoses into 'the heaviest and foulest of the birds; which is the 
vulture' . (108). Radiant Love turns into 'black, hairy, brutish' Lust, 
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'at the sight of the Archduchess presumably' (108), as the narrator 
informs us in a parenthesis. Yet this explanation is ambiguous. It 
implies that the Archduchess is rampantly lustful, and that Orlando flees 
from her hot desire. This interpretation is in part appropriate, since 
the Archduchess is taking the initiative here; but against it must be set 
other characterizations of her as well-mannered, gentle, even 
magnanimous. Earlier, for instance, she had been compared to 'a hare 
startled, but obdurate' (105). The narrator's phrase 'at the sight 
of... ', however, suggests that the lurid transformation may take place 
within the person (Orlando) looking at the Archduchess rather than in or 
because of the latter herself. The 'black, hairy' countenance of Lust is 
that of Orlando's own male passion, which he then projects onto the 
Archduchess. Hence it is that, though he escapes her attentions, Orlando 
remains 'haunted every day and night by phantoms of the foulest kind' 
(109); he can flee the woman, but he cannot escape those aspects of his 
own self which he had projected onto her. When Orlando returns to 
England as a woman and again meets the Archduchess (now the. Archduke), he 
reflects with a great sense of bathos that 'This was the eyrie of that 
obscene vulture - this the fatal fowl herself! ' (161-2). Relieved of his 
own lurid projections, her earlier 'seduction' attempt now seems 
'excessively flat' (162). 
Who is here the pursuer and who the pursued? Orlando flees from 
England, but then the Archduchess is 'a hare that sits upright and 
glowers at its pursuer' (105), and since Orlando flees his own 
lustfulness, he might be said to be pursued by his own nature as (male) 
pursuer. This image of the sexual hunt was already prominent in the 
Sasha episode. Orlando abbreviates her name to Sasha 'because it was the 
name of a white Russian fox he had had as a boy' (43); she is thus the 
object of his amorous 'fox-hunt'. Yet the fox seems capable of doing as 
much damage as the hunter himself; his boyhood pet was 'a creature soft 
as snow, but with teeth of steel, which bit him so savagely' (43). 
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In fleeing the Archduchess, Orlando is fleeing from aspects of his 
own masculinity which he now denounces as disgusting (and which had 
earlier repelled Sasha). In this limited sense, then, Orlando's 
metamorphosis into a woman is already prefigured at the end of chapter 
two. But this fantastic transgression of the boundary between one sex 
and the other will actually take place in surroundings of radical 
otherness - the Eastern world of Constantinople, than which nothing is 
'less like the counties of Surrey and Kent or the towns of London and 
Tunbridge Wells' (111). 26 The narrative pattern of chapter one - escape 
from the 'silken rope' of the usual boundaries - is repeated in chapter 
three. Between his diplomatic duties, which he performs diligently, 
Orlando sometimes, 'it is said... would pass out of his own gates... Then 
he would mingle with the crowd on the Galata Bridge' (114). The great 
celebration for the conferring of the Dukedom on Orlando is again a 
special time in which quotidian business is temporarily suspended, to the 
point where the people of Turkey expect a miracle. The British feel 
'considerable uneasiness' that the imperialist order they had been 
imposing by 'the superiority of the British' over the 'ignorant' 
Easterners (117) might be subverted. Though the agitation at the party 
is quelled, that night Orlando marries a gypsy woman, as revealed later 
by a document left in the room. Subversion thus takes place on the 
personal rather than political level, in a marriage that violates 
imperialist canons of social and even racial decorum. Jackson argues 
that the 'Fantastic is preoccupied with limits, with limiting categories, 
and with their projected dissolution'. 
27 Confronted with such 
'transgressive impulses', the text, as if in deep embarrassment, shows a 
certain reluctance to proceed; Orlando falls into a trance again. In the 
world around him, the political transgression is achieved: in a 'terrible 
and bloody insurrection', 'The Turks rose against the Sultan' (122). The 
moment of the fantastic (reversal of sex) and political revolution occur 
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simultaneously, yet the relationship between them remains obscure, since 
the novel uses the latter only as a metonym for the forrner. Whether 
their relationship is necessary or contingent it remains impossible to 
say. The biographer then confronts the most embarrassing 'fact', though 
'now again obscurity decends' (123), naturalised by the biographical 
inconvenience of burnt holes in the document. 
Yet despite delays and resistances the biographer at last has to 
confess, to the sound of the trumpet's impetuous blaring of 'The Truth! ', 
that when Orlando woke, 'he was a woman' (126), a sentence as 
ungrammatical as the transformation it records is bizarre. After a gap 
indicated by five asterisks, as if the only way to show the division of 
the sex were this hiatus, the novel describes the androgynous Orlando, 
though still referring to 'him': 'His form combined in one the strength 
of a man and a woman's grace' (126-7). Orlando's form is the image which 
the author has given to the non-conceptual, impossible figure of 
androgyny. Whereas his previous trance had served only to repress the 
extreme pain which his transgressions during the 'carnival' had caused 
him, this trance succeeds in dissolving the limits of gender. The change 
from a man into a woman is a castration, but it nevertheless 'seemed to 
have been accomplished painlessly and completely... ' (127). Orlando's 
physical form alone alters: 'But in every other respect, Orlando remained 
precisely as he had been. The change of sex, though it altered their 
future, did nothing whatever to alter their identity. Their faces 
remained, as their portraits prove, practically the same' (127). Even 
his memory of the past remains intact. The only thing which makes 
Orlando recognize his/her new sexual identity is the sight of his/her own 
image in the mirror. He 'stood upright in complete nakedness' (126) and 
'looked himself up and down in a long looking-glass, without showing any 
signs of discomposure' (127). The biographer's statements about 
Orlando's unaltered identity do not necessarily deny the difference 
between the sexes, but they do deny biologisim. Orlando's biological 
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change from man to woman does not automatically and immediately entail a 
change of personality (even his physiognomy is not affected). Since 
Orlando has not yet started to live as woman in a specific context, he 
'remain[s] precisely as he [has] been', but 'it altered their future. ' 
His/her new sexuality is to be constructed from now on in historical, 
social and cultural contexts. The biographer dismissess 'biologists and 
psychologists' who will probably discuss Orlando's sexuality futilely and 
endlessly (127-8), for this text implies that sexuality is constructed, 
and not given in nature. In the latter half of the book, Orlando is 
constructed as a woman; and since sexuality is not presented as naturally 
given, Orlando's gender becomes a legal matter for the Court to decide. 
As Stephen Heath argues: 
Sexuality is not given in nature but produced; the individual 
subject is not constructed from sexuality, sexuality is 
constructed in the history of the subject, with difference a 
function of that construction not its cause, a function which is 
not necessarily single (on the contrary) and which, a fortiori, 
is not necessarily the holding of the difference to anatomical 
difference (phallic singularity). Production, construction in 
the history of the subject, sexuality engages also from the 
beginning, and thereby, the social relations of production, 
classes, sexes. 28 
In the face of this mysterious change of sex, many people's 
reaction, from the 'naturalist' point of view, is to try to prove: 
'(1) that Orlando had always been a woman, (2) that Orlando is at this 
moment a man' (127). Curiously, these two contradictory positions are in 
a sense both true. Having lived as man, Orlando at this moment is still 
a man; s/he will have to learn to be a woman through the years to come. 
But the first argument also seems to be true on a totally different 
level, that is, as a kind of disguised confession on the part of the 
author. As a man, Orlando has never struck the reader as very masculine 
or virile. The very first sentence of the book - 'He - for there could be 
no doubt of his sex, though the fashion of the time did something to 
disguise it' (15) - paradoxically suggests a certain doubt by its very 
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effort to efface any ambiguity on the issue. His beautiful adolescent 
figure and dreamy character can be construed as 'feminine' (his 
particular charm is his 'shapely legs'). It may well be that Orlando. is 
in a sense a woman from the start. That there has been doubt on this 
point is proved by the housekeeper. When Orlando returns as a woman to 
her country house after the long absence in Turkey, Mrs. Grimsditch 
confides that 'she had always had her suspicions (here she nodded her 
head very mysteriously)... it was no surprise to her (here she nodded her 
head very knowingly)' (155). 
After the change of sex, the erstwhile Ambassador becomes a gypsy in 
the mountains, as Woolf joins a long literary tradition that associates 
gypsies with anarchic liberation and energy. Unselfconscious about her 
change of sex and her new sexuality, she can remain as ambiguous as the 
Turkish coats and trousers she is wearing, 'which can be worn 
indifferently by either sex' (128). She does not yet need to behave 
according to a rigidly coded set of manners as woman in gypsy society, 
which constitutes another version of carnival: 'the gypsy women, except 
in one or two important particulars, differ very little from the gypsy 
men' (140). What is emphasised is that Orlando has now abandoned his 
longstanding 'important part in the public life of his country' (110). 
In the narrator's comical treatment of his duties, Orlando as a public 
figure emerges as a cross between two of the publicly active men in 
Mrs. Dalloway: Hugh Whitbread, with his devotion to tedious and empty 
official routine, and Peter Walsh, as practical colonial administrator. 
Orlando now admits frankly that all these tasks are odious, and praises 
the relaxed, natural life of the present moment. Her new-found views 
accord with the philosophy of the gypsies, who despise official, 
punctilious styles of behaviour, and all power and rank. This makes them 
attractively rebellious, but never a political menace; they are a 
counter-culture rather than an oppositignal one, regarding the very 
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effort to organise in resistance to the dominant culture as a 
capitulation to its modes and styles. Joining them-is a way for Orlando 
(and the novel) to avoid taking an attitude to the Turkish 
revolutionaries. 
Orlando's new viewpoint accords with the feminist stance that the 
author assumes elsewhere. Even while Orlando himself was a committed 
politician, the biographer's attitude was from the start oblique and 
satiric, and thus very similar to that adopted by the persona of A Room 
of One's Own, who experiences that 'sudden splitting off of 
consciousness' (93) that reduces her from cultural inheritor to outsider. 
The distance which both biographer and Orlando maintain towards 
bureaucratic mandarinism results from an 'alien and critical' 
consciousness as either woman or gypsy. Orlando formulates her new 
attitudes through her gypsy life, not yet strongly conscious of her 
womanhood, of its future restrictions and deprivation. Yet gradually 
this view will be connected with her femaleness, for she will come to 
realize that though 'the man looks the world full in the face, as if it 
were made for his uses and fashioned to his liking', 'the woman takes a 
sidelong glance at it, full of subtlety, even of suspicion' (171). On 
board the ship to England, Orlando realizes that by becoming a woman she 
is now deprived of power, profession and political role: 'All I can do, 
once I set foot on English soil, is to pour out tea and ask my lords how 
they like it. D'you take sugar? D'you take cream? ' (144). As her 
speculation proceeds and as new experience inducts her into the female 
role, Orlando's initial resentment of this deprivation turns into 
contentment. She thanks Heaven that she is not 'prancing down Whitehall 
on a war-horse, nor even sentencing a man to death' (146). Like all 
other Woolfian female heroines, Orlando happily gives up politics for a 
spiritually richer inner life. 
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'Better is it', she thought, 'to be clothed with poverty and 
ignorance, which are the dark garments of the female sex; 
better to leave the rule and discipline of the world to others; 
better be quit of martial ambition, the love of power, and all 
the other manly desires if so one can more fully enjoy the most 
exalted raptures; known to the human spirit' (146). 
Here Orlando starts showing an affinity with Woolf's other female 
characters. She valorises the timeless over the historical, spirituality 
over the world of politics. However, she is not identifying spirituality 
with some innate 'femininity'; she sees clearly that it is forced upon 
women by men who 'dress up like a Guy Fawkes and parade the streets, so 
that women may praise you' and 'deny a woman teaching lest she may laugh 
at you' (144). She decides to use 'the dark garments' of 'poverty and 
ignorance' in order to 'enjoy the most exalted raptures' 'which are... 
contemplation, solitude, love' (146). The reader is likely to respond 
here with an irony Orlando herself does not feel, for 'contemplation, 
solitude, love' are not the exclusive prerogative of women. In fact, 
Orlando as man has indulged in all of them. The biographer therefore 
underlines the danger of accepting the produced definition of one's sex 
and 'the extreme folly - than which none is more distressing in woman or 
man either - of being proud of her sex' (146). This kind of valorization 
of either sex would tend to fix the social construction as innate, 
naturally given. 
This points to a difficulty in Woolf's feminism. Woolf's problem is 
that she rejects the privatised role of women in her society, but then 
her notions of any possible public roles are also conditioned that 
society. She cannot see any public commitment other than the empty 
vacuities of the Hugh Whitbreads; she always tends to consider the 
externals of British politics - its antiquarian pomp and ritual --as the 
beginning and end of it. Missing the raw exercise of power behind all 
that, she tends to merely despise rather than hate politics; for her, 
'prancing down Whitehall on a war-horse' and 'sentencing a man to death'. 
are to be denounced almost without distinction. Another problem is that 
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Woolf highly values the qualities (solidarity, sensibility, etc. ) 
fostered within an oppressed sub-culture; so her feelings about 
liberation are always ambivalent, because she feels (probably rightly) 
that those precious qualitites will be lost in the process. Three 
Guineas will struggle with, but never finally resolve, this tension in 
her feminism: a demand for liberation, a desire to preserve difference. 
By having a character become a woman at the age of thirty, Woolf can 
bring a critical adult consciousness to bear on that process of 
feminization which is usually unselfconsciously undergone by the female 
child. Fantasy lets her write a Bildungsroman with an already mature 
protagonist. The incident which best reveals that sex is not a fact 
existing in nature but a social product occurs as soon as Orlando returns 
to England. Her sex together with other issues of property and paternity 
come under legal deliberation. 'Thus it was in a highly ambiguous 
condition, uncertain whether she was alive or dead, man or woman, Duke or 
nonentity' (153). While the suit is under litigation, all her estates 
are put in chancery and her titles in abeyance. Thus 'sex becomes a legal 
fiction, like paternity and property rights', as DiBattista argues. 
Terry Eagleton points out: 'the "private" is always a juridically 
demarcated space, produced by the very public structures it is thought to 
delimit'. 29 As DiBattista also notes, we can hardly ignore the feminist 
satire in the equation in the sentence quoted above: 'To be alive is to 
be a man is to be a titled aristocrat. To be dead is to be a woman is to 
be a social nonentity'. 
30 After some hundred years' deliberation, the 
lawsuits are settled; Lord Palmerston announces that Orlando's sex is 
'indisputably, and beyond the shadow of a doubt... female' (229). This 
arbitrary proclamation is further undercut both by the fact that two 
pages earlier Orlando and her lover had cried to each other 'You're a 
woman, Shel! ', 'You're a man, Orlando! ' (227), and by the reader's 
knowledge of Orlando's androgynous life throughout the eighteenth 
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century. Property rights, paternity and above all sex are revealed as 
arbitrary, as legal fiction. If the court admits Orlando's womanhood and 
her complete right to the estates and titles, it is only at the expense 
of 'her' marriage with Rosina Pepita and its offspring (three sons). 
Moreover, the judgement does not admit female descendants hereafter. 
"'The estates which are now desequestrated in perpetuity descend and are 
bailed and entailed upon the heirs male of my body"' (229). Thus 
Orlando's femaleness is provisionally accepted only to eliminate a worse 
social threat to property (gypsy origins), and womanhood is anyway 
finally expelled from the pedigree to secure patriarchal property rights. 
Having lived for some time as a woman in a society which is 
structured by the division of sexes, Orlando cannot help being formed 
into a 'woman' along the lines of this division. The biographer's 
confident declaration that the change of sex in Constantinople had not 
altered Orlando's identity must now be qualified: 'what was said a short 
time ago about there being no change in Orlando the man and Orlando the 
woman, was ceasing to be altogether true' (170). 'More modest, as women 
are, of her brains', 'more vain, as women are, of her person' (170), 
Orlando the woman, though in a sense remaining 'one and the same person' 
as Orlando the man, now prompts the biographer to remark that 'a certain 
change was visible... even in her face' (171). And to speculate on the 
cause and effect of these changes, one 'philosophical' theory the 
biographer introduces is that 'clothes change our view of the world and 
the world's view of us' (170). 'Vain trifles' clothes may be, yet they 
constitute a code in society, are part of our system of signs, and the 
effect of having skirts around her legs had already been shown to have an 
impact in the development of Orlando's new womanhood. Reversing the 
presumed relationship of priority between men and women and their 
signifying systems in good structuralist fashion, the narrator speculates 
that 'it is clothes that wear us and not we them' (170). However, the 
biographer offers another theory to which she says 'on the whole, we 
195 
incline' (171). 'The difference between the sexes. is, happily, one of 
great profundity. Clothes are but a symbol of something `hid deep 
beneath. ' This could be read as meaning that clothes are only a 
superficial social code, which symbolizes some deeper, more important, 
structural coding of society, and would thus be consistent with the 
previous position. But the biographer continues: 'It was a change in 
Orlando herself that dictated her choice of a woman's dress and of a 
woman's sex. ' The previous case now seems reversed, as some feminine 
'essence' is given priority over female social existence, yet if we take 
the 'change in Orlando herself' to be her physical change of sex, the 
sentence becomes circular, its first and last phrases coinciding with 
each other. - It is then the word and fact of 'change' itself that loses 
its obviousness, as the text elaborates: 'And perhaps in this she was 
only expressing rather more openly than usual... something that happens to 
most people without being thus plainly expressed' (171). Again the 
sentence becomes circular: in 'this' (a change) Orlando expresses 
'something that happens' (change). The nature of the 'change' is never 
specified nor clarified; it is just 'something that happens to most 
people'. This shows the limit of Woolf's concept of androgyny, but in a 
sense she is necessarily obscure on this point; for if, as I will argue 
below, Woolf believes the difference between the sexes cannot be defined 
in terms of biological or immanent essences, then 'change' from one sex 
to the other cannot be specified either. 
Orlando enacts 'a vacillation from one sex to the other' (171) and 
changes her behaviour and clothes according to the changes in her; this 
is not a once-for-all 'change' to a fixed essence of femininity or 
masculinity. 'Different though the sexes are, they intermix' (171). We 
face what the biographer terms 'a dilemma' (171): the difference between 
the sexes does not simply coincide with biological gender-difference; for 
'often it is only the clothes that keep the male or female likeness, 
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while underneath the sex is the very opposite of what it is above' 
(171-2). Thus she negates the previous essentialist argument on clothes 
and sexual difference. But intermixture does not mean fusion into 
homogeneous unity, for the difference between the sexes remains 'one of 
great profundity'. Yet this difference in turn cannot any longer be 
confounded with biological determination. Profound yet intermixing, such 
'difference' becomes as difficult a term as 'change' itself. As I noted 
in my first chapter, Woolf often emphasises sexual 'difference' in her 
essays, at the same time carefully avoiding any essentialist definition 
of it. Difference between the sexes exists only in relation to each other 
and the representation of it. It is a matter of where the dividing line 
is, and the location of that line varies historically. Any definition 
only has meaning in relation to a specific socio-historical context, 
since there is no innate bond between signifier and signified. Woolfian 
androgyny is analogous to Saussure's definition of language; just as 
language is a system of differences without 'positive' terms, so is 
gender a system of differences without any immanent essences. Thus 
androgyny opens up new possibilities in the fixed division of gender. 
'She was man; she was woman... It was a most bewildering and whirligig 
state of mind to be in' (145). This 'whirligig' should be seen as 
Woolf's attempt to solve a dilemma for feminism which, as I noted above, 
Julia Kristeva has most sharply posed: how to achieve the 'masculine, 
paternal' identification which supports time and symbol, in order to have 
one's voice heard in politics and history, but simultaneously to preserve 
and assert one's otherness, to summon 'this timeless "truth" - formless, 
neither true nor false, echo of our jouissance, of our madness, of our 
pregnancies - into the order of speech and social symbolism'. 
31 We may 
see Orlando as attempting to realize precisely the 'impossible dialectic' 
that Kristeva evokes: 'a constant alternation between time and its 
"truth", identity and its loss... never the one without the other'. For 
this sexual oscillation is not, according to the novel, merely Orlando's 
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unique situation: 'In every human being a vacillation from one sex to the 
other takes place' (171). 'Of the complications and confusions which 
thus result everyone has had experience' (172). The biographer 
generalizes this phenomenon of heterogeneity; Orlando is just more honest 
and open than most people to 'this mixture in her of man and woman, one 
being uppermost and then the other' (172). Changing 'frequently from one 
set of clothes to another' (199) and living both sexes, Orlando 'reaped a 
twofold harvest', 'the pleasures of life were increased and its 
experiences multiplied' (200). Reading 'in a China robe of ambiguous 
gender'(200), engaged in the economic management of the estate, receiving 
proposals of marriage from a nobleman at Richmond, fighting duels and 
serving as a naval captain, Orlando alternates between time and truth, 
history and the timeless, at once an active participant in society and 
the muted object of male desire. S/he slides from woman to man, from man 
to woman, as easily as she changes from one set of clothes to another, 
metamorphosing in a permanent flux and instability. The author does not 
present androgyny as a Hegelian synthesis of man and woman; Orlando lives 
alternation not resolution. 
In a sense, this points to the limits of our thinking within 
patriarchal societies in which sexual differences are so implacably 
structured that they do not even allow a utopian imagination of a new 
sexuality. However much 'whirligig' and 'vacillation' Orlando 
experiences, sexual differences persist almost sterotypically. Orlando's 
'manliness' involves nonchalance about clothes, impatience with household 
matters, bold and reckless activity ('games of hazard' and driving 'six 
horses at a gallop over London Bridge' (172)), and Orlando's womanly 
disposition entails a lack of male formality and desire for power, her 
excessive tender-heartedness, her 'tears on slight provocation', her 
weakness in geography and mathematics (172). Androgyny itself is ' non- 
conceptual' and unrealistic, but its components are presented in terms of 
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naturalistic sterotypes.. The unnaturalistic element (the fantastic) 
arises only from the continual shifting between these naturalistic 
components, in a way characteristic of fantastic narrative. The 
fantastic is not simply irrational: 'it exists in a parasitical or 
symbiotic relation to the real'. 
32 For in order to put the category of 
'the real' into question, the fantastic needs, at least initially, 
realistic forms. Through such forms it speaks all that is not said, all 
that is 'unsayable, in the positivist, realist narrative. The fantastic 
exists in the shifting of the 'real' and the 'imaginary'; it is the 
systematic inscription of 'hesitation'33 between them. No metaphor can 
condense into a single, fused image this heterogeneity, this constant 
transgression of sexual boundaries; it can only be presented in 
metonymical displacement. Woolf's choice of the genre of the fantastic 
for this novel of androgyny was a right and necessary one. For, as 
R. Jackson argues, 'the fantastic is not metaphorical. It does not 
create images which are "poetic", rather' it produces a sliding of one 
form into another, in a metonymical displacement'. 
34 Woolf writes in her 
diary that in Orlando she achieved 'externality' (WD, 118) rather than 
depth, atypically valorising metonymy over metaphor. 
The representation of androgyny as continual displacement of the 
boundary between the sexes naturally broaches the theme of 'disguise', 
with which the text is indeed obsessed from the start. Orlando is 
proclaimed 'he' in the first sentence of the book, but it is 
simultaneously reported that 'the fashion of the time did something to 
disguise it'(15). In view of this paradoxically unsettling sentence, 
Orlando's later sex-change and the housekeeper's long-standing suspicion 
of his sex, his ambiguous clothes here may be seen as an index of 
Orlando's 'true' sex; Orlando may well be woman disguised as a boy. As 
the biographer reflects later, it is only the clothes that define as male 
or female the individual person in whom, in fact, a vacillation from one 
sex to the other constantly takes place. Clothes thus attempt to 'fix' an 
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aberrant sexuality just as Palmerston's legal decision does later. The 
text often introduces ambiguous clothes which shake people's automatic 
identification of the sex by the accepted sartorial codes. Sasha first 
appears to Orlando with her sex disguised and ambivalent: 'whether boy's 
or woman's, for the loose tunic and trousers of the Russian fashion 
served to disguise the sex' (36). This incidental concealment of sex 
becomes a more conscious manipulation of disguise in the Archduke Harry's 
case. He reveals himself as a man, leaving 'a heap of clothes... in the 
fender' (162) when Orlando turns round to offer a glass of wine. Orlando 
often disguises herself as a man, or, more strictly speaking, just 
dresses herself more honestly, according to turns of her disposition. On 
the first night of her adventures Orlando 'flung off all disguise and 
admitted herself a woman' (197) in the room of a street woman. 
'Disguise' is a play with the boundary between seeming and being, 
blurring any sharp distinction between the two and opening up a space of 
heterogeneity within unitary being. This recurrent theme of disguise is 
only another enactment of the impossible concept of androgyny, a literal 
realization of the heterogeneity of sexuality by metonymical movement, 
though now on a naturalist level. In the end 'disguise' is no longer 
even necessary; even without it, Orlando recognizes a woman in Shel, Shel 
a man in Orlando. They realize and recognize their own and each other's 
androgyny, rejecting that apparent unitariness of sex which is only held 
in place by clothes as signifying systems. 
Orlando's search for 'male' nocturnal adventure reflects partly her 
fidelity to her own turn of sexual disposition, but also her 
dissatisfaction with the male friendship and love she has experienced as 
a woman, whether with the Archduke Harry, ' London society' or with the 
literary wits. She fails to find the 'life and lover' which she had come 
to London in search of (173) as long as she is a woman, a mere 
'beautiful, romantic animal' (190) or 'only a child of a larger growth' 
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(193). Subtly or just bluntly excluded from society except as a 
commodity for exchange or a tea-serving machine, in bitter fulfilment of 
her earlier prediction (144), Orlando has debased herself into a dumb 
listener and mediator to the wits. 'So Orlando poured out tea for them 
all' (191); 'What a life this is? ' (192) she exclaims in final 
disillusionment. 
On one of her nocturnal escapades Orlando experiences a 'foolish 
reverie' which offers an image of the novel's own processes. On a fine 
April night 'everything appeared in its tenderest form, yet, just as it 
seemed on the point of dissolution, some drop of silver sharpened it to 
animation. Thus it was that talk should be, thought Orlando... that 
society should be, that friendship should be, that love should be' (195). 
This 'symbol of what is unattainable' has something of the character of 
an image of ideal androgyny, a syncopation of contradictory impulses of 
tenderness and sharpness, of entropy and animation. The vacillation 
between these opposite states of energy is found in Orlando quite apart 
from his sexual vacillation. S/he was once described as being tossed 'in 
violent see-saws from life to death', between happiness and melancholy 
(44). S/he had also recognized her/his image in the mirror as being, 
contradictorily, 'so dark, so bright, so hard, so soft' (169). This 
might also be regarded as a self-reflexive account of the novel's own 
ideal writing, and closely parallels an earlier moment of self- 
description in Mrs. Dalloway. 
Rambling through the night disguised as a man, Orlando strikes up a 
friendship with the street women. As when s/he had slipped out of the 
silken rope of the Royal enclosure into the crowd of common people with 
Sasha, or when as Ambassador at the Court of the Sultan he had slipped 
out at night in disguise to mingle with the crowd, so Orlando adds 
another to her/his series of social transgressions. If Orlando were in 
the usual sense a man, a relationship with a street woman would not be 
transgressive at all, but rather an accepted act of sexual exploitation 
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within the limits of the social system. Socially functional though they 
are, the prostitutes (and their unwanted offspring) are excluded from the 
main stream of society into its margin. Thus Orlando's three sons by the 
Spanish dancer are pronounced illegitimate and excluded from society too 
(229). From one viewpoint, Orlando's friendship with these outcast women 
is a socially transgressive act, yet since many of them are illegitimate 
daughters of earls (or even the King), they are, in another, bitterly 
ironical sense, her equals. Orlando is elected by these women as a 
member of the 'society of their own' (198), a phrase which glances back 
to the short story 'Society' and which points a parallel with A Room of 
One's Own and Three Guineas, which advocates 'the Society of Outsiders'. 
In the former, which is addressed to middle-class women, Woolf will 
contend that 'a woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to 
write fiction' (RO, 6), but the prostitute needs a room of her own just 
as much as the woman writer. 'Intellectual freedom depends upon material 
things' and 'Poetry depends upon intellectual freedom' (RO, 162-3). The 
other difficulty a woman has to face if she is to write fiction is the 
lack of tradition behind her: 'For masterpieces are not single and 
solitary births; they are the outcome of many years of thinking in 
common, of thinking by the body of people, so that the experience of the 
mass is behind the single voice' (RO, 98). This lack of community holds 
good not only in a diachronic sense but synchronically too. Women have 
been represented in fiction only from the man's point of view, as the 
other and as the object of his desire. Women 'are shown in their 
relation to men' (RO, 124), never allowed to exist in their own right or 
in their relation to other women. This one-sided picture is both cause 
and effect of the actual state of women in society. The lack of material 
conditions deprives women of the mental freedom necessary for forming 
their own community, and at the same time the absence of women's 
relationships with each other in the realm of representation undermines 
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their belief in their practical relationships with other women. Women 
have thus been separated from each other and cannot develop their own 
corrrnun i ty. 
In terms of income and the crucial 'room of one's own' Orlando is 
utterly privileged. She is enormously wealthy with a mansion of '365 
bedrooms' (0,135), though it is true that all her estates have been put 
in chancery and her titles are in abeyance while the suits are under 
litigation. As for the street women, they, too, own their own space 
simply because they are excluded from the 'main' society and have to 
support themselves in its margin. The prostitutes differ only in degree, 
not kind, from the other women in society; their exclusion exposes the 
blatant truth of that 'marginalisation' to which every woman is in fact 
subjected. Woolf attempts to fill the gap in the representation of women 
through the utopian imagining of friendship and community between Orlando 
as duchess and the street women. The ground of this bond is that both 
aristocrat and whores are free from the middle-class values of thrift, 
prudence, economic exchange. The narrative voice in A Room of One's Own 
tries to recall any occasion in her reading where two women are 
represented as friends, and realizes that there is none. Mary 
Carmichael's imaginary sentence - 'Chloe liked Olivia' (RO, 123) - has 
never yet been written. The scene in which two young women, 'engaged in 
mincing liver' (RO, 125), liked each other 'has never been seen since the 
world began' (RO, 127); nor have female words and gestures 'when women 
are alone, unlit by the capricious and coloured light of the other sex' 
(RO, 127). 
Woolf tries to give expression not only to friendship but also to 
love between women. Even after Orlando has become a woman herself, it 
remains women that she loves, 'through the culpable laggardry of the 
human frame to adapt itself to convention' (147). Thus the text to a 
degree 'exculpates' the shockin g issue of lesbianism by the fantastic 
device of Orlando's sex-change. After this cunning naturalization, the 
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author asserts that Orlando's former love for Sasha has neither changed 
or diminished; on the contrary 'if the consciousness of being of the same 
sex had any effect at all, it was to quicken and deepen those feelings 
which she had had as a man' (147). The author claims that Orlando's love 
for Sasha, now without the gulf which divides the sexes, is purer and 
truer: 'this affection gained in beauty what it lost in falsity' (147); 
'At last, she cried, she knew Sasha as she was' (147). It is obviously 
Utopian love, but the text offers this Utopia to protest men's belief 
"'that women are incapable of any feeling of affection for their own sex 
and hold each other in the greatest aversion"' (199). Woman's existence 
has not been recognized in its entirety, in its particularity and as 
difference; as A Room of One's Own argues, in literature women are 'shown 
in their relation to men' (RO, 124). Therefore without men, women do not 
exist. Hence, in Orlando, Mr. S. W. 's arrogant belief "'that when they 
lack the stimulus of the other sex, women can find nothing to say to each 
other. When they are alone, they do not talk, they scratch, " (199). 
Orlando's earlier -conversational difficulties with the Archduke 
sufficiently ridicule the banalities to which women are reduced by men. 
To defy male arrogance, the text shows Orlando and Nell in a state of 
extreme merriment and ease (197-8), and the biographer dismisses the male 
beliefs by simply proclaiming that 'Orlando professed great enjoyment in 
the society of her own sex' (199). 
Yet women's desire cannot get into the order of representation. 
Women are 'always careful to see that the doors are shut and that not a 
word of it gets into print' (198). So too Freud had asked 'What does a 
35 
woman want? ', and Lacan complains that 'ever since the time we've been 
begging them, begging them on bended knee to try to tell us about it 
[jouissance] 
6, 
well, not a word! We've never managed to get anything out 
3 
of them'. " Women cannot articulate what their desire is, for the 
symbolic order is constituted by, precisely, the repression of _ woman's 
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desire and pleasure. The very question, 'what does a woman want? ', denies 
the existence of woman's desire. Orlando elaborates: 'All they desire, 
we were about to say when the gentleman took the very words out of our 
mouths. Women have no desires, says this gentleman, coming into Nell's 
parlour' (198-9). The repression of all that women are identified with - 
the unconscious, dreams, the body, psychosis, desire, the Imaginary - 
constitutes the symbolic order as it is, and in this sense woman can be 
said not to exist. 
36 Already in 1919 Virginia Woolf showed her insight 
into this problem in an essay on George Eliot. Discussing Eliot's 
heroines, Woolf's penetrating analysis reaches far into the predicament 
which women face: 'The ancient consciousness of woman, charged with 
suffering and sensibility, and for so many ages dumb, seems in them to 
have brimmed and overflowed and uttered a demand for something - they 
scarcely know what - for something that is perhaps incompatible with the 
facts of human existence' (CE, I: 204). Inevitably, therefore, when 
Orlando, Nell and other women try to speak of what they desire, their 
words are snatched away by the man, repressed and denied. 
Yet the repressed always returns. The biographer shows as much 
embarrassment as she did at the moment of the sex-change in confronting 
Orlando's desire and its fulfilment, which at last however cannot be 
denied. Wishing that, as on the former occasion, 'Purity, Chastity, and 
Modesty' would appear and give her time 'to wrap up what now has to be 
told delicately', the biographer wishes 'to mitigate, to veil, to cover, 
to conceal, to shroud this undeniab le event' (263). Seeking to 
articulate 'natural desire' and its 'fulfilment' 'delicately as a 
biographer should' - that is, to represe nt desire and iouissance in the 
symbolic order - the biographer resorts to the intervention of the sound 
and music of the barrel-organs: 'allow it, with all its gasps and groans, 
to fill this page with sound' (263). In Kristevan terms, semiotic 
elements (sound, rhythm, melody) disrupt the symbolic (the written page). 
For Kristeva writes, the 'semiotization of the symbolic... represents the 
205 
flow of jouissance into language'. 
37 
Orlando herself has been trying to ignore 'desire', and the 
undeniable consequence of its 'fulfilment' ( jouissance), that is, her 
pregnancy, to the last moment. For this is the Victorian period; it is 
the age of damp, an age of 'the undistinguished fecundity' (208). The 
same fertility is seen in 'the bed room'; the life of the average woman 
was a succession of childbirths. 'Thus the British Empire came into 
existence' (207). 'The damp struck within. Men felt the chill in their 
hearts; the damp in their minds' (207). The very attempt to rouse 
feelings into warmth by language becomes a kind of subterfuge: 'Love, 
birth, and death were all swaddled in a variety of fine phrases. The 
sexes drew further and further apart... Evasions and concealments were 
sedulously practised on both sides' (207). The British Empire is 
constructed under male domination, denying woman's desire, jouissance. 
Women's minds are now channelled by this society solely for 'modesty and 
shame' (213). The crinoline symbolizes the age; it is 'heavy' and 
'drab', and 'impeded' woman's movements (220): 
wearing crinolines the better to conceal the fact; the great 
fact; the only fact; but, nevertheless, the deplorable fact; 
which every modest woman did her best to deny until denial was 
impossible; the fact that she was about to bear a child? to 
bear fifteen or twenty children indeed, so that most of a 
modest woman's life was spent, after all, in denying what, on 
one day at least of every year, was made obvious. (212) 1 
The music of the barrel-organ rescues the biographer from the linear 
narrative progression which her biographical responsibilities impose on 
her. She lets herself by carried away by the music on 'the most clumsy, 
the most erratic', 'little boat' of 'thought' (263). Freed from 
formality, the text becomes increasingly intimate in tone ('Do you 
recognise...? Oh yes, it is Kew! So here then we are at Kew, and I will 
show you today... ' (263)), and whimsical ('what is this place?... Well, 
Kew will do' (263)). The writing glides with free and irrelevant 'hops 
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and skips' (264) in enjoyment of its 'holiday', or 'escapade', just as 
Orlando was meant for a 'holiday' or 'escapade' by Woolf herself. Since 
any content will suffice - 'Well, Kew will do' - language does not exist 
here purely for the sake of the signified. The sentence is formed and 
urged on by rhyme ('flinging a cloak under... an oak' (264)), and the 
biographer modulates into a more characteristic Woolfian style. The 
narrator does not conceal the privilege of the semiotic - 'as the rhyme 
requires' (264) - indeed she rather emphasizes her playful nonchalance 
concerning the signified. 'Wait! Wait! The kingfisher comes; the 
kingfisher comes not' (264), and it hardly matters which. The linear 
passage of time is also loosened; the mind is freed from that irrevocable 
successivity of present moments which Clarissa Dalloway had experienced 
while hearing Big Ben striking the hour and which Orlando suffers as the 
oppression of the present. Now present and past mingle: to walk through 
the flowers in Kew Gardens is 'to be thinking of bulbs, hairy and red, 
thrust into the earth in October; flowering now' (264). Generative, 
erotic images emerge in this narrative before 'denial [is] impossible; 
the fact that she was about to bear a child' (212). This respite-is in 
fact less a means of evasion than the only way to approach desire and 
jouissance. To walk in Kew Gardens is 'to be dreaming of more than can 
rightly be said' (264), for those semiotic 'dreams' beyond representation 
embrace all that is outside the symbolic order. 
Freed from 'thetic' control, the mind brims over: 'it slops like 
this all over the saucer' (264), it takes 'silly hops and skips' (264) in 
'the most erratic' (263) way. It also recalls a blazing 'fire in a field 
against minarets near Constantinople' (264). Whether this is the 
biographer's memory, or the author's, or Orlando's remains indeterminate. 
The actual scenery, dreams, the past and present, memory, intermingle to 
the point where it no longer matters whose dreams or memories they are. 
'Hail natural desire! Hail happiness! ' (264): desire and jouissance now 
clearly challenge the symbolic order, and threaten the dominance of the 
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symbolic chain, of what Kristeva terms 'the well-oiled. order of 
communication (and, thus, society)'. 
38 
Hail!... pleasure of all sorts... and anything, anything that 
interrupts and confounds the tapping of typewriters and filing 
of letters and forging of links and chains, binding the Empire 
together... Hail, happiness! kingfisher flashing from bank to 
bank, and all fulfilment of natural desire, Whether it is what 
the male novelist says it is; or prayer; or denial; hail! in 
whatever form it comes, and may there be more forms, and 
stranger. (264-5) 
The kingfisher flashes from bank to bank 'like a match struck'; he 
'flys' and 'burns' (265), as 'the splendid fulfilment of natural desire' 
(264) flares up. With something of the erratic, pulsing rhythms of the 
semiotic itself, 'he darts of a sudden from bank to bank' (265) of the 
stream. Though the narrative consciousness wishes that this stream would 
flow 'as the rhyme hints "like a dream"' (265), the rhyme gets lost in 
the utilitarian 'binding together' of society, as the materiality of 
sound is subdued to the ideality of meaning. The stream the kingfisher 
flashes across becomes the stream of our own life. Though desire and its 
fulfilment could be more multiform and stranger than 'the male novelist 
says it is', 'our usual lot' cannot sustain the 'dream'. 'Alive, smug, 
fluent, habitual', we sustain 'the Empire', repressing the unconscious 
and its dreamwork. After this brief efflorescence of desire and 
pleasure, the symbolic order again rivets down this moment of rupture and 
thus the stream of society flows steadily on, just as the Thames resumes 
its quotidian flow after its carnivalistic interruption in the Great 
Frost. The shade of the trees 'drowns the blue of the wing of the 
vanishing bird when he darts of a sudden from bank to bank' (265). As 
the terrain of the unconscious, dreams expose the self as fissured; 
39 
immersion in dreams threatens the ego established by identification with 
the mirror image: 'Hail, happiness, then, and after happiness, hail not 
those dreams which bloat the sharp image as spotted mirrors do the face 
in a country-inn parlour; dreams which splinter the whole and tear us 
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asunder and wound us and split us apart in the night when we would sleep' 
(265). But the eruption of desire now threatens the 'forging of links 
and chains' of the symbolic, and has to be checked. For Freud, drives are 
fundamentally dual, positive and negative, 'charges' and 'stases'; their 
process is, he posits, governed by the death instinct. 
40 Orlando, too, 
evokes a homeostatic state in the grip of the death instinct: 'folded, 
shrouded, like a mummy... prone let us lie on the sand at the bottom of 
sleep' (265). But again the pulsations of desire break the stasis: 
'blue, like a match struck', the kingfisher 'flies, burns, bursts the 
seal of sleep', 'so that now flows back refluent like a tide, the red, 
thick stream of life again; bubbling, dripping' (265). Such oscillations 
mark out precisely the place of Kristeva's chora, which is 'no more than 
the place... where [the subject's] unity succumbs before the process of 
charges and stases that produce him'. 
41 But the constraints of social 
structures check the drives, create momentary arrests and stases; the 
marks of these stases in the drives are thus integrated into the symbolic 
order, and the semiotic can be seen to shape the symbolic as an 
'underlying causality'. 
42 Or, in Orlando's version of this process: 'and 
we rise, and our eyes (for how handy a rhyme is to pass us safe over the 
awkward transition from death to life) fall on... ' (265-6). 
Here the music abruptly stops and this semiotic interlude ends as 
'our eyes... fall on' Orlando's first-born child, the only childbirth in 
all Virginia Woolf's novels. Kristeva argues that a child is the 'sole 
evidence, for the symbolic order, of jouissance and pregnancy; the child, 
thanks to whom the woman, herself an instrument localized in time, will 
be coded into the chain of generations'. 
43 
The spirit of the nineteenth century is 'antipathetic to her in the 
extreme, and thus it [takes] her and [breaks] her'; she becomes 'aware of 
her defeat' (220). Caught up by her author's own hostility to the 
Victorian age, Orlando's career here reaches its nadir. This is, no 
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doubt, 
. the age which 
is most antagonistic to the ideal of androgyny. 
Contrasted to the orderly and serene eighteenth century, the nineteenth 
century is presented as an odious age of sentimentality, domesticity and 
rigid convention. Though the American Marxist critic Frediric Jameson 
occasionally uses Orlando as the image of an unchanging, transcendent 
personality passing through the centuries, 
44 historical' and social 
factors are in fact fully admitted as constitutive for the human subject 
in the novel. Such continuity as Orlando does maintain through the 
centuries is solely bolstered by Orlando's country house ('The house, the 
garden are precisely as they were (214)), and is thus not a matter of a 
personal 'essence' at all. The Victorian age, despite Orlando's hostility 
to it, necessarily reshapes her as a product of the age. The 
determination of consciousness by the social infrastructure is also a 
matter of the determination of the individual by his or her signifying 
systems. Orlando proves unable to master her own writing. The moment 
she gathers together her reflections on 'the eternity of all things', she 
is interrupted by her servants, 'as if to rebuke it', and then prevented 
by 'a blot' made by her pen and ink. Subsequently, the pen takes matters 
into its own hands 'to her astonishment and alarm', and produces 'the 
most insipid verse she had ever read in her life' (215). The spirit of 
the age steadily erodes the variety of her past androgynous experiences 
until she becomes 'the very image of appealing womanhood': 'Her words 
formed themselves, her hands clasped themselves, involuntarily, just as 
her pen had written of its own accord. It was not Orlando who spoke, but 
the spirit of the age' (222). Thus the text confirms its earlier 
structuralist speculation that 'it is clothes that wear us' (170) rather 
than we who wear them. 
The only freedom left to Orlando is to erase her own involuntary 
production by spilling her ink over it, a gesture whose pure negativity 
implies that any 'positive' action is irredeemably penetrated through and 
through by the age's meanings and values. Even an 'innocent' doodle turns 
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alien: 'round-headed monster, something between a bat and a wombat' 
(214). Author and protagonist both concede the latter's 'defeat' in her 
struggle with an age in which there seem no longer even to be sources of 
solidarity in alternative or oppositional cultures. There are in the 
novel no Victorian equivalents of the Turkish gypsies and the eighteenth 
century prostitutes. It is impossible for a woman to be independent in 
an age when 'everyone is mated' and 'the new discovery' prevails: 'each 
man and each woman has another allotted to it for life, whom it supports, 
by whom it is supported, till death them do part' (221). Deprived of the 
freedom that is the necessary condition for her literary production 
through the preceding centuries, Orlando reaches the nadir of her career. 
She walks on the moor, collecting 'steel-blue plume[s]' of wild birds, as 
the rooks wheel above her; she. is driven to the very margins of society. 
A single feather falls into the middle of a silver pool, 'mysterious as 
the lake into which Sir Bedivere flung the sword of Arthur' (223), and we 
are here reminded of Lily Briscoe's wish that some hand would part the 
waters of the lake so that the meaning of life would be revealed. 
45 
Overcome by 'some strange ecstasy' and 'some wild notion', Orlando 
decides to follow the perhaps symbolic birds to the rim of the world, 
fling herself on the turf and there drink 'forgetfulness'. She is now 
almost the point of stepping completely out of society and history into 
timelessness. 'She quickened her pace; she ran; she tripped.... Her ankle 
was broken' (223). Crippled, she lies content on the ground. For, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, lameness is a sign of nearness to nature, 
of intimate connection with the earth, and Orlando accordingly finds her 
'mate' in the moor: 'I am nature's bride' (223). She reveals herself as 
a being who cannot be completely circumscribed within the 'social', as 
still in touch with a 'nature' that cannot be controlled by civilization. 
Orlando's temporary lameness is, on one hand, the sign of her fleeing 
from patriarchal control, but on the other hand, it also prevents her 
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from fully escaping it. The crinoline which impedes her free movements 
is not enough after all; she has to be more thoroughly deprived of free 
movements, so that she can neither run nor 'rise' but will simply 'lie 
content', and so that finally she will be physically rescued by a man. 
Breaking her ankle is therefore in a sense the 'death' of the woman as 
independent being. For when Shelmerdine, the romance prince, appears to 
save Orlando, crying 'Madam... you're hurt! ', she replies 'I'm dead, sir! ' 
(225). At the very moment Orlando seems to give up any prospect of 
happiness in the social order and concludes that 'death is better', she 
is rescued -- 'she had broken her ankle, fallen in love, married 
Shelmerdine' (237) -- and given a legitimate place in Victorian society. 
Thus the function of Orlando's marriage with Shelmerdine is to 
accommodate her to the 'spirit of her age', at least on the surface, and 
to let her 'pass its examination successfully' (239). The novel must let 
the marriage temper Orlando to Victorianism, while at the same time 
distinguishing it from the loveless nineteenth century couplings the book 
had denigrated earlier. Thus Orlando likes her husband (which is perhaps 
not unrelated to the fact that he's always away! ), maintains friendships 
outside marriage, still preserves her creative desires. For in a sense 
the purpose of this marriage is to enable Orlando to write her poem: 'the 
transaction between a writer and the spirit of the age is one of infinite 
delicacy, and upon a nice arrangement between the two the whole fortune 
of his works depends' (239-40). What Woolf regards as the optimally 
'happy position' is that in which one need neither fight one's age nor 
submit to it, and Orlando now achieves this precarious balance: 'Now, 
therefore, she could write, and write she did' (240). In her essays too, 
Woolf is no less adamant that conflict with the spirit of the age can 
produce only a literary 'monster' (214). 'Consciousness of self, of 
race, of sex, of civilization', she writes in 'American Fiction', 'have 
nothing to do with art' (CE, 2: 113). This is not, however, to deny the 
vital impact which sexual, social and racial conditions have on art. 
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Woolf expressly affirms the power of these determinations on literary 
production in A Room of One's Own and 'Women and Fiction', and no less so 
in Orlando by making the intervention of the spirit of age explicit. It 
is passion such as resentment, unhappiness, anger, whose intensity cannot 
be objectified into the impersonal forms of art, that 'introduces a 
distortion and is frequently the cause of weakness' (CE, 2: 144). 
Marriage with Shelmerdine saves Orlando from such a disabling self- 
consciousness in an age so antipathetic to her temperament that it 
threatens to provoke in her a bitter resentment. 
Orlando's marriage not only saves her from bitter self- 
consciousness, but also seeks to realize the androgynous ideal in the 
only form which is permissable for 'the spirit of the age', namely in the 
form 'marriage'. It is a necessary compromise now that androgyny, 
realised in the eighteenth century, is repressed by a more rigid 
conventionality. The author thus presents a Utopian 'androgynous' 
marriage, which none the less remains one of the less convincing parts of 
the book, since it is after all a social facade; it is more a device to 
maintain social appearances than a radical exploration of the issues. 
"'You're a woman, Shel! " she cried / "You're a man, Orlando! " he cried' 
(227). Thus 'such a scene of protestation and demonstration', with its 
interchange of sexes, takes place for the first time 'since the world 
began'. Transgression from one sex to the other is now performed within 
matrimony. Behind this social facade, an 'air-pocket' of resistance to 
the false definitions and division of femaleness and maleness is secured 
in defiance of the unfavourable social climate. 
If the marriage has a Utopian content, sketching out the full 
possibilities of androgyny, it also has its ideological aspect, since it 
is in this relationship that Orlando arrives at last at a conviction of 
'rare and unexpected delight' in being a woman: "'I am a woman", she 
thought, "a real woman, at last"' (228).. Moreover, it is at this point 
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that she is legally pronounced a woman. What convinces Orlando of her 
womanliness is a feeling of maternal protectiveness incited by the odd 
vision of Shelmerdine as a 'boy (for he was little more) sucking 
peppermints' (227) during his passionate struggle against the waves. 
This almost Ramsayan affection prompts Orlando to declare herself 'a real 
woman, at last'. Here Woolf seems to be betraying some intractable 
personal limitation, a kind of feminist 'bad conscience', about what real 
womanhood is. For Woolf, her mother Julia Steph n and her sister Vanessa 
are always the model of complete womanliness. Mature, motherly, 
abundant, protective, practical, they embody precisely those qualities 
which Woolf feels that she lacks. She describes Vita too as a real 
woman: 'There is her maturity and full breastedness... her capacity-her 
motherhood-her being in short (what I have never been) a real woman'. 46 
Woolf's difficult sense of her own inadequacies as 'a real woman' have 
been canvassed in Phyllis Rose's A Woman of Letters. 
47 
The first fruit of Orlando's marriage is her completion and 
publication of her poem 'Oak Tree'. Preceding the birth of her first 
son, it is presented as the equivalent of child-bearing. Now that the 
poem is finally gone into the world thanks to the midwifery of Nick 
Greene, Orlando 'felt a bare place in her breast where she had been used 
to carry it' (253). Structurally, too, the narrative enacts a 
parallelism between Orlando's writing of the poem and the bearing of her 
child; in both cases the biographer is put into a dilemma - out of a job, 
or overcome with embarrassment - and employs evasion and indirection. 
Since bearing a child has no effect whatsoever on Orlando's mental life 
in the text, it is her poem and its publication, to which she is deeply 
committed, that emerges as the culmination of the marriage. 
Though Orlando's giving birth is rather abruptly presented and seems 
irrelevant in context, the text actually endorses the Kristevan view 
which I discussed above, namely that a child is the sole evidence of 
jouissance for the symbolic order. Just four pages before the onset of 
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labour,., the biographer presents Orlando in ecstasy. It is true that her 
husband is not physically with her (he is away off Cape Horn), but the 
source of Orlando's ecstasy is Shelmerdine all the same. The ecstasy 
which suddenly overcomes her, prompted by 'a toy boat on the Serpentine', 
is presented as completely nullifying the meaning and values which 
society upholds: usefulness, practicality, logic, in short, the symbolic 
order itself. 
'A toy boat, a toy boat, a toy boat', she repeated, thus 
enforcing upon herself the fact that it is not... eight-hour 
bills nor covenants nor factory acts that matter; it's 
something useless, sudden, violent;... a splash; like those 
hyacinths (she was passing a fine bed o f them); free from 
taint, dep endence, soilure of humanity or care for one's kind; 
something rash, ridiculous, like my hyacin th, husband I mean, 
Bonthrop: that's what it is -a toy boat on the Serpe ntine, 
ecstasy - it's ecstasy that matters. (258-9) 
Risking life itself, ecstasy casts away the 'articles' and 
'covenants' of society, and the writing itself enacts the 'sudden', 
'ridiculous' 'spirits' and ' splashes' it speaks of. It does not follow a 
coherent logic. A casual physical circumstance (the hyac inths she just 
happens to pass) becomes an integral part of the vision: 'She did not 
care in the least what n onsense it might make, or what dislocation it 
might inflict on the narrative' (259). 
The image of a boy sucking peppermints, courageously confronting 
danger sustained only by his passion for adventure, prompts a maternal 
protectiveness, and Orlando thanks Shelmerdine for arousing feminine 
delight. Yet this image of the boy on the boat or the 'toy boat' then 
shifts from the loving gentleness of maternal affection to a more 
violent, subversive jouissance, which threatens to overturn the 
repressive, paternal order. Orlando's ecstasy on the banks of the 
Serpentine can be compared to Clarissa Dalloway's experience of intense 
joy while walking in London. Just as Clarissa prefers roses to Armenians 
or Albanians, so too Orlando's enthusiasm for the toy boat risks 
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triviality, yet is more subversive than it may initially seem. It. aligns 
her with Septirnus against Bradshaw and his 'sense of proportion', against 
the symbolic and the 'rational' order of the sign. In Orlando, too, the 
same polarization is presented. The scholarly protocols of Nick Greene's 
article had plunged her into the depths of despair; but 'the toy boat had 
raised her to the heights of joy' (259). The heavy traffic kept Orlando 
'standing there, repeating, ecstasy, ecstasy, or a toy boat on the 
Serpentine, while the wealth and power of England sat... in hat and cloak, 
in four-in-hand, victoria and barouche landau' (259). Orlando regards 
these 'portly and splendid' figures, 'the triumph of an age', as some 
kind of unwieldy 'leviathans', who cannot accommodate 'stress, change and 
activity', but just sit lethargically finishing 'their time of 
propagation'. In this sense, Orlando's love for Shelmerdine, who is 
'rash', 'ridiculous' and who invariably sails 'uselessly', is already 
antithetical to the values of Victorian capitalism, which repress the 
non-utilitarian and non-productive. If this feeling of Orlando were 
intensified, then we should emerge into Septimus's disgust with humanity. 
If this vision moves from conventional maternal love to jouissance, then 
the fact of Orlando's own childbirth tends rather in the opposite 
direction, from challenge to convention. Though the child constitutes 
the sole evidence, for the symbolic order, of jouissance and pregnancy, 
it is also, ironically, the means whereby the woman will be coded into 
the chain of generations, receiving a place and function in the symbolic 
order at the cost of jouissance itself. 
With the 'shrinkage' which Orlando remarks as King Edward succeeds 
Victoria, the fantastic aspect of the book also diminishes as a result of 
the author's loss of detachment towards the object of her writing. The 
author's identification with Orlando strengthens as the narrative reaches 
the former's historical present and her own immediate concerns. 
48 As 
John Graham rightly points out: 
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Along with this reduction of Orlando and her. milieu to the 
proportions of actual life runs a steady transfer of their 
fabulous aura to the events of the past which she now recalls. 
Yet these events are carefully robbed of their absurdity.... 
Fables must become history, for we are intended to take this 
resurrection of the dead not in the irreverent spirit with 
which we took the Great Frost, but in the spirit of a solemn 
vision. 49 
But the aesthetic strength of the book was not in making history 
appear vividly before us, but rather in rupturing history itself by the 
laughter which results from the consciousness of being an outsider, of 
being a woman excluded from the historical. The success of the early 
part of Orlando derived from this stance, which Woolf was to adopt again 
in A Room of One's Own where she looks at the patriarchal institutions 
'with pleasurable obliqueness', 
50 
with a consciousness which 'splits 
off'. Where the female sense of priorities does not coincide with 
history (of men), history becomes irrelevant to women. The author makes 
the biographer deplore the fact that 'when we write of a woman, 
everything is out of place - culminations and perorations; the accent 
never falls where it does with a man' (280-1). Woolf herself noted a 
lack of 'unity' in her diary: 'The truth is I expect I began it as a joke 
and went on with it seriously. Hence it lacks some unity' (WD, 128). In 
fact, this deflation of the burlesque and fantastic had begun, as John 
Graham points out, with the onset of the eighteenth century. 
51 From that 
point the biographer's detachment towards the subject matter, which is 
the very basis of the whole burlesque mode, gradually diminishes until 
she completely disappears in the last five pages. Since this 'serious' 
tone gradually sets in after Orlando has become a woman, it seems that 
Woolf's feminist concerns ultimately drive her into earnestness. Woolf 
herself is at last affected by self-consciousness at being a woman, by 
her resentment and anger, though she had so often deplored this in other 
women writers. 
This diminishing of the fantastic also takes the form of the text's 
increasing inclination towards metaphor. As I remarked above, the 
2.17 
narrative principle of Orlando is initially metonymy, (or contiguity). 
The concept of androgyny is realized metonymically; and the narrative 
itself moves fast geographically and temporally. Woolf had herself 
pointed to this feature of the novel when she spoke of its 'plain 
sentences', 'the externality' (WD, 118) of never having got down to the 
depths, never having tried to explore (WD, 136). 'Half laughing, half 
serious' (WD, 120) as the book's tone has hitherto been, it is none the 
less towards the end drawn into 'depth' and hunts for metaphor and 
symbol. Since, as R. Jackson argued, 'the fantastic is not metaphorical' 
and 'does not create images which are "poetic" [but rather] produces a 
sliding of one form into another, in a metonymical displacement', 52 
Orlando necessarily abandons fantasy and embraces metaphor in the same 
gesture, thus in the end conforming to the canons of what Woolf 
considered the 'important', 'serious' side of her literary project. What 
began as a fantastic joke ends up foreshadowing her next work, The Waves, 
which is already envisaged as 'something abstract poetic next 
time... Orlando leading to The Waves (8 July, 1933)' (WD, 128,105). 
'Images, metaphors of the most extreme and extravagant twined and 
twisted in his mind. He called her a melon, a pineapple, an olive tree, 
an emerald, and a fox in the snow all in the space of three seconds' 
(36-7). Though_ the text is permeated with metaphor from the start, it 
remains very self-conscious about them. The biographer often makes 
defensive gestures, baring the mechanism of metaphor as 'extreme and 
extravagant' rather than trying to exploit its power of poetic 
symbolisation: 
Now the Abbey windows were lit up and burnt like a heavenly, 
many-coloured shield (in Orlando's fancy); now all the west 
seemed a golden window with troops of angels (in Orlando's 
fancy again) passing up and down the heavenly stairs 
perpetually. (51) 
if we must compare the landscape to anything, it would have 
been to a dry bone; to a sheep's skeleton; to a gigantic skull 
picked white by a thousand vultures. (137) 
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Orlando himself, as a would-be poet, is deeply concerned with the 
problem of metaphor, and often annoyed by the discrepancy between the 
thing itself and language, which operates necessarily according to the 
principle of methaphor. As a boy, he deplores the fact that 'green in 
nature is one thing, green in literature another', that 'nature and 
letters seem to have a natural antipathy' (18). In his passion for 
Sasha, trying to capture her essence in language, he discovers that she 
is 'like nothing he had seen or known' at least 'in England', and comes 
to despair: 'Ransack the language as he might, words failed him. He 
wanted another landscape, and another tongue' (45). But Orlando will 
discover that his difficulty is not a contingent matter of the limits of 
a particular language, but rather a problem of the limits of language as 
such. In his attempt to define 'What is love? What friendship? What 
truth? ' (92), he is trapped by the circularity and figurality of 
language. Unable to reach the truth of things, he frustratedly exclaims 
'Another metaphor by Jupiter! ': 
'Why not say simply in so many words... A figure like that is 
manifestly untruthful, ' he argued, ' ... And if literature is not 
the Bride and Bedfellow of Truth, what is she? Confound it 
all, ' he cried, 'why say Bedfellow when one's already said 
Bride? Why. not simply say what one means and leave it? ' (94) 
In denouncing the phrase 'Bride and Bedfellow', Orlando rejects the 
seductive pleasures of alliteration (semiotic) for the rigours of ideal 
meaning. Yet sheer literalism fares no better. No doubt 'the grass is 
green and the sky is blue', but when Orlando looks up he sees that things 
are totally different: 'the sky is like the veils which a thousand 
Madonnas have let fall from their hair; and the grass fleets and darkens 
like a flight of girls fleeing the embraces of hairy satyrs from 
enchanted woods' (94). Ironically, sensuous particularity can only be 
approached by metaphor. Thus whether he says bluntly what the thing is 
or whether. he uses sophisticated images and metaphors, Orlando remains 
embroiled in language, which - metaphorical or literal - 
has always 
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already displaced the thing itself (You, cannot eat the word 'bread'). 
Orlando exclaims, 'Both are utterly false' (95). One never escapes 
metaphor; seeing is always seeing as. As a woman among gypsies in the 
Turkish mountains, Orlando still 'compared the flowers to enamel and the 
turf to the Turkey rugs worn thin. Trees were withered hags, and sheep 
were grey boulders. Everything, in fact, was something else'(131). 
Towards the end of the book this self-consciousness or even self- 
ridicule in relation to metaphor disappears completely. The early 
excessive use of similes, which bares the principle of metaphor 
(similarity) openly, changes into an indulgence in 'metaphor' proper. 
The final resonant metaphor or symbol of 'the wild goose' had already 
been given its imagistic foundations in the penultimate chapter, with its 
references to 'A steel-blue plume' of the rooks, 'wild birds' feathers', 
'smooth, glinting plumage' (223). Orlando sees 'a single feather' 
quivering in the air and falling into the middle of 'a silver pool, 
mysterious as the lake into which Sir Bedivere flung the sword of Arthur' 
(223). Through this connection with the Arthurian sword, the various 
images associated with the plumage of birds are related to the 
possibility of some ultimate truth. In To the Lighthouse Lily Briscoe 
had expressed her agonized wish for 'the meaning of life' (TL, 249) in a 
.. 
similar. image: she wishes that 'a little tear would have rent the surface 
of the pool', that 'Something would emerge. A hand would be shoved up, a 
blade would be flashed' (TL, 276). Just as Lily's struggle in painting 
merges with her quest for this meaning, so too 'the wild goose' is 
closely implicated with Orlando's concerns as poet; it represents all 
that she has been trying to body forth in her poetry: 'Always it flies 
fast out to sea and always I fling after it words like nets... which 
shrivel... and sometimes there's an inch of silver - six words - in the 
bottom of the net. But never the great fish who lives in the coral 
groves' (282). The text here shows a curious intertwining of metaphor and 
220 
metonymy; it offers an important symbol, but slides from one form to 
another; from- the 'goose' to the 'fish' in a metonymical displacement 
with 'sea' as a point of contiguity. A similar interchange between 'sea' 
and 'sky' occurs again in the final episode where Shelmerdine lands on 
shore as Orlando looks on. Shelmerdine may have a passion for boats and 
have 'grown a fine sea captain' (295), but he arrives back by plane and 
leaps to the ground as if he were captain of that plane. At this very 
moment 'a single wild bird' springs up over his head: "'The wild 
goose... " Orlando cries' (295). If previously the wild goose flew out 
to sea, directions are now reversed; Shelmerdine, whose associations are 
all with the sea, has flown back from the sea as the wild goose. 
However, in both cases, this metonymical development is not elaborated, 
certainly not as a possible spring board for the fantastic. The whole 
emphasis is now on metaphor or symbol, whatever its physical embodiment 
may momentarily be, wild goose or fish. Yet, if the tenor of the 
metaphor is the same even when vehicles are changed, does this not mean 
its failure as symbol? But since towards the end of the novel the 
vigilant and ironical biographer has disappeared and the author is much 
more identified with the heroine, the discrepancies or extravagencies or 
failures of metaphor do not come to narrative self-consciousness. 
The fact that the narrative has reached the present is a major 
factor in diminishing the scope of the fantastic. Discovering that 'It 
was 1928... the present moment'; 'Orlando started, pressed her hand to her 
heart, and turned pale. 'For what more terrifying revelation can there be 
than that it is the present moment? ' (268). Does not this also allude, 
self-referentially, to the disturbance the biographer/author feels in 
confronting the present in writing? Roland Barthes writes that narrative 
is possible only in the past tense; 
53 to write a biographical story of 
the present moment is impossible, a point where writing has to stop. 
Thus both 
. novelist and protagonist receive 
with 'a great shock' the 
announcement of the present hour by the clock: 'the present again struck 
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her on the head. Eleven times she was violently assaulted' (275). If the 
present is such a 'disruption', yet still 'we survive the shock', this is 
'only possible because the past shelters us on one side and the future on 
another' (268). For Orlando, the present is always a fearful 'narrow 
plank' from which she might 'fall into the raging torrent beneath' (269) 
through an instant's carelessness. This is indeed the characteristic 
experience of time for Woolf's women. Orlando's chiming clock recalls the 
menacing strokes of Big Ben in Mrs. Dalloway: 'First a warning-then, 
the hour irrevocable' (MD, 6). At one level the hours operate in that 
novel as narrative connecting points, threading various characters' lives 
together, but at another they are mercilessly 'shredding and slicing, 
dividing and subdiving' (MD, 113) as they impose an objective order on 
the lived flux of experience; hence Big Ben tolls oppressively and 
gloomily ('The leaden circles dissolved in the air' (MD, 6)). Time 
carries one 'irrevocably' and momently nearer to death in its linear 
progress, as Mrs. Ramsay so sharply senses as she hears the sound of the 
falling waves with 'an impulse of terror' (TL, 30). For her too, the 
present is dangerous and slippery; safety resides only in the past 'since 
it had happened twenty years ago, and life, which shot down even from 
this dining-room table in cascades, heaven knows where, was sealed up 
there, and lay, like a lake, placidly between its. banks' (TL, 145). Why, 
then, should all these characters fear the present moment? 
And indeed, it cannot be denied that the most successful 
practitioners of the art of life-somehow contrive to 
synchronise the sixty or seventy different times which beat 
simultaneously in every normal human system so that when eleven 
strikes, all the rest chime in unison, and the present is 
neither a violent disruption nor completely forgotten in the 
past. (0,274) 
Since Orlando is obviously not one of 'the most successful 
practitioners of the art of life', the present is either 'a violent 
disruption' or 'completely forgotten in the past' (274). The present 
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moment is not well 'sheltered' by the past and the future on both sides. 
Neither Orlando nor Clarissa nor Mrs. Ramsay can experience time as 
necessary development out of the past into the present directed towards a 
willed future. For them, present and future are discontinuous, with no 
dialectical relation to each other. The future is as alarming in its 
unpredictability as the present is disturbing in its intense actuality: 
'life, which shot down even from this dining-room table in cascades, 
heaven knows where' (TL, 145); 'The present fell from her like drops of 
scalding water' (0,269). What is lacking is any grasp of history as 
meaningful process; the past is merely an isolated space in which life is 
'sealed up' and lies 'like a lake, placidly between its banks', and into 
which one plunges now and then, or which engulfs the present. When 
Orlando sits in Queen Elizabeth's armchair the past revives as a vista: 
'It was as a tunnel bored deep into the past' (287). But when the clock 
strikes four, this vision is completely demolished: 'The gallery and all 
its occupants fell to powder' (287). Mutually incompatible as they are, 
when the past appears, the present disappears, and vice versa. Now that 
the present makes its appearance with almost alarming 'distinctness', the 
past is completely erased. 
Orlando's experience of discontinuity, her lack of any sense of 
history which would structure time into a meaningful teleology arises 
from the fact that, as a woman, she is excluded from the temporal order 
itself - from history, politics, society. When Orlando becomes woman, 
she initially welcomes this position of outsider set over against 'the 
rule and discipline of the world'. Against the political order, she 
asserts the full enjoyment of 'the most exalted raptures', 
'contemplation, solitude, love' (146). This is clearer still in the 
manuscript version of the novel: 
surely our choice is better than theirs: poverty, 
insignificance, nakedness: [those are] the [humble] garments 
which cover us with invisibility & allow us to escape from all 
the [ties of pomp] & circumstance: to pass lonely & free as 
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clouds where we are unnoted; to hover there ... unregarded, 
[peeking], watching; observing, lost in. contemplation; to 
[escape from] the [0] odious ceremonies, disciplines (here they 
come to slip from mankind) who are as busy with their 
ceremonies & disciplines; & thus enjoy the most exalted of all 
states of mind. 54 
Here Woolf more explicitly offers Orlando's alienation from 
political and social affairs as freedom, as Madeline Moore's note points 
out. 
55 But this escape from 'disciplines' also entails 'insignificance', 
'invisibility' and 'loneliness' - namely the silence and marginality to 
which women are so often consigned. History is made elsewhere by others, 
without Orlando (woman) having anything to do with it. Since her life 
has been shaped within patriarchal structures of which she has no grasp, 
time seems to her to come from an unknowable future and to race into an 
unknown past. The present is then the precarious 'narrow plank' over 
'the raging torrent' (269) between these two unknown elements. For 
Orlando, history is alien to the living moment of the present: 'It [the 
house] belonged to time now; to history; was past the touch and control 
of the living' (286). The present is a place of rapture and terror 
equally; it is the locus where jouissance may suddenly subvert 'the rule 
and discipline of the world', but it is also the place where the shocks 
of both past and future are borne. Hence 'braced and strung up by the 
present moment', Orlando is also afraid, 'as if whenever the gulf of time 
gaped and let a second through some unknown danger might come with 
it'(288). 
I have argued that the temporal discontinuity which Orlando 
experiences is related to her being a woman and thus outside history, but 
it is clearly also concerned with the difficulties of modern, urban 
perception. In the capitals of advanced technological capitalist 
societies many aspects of life depend on processes beyond personal 
understanding and control. Modern city life is made possible by a 
separation of people from the sites of production of commodities, and 
from the requisite scientific processes. Advanced technology and the 
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immense scale of urban life is beyond the individual's grasp; even the 
specialist can handle only his own small area. Hence Orlando's 
amazement: 'The very fabric of life now, she thought as she rose, is 
magic. In the eighteenth century, we knew how everything was done; but 
here I rise through the air; I listen to voices in America; I see men 
flying - but how it's done, I can't even begin to wonder'(270). This 
sense that one's life is governed by unknown social mechanisms and 
technology destroys any possibility of wholeness of identity as well as 
the possibility of totalising history as teleology. The discontinuity of 
time and fragmentation of the self are clearly connected with each other 
by the novel: 'For if there are-seventy-six different times all ticking 
in the mind at once, how many different people are there not - Heaven 
help us - all having lodgment at one time or another in the human 
spirit? ' (277). Raymond Williams cites Orlando's drive from London to 
her country house as 'characteristic imagery of the urban preoccupation': 
'In Virginia Woolf the discontinuity, the atomism, of the city were 
aesthetically experienced, as a problem of perception which raised 
56 
problems of identity'. 
Nothing could be seen whole or read from start to finish. What 
was seen begun... was never seen ended. After twenty minutes 
the body and mind were like scraps of torn paper tumbling from 
a sack and, indeed, the process of motoring fast out of London 
so much resembles the chopping up small of identity which 
precedes unconsciousness and perhaps death itself that it is an 
open question in what sense Orlando can be said to have existed 
at the present moment. (276) 
This problem of fragmented identity is, as Williams points out, 
conventionally resolved on arrival in the country. Just before Orlando's 
person is 'entirely disassembled', 'one green screen' is held out before 
her; 'and then green screens were held continuously on either side, so 
that her mind regained the illusion of holding things within itself' 
(276). One, may draw a psychoanalytical parallel here; as the baby first 
gains coordination of its motility and then constructs the self as a 
225 
unitary whole by identification with its mirror image, so Orlando regains 
the 'illusion' of a total self by 'the green screens' held out in the 
Kent countryside. 
Orlando seeks 'what some people call the true self' or 'the Key 
self, which amalgamates and controls' 'all the selves' she has it in her 
to be (279): 'For she [has] a great variety of selves to call upon', and 
'all were different' (278). Evoking the heterogeneous 'selves' possible 
for Orlando, the biographer demolishes the idea of a single, unitary 
identity. Orlando herself has to quest for what she is, for who she is 
(279). Woolf again takes up the theme of the heterogeneity of one's being 
in the essay 'Street Haunting'. Each human being, she remarks, has 
'instincts and desires which are utterly at variance with his main being, 
so that we are streaked, variegated, all of a mixture: 
Is the true self this which stands on the pavement in January, 
or that which bends over the balcony in dune? Am I here, or am 
I there? Or is the true self neither this nor that, neither 
here nor there, but something so varied and wandering that it 
is only when we give the rein to its wishes and let it take its 
way unimpeded that we are indeed ourselves? Circumstances 
compel unity; for convenience sake a man must be a whole. 
(CE, 4: 161) 
The theme of the impossibility of totalizing all the heterogeneous, 
incongruous components of the individual was treated in Jacob's Room. 
That novel was a shuffling of the discontinuous, fragmentary selves of 
Jacob in the hope that some symbolical fusion would emerge in the end. 
But what the text could finally offer us was only Jacob's room in London 
as a frame for sustaining the continuity of Jacob as a person, and even 
that room itself had to be left empty. In Orlando, the great country 
house and estate successfully totalizes Orlando's many part-selves. As 
she passes through the lodge gate and enters the park, Orlando becomes 
'what is called, rightly or wrongly, a single self, a real self' (282). 
The house Js origin and continuity - the origin as continuity - it is the 
only thing that guarantees history for Orlando. Orlando's consciousness 
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may be radically splintered, but this immense building - its heart still 
beating - has lived through centuries as a witness of history. Orlando 
sighs that 'the house was no longer hers entirely... It belonged to time 
now; to history' (286). She, the living present, cannot be part of time 
and history, precisely because she is a woman and therefore excluded. 
Lord Palmerston's judgement declared that the building and the estates 
descend on 'the heir's male of [her] body' (229). So Orlando will have 
to abandon the house, because history excludes her. In Jacob's Room, 
Jacob will never return to his room; history has destroyed him because in 
nn 
Woolf's novels there can bei involving, constructive relationship between 
history and the living individual. 
Returning to her origin, the country house, Orlando manages to 
become 'a single self, a real self' (282), and achieves a certain grasp 
and mastery of the world: 'Masterfully, swiftly, she drove up the curving 
drive... ' (282). Even at the dangerous moment of the clock's striking 
the hour, 'she kept, as she had not done when the clock struck ten in 
London, complete composure (for she was now one and entire, and 
presented, it may be, a larger surface to the shock of time)' (288). But 
we should perhaps make note of a certain particularity of Orlando's so- 
called 'real self', which implies, that it is somewhat different from the 
unitary, fixed self with its monolithically rigid identity. Orlando's 
self is characterised by certain images of fluidity - 'all is contained 
as water is contained by the sides of a well' (282), 'as if her mind had 
become a fluid that flowed round things and enclosed them completely' 
(283). This mode of perception - gentle envelopment rather than 
penetration at a single point, using all the senses rather than using 
just sight - was, as I pointed out above, also the concern of Lily in To 
the Lighthouse. The scenery observed by the 'fluid' subject in Orlando 
is also presented in water images: 'the falling turf of the park whose 
fall was so gentle that had it been water it would have spread the beach 
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with -a smooth green tide' (282=3); ''So she... watched the vast view, 
varied like an ocean floor' (292). 
We now come to a strange episode in this text. Despite her extreme 
attempt to sustain her unitary 'thetic' self (she 'went firmly' 'with 
great alertness of movement' (288), walked more 'briskly than she liked' 
(289)), Orlando encounters an experience which thoroughly subverts this 
'positioned' self: 'a raised saucer of pink flesh where the nail should 
have been' (289) on the carpenter's thumb. Unpleasant this may be, but 
does it, in naturalistic terms, account for the violence of Orlando's 
reaction here? I suggest that a psychoanalytical reading is necessary to 
account for the deeper forces which this sight releases. 'Braced and 
strung up by the present moment', Orlando desperately tries to maintain 
hold on the ego that constitutes itself as 'one and entire' (288), as the 
self which stabilizes the otherwise dispersed and contradictory 
perspectives of her being, 'the sixty or seventy different times which 
beat simultaneously (274), the 'many thousand' selves a person may well 
have (278). This self is maintained by the secure separation of subject 
and object, inside and outside, and thus positions itself firmly in the 
world. It can master and know the world only so long as these rigid 
binary distinctions are held in place; thus the world Orlando sees is now 
'miraculously distinct' (288). However, she then sees the 'pink flesh', 
that vulnerable inside which should have been covered and hidden by a 
finger nail (the tough carapace of the outside). Her revulsion derives 
from this sudden, unexpected emergence of the inside. This transgression 
of the borderline, this confusion of what should have been separated 
instantly destabilizes the security of the ego and its self-constitutive 
demarcations of inside and outside. Her ego is overthrown in a fit of 
disgust which is perhaps related to what Kristeva has called the 
'abjection' roused by any ambiguity that confuses identity, system, 
order, that ignores a border, rules, location. 
57 In this state of 
disgust or 'abjection', with its unstable relations of object and 
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subject, its unstable 'identity' of other and self, Orlando's ego 
dissolves, losing its self-possession ('no fingers can hold it' (289)) as 
unconsciousness threatens and she has a moment of faintness. What is 
this world that Orlando has been to in this moment of blacking out of 
consciousness? In that 'moment's darkness' that which had been repressed 
in the present emerges: 'she was relieved of the pressure of the present. 
There was something... which... is always absent from the present' (289). 
'Terror' and 'beauty' at once, it is 'something one trembles to pin 
through the body', though it itself 'has not body' (289). In contrast to 
that 'miraculously distinct', focussed world of the present, which the 
thetic subject sees, 'the shadow of faintness' reveals a 'pool of the 
mind' (294), 'at the back of her brain' (290). 'Furthest from sight' 
(290), there is no clear distinction of subject and object, things are 
'misty' (293), nothing is detailed or distinct. There is 'relief', and 
this is the world of metonymy and metaphor: 'everything was partly 
something else'; 'things... made the strangest alliances and combinations' 
(290). This is the terrain with which 'art and religion' are connected 
(290), a timeless world governed and syncopated by oceanic rhy thms: 'Her 
mind began to toss like the sea ' (289). This 'dark pool of the mind', 
with its shifting and dissolving forms, its labile rhythms, is surely an 
image of the Kristevan semiotic itself, representing a lapse back from 
the individuation of the Oedipus into the maternal realm of oceanic 
indifferentiation. 
'She now looked down into this pool or sea in which everything is 
reflected -' (290). If art is 'the reflections which we see in the dark 
hollow at the back of the head when the visible world is obscured for the 
time' (290) (when the specular ego is in abeyance), then Orlando's poem 
'The Oak Tree' is her ultimate achievement in this direction. She climbs 
the path to the oak tree, which is the eponymous hero of the poem she has 
been working on for some three centuries, in order to perform 'symbolical 
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celebrations' (291) and pay homage to the oak tree. But this symbolical 
intention - to bury the book as tribute - is abandoned, because 'the 
earth was so shallow over the roots' (291) and anyway she finds it 
'silly'. I have argued that towards its end the book precipitates a quest 
for metaphor and symbol, entailing a rapid abandonment of the fantastic 
which has operated according to the principle of metonymy. But in this 
final episode the principle of metonymy 'revolts' and rejects the 
symbolic gesture. As if the author had become aware that the book has 
turned serious in spite of her initial intention to have a 'joke', she 
thwarts an act of burial that would have been a kind of literal enactment 
of metaphorical depth, a 'reconciliation' of language and Nature. The 
poem's leaves are ruffled disconsolately by the wind, an appropriately 
casual and metonymical end to Woolf's venture into the fantastic. 
Once again the clock chimes and the present showers down upon 
Orlando, but now it is night and no longer necessary to faint in order to 
gaze into 'the dark pool of the mind' (294). The specular ego is now in 
abeyance; mere 'reflections' have not yet formed into a subject separate 
from the other or object. This functional world of subject and other is 
jouissance and death, a collapsing of subject upon object which is 
simultaneously homeostasis and ecstasy, thus Nirvana. 'She looked into 
the darkness' (294) in which 'death' and 'ecstasy' blend. 
There was her husband's brig, rising to the top of the wave! 
Up, it went, and up and up. The white arch of a thousand 
deaths rose before it... But the brig was through the arch and 
out on the other side; it was safe at last! 
'Ecstasy! ' she cried, 'ecstasy! ' And then the wind sank, 
the waters grew calm;... 
'Marmaduke Bonthrop Shelmerdine! ' she cried, standing by 
the oak tree. 
The beautiful, glittering name fell out of the sky like a 
steel-blue feather... He was coming, as he always came, in 
moments of dead calm; when... nothing moved between sky and sea. 
Then he came. (294) 
At the stroke of midnight, Shelmerdine makes a 'fantastic' 
appearance, coming back from sea by aeroplane and leaping to the ground 
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in front of Orlando. After this final moment of the 'fantastic', the 
book ends with the symbolic 'wild goose' flying into the night, which I 
discussed above. Earlier Orlando said: 'Always it flies fast out to sea 
and always I fling after it words like nets... But never the great 
fish... ' (282). The book ends with a suggestion of her renewed pursuit 
of 'the wild goose'/'the great fish'. This pursuit will be continued by 
the author in her next work, The Waves, which is, as she writes in her 
diary, 'a reach after that vision' of a 'fin in the waste of water' 
(WD, 158,169). 
CHAPTER VI: THE WAVES 
Woolf had been pursuing her own novelistic ideal since she declared 
war on the Edwardians with 'Modern Novels' in 1919, and on completing The 
Waves she wrote in her diary: 'What a long toil to reach this beginning - 
if The Waves is my first work in my own style! '(WD, 176). Yet if The 
Waves is continuous with her rejection of Edwardian fiction in quest of 
some inner life or vision, it also marks an attempt to check the 'liquid' 
mode of writing of To the Lighthouse. Woolf notes that one reviewer had 
remarked a crisis in her style - 'now so fluent and fluid-like water' - 
and wonders whether she can 'check' 'that disease' and 'consolidate, more 
in the Dalloway and Jacob's Room style'(WD, 137). In the diary entries 
for The Waves she records her desire for a new solidity and depth. She 
aspired to penetrate deep, vertically, rather than pursue a 'liquid' 
expansion on the surface, 
1 
and it is accordingly the very narrative 
consciousness that had sponsored the 'fluent and fluid' mode of To the 
Lighthouse that is scrutinized and probed in the later novel. 
The style of The Waves is indeed strikingly different from that of 
Woolf's earlier novels. In Jacob's Room the narrator had made her 
appearance in a meditation on the difficulties of being a woman ten years 
older than Jacob, and is thus foregrounded from the start. In 
Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse the narrator 'disappears', merging 
with the consciousness of the characters. As I argued in earlier 
chapters, an extensive use of free indirect speech results in a narrative 
consciousness of such versatile subjectivity that there is no longer a 
single subject; narrative discourse hovers suspended between authorial 
consciousness and characters' minds. In The Waves this 'chameleon 
style', 
2 
whereby the third person narrative merges into the first person, 
is replaced by the device of the dramatic monologue. However, as has 
often been pointed out, the interior monologues of this novel are very 
different from that 'stream of consciousness' which such a device is 
normally used to effect; consciousness does not spill over as it were 
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unmediatedly on to the page in The Waves.. Borrowing a formula from 




e': 'a way of writing, a style... to obtain an equivalent to the 
sort of reality she is trying to express'. 
3 Hermione Lee equally 
stresses stylization rather than immediacy: 'a formal, rhythmic monologue 
subjugates the representation of personality or action to a series of 
physical images which are made to stand for a state of mind'. 
4 The 
violence of Lee's language - subjugated, made to stand -testifies to 
liberal humanist assumptions about character that the novel itself 
rejects, as I shall argue later. Psychoanalysis, too, argues that desire 
only emerges as such with its 'instinctual representative' or image, 
which is thus not secondarily yoked to or 'made to stand' for it. None 
the less, Lee's hostile remark does at least register the formal 
innovation of the novel. One critic, remarkably, has called The Waves 
'the most firmly rooted in stream of consciousness of all her books'; but 
this could only be said - charitably - to be true in the sense that a 
narratorial stream of consciousness existed in Woolf's early, inchoate 
plan of the book, but it disappeared swiftly as she elaborated her idea. 
The development of the structure of the book in her diary runs as 
follows. First it is a 'man and a woman' sitting at a table talking, but 
then 'she might talk, or think... Perhaps the man could be left absolutely 
dim' (W D, 108). Yet, still unable to start The Moths (the novel's 
original title), Woolf has another, clearer idea: 'A mind thinking... In 
its leaves she might see things happen. But who is she? I am very 
anxious that she should have no name... I want "she"' (W D, 142-3). A month 
later, in June: 'Well, all sorts of characters are to be there. Then the 
person who is at the table can call out anyone of them at any moment; and 
build up by that person the mood, tell a story'(WD, 144). She asks 
herself in September: 'Who thinks it? And am I outside the 
thinker? '(146). As these diary entries suggest, in the first draft of 
233 
The Waves there indeed existed an unidentified figure or mind. Initially 
referred to only as 'the lonely mind'(H, 6,9), it speaks merely as 'I'. 
Sexual identity is deliberately blurred: 'by somebody whose sex could not 
be distinguished in this very early light' (H, 42). 'Some rather vague, 
apparently very large, yet indefinite figure appeared to be seated at the 
table... like an old man or woman, thinking alone'(H, 42). Then, as if to 
make it still more obscure, Woolf 'hoods'(H, 62) that figure or mind; it 
becomes only 'an eye in the hooded tent' (H, 69). As if in answer to her 
own earlier question ('Am I outside the thinker? '), the author is indeed 
situated outside this shadowy mind. Sentences tend to begin: 'if there 
was a person... '(H, 89), 'suppose there was someone... '(H, 113), 'if 
there was an eye... '(H, 124). But the eye is effaced as third person 
description of character gives way to first person monologue. Woolf 
records this process in the diary: 'The Waves is I think resolving itself 
(I am at page 100) into a series of dramatic soliloquies'(WD, 159), and 
this shift seems to take place after page 192 of the holograph. 
As the narrative consciousness or meditating mind recedes further 
from the narrative surface, the characters attain a measure of autonomy. 
The hitherto detached consciousness interfuses with the speech of the 
characters, insinuates itself into their very phrases and rhythms. To 
Woolf it was a sign of achievement that 'I could say what Rhoda said. 
This proves that the book itself is alive: because it has not crushed the 
thing I wanted to say, but allowed me to slip it in, without any 
compression or alteration'(WD, 156). Identification with the characters 
is in a sense more perfect than in the case of Mrs. Dalloway and To the 
Lighthouse, for the stream of consciousness method maintains and utilises 
a slight distance between the narrative voice and the discourse of the 
characters. 
6 By expunging the narratorial consciousness from the textual 
surface, Woolf attempts to realise an ambition first formulated in 1920 
as she contemplated what was to become Jacob's Room: '... enclose 
everything, everything?... enclose the human heart - Am I sufficiently 
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mistress of my dialogue to net it there?... no scaffolding; scarpely a 
brick to be seen; all crepuscular, but the heart, the passion, humour, 
everything as bright as fire in the mist'(WD, 23). Eight years later, 
planning The Moths, her novelistic goal has not changed: 'what I want now 
to do is to saturate every atom... to give the moment whole; whatever it 
includes... It must include nonsense, fact, sordidity: but made 
transparent'(WD, 139). If we consider Woolf's texts from the early 
experimental short stories to The Waves in the light of narrative voice, 
her aim seems to define itself as a quest for the coincidence of the 
narrative consciousness and 'life' itself, in a manner that would not, 
however, be that of the omnipotent narrator of the realist novel. Her 
repeated innovation in forms of narrative consciousness is thus a quest 
for a more perfect fusion with the minds of the characters. In The 
Waves, then, it is not the characters' but the narrator's consciousness 
that is elaborated, the former being only 'poetic correlative' for some 
wider consciousness that envelops and exceeds them. 
The continuities across Woolf's career have been made clearer with 
the publication of the holograph draft of The Waves, which reveals 
thematic relationships with such early stories as 'An Unwritten Novel' 
and 'The Mark on the Wall' that are less apparent in the final text. The 
original title itself -. The Moths - is already a recurrent image in her 
work, denoting that 'uncircumscribed spirit' that flits briefly towards 
the light of narrative consciousness only to veer away again before it 
can be definitively grasped. Also prominent in the opening pages of the 
draft is that problematic of signs and meaning which I traced aböve in 
relation to Jacob's Room and certain short stories. It is necessary to 
decipher 'a mysterious hieroglyph, always dissolving'(ll, 2), which, the 
text announces, is made by the purple crescent pattern on the lower wings 
of 'an enormous moth' settled on the wall. In quest of a meaning impeded 
by the opacity of the signifier, the text has to face the still more 
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troubling prospect that the signified may be not just postponed but 
absent from the start: some bird pattered out a few irrelevant bars of 
se-- @dFe-a so blank 
&aRk sound se-page that all meaning seemed emptied out of it'(H, 2). 
This is the purity of kenosis not plenitude, and the rest of the page 
evokes a world of allegory in the sense I defined in Chapter II. Sign is 
not fleshed full with meaning; the world, drained of immanent 
significance, dissolves into unrelated fragments: 
It was all very pale, & discordant too; with 
so oung blank music of the its hier 0) lyph dissolved; 
that it the cock crowing & the melodious birds; the moth; the white 
was 
hardly plate; the plan the sbef4s sea turning the shells over, & the 
green; over again Sight & sound 
on the beach. hey interrupted each other, 
as if the mind of a very old per-sen, man or woman, had 
without being 
gone back to the dawn of memobery; & had-net-been able to 
without ing finish any sentence; had-net-been sure hew-things-happened, 
or what-Far e-Hext; -but in what order things came; 
without attempting to make a coherent story. (H, 2) 
Though the text here disowns the ambition to make a coherent story, that 
impulse in fact remains incorrigible. Like the earlier narrator of 'An 
Unwritten Novel', the text cannot but attempt to centripetally gather the 
fragments into some satisfying order. 'The power that centralises'(6) 
collects shreds and shards from the debris, 'attempting to make a 
whole'(9), 'thinking them into one story, which we one heiles has meaning; 
or has no meaning'(6). It sets itself the task of discovering 'in the 
folds of the past' or in 'such fragments as time having broken... the 
perfect vessel'(H, 6,9). The last phrase perhaps looks forward to the 
Grail motif that Percival's name points towards. 
If The Waves can at all usefully be called a 'stream of 
consciousness' novel, it is only by reference to the 'lonely mind', that 
'figure brooding at the table'(H, 154), which was expunged from the final 
version. The operations of this mind in the early pages of the draft 
recall 'The Mark on the Wall', for they too are a chain of images, 
associations, speculations, incited by a 'mark' on the wall in a 
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narrative mind sinking 'deeper and deeper, away from the surface, with 
its hard separate facts'(HH, 42). Woolf's earlier narrator meditates on 
the fictional 'image of oneself' created indulgently, stealthily, in 
solitude: 'we are looking into the mirror... and the novelists in future 
will realize more and more the importance of these reflections, for of 
course there is not one reflection but an almost infinite number; those 
are the depths they will explore, those the phantoms they will pursue, 
leaving the description of reality more and more out of their stories, 
taking a knowledge of it for granted' (H H, 43). If we interpret this in 
the light of Lacan's mirror stage, it would seem that the narrator seeks 
to fix identity in a single specular image only to find a radical process 
of splintering and fission begin. Such instability afflicts the object 
as well as the subject. In this inchoate world, an apparently harmless 
metaphor, which one had assumed would better render the object in its 
concrete fullness, shows a dangerous tendency to metamorphose the object. 
The copula of metaphor -X is Y- assumes an ontological rather than 
merely rhetorical force. 'In this dim light one thing very easily 
suggests another. The creases of the table cloth might be waves 
endlessly sinking and falling'(H, 63); 'how can I be sure that it is a 
cupboard there; it is a mountain. slope'( H, 114). But in so far as Woolf 
is in quest of a 'feminine' writing that avoids the complementary 
pitfalls of feminist realism (old form, new content) and schizophrenic 
modernism (new form, 'no' content), she will have to do justice to both 
the systematic and the centrifugal impulses. Feminist realism offers a 
challenge to patriarchy at one level, but only confirms it at another and 
deeper level (of forms and categories of representation). But an 
absolute rejection of the symbolic order would only precipitate psychosis 
and silence. It would so radically divorce itself from the patriarchal 
system that it would lose all possibility of exerting any effective 
pressure for change on that system; Finnegan's Wake perhaps suggests the 
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dangers in this direction. I shall argue that Woolf tries to situate The 
Waves in the difficult 'between' of these two equally unpalatable 
options, maintaining a precarious dialectic between identity and its 
loss, the symbolic and its unrepresentable Other, an unsettling and 
unsettlable alternation that she had already figured in the sexual 
metamorphoses of Orlando. 
The Waves opens with the dawn sky and seascape. Towards the end of 
the book Bernard, his self now limitlessly enlarged to 'a whole 
universe', returns to the same scene (W, 207). Thus the interludes are 
also images, dreams or reflections which occur inside the narrative 
consciousness - 'a mind thinking'(WD, 142). The mind looks reflectively 
at itself, at its own 'shadow' which might hold 'Something? 
Nothing? '(W, 207) and starts to explore its very beginnings. 
7 The book 
inscribes the emergence of self-identity and the process of its 
development and consolidation. The scenic details are a metaphor for the 
life process of the characters, and the first interlude presents an 
undivided state before individuality appears: 'The sea was 
indistinguishable from the sky.... Gradually as the sky whitened a dark 
line lay on the horizon dividing the sea from the sky'(5). In this 
prefiguration of the birth of self-consciousness there appears the image 
of 'veil' or 'fabric' which will recur throughout the book and which is 
often associated with the mind and being itself. Woolf's image of life 
as a membrane or veil which contains consciousness or, rather, is 
consciousness had of course already appeared in her famous definition of 
life as 'a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of 
consciousness to the end'. A later account of her first memory of life 
at the dawn of consciousness in 'A Sketch of the Past' reveals the origin 
of this image: 'the feeling... of lying in a grape and seeing through a 
film of semi-transparent yellow'(MB, 65). 
The- last lines of the interlude evoke a still obscure state before 
the dawn of the self and before the birth of meaning: 'all within was dim 
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and unsubstantial. The birds sang their blank melody outside'(6). The 
draft of The Waves offer a more explicit image of the birth of the human 
subject: 
that 
these waves were... many mothers, & again 
of many mothers .. endlessly sinking & falling, 
& lying prostrate, each holding up, 4ke 
pass 
as the wave held its crest... a child. (H, 9-10) 
For every wave, be¬er-e-t-suHk sank hefd -up1 -& cast a 
child from it; before it sank into the obscure body 
of the sea. (H, 10) 
... innumerable multitudes of little bald naked purplish 
fefRg balls... rolling about on the vast wrinkled white 
bleached desert. ... The twisted babies - for such perhaps 
they were. (H, 61) 
The little bodies wriggled & 
turned & twisted, curiously mobile & restless, 
[--] uneasy, ill-directed, shooting out arms & legs, -- for 
there could be no doubt that these whiffs of spray, these 
pinkish balls, were, now that the light burnt a 
greener 
little clearer, ehtldFeR, new born babies, tossed by-the 
from the top of the waves, cast off by the rapidity 
of the sea... the worm . 
like, eel like, half conscious yet 
animals 
blindly impulsive & violent actions of these little bald bFats. 
And soon the beach was covered with their markings. 
Soon they were staggering across the sand, & leaving foot prints 
... all across... its blankness. 
(H, 62) 
This realm of inchoate motility, constituted by impulsive movements of 
muscles - Kristeva's chora - is anterior to meaning; nothing is yet 
regulated into patterns of signification, though the world is pregnant 
with the possibility of meaning. Some bird 'pattered out a few irrelevant 
bars of sound so bland'(H, 60); 'There seemed to be beginnings or endings 
of meaning everywhere'(H, 61). 
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In the dim light in which 'one could scarcely distinguish 
anything'(H, 60) waves tumbled over 'innumerable children'(H, 62) who are 
mere 'pullulating', 'bubbling', 'pinkish rings of flesh'(H, 63}: 'And how 
discriminate? '(H, 62). In this inchoate pre-subjectivity the monologues 
are dominated by semiotic elements. The characters in the novel see 
shapes, colours, hear sounds; and a two-beat rhythm -- 'in and out', 'up 
and down', 'one, two; one, two; one, one, two' -- pulses across their 
monologues. This wave rhythm persists strongly throughout the book and 
constitutes a most distinct characteristic of its writing, to which I 
shall return. 
8 Out of this primitive state, separation and difference 
emerge. In the Latin class Neville will later discover that 'each 
tense.... means differently. There is an order in this world; there are 
distinctions, there are differences in this world, upon whose verge I 
step. For this. is only a beginning'(W, 15). This learning of lexical 
and syntactic organization, namely the entry into the symbolic order, is 
also the beginning of subjectivity, and with it, of individuality and 
personality. Hence Bernard makes 'a wonderful discovery': 'I am myself, 
not Neville'(170). Thus each character 'elaborates' and 'differentiates' 
him/herself (83), using their friends to measure their own stature (65). 
In youth self-identity is formed and asserted ferociously; the six 
characters become separate and sing his/her own song like eager birds 
which descend 'dry-beaked, ruthless, abrupt', spying a snail, and tap 
'the shell against a stone'. (78). The 'film of semi-transparent yellow' 
for which Woolf envelops one's being has now solidified: 'A shell forms 
upon the soft soul, nacreous, shiny, upon which sensations tap their 
beaks in vain'(181). For The Waves, age 'matures' only in the sombre 
sense that the sequence of days and years hardens the receptive,. 
trembling film of being to a shell which is called 'identity': 'the being 
grows rings; identity becomes robust'(186). 
But self-identity is never something which is given and fixed once 
and for all. It is a continuous intermixture, the dispersal and 
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reassembly of diverse elements, Kristeva's subject in process. Woolf's 
concept of personality is never essentialist, though the theme of her 
work is often a quest for the essence of a character. The quest is 
always accompanied by a sense of the impossibility of fixing the essence, 
for there is no inherent substantiality to the personality, which turns 
out to be the concurrence of all surrounding elements. For just as the 
narrator of Jacob's Room realised that 'part of this is not Jacob but 
Richard Bonamy - the room; the market carts; the hour; the very moment of 
history'(JR, 71), so too Bernard can never definitively grasp his 
identity: 'what am I? There is no stability in this world... We are for 
ever mixing ourselves with unknown quantities'(W, 84). 'Abnormally aware 
of circumstances'(55) and susceptible to atmosphere, Bernard is 'made and 
remade continually'(96). Identity is never pure, unitary and immanent. 
'For there is nothing to lay hold of... there is something that comes from 
outside and not from within'(96). As the narrator of 'Street Hunting' 
remarked, 'circumstances compel unity; for convenience sake a man must be 
a whole'(CE, 4: 161), and Bernard's self-identity is triggered only by the 
gaze of the other: 'To be contracted by another person into a single 
being - how strange'(W, 64). In solitude, without 'the stimulus of other 
people'(58) which constitutes part of his character(95), Bernard's sense 
of himself becomes vagrant, vague, loses its shape(83). Walking in a 
street alone, no longer shaped by the gaze of others, his sense of 
identity fades out: 'I am not, at this moment, myself'(82). But it is 
not a once and for all dissolution of self that Bernard experiences; his 
self-identity somehow always returns - 'my self, who always comes at a 
call'(55). 'It steals in through some crack in the structure - one's 
identity. I am not part of the street - no, I observe the street. One 
splits off, therefore'(82). The separation of oneself, as subject, from 
the surrounding world coincides with the acquisition of language. In 
psychoanalytic terms, subjectivity is achieved with the entrance into the 
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symbolic order from the Imaginary, dyadic relation with the mother, with 
the acceptance of the third term (the Name-of-the-Father), namely, the 
comprehension of mediation, the separation of word from the thing itself. 
This ability to erect himself as subject and situate the other as object 
makes language possible for Bernard; he is 'a natural coiner of 
words'(82). 'And, striking off these observations spontaneously, I 
elaborate myself; differentiate myself'(83). His experience of continual 
alternation between an integrated assertion of identity and its 
dissolution makes Bernard a would-be novelist: 'Underneath, and, at the 
moment when I am most disparate, I am also integrated'(55). Only with 
the integration of selfhood in the thetic phase is language possible. 
But integration at the same time hampers his writing and defeats him when 
complete fusion is needed. 'The real novelist, the perfectly simple 
human being, could go on, indefinitely, imagining. He would not 
integrate, as I do'(58). This is not correct, however, for as Kristeva 
emphasizes, 'without the completion of the thetic phase' - the 
integrating faculty - 'no signifying practice is possible', and so art 
must 'not relinquish the thetic even while pulverizing it'. This 
'unstable yet forceful positing of the thetic' is crucial for poetic 
practice. What is at stake is Kristeva's impossible dialectic: a 
permanent alternation between identity and its loss. 
9 So here, as 
elsewhere, Wco f's Utopian idea of ändrogyny is expressed, " thöügh *only 
partially, for Bernard is after all a failed novelist. Partially 
caricaturing himself, Bernard describes himself as an androgynous being: 
"'joined to the sensibility of a woman"... "Bernard possessed the logical 
sobriety of a man"'; 'the double capacity to feel, to reason'(55). For 
Woolf, writing should be such an androgynous alternation, an impossible 
dialectic which aims to be 'integrated' at the moment of maximum 
dispersal, for her ambition is to summon 'silence' into the order of 
speech, to. reintroduce the excluded and repressed into the order which is 
possible only by that exclusion of 'the other'. This permanent 
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alternation between the integration of the thetic subject and its 
dissolution, lived by Bernard as would-be novelist, is what the novel 
itself attempts to embody, as it was what Woolf most deeply pondered in 
the problem of writing. 
It is Bernard who is most acutely aware of the vagrant, non- 
homogeneous nature of selfhood: 'not one and simple, but complex and 
many'(55). But in fact not only Bernard but all the characters of The 
Waves (except Jinny) confront' the same query in their monologues: 'what 
am I? ' Comparing himself with Bernard, Neville boasts that 'I am one 
person - myself. I do not impersonate Catullus, whom I adore'(63), but 
he, too, has the same ultimate uncertainty about his own identity. 'I do 
not know myself sometimes, or how to measure and name and count out the 
grains that make me what I am'(60). His account of the blurred frontiers 
between self and other is exactly parallel to Bernard's sense of fusion 
with the other. 'As he approaches I become not myself but Neville mixed 
with somebody - with whom? - with Bernard?... Who am I? '(60). Though 
Susan represents a simplicity of 'love and hate', purely feminine'(175), 
'in accordance with the high but unemphatic beauty of pure style'(176), 
and is destined to live in contentment or 'natural happiness' 0 23), she 
too asks herself, 'But who am I...? '(70). Louis assumes a rigidly 
definite, identity. 'I, and again I, and, again. I., Clear,, firm, 
unequivocal, there it stands, my name. Clear-cut and unequivocal' am I 
too'(118). His is the egoistic, assertive self of a Mr. Ramsay, a 
Charles Tansley or a Miss Kilman, the kind of domineering self that Woolf 
categorizes - and condemns - as characteristically male in A Room of 
One's Own. As an efficient and successful agent of Imperialist 
capitalism(119), Louis necessarily embodies this hated 'masculine' ego; 
he is 'acrid, suspicious, domineering, difficult' and 'formidable'(85). 
He loves authority and orderly progress(24-25), and erases individual 
differences for the sake of generality (114,121). Clearly Louis belongs 
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to that realm of voracious ego/fascism which Woolf most hates. 
10 But 
this domineering self, is the result of a frantic defensive manoeuvre 
prompted by Louis's inferiority complex as 'the weakest, youngest'(69, 
155), an 'alien, external' being of colonial (Australian) origin. What 
'redeems' Louis is that at least he knows this, that the 'masterful' ego 
is a persona adopted consciously. Perhaps in any case the machismo of 
the domineering self is a defensive rejection of its own 'feminine' or 
maternal element, the fear of a difference or heterogeneity necessarily 
existing in oneself. 
1' Louis explicitly images himself as a baby - 'my 
shivering, my tender, and infinitely young and unprotected soul' (155), 11 
am naked'(69). Though he respects Susan and desires the maternal safety 
she represents, it is in fact Rhoda, who has no trace of the maternal, 
that Louis chooses as his lover. In contrast to Susan, Louis has known 
'little natural happiness'(143); he is never at ease, for he has to sever 
himself from the mother by force of will. He is 'stiff from force of 
will'; Sara Ruddick aptly borrows this phrase from Jacob's Room to 
describe Louis. 12 Memory of the initial union with the mother, of 
dependence on her, is a threat to his ego and his gender identity as a 
male, though he can never finally escape it. Hence in a powerful image he 
evokes his disgust and guilt at his own former dependence on the mother: 
'I am like some vast sucker, some glutinous, some adhesive, some 
insatiable mout6'(1'43). The mother must be rejected as 'abject', - for 
only by this 'abjection' can the human subject form itself as subject, 
separating off the other as object. 
13 Because he is 'not single and 
entire', but diverse, multiple, heterogeneous - 'I have lived a thousand 
lives already' (91), Louis must strive all the more to shore up a 
singular, unitary selfhood. 'But now I am compact; now I am gathered 
together this fine morning' (119). 11, now a duke, now Plato, companion 
of Socrates; the tramp of dark men and yellow men migrating east, west, 
north and south ... all the furled and close-packed 
leaves of my many- 
folded life are now summed in my name'(119). Determined to be 'a full- 
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grown man', he aims to impose his name, his ego onto the world, 'for if I 
deviate ... I shall fall like snow and be wasted'(119). His will for 
integration extends to the whole world, indeed to the whole history of ' 
the human race, and his megalomaniac ambition is, Bernard notes, to make 
'some grand total'(66), or in his own words, to reduce all the diversity 
and difference of life 'to one line capable of linking all in one'(155), 
to erase individuality into universality: 'if we submit he will reduce us 
to order'(114). Louis even smooths out Percival's death: 'all deaths are 
one death' (121). Louis's ambition to write one poem which plaits into 
'one cable the many threads... of our long history, of our tumultuous and 
varied day'(144) and which will resolve the 'discrepancies and 
incoherences'(143) is an aspect of this desperate need to maintain a 
unified selfhood. 
I take the trees, the clouds, to be witnesses of my complete 
integration. I, Louis, I... am born entire, out of hatred, out 
of discord... Now grass and trees, the travelling air... and our 
ring here, sitting... hint at some other order, and better, 
which makes a reason everlastingly. This I see for a second, 
and shall try to-night to fix in words, to forge in a ring of 
steel ... (28) 
The subjection of the whole universe to reason and order would secure the 
integrity of the self. 'Meeting and parting, we assemble different 
forms, make different- patterns. But if I do not nail these. impressions 
to the board and out of the many men in me make one; exist here and now 
and not in streaks and patches... then I shall fall like snow and be 
wrasted'(121). 
When Louis speaks of the necessity to unify many selves into one 
whole, he reminds us of Rhoda who is precisely destined to 'fall like 
snow and be wasted', unable to form the self into a unified whole, unable 
to exist 'here and now'(159). As a child, Rhoda is the only one who 
cannot write the answer in the mathematics lesson: 'But I cannot 
write... The figures mean nothing now. Meaning has gone. The clock 
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ticks ... Look; the loop of the' figure is beginning to fill with time; it 
holds the world in it... The world is entire, and I am outside of it, 
crying "Oh save me, from being blown for ever outside the loop of 
time! "(15). The symbolic order is a temporal order, as Kristeva insists 
in About Chinese Women; 'For the speaking animal, it is the clock of 
objective time: it provides the reference point, and, consequently, all 
possibilities of measurement, by defining a past, a present, and a 
future. ' 14 While the other children, inserted into the -symbolic order, 
learn and form a stable relationship with words each in his or her own 
way, Rhoda does not. She continually feels that she bears a false 
relationship to speech; she cannot say this or that, yes or no, in the 
decisive way that Susan and Jinny can: 'But I lie; I prevaricate, (76-77). 
She is conscious, beyond her own difficulties with language, of 
everybody's 'lying tongues'(77). For Rhoda, language itself is false; 
these lies are not just contingent strategems but are structural to 
discourse. Being 'broken into separate pieces',. being 'no longer 
one'(76), Rhoda can neither judge, name, nor be logical. 'I am not 
composed enough... to make even one sentence. What I say is perpetually 
contradicted'(77). 'Composed' has both its straightforward implication 
that she is nervous, 'afraid of the door opening and the leap of the 
tiger'(77), and also a more radical sense, for Rhoda is not formed into 
the unified subject "that could wield speech; she is merely 'separate 
pieces'. Her uneasy relationship with language and her exclusion from 
time mutually imply each other. Kristeva writes that 'there is no time 
without speech. Therefore, no time without the father. That's what the 
father means: sign and time'. 
15 Significantly 'Rhoda has no father'(14), 
and she is excluded from and rejects genealogical continuity, temporal 
order, the clock of objective time. When 'the identity becomes 
robust'(182), Bernard images this full, self-possessed entry into the 
symbolic order as a clock which expands and contracts in an unswerving 
rhythm: 
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Opening and shutting, shutting and opening, with increasing hum 
and sturdiness, the haste and fever of youth are drawn into 
service until the whole being seems to expand in and out like 
the mainspring of a clock. How fast the stream flows from 
January to December!... And the little fierce beat -- tick-tack, 
tick-tack -- of the pulse of one's mind took on a more majestic 
rhythm... We are the continuers, we are the inheritors, I said, 
thinking of my sons and daughters... (183) 
But Louis and Rhoda both contradict Bernard's momentary conviction 'that 
we marry, that we domesticate'(183) within the 'machine' of the symbolic 
order. 
Interestingly, these two figures who refuse/are unable to take a 
place in the passing on of a family linage are both instances of the 
unsuccessful repression of the mother -a repression necessary to place 
oneself in the family triangle and thus enter the socio-symbolic order. 
Both Louis and Rhoda have exactly the same self-image as 'the youngest', 
'the most naked', 'exposed', 'unprotected'(69,76,155) and accordingly 
seek protection. In Louis this dependence of the vulnerable baby on the 
mother provokes guilt, disgust and rejection, as I pointed out above, 
although at the same time he seeks women's sympathy: 'I have an 
immeasurable desire that women should sigh in sympathy. I have eaten no 
lunch to-day in order that Susan may think me cadaverous and that Jinny 
may extend to me the exquisite balm of her sympathy'(91). Rhoda yearns 
for 'mothers from whose wide knees skirts descend' to hide and protect 
her(76). At moments the text inscribes the image of union with and 
separation from the mother with moving explicitness. Neville in his 
'passive and exhausted frame of mind' longs 'to rejoin the body of our 
mother from whom we have been severed'(165); London is 'some ponderous, 
maternal, majestic animal'(80) into whose flanks Bernard in the train is 
going to 'explode'. Bernard remembers the first day of going to school 
as 'a second severance from the body of our mother'(89). 
Driven out of the socio-temporal order, Rhoda has to live a 
fragmented time; for her, 'one moment does not lead to another'(93). 
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I cannot make one moment merge in the next. To me they are all 
violent, all separate; and if I fall under the shock of the 
leap of the moment you will be on me, tearing me to pieces. I 
have no end in view. I do not know how to run minute to minute 
and hour to hour, solving them by some natural force until they 
make the whole and indivisible mass that you call life. (93) 
For Rhoda, who has only moments, maturation and teleology are impossible; 
she cannot believe that she will 'grow old in pursuit and change'(93). 
There is indeed no belief in maturation or purposive change 
throughout the whole novel. 'Nobody, I thought, ever changes the 
attitude in which we saw them first, or the clothes'(193). Bernard's 
opinion is a fundamental tenet of the book too. The style and vocabulary 
of the six characters do not change from the first monologues of 
childhood to their last; images which serve as indices to distinguish the 
six are fixed and repeated throughout the text. Fragmentariness is also 
as characteristic of the time of the book as of Rhoda herself. Woolf 
noted her intention of writing only 'moments' in the new book which 
eventually became The Waves: 
I mean to eliminate all waste, deadness, superfluity: to give 
the moment whole; whatever it includes. Say that the moment is 
a combination of thought; sensation; the voice of the sea. 
Waste, deadness, come from the inclusion of things that don't 
belong to the moment; this appalling narrative business of the 
realist: getting on from lunch to dinner: it is false, unreal, 
merely conventional. (WD, 139) 
This notion of 'the moment' is explicated later in 'A Sketch of the 
Past'. 'Exceptional moments' of being involve 'a sudden violent shock' 
which ruptures the 'sealed vessels'(MB, 122) of Woolf's being, tearing 
her out of the ruck of the mundane ('non-being', 'non-descript cotton 
wool'(MB, 70)), into either absolute despair or a fulfilling sense of 
wholeness (MB, 71). Those aspects of life which consist of walking, 
eating, everyday business, washing, cooking(MB, 70) are regarded as 
deadness and superfluity. On the level of fictional form, this mundane 
sequence is the narrativity of the realist novel which Woolf had been 
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condemning since 'Modern Fiction' and again in her diary entry quoted 
above; it is a materiality (cotton wool) which blots out the light. The 
Waves enacts a denigration of 'general sequence' both formally and 
thematically. Bernard's attitude to 'the usual order' (1 1 1), is profoundly 
ambivalent. 
Here am I marching up and down this terrace alone, unoriented. 
But observe how dots and dashes are beginning, as I walk, to 
run themselves into continuous lines, how things are losing the 
bald, the separate identity that they had as I walked up those 
steps. The great red pot is now a reddish streak in a wave of 
yellowish green. The world is beginning to move past me like 
the banks of a hedge when the train starts, like the waves of 
the sea when a steamer moves. I am moving too, am becoming 
involved in the general sequence when one thing follows another 
and it seems inevitable that the tree should come, then the 
telegraph-pole, then the break in the hedge. And as I move, 
surrounded, included and taking part, the usual phrases begin 
to bubble up... (134) 
This general sequence is more often resented as something that, impeding 
'the moment', is viewed as dead matter stifling truth and light ('cotton 
wool'). Even when Bernard welcomes it, he does so with an undertone of 
scorn or condescension, as when he talks of the complacent life of little 
shop keepers (166,186). 'Life is pleasant. Life is good. The mere 
process of life is satisfactory... Something always has to be done next. 
Tuesday follows Monday; Wednesday Tuesday... So the being grows rings; 
identity, becomes., robust'(1.85-186).. But for The Waves identity is as 
constrictive as it is desirable. Bernard later reflects on the 
'arbitrary' process of character construction in a decidedly dismissive 
figure: 'But why impose my arbitrary design? Why stress this and shape 
that and twist up little figures like the toys men sell in trays in the 
street? '(134) Though Bernard says, 'Heaven be praised... we need not 
whip this prose into poetry'(186), it is not without a sort of 
resignation. Plot is the equivalent, at the level of macro-structure, of 
the sentence in linguistic microstructure, and Woolf is similarly 
dissatisfied with the linearity of language itself, which is powerless to 
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give,, full expression to the polymorphous experience of simultaneous 
being: 
the power of music, the stimulus of sight, the effect on us of 
the shape of trees or the play of colour, the emotions bred in 
us by crowds, the obscure terrors and hatreds which come so 
irrationally in certain places or from certain people, the 
delight of movement, the intoxication of wine. Every moment is 
the centre and meeting-place of an extraordinary number of 
perceptions which have not yet been expressed. Life is always 
and inevitably much richer than we who try to express 
it. (CE, 2: 229) 
Language necessarily fails to give the moment whole, to render it as the 
conjunction of an extraordinary number of perceptions -'the senses of 
sight, of sound, of touch - above all, the sense of the human being, his 
depth and the variety of his perceptions, his complexity, his confusion, 
his self, in short'(CE, 2: 158-159). For, as Woolf realizes, life is 
inevitably much richer than the 'I' which exists only in language by 
repressing the body, the unconscious, desire and pleasure. 
Woolf's dissatisfaction with plot, sequence, narrativity is, in 
short, a dissatisfaction with the symbolic, which necessarily excludes 
the multi-sensory experience of living existence and thus calls into 
being the unconscious. Her constant though strictly speaking impossible 
aim is to write about what escapes the symbolic order; thus Terence in A 
Voyage Out had expressed his ambition to write a 'novel about Silence', a 
11 
novel about the domain outside speech. 
16 Woolf's rudimentäry ideas' for'- 
The Waves her desire to abolish story, naming, specificity of time and 
place(WD, 142-143), all indicate this aim towards a 'beyond' of the 
symbolic. Rhoda is incapable of establishing the thetic subject which 
sustains the socio-symbolic order and thus is terrified by it. Her own 
abhorrence of the social is largely shared by the book itself: 'how you 
stand embedded in a substance made of repeated moments run together; are 
committed, have an attitude, with children, authority, fame, love, 
society; where I have nothing. I have no face'(W, 158). Woolf hoped that 
women's literature would cultivate 'poetry', as she herself attempts to 
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do in The Waves: 'Why. admit anything to literature that is not 
poetry? '(WD, 139). Poetry, in this usage, involves reaching beyond 'the 
personal and political relationships to the wider questions which the 
poet tries to solve - of our destiny and the meaning of life'(CE, 2: 147). 
In 'Narrow Bridge of Art' she adumbrates a new kind of book which might 
encompass all the elements which the novel, poetry and drama of the past 
have not been able to accommodate; and this notion came to be realised as 
The Waves, which she termed 'a playpoem' (WD, 137). The new novel of the 
future will, she writes, 'have little kinship with the sociological novel 
or the novel of environment... It will resemble poetry in this that it 
will give not only or mainly people's relations to each other and their 
activities together... but it will give the relation of the mind to 
general ideas and its soliloquy in solitude... We long for some more 
impersonal relationship'(CE, 2: 225). The Waves accordingly refuses to be 
'embedded' and 'committed' in the socio-temporal, symbolic order. There 
is little evidence of development or history in the book; its time is 
either the detached moment- or 'a substance made of repeated moments' 
contained within no humanist or religious framework. The time of The 
Waves is as it were agnostic, where one has constantly to confront 
'abysses of infinite space'(W, 160) and in which human history is, 
. 
humblingly, just 'one inch of light'(161). 'And we ourselves, walking. six 
abreast, what do we oppose, with this random flicker of light in us that 
we call brain and feeling, how can we do battle against this flood; what 
has permanence? Our lives too stream away, down the unlighted avenues, 
past the strip of time, unidentified'(161). Such phrases of Bernard's 
closely parallel Rhoda's awareness that 'nothing persists': 'I am whirled 
down caverns, and flap like paper against endless corridors'(93). Their 
moments can never be pieced together into meaningful continuity, on 
however modest a scale. Bernard tries to recover 'the sense of time', 
but with the 'streaming darkness' in his eyes he has lost his mastery of 
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it(161). Meanwhile during the same visit to Hampton Court, Neville 
recovers time: 'Unreasonably, ridiculously... as we walk, time comes 
back... Three hundred years now seem more than a moment vanished against 
that dog... I am become a subject of King George'(161). Thus Neville, for 
a moment at least, places himself in a particular flow of time which 
carries the specific values of a once extant society, in sharp contrast 
to Bernard who cannot believe in the validity of historical time with its 
'little figure [the King] with a golden teapot on his head' set against 
the 'whirling abysses of infinite space'(161). However, as Neville's 
adverbs - 'unreasonably, ridiculously'- betray, this is not the usual 
cast of his mind, for his desire is more often to eternalize the perfect 
moment and time: 'if that blue could stay for ever; if that hole could 
remain for ever; if this moment could stay for ever'(27). His passion is 
'for firelight, privacy, and the limbs of one person'(37), pitting love 
against temporality: 'let us abolish the ticking of time's clock with one 
blow. Come closer'(129). Of the six characters Louis seems most to have 
a sense of history, feeling that he has 'lived thousands of years' 
(118-119), and seeking 'to mark this inch in the long, long history that 
began in Egypt' in a single line of poetry, 'to realise the meeting-place 
of past and present'(48). But what he in fact does is to wipe out all 
particularity and reduce it to the blandness of the universal; Louis is 
thus 'too universal'(37), all deaths, including Percival's, are for him 
'one death'(121). He adds up people 'like insignificant items in some 
grand total which he is for ever pursuing'(66). In order to console 
himself in the petty and mediocre present, Louis has to establish 
continuities from the past, to assert the sameness of past and present; 
he views the world, finally, in the light of 'the eternal 
procession'(119), and not of a historical procession in which the dense 
particularity of an individual being or period would be irreducible to 
generality.. For Louis, modern 'women going with attache cases down the 
Strand' essentially are the women who 'went once with pitchers to the 
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Nile'(119).. 
Thus time in The Waves does not conform to canons of constructive 
development; it is discrete and momentary rather than continual, cyclical 
rather than linear. Bernard encapsulates these aspects of novelistic 
time in an image; 'And time', he remarks, 'lets fall its drop'. This 
drop forming represents the merely habitual nature of one's actions, 
structured by quotidian routine. 'Shave, shave, shave-The drop fell': 
This drop falling has nothing to do with losing my youth. This 
drop falling is time tapering to a point. Time, which is a 
sunny pasture covered with a dancing light, time, which is 
widespread as a field at midday, becomes pendant. Time tapers 
to a point. As a drop falls from a glass heavy with some 
sediment, time falls. These are the true cycles, these are the 
true events. (131) 
Experience produces mere habit, covering over truth; the practical 
comforts of the former efface the harsher necessities of the latter. 'As 
I let myself in with my latch-key I would go through that familiar ritual 
and wrap myself in those warm coverings'(132-133). Thus the moments of 
'being' get buried in 'cotton wool'(MB, 70). When one phase of life 
reaches the maximum possible accumulation of habit it falls like an 
excessively heavy drop of water and completes itself. It does not lead 
with any cumulative progression or even connection into the later phase, 
just.. as it owed nothing to the previous one; it simply amounts .. 
to 
'shedding one of [one's] life-skins'(134): 'some sediment formed; I 
formed; a drop fell; I fell - that is, from some completed experience I 
had emerged'(179-180). In the interval between one drop falling and the 
next forming, a covering 'veil' falls(133). When the illusory 
'luminosity of atmosphere' of the midday field withdraws, Bernard sees 
'to the bare bottom' (131), grasps 'truth' (132). 'The drop falls; another 
stage has been reached. Stage upon stage. And why should there be an 
end of stages? and where do they lead? To what conclusion? '(133). 
This scepticism towards progressive, linear time and Woolf's 
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rejection of narrative as the 'false, unreal, merely conventional' 
business of the realist(W D, 139) are two aspects of the same anti- 
symbolic stance. For time and narrative order are sustained by the 
logical, unified subjectivity (Kristeva's thetic subject) that is 
constituted in the repression of the senses of sight, hearing, touch, of 
perceptual multiplicity or confusion(CE, 2: 158-159). Though he is a born 
storyteller, Bernard comes to believe in story less and less: 'I have 
made up thousands of stories; I have filled innummerable notebooks with 
phrases to be used when I have found the true story, the one story to 
which all these phrases refer. But I have never yet found that story. 
And I begin to ask, Are there stories? '(W, 133). He rejects classical 
canons of narrative: 'it is a mistake, this extreme precision, this 
orderly and military progress; a convenience, a lie. There is always 
deep below it... a rushing stream of broken dreams, nursery rhymes, street 
cries, half-finished sentences and sights - elm trees, willow trees, 
gardeners sweeping, women writing - that rise and sink'(181). Bernard 
here articulates the text's own desire to embody this stream, 'alive' and 
'deep' beneath the civilized surfaces of the socio-symbolic order, though 
in it 'there is nothing one can fish up in a spoon; nothing one can call 
an event'. 
In his final monologue Bernard declares his weariness with beautiful 
phrases: 'Also, how I distrust neat designs of life that are drawn upon 
half-sheets of note-paper'(169). He can tell a story only by a 
Coleridgean 'suspension of disbelief', by provisionally assuming that 
life is a solid substance like a globe: 'Let us pretend that we can make 
out a plain and logical story, so that when one matter is dispatched - 
love for instance - we go on, in an orderly manner, to the next'(178). 
Yet life is not so rigid; it rather has 'walls of thinnest air'(182). 
Though his gift is language, Bernard despairs, in the face of the 
complexity. and heterogeneity of beings, 'to order them rightly; to detach 
one separately, or to give the effect of the whole - again like 
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music'. (182). Yet despite his distrust for that 'logical story'. in 'an 
orderly manner' which 'biographic style' produces, Bernard does not 
repudiate it altogether, since after all it serves to hold one within 
civilization and sanity. One cannot so unreservedly despise the social 
and symbolic codes 'laid like Roman roads across the tumult of our lives, 
since they compel us to walk in step like civilised people with the slow 
and measured tread of policemen though one may be humming any nonsense 
under one's breath at the same time - "Hark, hark, the dogs do bark, " 
"Come away, come away, death"(184). The system of civilized society 
regulates wanton desire or vagrant dreams, achieving on its grander scale 
the efficiency of Bernard's humble clock(183,185). Its guardians, like 
the policeman in Jacob's Room, or William Bradshaw, tell one to 'keep 
straight on', ignoring 'the chasms in the continuity of our ways'(95), 
repressing 'sudden impulses'(155), and its marvels of efficiency, like 
the ambulance which so impresses Peter Walsh, bolster the health and 
wealth of society by eliminating the 'insanity' of a Septimus Smith. 
But the 'biographic style' with its Roman roads cannot fish up the 
'tumult of our lives'(184), the 'rushing stream of broken dreams'(181). 
It dare not, as Woolf notes in 'Street Haunting', 'leave the straight 
lines of personality' with its series of gig-lamps symmetrically arranged 
in order to . 
deviate into 'footpaths that lead beneath brambles and thick 
tree trunks into the heart of the forest'(CE, 4: 165). Bernard reflects: 
'Here again there should be music. Not that wild hunting-song, 
Percival's music; but a painful, guttural, visceral, also soaring, lark- 
like, pealing song to replace these flagging, foolish transcripts - how 
much too deliberate! how much too reasonable! '(W, 177). Again the power 
of music is evoked as an alternative to the linearity of language, but 
this is not the song of hunters who pursue one object with unwavering 
determination and aggression(93); it is not the music of the emphatically 
masculine hero, Percival. Bernard describes linear orderliness as 
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'military progress' and denounces it as a 'mistake', a 'Iie'(18I). Thus 
in this chain of associations - Roman roads, policemen,; hunting, 
Percival, the military - the smooth teleology of narrative plot and male 
aggressivity or even totalitarianism are clearly connected. It is this 
order which persecutes Rhoda: without 'attitude... children, authority, 
fame, love, society'(158), her life is 'the white spaces that lie between 
hour and hour'; and this white space will just be thrown 'into the waste- 
paper basket' by the symbolic order(145). Bernard seeks a 'music' close 
to the body, primitive (guttural and visceral) but also rhythmical and 
joyous (the pealing of a soaring lark). If ordered transcription, 
elaborate style and logical story are 'masculine', we may regard this 
Utopian alternative as 'feminine': 'what is the use of painfully 
elaborating these consecutive sentences when what one needs is nothing 
consecutive but a bark, a groan? '(178). Bernard wishes to get back 
behind the construction of language, to 'a howl; a cry'(209) which would 
be prior to syntax: 'a little language such as lovers use, words of one 
syllable such as children speak when they come into the room and find 
their mother sewing and pick up some. scrap of bright wool, a feather, or 
a shred of chintz'(209). This language of or for the maternal presence 
would then be the Kristevan semiotic. The novel itself endorses Bernard, 
deploying discrete groups of words and isolate images rather than 
syntactical elaboration. Hence the fragmentation of the writing of The 
Waves: short sentences strung loosely together by semi-colons, the 
juxtaposition of nouns, its patterns of repetition. The very weariness 
and frustration that such effects produce in the reader testify to the 
deeply ingrained force of those conventions of plot and sequence which 
the novel regards as falsely produced by the 'totalitarianism' of the 
logocentric mind. Woolf defines the modern age as one of fragments: 'it 
is an age incapable of sustained effort, littered with fragments' 
(CE, 2: 157). This is because the moderns have lost the power of 'belief' 
or 'conviction'(CE, 2: 159); they can no longer sustain that firm 
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'attitude towards life, a po, sition... a. view' of the Elizabethan 
dramatists(CE, 2: 220). And yet she , defends the, moderns, for they 
stimulate 'the senses of sight,. of sound, of touch - above all, the sense 
of the human being, his depth and the variety of his perceptions, his 
complexity, his confusion, his self, in short'(CE, 2: 158-159), whereas 
past literature had been unable to express a mind 'full of monstrous, 
hybrid, unmanageable emotions'(CE, 2: 219). Woolf's dissatisfaction with 
the literary tradition and its contemporary Edwardian representatives is 
by now gender-specific, not simply generational. If fragmentation of the 
psyche was a general experience of her age, it is seen by the woman 
writer as a positive force of heterogeneity, unlike her male counterparts 
who tend to look nostalgically back to some pre-Renaissance 'unified 
sensibility'. 
Dissatisfaction with, even abhorrence of fixed unitary selfhood is 
frequently articulated by the characters of The Waves, who have a strong 
sense of the self as multiple and heterogeneous. Experiencing himself as 
'so vast, a temple, a church, a whole universe, unconfined and capable of 
being everywhere on the verge of things and here too'(207), Bernard seems 
to experience a megalomaniac inflation of the ego rather than its 
fragmented dissolution, as in Rhoda's case. However, that the inflation 
of the ego and its dissolution come, in the end, to the same thing is 
indicated by the fact that this experience of Bernard's only arises in 
the death of his self. Neville also experiences a sense of the 
expansionist ego: 'I am merely "Neville" to you, who see the narrow 
limits of my life and the line it cannot pass. But to myself I am 
immeasurable'(152). In his case, too, this elated awareness of the 
enlargement of the ego is close to its dissemination, to a radical 
indifferentiation of self and world: 'a net whose fibres pass 
imperceptibly beneath the world. My net is almost indistinguishable from 
that which it surrounds. It lifts whales - huge leviathans and white 
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jellies, what is amorphous and wandering'. Even Louis's near manic 
investment in the fixity of the self in fact testifies to the insidious 
force of pressures working always for its dissolution. The escape into 
universality is always undermined by the crumbling away of the empirical 
ego that is trying to transcend itself: 'I smoothed my hair when I came 
in, hoping to look like the rest of you. But I cannot, for I am not 
single and entire as you are'(91). But it is Rhoda, not knowing how to 
make 'the whole and indivisible mass' called life(93), who feels most 
harried and persecuted by those who live in self-unity, and who hates 
'all details of the individual life'(76). She endures agony in going 
'through the antics of the individual'(158), yearning for those 'moments 
when the walls of the mind grow thin; when nothing is unabsorbed' and 
when she could for a moment fancy 'that we might blow so vast a bubble 
that the sun might set and rise in it and we might-cast off and escape 
, from here and now'(159). Thus Rhoda's dream parallels Bernard's vision 
towards the end of the novel, and this vast illimitable consciousness 
beyond individuality in turn suggests the narrative consciousness of the 
text itself, in which scenery, character, monologue take place (see above 
p. 237) . 
This abolition of the limiting walls of individuality can be 
experienced either as the infinitizing or the dissolution of the self; 
the denial of unity can be either a polymorphously perverse enjoyment of 
multiple selves or the agony of the fragmented self. Neville feels that 
his sense of self perishes in the rushing crowd; Bernard in solitude or 
silence is 'dissolved utterly' and becomes 'featureless and scarcely to 
be distinguished from another'(159). Rhoda is undone by her fellow human 
beings who pierce her with a 'million arrows', pinning her down and 
exposing her. 'What dissolution of the soul you demanded in order to get 
through one day'(145). The sense of psychic breakdown even produces 
hallucinations of corporal disintegration: 'More cruel than the old 
torturers, you will let me fall, and will tear me to pieces when I am 
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fallen'(159); 'I am broken into separate pieces; I am no longer one'(76). 
In trying to escape the limits of the self, Bernard had yearned to 
believe that it was only his body that was fixed irrevocably(153), and it 
is indeed the body which founds the unitary identity of the human 
subject. Lacanian theory shows us that it is the corporeal unity that an 
infant discovers and identifies with that makes of him or her a coherent 
human subject; this process is Lacan's 'mirror stage'. Rhoda hates 
looking-glasses, as we might have predicted, for the image of herself 
urges her to congeal into identity(31). Yet still she has to experience 
her totality outside her, over there in the mirror; her identity as a 
whole is experienced in alienation. This impassable abyss of beance 
between the image in the mirror and the self threatens her: 'Alone, I 
often fall down into nothingness. I must push my foot stealthily lest I 
should fall off the edge of the world into nothingness. I have to bang 
my head against some hard door to call myself back to the body'(31). 
17 
The most intense crisis of this kind occurs at the puddle: 
I came to the puddle. I could not cross it. Identity failed 
me. We a re nothing, I said, and fell. Iw as blown like a 
feather, I was wafted down tunnels. Then very gingerly, I 
pushed my foot across. I laid my hand against a brick wall. I 
returned v ery painfully, drawing myself back into my body over 
the grey, cadaverous space of the puddle. (46) 
Between the image of herself on the surface of the water and her actual 
self lie 'crevices' and 'fissures'(47), from which the 'emerging 
monster'(47) leaps and menaces her. 'With intermittent shocks, sudden as 
the springs of a tiger, life emerges heaving its dark crest from the sea. 
It is to this we are attached; it is to this we are bound, as bodies to 
wild horses'(47). In this realm anterior to the entrance into the 
symbolic an unfocused aggressivity menaces the nascent ego: the ego is in 
continual struggle with the alter ego in binary relationship. 'Reckless 
and random the cars race and roar and hunt us to death like bloodhounds. 
I am alone in a hostile world. The human face is hideous'(113); you 
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'will tear me to pieces when I am fallen'(159). So Rhoda has ultimately 
no choice but to 'draw [herself] across the enormous gulf into [her] body 
safely'(113). 
When the transcendental ego is threatened with dissolution, the 
mirror phase is reversed in phantasies of corporal disintegration, a 
terror not peculiar to Rhoda. 'Little bits of ourselves are 
crumbling'(166), says Bernard; and even when he is talking of the 
'indivisibility' of his drowsy, exhausted body, the image he uses evokes 
corporeal dissection: 'if the train were to cut me in two, I should come 
together on the further side'(167). In similarly violent terms, Louis 
describes to Rhoda the other four characters at the dinner party: 'They 
are savage; they are ruthless. They dance in a circle, flapping 
bladders. The flames leap over their painted faces, over the leopard 
skins and the bleeding limbs which they have torn from the living 
body'(100). In The Waves even such casual experiences as taking the Tube 
become major psychical traumas, involving lurid images of being 
'dissevered by all those faces'(127). Falling into crevices or 
nothingness, being torn to morsels by others - such images closely 
parallel Rhoda's psychotic fears, as does that vision of the dead man 
with his throat cut which had terrified Neville as a child and which 
comes to represent for him the 'unintelligible obstacle' or 'doom' which 
he cannot bypass(17-18). That the text is obsessed with the 
disintegration of the body can also be seen in the very intensity with 
which the six characters seek to compose unity or wholeness among 
themselves, for '[they] suffered terribly as [they] became separate 
bodies'(171). Recalling their dinner together in his last soliloquy, 
Bernard reflects dolefully: 'We saw for a moment laid out among us the 
body of the complete human being whom we have failed to be, but at the 
same time, cannot forget'(196). Though they attempt to assert 
individuality, 'like separated parts of one body and soul', Percival 
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makes them aware that such efforts are false. They create one 'circle', 
'this globe': 'do not let the swing door cut to pieces the thing that we 
have made'(104). And this achievement is later repeated at the second 
dinner party. The unification into one body occurs during a communion 
meal in both instances, and this is not simply a contingent matter of the 
logistics of bringing scattered bodies socially together. The 
concomitant satisfaction of oral impulses perhaps suggests a phantasy 
return to primitive fusion at the breast. 
Also marked by a certain disintegration and fragmentation is the 
'body' of The Waves itself, whose formal characteristics I have already 
noted. Though the laws of syntax are never finally shattered, the novel 
does create in the reading an effect of fragmentariness, of a radical 
lack of sequential momentum. The novel abounds with short sentences, 
organized in an often simple syntax, in marked contrast to the 'chameleon 
style' of the earlier novels whose typically long sentences sprawl 
through a meandering syntax. In his major study of poetic syntax, 
Articulate Energy, Donald Davie identifies three traditions of syntax in 
poetry. The tautly organized 'strong lines' of eighteenth century verse 
contrast clearly with the radically fragmented syntax of, say, 
Ezra Pound, but between these two poles Davie indentifies a third 
alternative: 'pseudo-syntax, a play of empty forms'. 
18 For in Symbolist 
poetry syntax is, on the surface, intact, yet in fact has no function, 
carries no charge of meaningful articulation, in a poetry that is 
structured according to principles of sound, rhythm, imagery. It is such 
a syntax that Woolf's novels operate, and in The Waves in particular, 
syntax is conspicuously subordinated to an organization of rhythm, phonic 
or semantic repetition: 
There is a dancing and a drumming, like the dancing and the 
drumming of naked men with assagais(100) 
doors will open and shut, will keep on opening and 
shutting... (111) 
261 
I am no longer young. I am no longer part of the procession. 
Millions descend those stairs in a terrible descent-Mill ions 
have died. Percival died. I still move. I still live(137) 
This is the prelude, this is the beginning. I glance, I peep, 
I powder... This is my calling. This is my world. All is 
decided and ready; the servants, standing here, and-again here, 
take my name, my fresh, my unknown name, and toss it before me. 
I enter. (73) 
Such repetition of the personal pronoun between two adjectives -my fresh, 
my unknown name - is a stylistic oddity which is maintained throughout 
the text, and shows repetition at work in the micro-structures of the 
novel's language as well as orchestrating whole paragraphs or pages at a 
time. 
Since it produces strong rhythmic effects, repetition foregrounds 
the phonetic properties or materiality of language at the expense of 
linear narrative development. By reintroducing words or phrases from the 
previous sentence, or redeploying a simple, emphatic syntactic structure, 
repetition and tautology activate the paradigmatic axis of language, 
which would otherwise be excluded by the developmental urgency of the 
syntagmatic chain, and in so doing they begin to dissolve the syntagma. 
The language of The Waves shows a consistent reluctance to give up the 
paradigmatic substitutions which in practice have to be repressed as the 
'Other' in order that meaning may be produced along the syntagmatic 
chain. The novel tends to explore the vertical axis, playing 
associational variations on a single signifier which, as Saussure pointed 
out, 'will unconsciously call to mind a host of other words' from the 
paradigm. 
19 Lacan has argued that the coherence of the subject is 
produced along the syntagmatic chain: 'strict coherence in the 
syntagmatic chain provides a position for the transcendental ego'. 
20 
Accordingly, to unleash the paradigm, to juxtapose rather than to 
subordinate signifiers, is to threaten that security. The Waves 
manipulates discrete clusters of words or isolated images which are not 
neatly pigeon-holed in an elaborate syntactic hierarchy. Its philosophy 
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of language is articulated by Bernard, who is tired* of stories and 
phrases that 'come down beautifully with all their feet on the 
ground'(169): 'what is the use of painfully elaborating these consecutive 
sentences when what one needs is nothing consecutive but a bark, a 
groan'(178). Thus the set images of each character, their distinctive 
bark or groan as it were, recur throughout the text without their 
reappearances being governed locally by logical connections or narrative 
necessity. Woolf had jotted in her diary: 'I am sure that this is the 
right way of using them [images and symbols] - not in set pieces, as I 
had tried at first, coherently, but simply as images, never making them 
work out; only suggest'(WD, 169). On this showing, Donald Davie's 
description of Symbolist poetry again has a bearing on The Waves: 'a poem 
which works by the arrangement of images, letting the meaning flow 
unstated, as it were, from the space between them'. 'It follows', he 
continues, 'that dislocation of syntax is essential to all poems written 
in this tradition'. 21 It may be that the novel, as genre, exercises 
stronger syntagmatic constraints than operate in lyric poetry, but if 
Woolf does not dislocate syntax, even in Rhoda's most extreme assertions 
of psychic breakdown, she certainly goes a long way towards emptying 
syntax of its. function of articulation across the novel as a whole. Yet 
the novel is divided about the consequences of this. Bernard rejects 
sequentiality, but also knows that 'without [it] we should be 
undone'(166); syntax is one major element of those psychic 'Roman roads' 
which maintain the self within sanity and civilization. In this phase 
Bernard would doubtless concur with Donald Davie (who has Pound's Cantos 
in mind) that 'to dislocate syntax in poetry is to threaten the rule of 
law in the civilised community'. 
22 Yet still he has, like the' novel in 
which he features, a desire to pursue the paradigmatic, to 'play ducks 
and drakes with all these phrases'(184). 
The arrangement of the monologues is a further device contributing 
to the novel's effect of broken stasis. Though described by its author 
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as a 'play-poem'(WD, 137), the text has no dramatic impetus. Its 
monologues are not addressed to each other, they achieve no dramatic 
interaction, and only follow one another within a general chronology that 
does not establish close local links of logic or sequence. Not only at 
the level of its individual sentences but also between its major units of 
monologue, the text tends not to establish syntagmatic relationships of 
implication, causality or subordination. The monologues are organized by 
parataxis rather than syntaxis. Laid in juxtaposition, they do not aim 
for tight closure in the larger syntagmatic chains of the novel, and the 
reader is again deprived of the fixed, unitary subject position that 
brings about Kristevan 'thesis'; the resultant anxiety will usually 
emerge in the reading as frustration and tedium. These effects are 
reinforced by a lack of drama within the speeches as well as between 
them. Rhythm rather than dramatic interaction was Woolf's major concern 
in this 'series of dramatic soliloquies': 'the thing is to keep them 
running homogeneously in and out, in the rhythm of the waves'(WD, 159). 
The hard, external linguistic mode of the soliloquies denies the reader 
the pleasures of 'inwardness', of the intimate access to subjectivity 
that the stream of consciousness, for example, affords. Dislocation of 
syntax runs the risk of being recuperated as a more faithful 
transcription of a disordered but none the less basically unitary (even 
lyrical) subjectivity; this has been the fate of Pound's Pisan Cantos. 
Woolf avoids that danger, first, by emptying rather than fracturing 
syntax, and, second, by a rhetoric of externality that rebuffs her 
reader's empathy. 
The Woolfian novel must convey the uncircumscribed spirit 'whatever 
aberration or complexity it may display'. It must reproduce the order in 
which the atoms impinge on the mind, 'however disconnected and incoherent 
in appearance'(CE, 2: 106-107). But even so Woolf was worried about the 
fragmentation of The Waves, for 'everything in a work of art should be 
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mastered and ordered' as well(CE, 2: 228). In February 1930 she wrote: 
'Lord how I wonder if I shall pull this book off! It is a litter of 
fragments so far'(WD, 154). In one sense, the novel has a very rigid 
form and order. It is structured by the temporally progressive 
interludes, which also effect a rough parallelism between the position of 
the sun and the phase of the characters' lives. But this rigid framework 
can perhaps be seen as opportunistic, as a concession to the 
'disabilities' of a contemporary readership. In a letter to Ethyl Smyth, 
Woolf remarked: 'I think then that my difficulty is that I am writing to 
a rhythm and not to a plot... And thus though the rhythmical is more 
natural to me than the narrative, it is completely opposed to the 
tradition of fiction and I am casting about all the time for some rope to 
throw to the reader'(L, 4: 204). Another such guide for the reader is 
given in Bernard's final soliloquy, which Woolf clearly intends to 
produce an effect of summary or synthesis and 'absorb all those scenes' 
(WD, 162). Yet this long soliloquy of Bernard's results only in a mere 
restatement of all the previous scenes without throwing any new light or 
perspective on them, and it thus increases the reader's sense of 
monotony. After her attempt to pulverize the 'false, unreal, merely 
conventional' narrative sequence into 'moments'(WD, 139), Woolf now 
worries about a possible excess of fragmentation. From Julia Kristeva's 
viewpoint, such anxiety is a necessary component of the creation of art: 
'a text, in order to hold together as a text... requires a completion 
[finition], a structuration, a kind of totalization of semiotic motility. 
This completion constitutes a synthesis that requires the thesis of 
language in order to come about, and the semiotic pulverizes it only to 
make it a new device'(RPL, 51). The more Woolf destroys the thesis, the 
more rigid control she in another sense requires. If she dissolves the 
sequentiality of narrative, she must also introduce a more rigid - almost 
rebarbatively so - formal sequence. If she lets rhythm empty syntax, the 
syntax now none the less becomes far more stiff and straightforward, 
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losing its earlier 'meandering' qualities. The overall effect shifts 
from the 'fluent and fluid' to 'solidity'(WD, 176). 
Woolf repeatedly records in her diary her sense of an extreme 
pressure of difficulty in writing The Waves, (WD, 156-157), and this 
difficulty is encountered in turn by the reader. Worrying about the 
disintegration of the work, Woolf comes to rely on rhythm to weld the 
book into a unity, yet it was precisely rhythm that had fragmented the 
text in the first place. 'What it wants is presumably unity... Suppose I 
could run all the scenes together more? - by rhythms chiefly'(WD, 163). 
Throughout The Waves effects of rhythm pulse, pass, recur, especially the 
two-beat rhythm of wave movement itself; rhythmic patterns or images of 
in/out, up/down, rise/fall appear innumerably throughout the text: 'Lifts 
rise and fall; trains stop, trains start as regularly as the waves of the 
sea'(139). Another recurrent rhythm finds momentary expression in 
Louis's image of the mainspring, used to evoke the tempo of life in his 
eating house: 
It is like a waltz tune, eddying in and out, round and round. 
The waitresses, balancing trays, swing in and out, round and 
round, dealing plates of greens, of apricot and custard, 
dealing them at the right time, to the right customers. The 
average men, including her rhythm in their rhythm ('I would 
take a tenner; for it blocks up the hall') take their greens, 
take their apricots and custard... Here is the central rhythm; 
here the common mainspring. I watch it expand, contract; and 
then expand again (67-68) 
Yet Louis is 'not included'. He hates this 'cheap and worthless' 
pulsation, attempts to quell this subterranean rhythm into order. On 
this issue, as on so many others, then, he is counterposed to Bernard who 
declares that 'the rhythm is the main thing in writing'(57). It is also 
by the power of rhythm that Neville arrives at the conviction that he is 
a poet: 'Now begins to rise in me the familiar rhythm; words that have 
lain dormant now lift, now toss their crests, and fall and rise, and fall 
and rise again. I am a poet, yes'(59). In 'Letter to a Young Poet' 
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Woolf expands on the significance of rhythm in the writing of poetry. 
Addressed to a young poet, this essay none the less bears upon The Waves, 
which she had called a 'playpoem'. She meditates on 'the most profound 
and primitive of instincts, the instinct of rhythm': 
All you need now is to stand at the window and let your 
rhythmical sense open and shut, open and shut, boldly and 
freely, until one thing melts in another... until a whole has 
been made from all these separate fragments... Then let your 
rhythmical sense wind itself in and out among men and women, 
omnibuses, sparrows... until it has strung them together in one 
harmonious whole. That perhaps is your task... to absorb every 
experience that comes your way fearlessly and saturate it 
completely... to re-think human life into poetry and so give us 
tragedy again and comedy by means of characters not spun out at 
length in the novelist's way, but condensed and synthesized in 
the poet's way. (CE, 2: 191) 
Most profound and primitive of instincts', rhythm is central to 
Kristeva's semiotic which becomes more or less integrated into the 
signifier, and even after the acquisition of language it is a necessary 
accompaniment to adult speech or even the highest flights of rational 
thought. It becomes dominant and breaks through the thetic elements of 
language in The Waves, subduing all the elements that are conventionally 
expected in a novel. Repetition and tautology, multiplied for the sake 
of the rhythmical wave-effects, persistently hinder linear narrative 
development; small-scale, local effects of inertia ultimately give the 
effect of a universe of entropy, a term which is pejorative only from 
that teleological viewpoint that the text here puts in question. "'What 
is lost? What is over? " And "Over and done with, " I muttered, "over and 
done with, " solacing myself with words' (131). 'A child playing -a 
summer evening - doors will open and shut, will keep opening and 
shutting... (III). 
The conventional concept of character is no less eroded by rhythm, 
for the same rhythms pervade the six figures equally and blur the 
boundaries and extend the margins of self; a kind of choric dimension is 
thus given even to the most intimate of self-revelations. 
23 'The 
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tautology is there for the sake of the rhythm and is not in character', 
and The Waves is thus difficult, Hermione Lee continues, 'to read as a 
novel, in that the emphasis on rhythm overwhelms distinctions of 
character'. 24 This 'difficulty' is of course not a critique of the text, 
but rather precisely its point. If rhythm is the most profound and 
primitive of the instincts, repetition is hardly less so. 'The 
compulsion to repeat is an ungovernable process in the unconscious', and 
in elaborating the theory of Wiederholungszwang Freud finally sees 
repetition 'as the expression of the most general character of the 
instincts'. 25 The Waves as it were consciously decides to give the reins 
to unconscious impulse, to 'let [the] rhythmical sense open and shut, 
open and shut... wind itself in and out' (CE, 2: 191), that is, to let the 
semiotic play dissolvingly across discourse. Introduced in order to 
guarantee uniformity, rhythm itself ironically loses freedom, since 
everything in the text is now reduced to the same rhythmical pattern. 
The very extremity of Woolf's challenge to conventional narrative unity, 
as she abandons 'casting a line to make my book the right shape' 
(WD, 153), curiously ends by undercutting its own radicalism. Resenting 
the homogeneity of narrative, The Waves itself none the less actually 
impoverishes heterogeneity in another sense, cancelling out the flowing, 
polyphonic richness of the earlier novels into a monotous uniformity. 
Woolf's second and more thematic device to give unity to the text is 
the figure of Percival. -As a charismatic personality who 
draws the six 
characters together, he is the hero who generates a 'common feeling'(104) 
or 'communion'(96) by smoothing away the pugnacious assertion of 
egotistic differences. As in To the Lighthouse, the epiphanic moment 
occurs during a dinner-party; 'a steel-blue circle beneath' becomes 
evident, 'a globe whose walls are made of Percival, of youth and beauty'. 
Again as in the earlier novel, this moment of wholeness is contrasted 
with an 'outside'(101) of Darwinian nature, of dangerous flux: 'do not 
let the swing door cut to pieces the thing that we have made, that globes 
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itself here, among these lights'(104). But whereas Mrs. Ramsay is a 
passive guardian of the human light or interior, Percival is a male hero 
whose mission it is to spread the light into hitherto benighted regions 
of the world; he aims to solve 'the Oriental problem' by opposing 'a 
sense of the uselessness of human exertion'(97). Thus the symbolic 
moment experienced by the six characters and Percival is presented as the 
triumph of civilization, of human creativity, against the lightless flux 
of nature: 'we too, as we put on our hats and push open the door, stride 
not into chaos, but into a world that our own force can subjugate and 
make part of the illumined and everlasting road'(105). In the second 
reunion at Hampton Court, with the characters now middle-aged and 
Percival dead, the moment of 'illumination' or 'one life' once again 
blazes against the dark 'abysses of space'(162), but only fitfully: 'The 
moment was all; the moment was enough'(197). For the sense of an 
ungovernable flux is more acute, the 'illimitable chaos'(160) more 
menacing than previously. 
If pessimism becomes more difficult to resist as the characters age, 
it is also reinforced by the death of Percival, the loss of the centre he 
had once been. In his role as absent centre, Percival has strong 
affinities with Jacob Flanders. Adored by the other characters, in whose 
consciousness he occupies a near-obsessive place, Percival himself is 
silent; his mind, like Jacob's, is a lacuna in the text. Like his 
predecessor, he too possesses an enviable lack of self-consciousness. 
'Not a thread, not a sheet of paper lies between him and the sun', 
remarks Neville(35); he is 'oblivious, almost entirely ignorant'(43) of 
the entanglements of consciousness. Percival's attraction is precisely 
this immediacy and solidity, his natural 'truthful[ness]'(111); like 
Jacob, he approaches an ideal unity of form and meaning. For Louis, 
Percival 'inspires poetry'(29); he is the object of a poetic 
consciousness that can aspire towards reality only through the mediate 
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measure of words. His death too is a Fall, casting doubt on the human 
project of shaping nature into meaning; 'His horse tripped. He was 
thrown'(107), and he dies an obscure and pointless death. (The image of 
the riderless horse occurs towards the end of Jacob's Room, serving as a 
bleak, ironic commentary on the earlier image of Jacob's masterful riding 
- JR, 163,97). Both texts are in deep ways ambivalent about the relation 
- cause or effect? - of the hero's death to the fallen world, but because 
in The Waves the action of the novel, the lives of the characters, extend 
beyond Percival's death, it is their interpretation, which sees his death 
as cause, which predominates. The 'centre' of the world has become 
'empty'(W, 109,111,194); Neville laments 'the depravity of the world' and 
suffers from 'bitterness and rancour'(129). The name Percival 
necessarily evokes the Grail legend, and critics have pointed out various 
parallels between the two Percivals. Both are in a sense failed heroes, 
not having lived up to their original promise. Percival not only fails 
in the quest for the Grail, but actually brings forth the Waste Land. 
26 
Maria DiBattista points out the abudance of 'veils' in The Waves, 
both as descriptive metaphors and as narrative technique(150). She 
argues that the veil masks the narrator whose power and voice will 
control the ensuing narrative. Veils are 'narrative garments, 
strategies, and ploys that permit the "she" behind The Waves to 
speak'(150-1). DiBattista also usefully reminds us that Percival's name 
'denotes in its original French, to pierce the veil (perce-voile)'(152). 
She concludes that Percival is an inspired name for the hero of a 
narrative so concerned with the powers of dissimulation and obsessed with 
the recovery of the departed past - the memory of Thoby Stephen - that 
Woolf confides to her diary. Inconspicuously but persistently, the text 
is indeed full of images of veil, net, film, fabric, which serve either 
for metaphors of mind or consciousness, its delicate films of nerves and 
percept ions(c35,84,97,142,171,182), or for the system of signs which 
constitutes and is constituted by consciousness(127), or, finally, for 
270 
the muffling layer of daily habit. This series of linked images thus 
rejoins the famous image of the 'luminous halo', that 'semi-transparent 
envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end'. 
As perce-voile, Percival comes to signify a hole punched through the veil 
of consciousness; he is a lacuna in the consciousness of the text, the 
lack of self-consciousness, representing (but that word already denotes a 
mediacy he has happily never known) an Edenic relationship to the word. 
As I suggested above in relation to Jacob's Room, such immediacy is the 
fortunate identity of signifier and signified; in The Waves Percival is 
the condition of possibility of their coincidence. The death of Percival 
is the death of both the symbolic ideal and the utopian community, which 
are the two modes of fusing organically the disparate and contingent. 
However, Percival is ambivalent in the same way as Jacob Flanders. 
For if the veil is truly an envelope surrounding us from the beginning of 
consciousness, then to pierce the 'veil of being'(209) is to run the risk 
of death. Percival's name thus foreshadows his own premature death. 
'Pierce (the) veil' suggests the fundamental aggressiveness and violence 
of this masculine hero - aspects of the male nature which were revealed 
in the boy Jacob's enthusiasm for moth-hunting - and also carries 
suggestions of the male's penetration of the hymen. Associations of 
heroic violence pervade the images in which the characters think of 
Percival. For Neville, he is the equal of 'Alcibiades, Ajax, Hector': 
'they loved riding, they risked their lives wantonly'(129). In contrast 
to the others, Percival is a man of action, a born 'leader'(26), a 
guardian of standards and rules rather than an open, receptive 
sensibility. His magnificence reminds Louis 'of some medieval 
commander'(26). Neville's association of Percival with the classical 
world for his 'straight nose', his 'blue and oddly inexpressive eyes', 
his 'upright and indifferent' stance, points both to his physical 
splendour and his less attractive potential as 'an admirable church- 
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warden. He should have a birch and beat little boys for 
misdemeanours'(25). For Percival is in the end a typical representative 
of patriarchy, as is attested by his finally going to India as the agent 
of British Imperialism. The other characters thrill to the possibility 
of his resolving 'the Oriental problem' 'by applying the standards of the 
West, by using the violent language that is natural to him' and becoming 
'a God' there(96). Percival's nobility and magnificence thus shade off 
into more sinisterly patriarchal qualities - aggression, oppressiveness, 
domination. Dubbed 'conventional' by Bernard(88), Percival embodies 
qualities that the patriarchy values, and will assist their social 
diffusion. Percival's death is then both poignant and ironic, as was 
Jacob's: as an eminent representative of a crass patriarchy, he deserves 
what he gets - what he indeed virtually brings down on himself - yet he 
is also the system's victim, denied by it any glimpse of a viable 
alternative and thus still worth mourning. The text's ironic critique of 
Percival is articulated by Bernard, who reflects after the former's 
death: 'I should be able to place him in trifling and ridiculous 
situations...! must be able to say, "Percival, a ridiculous name"(110). 
It is crucial for the novel's final position that the centre that 
Percival once was is emptied. Bernard again: 'he sat there in the 
centre. Now I go to that spot no longer. The place is empty'(109). 
Adored but absent, Percival's real function is, argues DiBattista, 
to serve 'as a decoy figure whose function it is to divert attention from 
the novel's real center, the "She" not the "He" who successfully pierces 
the veil'. She contends that 'displacement and dissimulation are 
necessary to avoid all those censors of private feminine dreams', 
represented in the novel by, for example, St. Paul's pronouncement that 
women should veil themselves. But her argument is not wholly convincing, 
for at this stage of her career, with several successful books already 
behind her and her identity as a woman writer affirmed by A Room of One's 
Own, 'displacement and dissimulation' seem hardly necessary any longer to 
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enable Woolf to write. If there is such a need, then it is perhaps in 
order to avoid her own self consciousness as a woman, which, as she had 
often argued, was harmful to artistic creation. DiBattista further 
argues that 'the disguised presence and subject of the novel is the "real 
novelist" - Virginia Woolf, the woman writing in the seclusion of 
Rodmell-Elvedon'. 27 Certainly DiBattista is right to relate Percival to 
the issue of woman's writing, but he relates to it as absent centre, not 
as disguise. 
To examine the Elvedon episode will help clarify the issue. After 
his visit to it as a child, this half-imaginary land haunts Bernard: 
'That is Elvedon. The lady sits between the two long windows, writing. 
The gardeners sweep the lawn with giant brooms'(12). This 'unknown 
land'(12) lies 'down below, through the depth of the leaves'(170), which 
Bernard imagines as waves: 'We shall sink through the green air of the 
leaves, Susan. We sink as we run. The waves close over us, the beech 
leaves meet above our heads' (11). The episode is deeply connected with 
the question of writing: it was while Bernard was 'making phrases'(13) in 
an attempt to console Susan that he makes this exploration into Elvedon, 
and when they return from this dreamland he composes a poem about a wood- 
pigeon. The experience brings a kind of revelation which the boy Bernard 
grasps, for the first time, in language: 'a single phrase, for a hole had 
been knocked in my mind, one of those sudden transparencies through which 
one sees everything'(171). The image of the lady writing and the 
gardeners sweeping recurs continually to him. DiBattista claims that 
this woman writing is the disguised subject of the novel, and Sara 
Ruddick also interprets her as 'an androgynous yet recognizably female 
narrator'. 
28 Bernard's occasional generalization of the lady to 'women 
writing' suggests that what is symbolized here is indeed female 
creativity and power to write. The men in the scene are 
characteristically ambivalent figures. As gardeners, they control Nature 
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to provide a locus of security where the woman can write, yet they are 
also reduced to the kinds of menial task (sweeping) that are 
conventionally allotted to women. Bernard discovers that he. 'cannot 
interfere with a single stroke of those brooms... Nor with the fixity of 
that woman writing'(170-171). As 'an unknown land' or 'the ladies' 
garden', Elvedon seems to figure a Utopia where feminine writing can 
exist unthwarted. 
A passage from 'The Mark on the Wall' throws light on this dream 
land: 
Yes, one could imagine a very pleasant world. A quiet, 
spacious world, with the flowers so red and blue in the open 
fields. A world without professors or specialists or house- 
keepers with the profiles of policemen, a world which one could 
slice with one's thought as a fish slices the water with his 
fin... How peaceful it is down here, rooted in the centre of the 
world and gazing up through the grey waters, with their sudden 
gleams of light, and their reflections - if it were not for 
Whitaker's Almanack - if it were not for the Table of 
Precedency! (H H, 46) 
This utopic realm is liberated from the masculine standards which still 
govern our lives, but whose ascendency, Woolf writes earlier, has been 
crumbling since the First World War. This, like Elvedon, is a subaqueous 
world, and the 'fish' is a recurrent image in Woolf for the female 
thought or imagination that is quickly scared into hiding by the 
masculine point of view. In A Room of One's Own the narrator's 'little 
fish' is cowed by the Beadle who aims to protect the turf of the college; 
in 'Professions for Women' the girl, who is 'impeded by the extreme 
conventionality of the other sex'(CE, 2: 278-288), cannot let her fish 
swim freely as she needs to be able to if she wants to write. The female 
imagination only flourishes in this underwater realm, in the 'stream' 
which lies 'deep below' the 'orderly and military progress' that Bernard 
condemns as 'a mistake... a convenience, a lie' (181), in a speech that 
directly reflects Woolf's own critique of the 'narrative business of the 
realist' in her diary (WD, 139 - see above p. 247). Bernard counterposes 
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an alternative mode of being to this orderly linear progression which is 
both narrative and the general social order supporting/supported by this 
literary form. This other realm is 'a rushing stream of broken dreams, 
nursery rhymes, street cries, half-finished sentences and sights - elm 
trees, willow trees, gardeners sweeping, women writing' (181); it coexists 
with the linear everyday world, but remains suppressed. The turbulent 
stream, which is the locus of women's writing, lies beneath or outside 
the 'Roman roads'(184) - Bernard's phrase for the biographic style that 
ignores the 'tumult of our lives'. 'Since they [the Roman roads] compel 
us to walk in step like civilized people with the slow and measured tread 
of policemen', they hold us within civilization, 'though one may be 
humming any nonsense under one's breath at the same time'(184). This, 
clearly, is once more the policeman of Jacob's Room, controlling the 
traffic just as he represses wayward impulses and sentiments 'by force of 
will', and it is of this oppressive order that Percival is the major 
representative. Percival, narrativity and the patriarchy must be 
simultaneously dislodged in order to allow Elvedon and women's writing to 
emerge: hence it is that the centre that Percival occupies must be 
emptied. Bernard remarks: 'There is, nothing one can fish up in a spoon; 
nothing one can call an event' (181) in this concealed stream, and he 
might well be describing Woolf's own aims in writing The Waves: 'not 
trying to tell a story... do away with exact place and time'(WD, 142-143). 
In a self-reflexive gesture, the text thus figures, in Elvedon, its own 
project. The woman writing is indeed the narrator of the book, that 
'mind thinking' or 'she' (WD, 142-143), who had initially existed but 
receded from the surface of the text in its final version, and is 
ultimately the author of the book, Woolf herself. 
Immersed in the underworld below the socio-symbolic order, Bernard 
is granted 'a reason', 'a sudden revelation', which he attempts at the 
same time to form into phrases: 'a hole had been knocked in my mind, one 
of those sudden transparencies through which one sees everything' (181). 
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In a system of images that first appeared as the 'wild goose' and 'great 
fish' of Orlando (0,281-282), Bernard's revelation is symbolized as a 
bird or fish (W, 181), the former of which catches up the earlier 
incident in which he had turned the pigeon into a poem. For Bernard at 
Rome, in his 'moments of escape' from the quotidian sequence of daily 
life, 'A fin turns': 'This bare visual impression is unattached to any 
line of reason, it springs up as one might see the fin of a porpoise on 
the horizon. Visual impressions often communicate thus briefly 
statements that we shall in time to come uncover and coax into words. I 
note under F., therefore, "Fin in a waste of waters"' (134-135). Here 
again the novel refers back to its own inception, for The Waves itself 
was 'a reach after that vision', an attempt to net 'that fin in the waste 
of water which appeared to me over the marshes' as Woolf was coming to 
the-end of To the Lighthouse(WD, 158,169). Associated with the 'essence 
of reality'(WD, 101), the image of the fin as reality comes to her as, 
'driven by loneliness and silence from the habitable world', she sinks to 
'the bottom of the vessel' (W D, 148,132) - just as Bernard had reached 
Elvedon by sinking 'through the green air of the leaves' (W, 11) or, in a 
sense, the waves. But the eruption of a hidden meaning - fin or reality 
- from the calm surface is deeply ambivalent, alternately benevolent and 
sinister. 'Frightening and exciting', it entails loneliness, 'agony', 
'terror', and yet remains 'the most necessary thing to me: that which I 
seek'(WD, 101,132). There is a sense of adventurous liberation from the 
self fixed in the socio-symbolic sequence, but also a fundamental fear of 
emptiness or nothingness (WD, 148,144). The visual image varies 
according to the local balance of the ambivalent values. It may emerge 
as 'the fin of a porpoise'(134), a conventionally friendly and alert 
creature, or as the jutting 'spine' of some dangerous sea-monster. It is 
this latter, sinister vision that haunts Rhoda: 'with sudden intermittent 
shocks, sudden as the springs of a tiger, life emerges heaving its dark 
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crest from the sea. It is to this we are attached; it is to this we are 
bound, as bodies to wild horses... the emerging monster to whom we are 
attached'(47). 
29 In a further ramification of this system of images, the 
fin becomes a dangerous, uncontrollable horse, which connects to the 
horse that involves Percival in his fatal accident and to the similar 
vein of imagery in Jacob's Room. 
It is the power of language that governs whether 'reality' emerges 
as benevolent or menacing. If it can be successfully encircled by 
language, 'coaxed' into a coherent whole or symbol, then meaning can be 
created/retrieved and the human mind triumph over insensate nature. In 
'A Sketch of the Past' Woolf reflects on a childhood revelation in a 
passage that illuminates the relation between the epiphanic moment and 
the power of words. In one of the 'exceptional moments' to which I 
referred above, she realizes in a shock of insight as she contemplates a 
flower: 'That is the whole', 'I found a reason'. She then analyzes this 
visionary shock: 
I feel that I have had a blow; but it is not, as I thought as a 
child, simply a blow from an enemy hidden behind the cotton 
wool of daily life; it is or will become a revelation of some 
order; it is a token of some real thing behind appearances; and 
I make it real by putting it into words. It is only by putting 
it into words that I make it whole; this wholeness means that 
it has lost its power . 
to hurt me; it gives me, perhaps because 
by doing so I take away the pain, a great delight to put the 
severed parts together-it ' is a constant idea of mine; that 
behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we... are 
connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; 
that we are parts of the work of art... we are the words; we are 
the music; we are the thing itself. And I see this when I have 
a shock. (M6,72) 
To synthesize in the instantaneity of the symbol, to reduce 
undifferentiated matter to transparency, thus becomes a raison d'etre of 
both literature and life. When Woolf fails in this, as she does in two 
other of her childhood's 'exceptional moments', she is thrown into 'a 
state of despair', 'a peculiar horror and a physical collapse'(MB, 71, 
72). Language is thus both the means by which, and the zone in which, 
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the shock of submarine impulses or the 'illimitable chaos' of The Waves 
may be humanly mastered. It aims to 'retrieve' experience 'from 
formlessness with words'(191), as part of what Bernard terms 'a fight 
against the green woods and green fields and sheep advancing with 
measured tread, munching'(192) -a vision of Nature's depradations that 
harks back to the 'Time Passes' section of To the Lighthouse. It was 
'the presence of these enemies' (170) that had incited Bernard, even as a 
child, to explore Elvedon. 
'Beneath the surface of a stream'(81) is the place of potential 
revelation, which might optimally be synthesized in language into a 
meaningful whole, but also of danger. Bernard expresses the positive 
wish for immersion in this realm beyond the symbolic order and language: 
to visit the profound depths; once in a while to exercise my 
prerogative not always to act, but to explore; to hear vague, 
ancestral sounds of boughs creaking, of mammoths; to indulge 
impossible desires to embrace the whole world with the arms of 
understanding - impossible to those who act. Am I not, as I 
walk, trembling with strange oscillations and vibrations of 
sympathy... unmoored as I am from a private being... (81-82) 
But these pre-civilized depths beneath the 'Roman roads' have also, as 
the imagery of 'mammoths' and 'ancestral sounds' here suggests, a darker 
aspect as the dangerous flux of Darwinian nature; 'the green woods and 
green fields' modulate into an 'unfeeling universe' or 'immeasurable 
sea'(192,199,201). One enters this realm by casting off the thetic 
self of coherent action and will, but this is simultaneously to abandon 
the human project of constructing chaos into an order within which we can 
live. Freedom from 'the burden of individual life'(80) is also a state 
of impotence which leaves one buffetted by the forces of nature. 
Rejecting 'deliberate' or 'reasonable' transcripts, Bernard calls for 'a 
painful, guttural, visceral, also soaring, lark-like, pealing song'(177), 
yet the text cannot so readily hold these two moments - guttural and 
lark-like - of its Utopian ideal together. To enter the semiotic realm 
of dreams, 'unborn selves' or 'old, half-articulated ghosts' is 
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simultaneously to unleash a threateningly pre-human self: 'the old 
brute... the savage, the hairy man who dabbles his fingers in ropes of 
entrails; and gobbles and belches; whose speech is guttural, 
visceral'(205). Alert to the dangers of primitivism, the novel halts 
before giving free rein to this Darwinian savage, this 'illimitable 
chaos' within the self. 30 The novel needs to dissolve the rigid, 
premature totalities of patriarchal 'consecutive sentences', yet without 
abolishing the project of totality altogether; it both desires and fears 
the 'bark, a groan'(178) which seems to it the only possible alternative 
to the suave schematizations of the symbolic order. Bernard at last 
finds it impossible to live 'without a self, weightless and visionless... 
without illusion'(202-203). His final soliloquy is increasingly 
pessimistic as it contemplates the disastrous consequences of a collapse 
of the thetic self that had initially been desired. 
The extreme enactment of the negative aspects of rejecting the 
symbolic and the thetic are seen in Rhoda, who suffers a dispersal of the 
self of pathological proportions, from which even self-inflicted pain- 
banging her hand 'against some hard door'(31) - cannot recall her. 
Excluded from the thetic domain of propositions and positionality, Rhoda 
exists (if that is indeed the right word for her tenuous mode of being! ) 
only in the 'margin' of the symbolic order, in the chasms in the 
continuity of its ways: 'How you snatched me from the white spaces that 
lie between hour and hour and rolled them into dirty pellets and tossed 
them into the waste-paper with your greasy paws. Yet those were my 
life'(145). Associated with whiteness(13,46,77) and emptiness(16,99) 
outside time and logic, Rhoda marks out the locus of a feminine space, 
that non-symbolizable Other that must be repressed but none the less 
exist for a normative discourse to be installed. Such a 'discourse' is 
not organized around the self-present centre - Derrida's transcendental 
signifier - that sustains masculine meaning and order; it is infinitely 
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decentred. Yet Bernard finds language impossible without a self and 
Rhoda psychotically sinks under the waves and is dissolved. A feminine 
discourse of the white spaces is thus strictly a contradiction, 
impossible except as silence, for those white spaces have, precisely, to 
be repressed in order for discourse to be possible. 
Feminine writing would thus put into discursive circulation that 
which normative writing represses, the realm outside the Cartesian 
subject. In 'On Being 111' Woolf draws attention to just such a realm. 
As the body asserts itself in the state of illness, so language suddenly 
reveals its normally repressed materiality: 'In health meaning has 
encroached upon sound. Our intelligence dominates over our senses. But 
in illness, with the police off duty, we creep beneath some obscure poem 
by Mallarme or Donne-and the words give out their scent and distil 
their flavour, and then, if at last we grasp the meaning, it is all the 
richer for having come to us sensually first, by way of the palate and 
the nostrils, like some queer odour'(CE, 4: 200). The self is pluralized; 
there return 'embryo lives which attend us in early youth until "I" 
suppressed them'. With responsibility and reason in abeyance, we become 
'sudden, fitful, intense'(199); the sick are 'outlaws', escaped from 
'paternal government'(200). Illness thus releases the characteristics of 
the submarine realm that Bernard visits, the feminine that is repressed 
as disruptive by patriarchal law. Liberated into a rich polyvalence, 
this realm is always in Woolf simultaneously menacing because it is near 
to, or even simply is, a Nature that nullifies all human values into 
chaos. Elvedon will always be a 'hostile country'(12) from which Bernard 
and Susan must escape, as well as a Utopia. 
A difficult poise must be effected, since feminine writing must be 
inside language enough not to succumb to nature, but also outside it in 
the sense of dissolving its reified unities. For as Woolf phrases it in 
A Room of One's Own, it is fatal to be either a man or woman pure and 
simple(RO, 157). In the early stages of working on The Waves, she had 
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planned to use 'a man and a woman' talking as the narrative 
consciousness, and even if the man was later to be left 'absolutely 
dim'(WD, 108), his existence was still necessary, just as in Elvedon there 
must be gardeners who tend Nature as a counterpart to the woman writing. 
It is, appropriately, the androgynous Bernard, who possesses 'the logical 
sobriety of a man' 'joined to the sensibility of a woman'(55), who 
discovers Elvedon. It is also Bernard who absorbs the consciousnesses of 
the five characters and even at last takes the place of the narrative 
consciousness itself, in which the whole discourse - interludes and 
monologues - had taken place. 'Day rises; the girl lifts the watery 
fire-hearted jewels to her brow; the sun levels his beams straight at the 
sleeping house'(207). Bernard's own discourse thus subsumes the 
interludes themselves, and he in a sense becomes identified with the 
woman writing in Elvedon. 
Androgyny is necessary for the feminine discourse to be heard at 
all. If it is 'feminine' pure and simple, there will be only silence, a 
'white space' that will be tossed into the wastepaper basket (145). To 
make such white space conspicuous, to make silence heard, the letter and 
the voice are necessary, even though at the very same moment they 
threaten to quell what they enable. Feminine writing will appear as 
'white spaces between hours', as emptiness and lack between syntax and 
logic, disturbing the linearity of the paternal order. Lest a female 
discourse should collapse into eternal silence, there must be, in 
Kristeva's words, 'a constant alternation between time and its "truth", 
identity and its loss, history and the timeless, signless, extra- 
phenomenal things that produce it. An impossible dialectic: a permanent 
the 
alternation: never zone without the other'. 
31 The condition of 
possibility of feminine writing can only be this alternation between the 
formation of the thetic subject and a regression to the pre-Oedipal 
stage, to the jouissance of an as yet undissociated mother and child. 
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Androgynous as he is, Bernard lives precisely this endless oscillation 
between the formation and dissolution of the self: 'Having dropped off 
satisfied like a child from the breast, I am at liberty now to sink down, 
deep, into what passes, this omnipresent, general life'(81). As the 
regressive image of contented suckling suggests, Bernard 'sinks down' to 
'the profound depths'(81) of the Imaginary in which there is no solidity, 
no distinction, no time but dreams: 'the passage of undifferentiated 
faces... drugs me into dreams; rubs the features from faces. People might 
walk through me. And, what is this moment of time, this particular day 
in which I have found myself caught? '(81). 'Unmoored... from a private 
being', Bernard retrieves the Imaginary identification with the whole 
world: 'to embrace the whole world with the arms of understanding', 'I am 
not, at this moment, myself'(82). Then, in the next stage of the 
dialectic, he gropes his way out from the Imaginary, separating himself 
as subject from the world of objects, taking up a position as thetic 
subject: 'It steals in through some crack in the structure - one's 
identity. I am not part of the street - no, I observe the street. One 
splits off, therefore'(82). He resumes his command over language, 
generating one story after another; thus he 'elaborates' or 
'differentiates' himself(83). 
Bernard's oscillation never comes to an end - 'one moment free; the 
next, this(207) - for it is the very process of androgyny. But this 
dialectic is charged with ambivalence, and a final value can never be 
assigned to either of its phases. Under one aspect, dissolution of the 
self is liberation from the limits of personal identity, freedom from 
'false phrases'. In this stage Bernard expands in phantasy, 'so vast, a 
temple, a church, a whole universe, unconfined and capable of being 
everywhere on the verge of things'(207). Emerging from the 'thick leaves 
of habit'(201), he attains a radical Keatsian negative capability 
('Immeasurably receptive'(206)), from which perspective language is 
necessarily partial and false: 'I need a little language such as lovers 
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use, words of one syllable such as children speak when they come into the 
room and find their mother sewing and pick up some scrap of bright wool, 
a feather, or a shred of chintz'(209). Once again the image of 
ontological security (which is the precondition, however, of the blurring 
of the borders of self) in the presence of the mother testifies to the 
retrieval of the Imaginary. Bernard wonders whether inability to recover 
from 'dissipation', 'endless throwing away', from becoming an 
'immeasurable sea'(201), is 'a sort of death' or, positively, 'A new 
assembly of elements'(198). For dissolution may also be a foundering and 
sinking, threatening one with 'becom[ing] part of that unfeeling 
universe'(199), which is Rhoda's unenviable fate. It is potentially the 
defeat of humanity by 'the sea; the insensitive nature'(WD, 153). His 
ambivalence towards this dialectic of the self and its dissipation can be 
seen in his simultaneously thanking and cursing the other who forces him 
to re-collect his self from its dispersal: 'how also under your gaze ... I 
begin to perceive this, that and the other-there is a gradual coming 
together, running into one, acceleration and unification'(208); 'Curse 
you then... I must haul myself up-must push my arms into the 
sleeves... tired as I am, spent as I am'(210). The image of pushing arms 
into sleeves is in part the reassumption of daily routine, but perhaps 
also suggests, as a gesture of penetration (weary though it may be), a 
return to the phallic position and self-possession which underpins such 
routines. For Bernard, 'must, must, must' are 'merciful words', for 
though 'we pretend to revile', without them 'we should be undone'(166). 
Thus he must perforce undergo 'the eternal renewal' of selfhood, a 
permanent alternation between the formation and the dissemination of the 
self: 'the incessant rise and fall and fall and rise again'(211). This 
dangerous, impossible dialectic is the existential reality of androgyny. 
The rhythm of the sea as a metaphor of the semiotic chora - its patterns 
and pulses of one/two, in/out, rise/fall - cuts across the syntax of 
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sentence and plot throughout the text, yet without dissolving them 
completely, and only in this form can the 'impossible', endless 
alternation realize itself. 
How indeed is it possible to actualize a feminine writing that is 
not organized around the phallocentric identity and positionality, but 
would none the less - centreless though it is - not be lost in silence? 
How, in the terms of Woolf's imagery, deviate from the 'straight lines' 
of the Roman roads into 'the brambles and thick, tree trunks into the 
heart of the forest'(CE, 4: 165), and yet not simply abandon oneself to a 
valueless nature or flux. The struggle to preserve both these moments or 
modes of being constitutes Bernard's 'perpetual warfare, it is the 
shattering and piecing together'( 191). 
32 Reassembling the scattered 
jigsaw of identity, Bernard asserts himself against 'the stupidity of 
nature'(191), once more challenges 'the immeasurable sea'. The 
ambivalences and oscillation I have traced throughout this study recur in 
Woolf's own comments on the ending of the novel. On the one hand, she 
aims 'to show that the theme effort, effort, dominates: not the waves: 
and personality: and defiance'. But, on the other hand, she at once 
falls into doubt, almost immediately recants: 'but I am not sure of the 
effect artistically; because the proportions may need the intervention of 
the waves finally so as to make a conclusion'(WD, 162). And the waves, 
which are both a Darwinian 'insensitive nature'(WD, 153) and a warm, 
fecund bath of semiotic energies, a kind of primordial maternal body, of 
course do complete the novel. The waves are, thematically, the 
dissolution of human order, which has both its negative and positive 
(feminist) aspects, but formally the affirmation of an authorial will 
that seeks to round the multifarious materials of its novel into a 
satisfying totality. 'The waves broke on the shore'(211), thus 
sustaining the impossible dialectic of an androgynous feminine writing, 
of the dissemination and integration of the self, to the very last. 
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believing that the way things are written matters and not the things] ? 
I don't believe you can possibly separate expression from thought in an 
imaginative work'(L, III: 201). 
12 
Josette Feral writes ' [woman] is outside any principle of identity- 
to-self, but she can identify with several scenes without really integrat- 
ing herself into them', 'Antigone or the Irony of the Tribe', Diacritics, 
Fall 1978, p. 6. 
13 I4eisel, p. 181. 
14 
Ibid., p. 182. 
15 
To Ethel Smyth Woolf wrote: 'how can you imagine how much sexual feeling 
has to do with an emotion for one's mother; ' Cited by Jane Marcus in her 
'Thinking Back through Our Mothers' in New Feminist Essays on Virginia 
Woolf, p. 14. 
16 
Juliet Mitchell, Psychoanalysis and Feminism, p. 116. 
17 
The Shelley quotation is in 'Mrs. Dalloway in Bond Street' in Mrs. 
Dalloway's Party: A Short Story Sequence Virginia Woolf, edited by 
Stella McNichol, p. 22. In this short piece, from which the novel developed, 
the theme of losing integrity and purity as one grows is more explicit. 
13 
Julia Kristeva, Polylogue, p. 79, cited in Feral, 'Antigone or the 
Irony of the Tribe', p. 12. 
19 
In so far as the bond with another woman is cancelled by the necessity 
of serving male desire, this instance repeats the earlier incident in which 
Clarissa's sisterly feeling towards Whitbread's wife is undermined by a 
coquettish consciousness of herself as woman. In puberty Clarissa had had 
'a presentiment' that the pure love, the special bond, between women 
could not last (35). 
20 
Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway's Party, p. 19. 
21 
I use the phrase in the generalized, non-psychoanalytic sense indicated 
by Laplanche and Pontalis: 'it should be pointed out that this expression 
is often employed in a loose way as a description of a woman with allegedly 
masculine character- traits - e. g. authoritarianism - even when it is not 
known what the underlying phantasies are'. J. Laplanche and J. -B. Pontalis, 
The Language of Psycho-Analysis, p. 312. 
22 
Raymond Williams, ''Ihe Bloomsbury Fraction', Problems in Materialism 
and Culture: Selected Essays, p. 156. 
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3 
Jonathan Culler, 'Jacques Derrida' in Structuralism and Since: From 
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In her diary Woolf notes that, in the last section, 'the problem is 
how to bring Lily and ;? r. t. together and make a combination of interest 
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